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Abstract 
 
In this research, a model for ethically questionable decision-making is developed by 
amalgamating several decision-making theories. The variables of interest are the 
techniques of neutralization, perceived moral intensity, Machiavellianism, unethical 
intentions, and ethical judgment.  
 
Using a sample of 276 U.S. marketing professionals, partial least squares structural 
equation modelling was used to validate the model. Findings reveal that U.S. marketing 
professionals rationalize their ethically questionable intentions through their: (1) 
perception of moral intensity (i.e., minimizing the harms on others, perceiving their self-
interest as most salient, and indifference to social consensus), (2) reliance on various 
neutralization techniques, and; (3) judgment of their ethically questionable intentions as 
ethical. After controlling for the Machiavellian personality trait, Machiavellianism did 
not have a profound effect on the decision-making process, which implies that 
marketers, in general, are capable of the cognitive distortions found in this study.  
 
The main contribution to knowledge is the synthesis of the techniques of neutralization 
and the perceived moral intensity construct. Through this amalgamation, knowledge of 
the intermediary steps in the decision-making process has emerged. A contribution to 
knowledge involves testing the relationship between Machiavellianism and unethical 
intentions through the mediating variable of the techniques of neutralization. Through 
this investigation, it was found that the Machiavellian personality is inconsequential to 
the decision-making process. As a contribution to managerial knowledge, it was found 
that through cognitive distortions, marketers are capable of various illicit behaviours, 
which have been shown to be costly to not only stakeholders, but also to the 
profitability and reputations of organisations.  
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 1 
Introduction  
1.1 Introduction 
Corporate malfeasance is widespread and governance models are ill-prepared, despite 
good intentions. This is problematic as the repercussions are affecting the lives of 
millions and are resulting in losses in the billions (Chu, Du, & Jiang, 2011), if not, 
trillions of dollars. In 2006, 5.2 million subprime mortgage loans were outstanding in 
the U.S. (Bar-Gill, 2008), the market was worth $650 billion, and the industry was 
highly profitable (Tashman, 2007). In 2008, this subprime market crashed with losses 
estimated at $945 billion (China Daily, 2008). For their part in the subprime lending 
crisis, the corruption of the managers at Lehman Brothers was a contributing factor to 
not only the failure of the financial system, but also an economic recession of global 
proportions (Chu et al., 2011). In the U.S., companies were in financial disarray as 
banks refused to lend, unemployment reached 10.2%, 3.5 million homes were lost to 
foreclosure (Squires & Hyra, 2010), and $700 billion was paid out for corporate 
‘bailouts’ by the U.S. Treasury. In Europe, the European Union euro currency was 
threatened, nations defaulted on scheduled debt repayments (Roman, Roman, & Talvan, 
CHAPTER ONE 
 2 
2012), mass employment layoffs ensued (Aslan, 2009), and social unrest followed in 
Portugal, Italy, Spain, and Greece (Keil, 2010). 
To achieve short-term goals and objectives, managers experience considerable pressure 
and are often coerced into corruption (Anand, Ashforth, & Joshi, 2005; Chen & Tang, 
2006; Tepper, 2010). If managers fail to attain their objectives, employment 
ramifications can occur and when managers perceive negative consequences, it may 
lead them to care less about the aftermath of their decisions, suppress the ethicality, and 
become blinded by the short-term gains (Gioia, 1992). When unethical behaviour is 
exposed, managers try to disguise their actions by denying their responsibility (British 
Petroleum PLC), covering up their misdeeds (Enron, Lehman Brothers, and Parmalat), 
threatening whistleblowers (Enron), and failing to cooperate with investigators (Beech-
Nut). 
In this introductory chapter, ethically questionable behaviour (EQB) in the marketing 
context is presented. Discussions centre on the perceived greater propensity for EQB to 
occur within a marketing context. Through this discourse, the research questions of this 
research are outlined. In the second section, discourse is focused on the U.S. context. In 
the third section, the objectives and contributions of this research are discussed. In the 
final section, the structure of this thesis is outlined. 
It is important to note that there are two dimensions of EQB: (1) actions that are illegal 
and unethical, and; (2) actions that are legal, but not necessarily ethical (Laczniak & 
Inderrieden, 1987). In the latter case, actions that fall within this dimension could 
involve behaviours that are legal in one nation, such as an emerging market with lax 
legislation, but not in an industrialized nation. In this research, both dimensions are 
considered ethically problematic. Further discussion on this topic is included in chapter 
two.  
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 1.2 Ethically Questionable Behaviour in Marketing and Research Questions 
To convey corporate information to valued stakeholders, marketing communication 
messages are useful tools. Marketers address consumer concerns, resolve social needs 
through new product development, and enter new markets to meet customer demand 
(Kotler & Keller, 2007). To address a social need in Africa, at a loss of $100 million, 
Merck entered several markets with a new product to combat river blindness (Seifert, 
Morris, & Bartkus, 2003). Social enterprises, such as the Red Cross, publicise their 
positive contributions to society to create awareness of the issues facing people in 
different parts of the world and, also to gain funds to support their cause.  
Although marketing has benefits, there are disadvantages to marketing practices, which 
can be perceived as ethically problematic. Marketers have been accused of deceptive 
practices and exploitative behaviours (Dubinsky, Nataraajan, & Huang, 2004). Other 
than the code of ethics from the American Marketing Association, there are limited 
professional standards and regulations to deter this type of behaviour (Hoek & Jones, 
2011; Israel, 1993). However, the accounting profession is regulated stringently through 
the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Engineers are guided by self-
regulatory professional codes of conduct. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act regulates the 
publishing of financial statements and through these rigorous regulations, finance 
specialists are concerned with complying (O’Higgins & Kelleher, 2005). The operations 
of human resources managers are guided through labour legislation, human rights 
legislation, the equal employment opportunity acts, and professional accreditation 
standards.  
Although there are consumer rights legislations in place, limited regulation guiding the 
marketing profession exists in other areas (Gupta, Tandon, Debnath, & Rominger, 
2007). For example, the U.S. packaging legislation is lenient as marketers can 
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implement ethically questionable packaging initiatives without experiencing legal 
repercussions (Gupta et al., 2007). Companies have been accused of using package 
downsizing strategies, which involve reducing the quantity of a good while keeping the 
price and packaging constant. This strategy passes invisible cost-increases onto 
customers and is used frequently by marketers (Gupta et al., 2007). In an effort to 
conceal high fat and calorie content, marketers have also been accused of manipulating 
the nutritional content on food packaging. Many products that are perceived as a single 
serving are labelled as multiple. Through this misrepresentation, consumers are often 
unaware that they have to double the nutritional content if they consume the entire 
package (Carroll & Buchholtz, 2006). From these examples, it appears that the 
marketing profession might be loosely regulated (Hoek & Jones, 2011; Israel, 1993). 
Beyond the regulations, marketers are primarily responsible for increasing profitability 
(O’Higgins & Kelleher, 2005) and their performance is measured through stringent 
metrics (Wotruba, 1990). In view of these aggressive performance appraisals, marketers 
are often perceived as more willing to behave unethically (Vitell & Festervand, 1987). 
Due to their interactions with customers, accusations of false advertisements, and 
deceptive practices, marketers are often perceived negatively by society (Dubinsky et 
al., 2004).  
Compared to professionals from the finance and human resources functional areas, 
marketers have been found to be more accepting of EQBs (O’Higgins & Keller, 2005). 
In general, the functional area most notoriously related to ethical issues is marketing 
(Tsalikis & Fritzsche, 1989). Given EQBs are examined in this research and a greater 
propensity for malfeasance seems to be apparent in marketing, marketing professionals 
are the sampling frame for this research.  
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However, it is important to note that the O’Higgins and Keller (2005) study was based 
on data from 2005 and with the recent subprime lending crisis, professionals from other 
functional areas, such as finance, might be inclined to behave illicitly. Tepper (2010) 
further indicated that individuals, in general, could be inclined to behave unethically. 
Therefore, it is worth emphasizing that managers from other functional areas might also 
be willing to behave unethically. 
As indicated in the introduction, certain behaviours are often illegal in industrialized 
nations, but they can be less heavily regulated in emerging markets. To circumvent the 
legislation in developed markets, some managers often move their operations abroad. 
As a result of the limited regulation in many emerging markets, managers have been 
accused of exploiting the environment and populations abroad for temporary gains 
(Perkins, 2007). Through outsourcing and joint-venture strategies, companies are able to 
conceal the unethical activities in their supply chains, disconnect from domestic legal 
systems, and remain unaccountable to stakeholders (Zyglidopoulos & Fleming, 2011). 
Often these vendors operate so far down the supply chain that the organisation is 
effectively dislocated from any malfeasance that would typically be visible within the 
high-profile aspects of their operations (Zyglidopoulos & Fleming, 2011). 
For example, apparel companies (Nike), children’s toy manufacturers (Mattel), and 
coffee retailers (Starbucks) have been accused of operating under abusive labour 
conditions in Vietnam, Indonesia, and Guatemala, respectively (Klein, 2000). In 
Indonesia, 52% of the workers in the export processing zones are paid less than $2 per 
day, which by local standards, is argued to be a ‘slave labour wage’ (Perkins, 2007). In 
many of these manufacturing facilities, it is claimed that workers are coerced into 
working 72 hour shifts. In more extreme cases, to meet aggressive orders from their 
multinational customers, factory managers in Honduras have been accused of injecting 
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assembly-line workers with amphetamines (Klein, 2000). In her ethnographic research 
in the export processing zones in the Philippines, Klein (2000, p. 96) wrote that:  
Workers tell me stories about pregnant women forced to work until 2 a.m., even 
after pleading with the supervisor; of women who work in the ironing section 
giving birth to babies with burns on their skin; of women who mould the plastic 
for cordless phones giving birth to stillborn infants... the abuse of pregnant 
women in export processing zones is also well documented and the problem 
reaches far beyond Cavite. 
 
In Mexico, General Motors was accused of discriminating against pregnant women in 
their manufacturing facilities. To address the accusations, General Motors stated in a 
letter to Human Rights Watch that it “‘will not hire female job applicants found to be 
pregnant’ in an effort to avoid ‘substantial financial liabilities imposed by the Mexican 
social security system’” (Klein, 2000, p. 97).  
In Ecuador, U.S. based lawyers assisted indigenous Ecuadorians with filing a class-
action lawsuit against Chevron Texaco (Perkins, 2004). Between 1971 and 1992, 
Texaco was accused of dumping over four million gallons of toxic waste in rivers 
throughout the Amazon rainforests. Over 350 uncovered waste pits were littered across 
the lands of indigenous populations (Perkins, 2004). As a result, Texaco was sued for 
$18.2 billion (Barrett, 2011). When queried about their behaviour, executives claimed 
no regulations at the time forbade their practices (The Economist, 2003).  
In Nigeria, annual oil revenues are $7.5 billion (Adebamwi, 2001). However, 
approximately 138 oil spills occur per year, which amount to an estimated $4.4 billion 
in damage (Aprioku, 1999). The financial gains from the oil industry are causing wealth 
disparity and contributing to social unrest among the local population (Eweje, 2007). 
Cost-cutting measures and a lack of regulations were also associated with the Union 
Carbide tragedy in Bhopal, India that killed 23,000 and injured 120,000 (Trotter, Day, 
& Love, 1989).  
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In the 1970s, Nestle marketed their infant formula products in Africa and South 
America. Using sales representatives dressed as health professionals, the company 
distributed free product samples through maternity wards. By arguing that infant 
formula was a healthier alternative, sales representatives persuaded mothers to abandon 
breast feeding (Boyd, 2012). Once the switch to formula is made, there is no going back 
as the mother can no longer produce milk.  
By switching to formula in places like Africa, illness becomes increasingly possible as 
babies are no longer getting the needed antibodies found in breast milk. Without these 
antibodies, babies become unprotected against the numerous parasites festering in their 
unsanitary surroundings. In addition, most mothers were illiterate and, thus, unable to 
read the instructions on the package, which subsequently resulted in them mixing the 
formula in contaminated water. Most concerning was that mothers were unable to afford 
the price of the product and in an effort to preserve the quantity, they diluted the 
formula, which subsequently caused malnutrition (Boyd, 2012).  
Although Nestle claimed it was attempting to address a social need, negative publicity 
grew throughout the United States as the organisation was accused of severely injuring 
and killing millions of babies (Campbell, 2006). Among the backlash, Senator Edward 
Kennedy asked “… can a product that requires clean water, good sanitation, adequate 
family income, and literate parents to follow printed instructions be properly and safely 
used in areas where water is contaminated, sewage runs in the streets, poverty is severe, 
and illiteracy is high” (McCoy, Evers, Dierkes, & Twining, 1995, p. 7). As a result of 
the crisis, Nestle experienced regular boycotts, a tarnished brand, and the perpetuating 
costs of litigation (Campbell, 2006). 
Although several of the aforementioned examples were not directly related to 
marketing, these examples demonstrate that managers, in general, often take advantage 
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of lax legislation in developing markets to pursue their organisational goals. From this 
discourse, it appears that organisational professionals have polluted the environment in 
emerging markets, disrespected stakeholders, and directly harmed local populations. 
Due to lax regulations, many of these unethical activities go unnoticed by authorities 
and managers can often escape accountability. 
Beyond some illicit activities abroad, marketers have been known on occasion to 
deceive customers domestically. In a packaged goods context, Beech-Nut purchased 
sugar-water with apple flavouring and caramel colouring, which was advertised as 
100% pure apple juice. Through this deception, the company saved approximately $1.5 
million over five years. However, when a former employee blew the whistle and 
knowledge of the deception surfaced, managers failed to cooperate with investigators 
and attempted to sell the remainder of the tainted product (Sims, 1992). When queried 
about their illegal behaviour, executives justified their actions by stating the competition 
was selling a similar product. The company was subsequently fined $2 million and 
ultimately settled a $7.5 million class-action suit (Boyd, 2012). 
Beyond marketing, ethically questionable strategic, risk management, and investment 
decisions have been advanced to attain short-term organisational objectives. As a 
consequence of downsizing measures to preserve short-term profits, Exxon Valdez was 
responsible for spilling more than 11 million gallons of oil off the coast of Alaska. The 
spill devastated the environment, killed wildlife wholesale, and cost the company $8.7 
billion in damages (Husted, 2005). British Petroleum PLC failed to learn from Exxon as 
poor risk management and systems failures led to a spill of 4.4 million barrels of oil in 
the Gulf of Mexico. British Petroleum PLC and their valve supplier were unwilling to 
accept accountability as both considered the spill the responsibility of the other. The 
spill ravaged local communities and the company was fined $60 billion (Griggs, 2011).  
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Indeed, corporate malfeasance results in rising legal costs and damaged reputations 
(Collins, 2012). Clearly, the long-term consequences of malfeasance outweigh the 
short-term benefits; however, managers seem undeterred. As an example of an 
investment decision, Royal Dutch Shell is planning a deep water drilling operation off 
the coast of Alaska – the company expects to net $1 billion in annual profits from the 
venture (Birger, 2012). If a spill occurred, the costs in environmental damage, fines, and 
productivity losses would almost certainly exceed the forecasted revenue.  
When decisions are made to behave illicitly, managers often experience cognitive 
dissonance. Cognitive dissonance occurs when individuals make decisions that 
contradict their values (Maruna & Copes, 2004). If their values are compromised, 
managers have an insuperable urge to rationalize them by creating an illusion their 
initiative was informed by common sense and conventional morality (Fromm, 1955). 
Rationalization is defined as a socially constructed process used by individuals to 
legitimize their illicit acts (Ashforth & Anand, 2003). In the rationalization literature, 
the techniques of neutralization (TON) have been used to facilitate norm-violating 
behaviours by enabling individuals to temporarily exempt themselves from social 
norms, which minimizes guilt and cognitive dissonance (Sykes & Matza, 1957). To 
understand how marketers make ethically questionable decisions in the presence of 
significant repercussions, the first research question of this study is: how do marketers 
rationalize their intentions in (an) ethically questionable context(s)? 
Trevino and Youngblood (1990) argued that EQB within an organisational context is 
the result of deviant personality types. Of the deviant personalities, Machiavellians have 
been consistently found to behave unethically (O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005). 
Machiavellianism has been associated with the famed 16th century Italian political 
scientist, Niccolo Machiavelli. Individuals with high Machiavellian tendencies take an 
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amoral (or immoral) view of their interactions with others and have a cynical 
perspective of human nature (Christie & Geis, 1970). It is believed that Machiavellians 
are most inclined to deceive and manipulate others to advance their self-interests 
(Calhoon, 1969).  
Tepper (2010) contends that certain individuals are predisposed to EQB, but argues that 
decent people are also capable of malfeasance. Consistently, decision-making 
psychologists (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980) argue personality is unlikely to have a 
significant effect on the decision-making process. It is believed personality might not 
directly influence the dependent variables in the decision-making process, but might 
have an indirect impact through a network of latent variables (Chatzidakis, Hibbert, & 
Smith, 2007). To understand what (if any) effect Machiavellianism has on decision-
making, the following research question is investigated in this study: what influence 
does Machiavellianism have on the decision-making process? 
To answer these research questions, a model for EQB is conceptualized in this research. 
The model is based on an amalgamation of several decision-making theories drawn 
from a vast literature involving criminology, psychology, moral decision-making, and 
philosophy. The model consists of the perceived moral intensity (PMI) construct, which 
is a multidimensional variable that captures the most salient factors pertinent to an 
ethical problem (Jones, 1991), such as consequences and social norms. Through the aid 
of the TON (Sykes & Matza, 1957), decision-makers are argued to deceive themselves 
by enabling them to believe their EQBs are acceptable. This model accounts for the 
less-optimal decision-making abilities of individuals (Simon, 1955) and their 
willingness to satisfy their immediate concerns, but not maximize the possible utility 
associated with behaving ethically.  
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In the next section, the U.S. context is presented. Culturally, U.S. citizens are contended 
to be highly individualistic (or self-interested) and short-term oriented (Hofstede & 
Bond, 1988). It is believed that U.S. businesspeople are oriented toward maximizing 
profit (Hofstede, 2007) and operate in accordance with profitability (Zouboulakis, 
2001). U.S. businesspeople place a high importance on the law (Zarkada-Fraser & 
Zarkada, 2001) and an overwhelming majority of U.S. managers are solely concerned 
with fulfilling their economic and legal responsibilities (Maignan, 2001).  
In their study, Flannery and May (2000) found U.S. managers often frame ethical 
problems within a legal framework. Morality is considered largely irrelevant. Decision-
making within an organisational context thus appears to reflect legal codes, regulations, 
and norms. Consistent with the discourse from this section, it appears individuals might 
be willing to engage in activities that are legal but not necessarily ethical.  
The organisations operating within a U.S. context are perceived as formal with rigid 
rules and procedures centred on avoiding legal liability (Verhezen, 2010). Nakano 
(2007) argues that this system is associated with responding to internal and external 
monitoring systems, which involve corporate governance models and legislative codes 
of conduct (Geva, 2008). These external mechanisms often fail to inspire as they 
include negative language stating how employees are not to act (Nakano, 2007). These 
codes are not frequently valued (Nakano, 2007) and, sometimes, avoided (Kish-
Gephart, Harrison, & Trevino, 2010).  
1.3 American Context 
During the subprime lending crisis, the U.S. government intervened in the market with a 
large influx of funding. Beyond the inflow of stimulus funds, the act of subprime 
lending or targeting individuals with low incomes and poor credit ratings has not been 
addressed by the government. As demonstrated, the long-term consequences of 
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subprime lending outweigh the short-term benefits. Nevertheless managers are 
undeterred from the consequences and remain attracted to this market.  
For example, credit card companies or retailers offering credit to consumers are exempt 
from usury laws (White, 2007) and the industry remains largely unregulated. Given the 
lack of constraints, creditors often increase the interest rates charged to subprime 
borrowers (Tribue, 2009). These consumers typically pay interest rates within the 30% 
range (Somer, 2011), which is approximately 10 times the U.S. inflation rate from 2011. 
In the payday loan industry, there are over six thousand cheque cashing locations 
throughout the United States. These retail outlets process nearly $60 billion in 
government and employer cheques (Karpatkin, 1999). Subprime borrowers pay 
exuberant fees and high-interest rates. The average annual interest rate on loans in this 
industry is 390%. In the extreme, some loans peak at 1,700% (Spector, 2007). At these 
interest rates, debtors are unable to repay their loans, they enter endless cycles of debt, 
and their ability to consume is severely inhibited, which limits economic productivity. 
Although profitable in the short-term, subprime lending seems detrimental in the long-
term. 
Beyond subprime borrowers, U.S. citizens, in general, are experiencing comparable 
pressure with their personal finances. In the early stages of the 21st century, U.S. 
households owed approximately 120% of their annual disposable income and 
outstanding consumer debt was calculated at $769 billion (Montgomerie, 2007). As a 
result of the increasing amount of personal debt, bankruptcy filings increased by 350% 
from 1980 to 2005 (Garrett, 2007). In fact, by 2004, more Americans were declaring 
bankruptcy than graduating from university, getting diagnosed with cancer, or getting 
divorced (White, 2007).  
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Beyond the pressure from meeting their personal obligations, U.S. employees encounter 
increasing amounts of pressure to perform in an organisational context. According to 
descriptive statistics from the extant literature, 56% of U.S. workers have been 
pressured by superiors to behave illicitly, 48% have behaved unethically in their careers 
(Chen & Tang, 2006), and 30% behaved unethical to gain a promotion (Tepper, 2010). 
With this mounting pressure, it is believed that decent U.S. employees can be coerced 
into behaving unethically (Tepper, 2010). Most corporate employees are good people 
(Collins, 2012), but when they experience pressure, they can behave unethically. 
The pressure on employees to attain organisational objectives coupled with their 
personal burdens can result in desperation when ethical dilemmas arise (Beams, Brown, 
& Killough, 2003; Tepper, 2010). When workers experience pressure to meet deadlines, 
attain objectives, or reach quotas, concerns about job security, providing for their 
families, and making ends meets often results in malfeasance (Wicks, Freeman, 
Werhanes, & Martin, 2010). This level of desperation occurred at Ford when the 
decision to refuse to recall the Ford Pinto was made in the 1970s – decision-makers 
were motivated to retain their employment (Gioia, 1992). In her study, Wahn (1993) 
found the employees that were most dependent on their organisations complied with 
pressures to behave illicitly.  
In U.S. society, there is a need, or at least the illusion of the need to consume. Through 
marketing communication messages, organisations create the mentality that one’s 
imperfections can be rectified through consumption. Marketers coax individuals to 
consume as much as they can, whether they can afford to or not. The urge to consume is 
further stimulated through social and psychological pressures (Fromm, 1955). In the 
past, individuals consumed to resolve a need and consumption was a means to an end 
(Fromm, 1955). Now, consumption has become the aim and individuals are dependent 
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on consuming. They are enslaved by their needs, the organisations that produce them, 
their employers that help pay for them, and the financial institutions that charge them 
exuberant interest rates (Fromm, 1955).  
From this discourse, the U.S. system appears to function through aggressive growth 
objectives, mass consumption, and debt. Organisational employees seem to be coerced 
into behaving illicitly as they are dependent on their employment. To rid themselves of 
their dissatisfaction, they consume increasing amounts of goods and services as a 
distraction mechanism (Fromm, 1955). This consumption not only perpetuates the 
economic system, but also appears to contribute to additional debt, which subsequently 
results in further pressure at work. Fromm (1955) perceives this system as efficient and 
totalitarian - a powerful executive assembly controlled by an army of managers that 
pressure employees into attaining corporate objectives. These employees are 
overworked, underpaid, blinded by their tasks, and unable to perceive morality beyond 
their immediate predicament.   
Clearly, this is not the free-market capitalist economic system conceptualized by Adam 
Smith (1776). Smith (1776) envisioned capitalism as a system of self-interest profit 
maximization, the private ownership of goods, and minimal governmental intervention 
beyond the enforcement of: contracts, laws of justice, and personal liberty (Werhane, 
2000), which offers citizens freedom from oppression. In Smith’s economic system, by 
promoting their own interests, individuals advance the interests of others more 
effectively than if they had promoted the interests of others directly (James & Rassekh, 
2000). However, the use of government intervention in the market during the subprime 
lending crisis, which was beyond establishing a level-playing field for all participants 
(Werhane, 2000), sent a clear message, the government seems to condone one group 
benefiting at the expense of another. As such, subprime lending remains unregulated, 
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which appears to keep certain members of U.S. society perpetually in debt and 
struggling.  
Indeed, malfeasance seems to be influenced by a multitude of variables: rationalization, 
economic pressures, and a short-term mentality. As demonstrated, there appears to be 
significant issues of corporate malfeasance within a U.S. context and for these reasons, 
U.S. marketing professionals are the target population of this research. 
1.4 Objectives and Contributions 
The aim of this research is to examine the effect of neutralization on ethical judgments 
and intentions. A second aim is to evaluate the effect Machiavellianism has on the 
decision-making process. The third aim involves investigating the relationship between 
PMI, such as consequences and social consensus, and neutralization. The fourth aim is 
to understand if marketers believe their illicit intentions are morally acceptable. Finally, 
an aim is to understand if decision-makers are willing to behave illicitly in certain 
contexts, but not in others. The first research question of ‘how do marketers rationalize 
their ethically questionable intentions’ addresses aims one, three, and four. The second 
research question of ‘what influence does Machiavellianism have on the decision-
making process’ addresses the second aim. To address the fifth aim, various EQBs are 
manipulated and compared in the main study of this research, which is discussed further 
in chapter five. 
The primary objective of this research is to examine the effect of rationalization on 
one’s ethical judgments and intentions. Through this research, the main contribution of 
knowledge is the synthesis of four decision-making theories: (1) the less-optimal 
decision-making abilities of individuals (Simon, 1955), (2) the perceived moral intensity 
construct (Jones, 1991), (3) the techniques of neutralization (Sykes & Matza, 1957), 
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and; (4) the bad apples thesis (Trevino & Youngblood, 1990) in which deviant 
personalities are expected to influence the decision-making process. 
By amalgamating the TON within Jones’s (1991) PMI construct, a greater 
understanding of the intermediary steps within the decision-making process should 
emerge. Researchers have demonstrated that PMI has a direct relationship to judgments 
and intentions (O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005). Although high levels of moral intensity 
involving harms or benefits might be associated with an ethical problem, these factors 
might be considered less important to decision-makers when their personal interests are 
equally threatened. If unethical intentions are formed, the relationship between PMI and 
intentions will likely be influenced by the TON. In other words, decision-makers might 
rationalize their ethically questionable intentions to protect their self-interest (Bersoff, 
1999). This empirical and theoretical contribution can provide an improved explanation 
of how moral intensity influences decisions.  
By evaluating the effect of Machiavellianism on neutralization and PMI, an 
understanding if deviant personality traits contribute to the decision-making process 
should emerge. If Machiavellians maintain the same willingness to rationalize their 
EQBs as non-Machiavellians, Azjen and Fishbein’s (1980) theoretical framework would 
be applicable to Machiavellianism. In general, Azjen and Fishbein (1980) argued that 
background factors, such as personality traits, may not influence behaviour 
significantly, these factors might only indirectly affect ethical judgments (Fishbein & 
Azjen, 2010).  
The third objective involves studying the effect of rationalization on judgment. By 
reaching this objective it is anticipated that knowledge of the cognitive limitations of 
marketers will be gained. In general, marketers are expected to rely on neutralizations to 
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suppress the ethicality of a dilemma and by judging their EQB as morally acceptable, 
are able to reemphasize their self-concept.  
1.5 Outline of the Thesis 
In this final section of this chapter, this research concerned with examining ‘how 
marketers rationalize their intentions in ethically questionable contexts’ and ‘what 
influence Machiavellianism has on the process’, is outlined. In chapter two, the 
methodology, which takes a positivist philosophical perspective, is presented. In the 
chapter, the two broad theories of business ethics, normative and descriptive theories, 
are outlined. Discussions centre on consequentialism with a comparison of egoism and 
altruism. Later in the chapter, EQB is contextualized. At the close of the chapter, the 
broad descriptive decision-making theories involving rationalism and intuitionism are 
introduced. 
In chapter three, the main decision-making theories of economic rationality, bounded 
rationality, and irrationality are discussed. To facilitate irrational behaviour, the 
rationalization theories are compared. In the second portion of the chapter, the decision-
making theories within the business ethics research paradigm are presented. Discourse 
focuses on the four-component model (Rest, 1986), the issue-contingent framework 
(Jones, 1991), the models that account for influential factors, such as personality and 
rationalization (Chatzidakis et al., 2007), and the intuitionist frameworks (Reynolds, 
2006).  
In the fourth chapter, the model for ethically questionable decision-making is presented. 
This model represents an amalgamation of the PMI construct (Jones, 1991), the TON 
(Sykes & Matza, 1957), and Machiavellianism whilst acknowledging the intuitive 
nature of decision-making and the bounded rationality of individuals. In the chapter, the 
hypothesized relationships are presented. 
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In chapter five, the methods used to test the model for ethically questionable decision-
making are justified. In the first section, the current methodological issues in business 
ethics are discussed. The main topics involve socially desirable response bias, using 
intentions as proxies of behaviour, and vignette-based self-administered questionnaires. 
In the second section, the methods selected for this research, which involve a self-
administered vignette-based questionnaire using projective reasoning, are justified. In 
the third section, the procedures used to develop the questionnaire are discussed. In the 
fourth section, the sampling procedures and the sample profile are outlined. In the final 
section, the methods of analysis are discussed. 
In the sixth chapter, the results of the data analysis are presented. In the first section, the 
validity of the constructs is shown. In the second section, the results of the hypothesis 
tests are presented. In the final section, the findings of the post-hoc tests are discussed. 
In the first section of chapter seven, the path coefficients between the various constructs 
across the vignettes used in this study are compared. In the second section, the results of 
the hypothesis tests are interpreted. In the third section, the research questions are 
answered and the theoretical, empirical, and managerial contributions are discussed.  
In the first section of chapter eight, this research is summarized. In the second section, 
the implications for practice are discussed. In the third section, the limitations of the 
study are outlined and, in the final section, the directions for future study are suggested.  
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Development of Research in 
Business Ethics 
2.1 Introduction 
In the last chapter, the outline of this research focused on understanding how marketers 
rationalize their ethically questionable intentions and what influence Machiavellianism 
has on the decision-making process was introduced. In the chapter, discussions centred 
on the marketing profession. It was demonstrated that compared to other organisational 
professionals, such as finance, marketers are more inclined to behave unethically. To 
establish these arguments, various ethically questionable behaviours (EQBs) within a 
marketing context were introduced. In the latter portions of the chapter, the objectives 
and contributions of this research were presented.  
In the first part of this chapter, the philosophical perspectives in ethics research are 
discussed. Discourse centres on the ontology (identity of things), epistemology (the 
nature of knowledge), human nature (social theory), and the methodology (obtaining 
knowledge through investigation) of this research (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). In the 
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second portion of the chapter, the two main streams of business ethics research, 
normative and descriptive theories, are discussed. For the normative theories, 
discussions centre on altruism, rational egoism, and irrational egoism and 
Machiavellianism. The compatibility of these theories within the context of capitalism, 
which is the economic system in the U.S. and, thus, relevant to this research on 
decision-making within an organisational context, are also discussed. In the final 
section, the descriptive theories, which outline how decisions are made, are presented. 
The two main decision-making theories, the rationalist and intuitionist approaches, are 
the focus of discussion.  
2.2 Philosophical Perspectives in Ethics Research 
According to Burrell and Morgan (1979), social science research can be conceptualized 
using four-sets of assumptions involving ontology, epistemology, human nature, and 
methodology. As indicated, ontology involves how individuals identify things, the 
assumptions associated with the phenomena under investigation. Epistemology involves 
the assumptions associated with how knowledge is gained (Saunders, Lewis, & 
Thornhill, 2007). Human nature pertains to how individuals are influenced by their 
environment, which is largely associated with social theory (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). 
Methodology involves how individuals investigate phenomena and gain knowledge 
through their examinations of the social world.  
Decision-making theorists, such as the Nobel Laureate Herbert Simon, contend that in 
order to understand how individuals make decisions, the decision-making process 
should be analyzed rigorously using empirical data. Through this process, 
computational decision-making frameworks can be developed. Once developed, these 
theoretical models should than be compared with actual human behaviour (Simon, 
1955). Consistent with this perspective, the ontology of this research is realism. Realists 
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believe that the social world is comprised of facts that can be perceived by others and 
shared (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). The epistemology is positivism. Positivists believe 
the social world can be measured and that others are capable of understanding it. When 
positivists conduct social science research, the objective is to create knowledge that can 
be generalized and replicated (Saunders et al., 2007). Through a positivist approach, 
existing theory is used to develop hypotheses (or propositions), which involve taking a 
deductive approach by seeking causal relationships between variables (Greetman, 
2006). These hypothesized causal relationships are than tested through rigorous 
methods.  
In this research, causal relationships related to current ethically informed decision-
making are established. Intuitively, marketing professionals have had exposure to 
ethical problems and their decision-making in ethically questionable contexts is 
examined. It is anticipated participants have already developed their ethicality through 
years of exposure and application. Therefore, the focus of interest is a ‘snapshot’ of the 
current level to understand the influential mechanisms in the process. There is no 
intervening prompt that will have changed these mechanisms that can be measured over 
time. This temporal evolution has already taken place and it is the result, given current 
beliefs of morality and ethical behaviour that is of interest. Considering temporal or 
dynamic affects are not expected to be present, a mono-method approach involving 
cross-sectional data derived from a self-administered questionnaire is most appropriate. 
The data derived from the questionnaire is tested quantitatively using statistical 
methods. Importantly, this process can be reproduced and verified by others (Saunders 
et al., 2007). Through the confirmation of hypotheses, theory is developed, which can 
then be used to build additional theories to be tested in future studies. Thus, the 
deductive process involves the transition from theory to data (Saunders et al., 2007).   
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The social theory (or human nature) of the research involves determinism. Determinism 
is based on the belief that individuals are influenced by their environments and 
situational contexts (Saunders et al., 2007). The methodology of this research involves a 
nomothetic approach. Nomothetic research involves the belief that the social world can 
be measured through the testing of hypotheses derived from theoretical frameworks 
(Burrell & Morgan, 1979).  
Alternative methodologies to the aforementioned approaches were considered, but these 
options were deemed unsatisfactory to answer the research questions, attain the 
objectives, and reach the aims of this research. Specifically, given the target population 
of this research is marketing professionals, which by their profession, possess stringent 
schedules, using interviews or laboratory assessments would be impractical (Friedrich, 
Byrne, & Mumford, 2009). Second, an objective of positivist research is to offer 
generalized findings, which would be unattainable through interviews. Third, 
considering this research contains an ethical context or more specifically, a desire to 
understand the illicit behavioural intentions of marketers, interviews could result in 
socially desirable responses (Robson, 2002). Socially desirable response bias is argued 
to be the most significant challenge against the reliability of business ethics studies 
(O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005). Fourth, an objective of this research is to test a 
conceptual framework. However, conceptual frameworks cannot be examined using 
data derived from interviews, unless of course, several hundred structured interviews 
are conducted. For these reasons, self-administered questionnaires were used through a 
positivist methodology. 
In summary, the philosophy of this research is positivism, the approach taken is 
deductive, the strategy involves a self-administered questionnaire, and a mono-method 
approach involving cross-sectional data is used (Saunders et al., 2007). Consistent with 
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the methodology of this research, the business ethics research paradigm is founded on 
positivist research methodologies (Brand, 2009). According to Randall and Gibson’s 
(1990) review of the business ethics literature, approximately 83% of the studies 
involve positivist methodologies conducted through the use of self-administered 
questionnaires. In addition, Nill and Schibrowsky (2005) found that the marketing 
ethics empirical research published between 1981 and 2005 was predominantly within 
the positivist paradigm.   
2.3 Normative Theories 
The business ethics literature is largely comprised of two broad categories: normative 
theories and descriptive theories. Normative theories are the moral philosophies that 
dictate how decision-makers should behave in the marketplace. Descriptive theories rely 
on social psychology to explain how decisions are made in ethical contexts. In this 
section, the most prominent normative theories in the business ethics research are 
discussed. 
Individuals with a relativistic perspective disagree with a rule-based system that does 
not take into consideration possible exceptions (Rawwas, Al-Khatib, & Vitell, 2004). 
Relativists believe no universal ethical rules apply since normative beliefs are a function 
of the individual (Schwepker & Good, 1999). Relativists focus on the consequences of a 
decision and, not necessarily, the motivations (Agarwal & Malloy, 2002). They also 
consider decisions on a case-by-case basis and acknowledge the subjectivity of 
decision-making. In general, relativists contend an action is acceptable if the result 
produces a greater percentage of pleasure than pain (Rawwas et al., 2004).  
By contrast, idealists believe in rule-based systems. Idealists are most concerned with 
actions (Rawwas et al., 2004); they are less concerned with consequences. Regardless of 
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the consequences, idealists believe harming others is never acceptable (Lee & Sirgy, 
1999).  
Individuals that are guided by deontological norms typically review specific actions by 
their rightness or wrongness (Donoho, Polonsky, Roberts, & Cohen, 2001). Within a 
deontological framework, decision-makers centre on the action as opposed to the 
consequences (Agarwal & Malloy, 2002). Individuals that subscribe to unrelenting 
deontological norms believe that an action is only ethical if it is honest, fair, just, and 
loyal (Hunt & Vasquez-Parraga, 1993). The central criticism of deontology is the 
unwillingness of an individual to consider an action on a case-by-case basis, or 
compensate for potential exceptions to a rule.  
In opposition to deontology, individuals that follow teleological guidelines focus on the 
consequences of the behaviour, not the motivations (Lu, Rose, & Blodgett, 1999). The 
main philosophical frameworks within the consequentialist paradigm are utilitarianism, 
egoism, and altruism. Utilitarianism is based on maximizing the utility of the majority 
through a cost-benefit analysis (Tsalikis & Fritzsche, 1989). John Stuart Mill (1906) 
believed that, if needed, an individual is required to sacrifice his or her personal 
interests for the benefit of the majority. The principles of utilitarianism contend that the 
inefficient use of resources and self-interest gain at the expense of the majority are 
unethical (Ferrell & Gresham, 1985). The primary disadvantage of utilitarianism is the 
justification of harming the few for the well-being of the majority (Robin & 
Reidenbach, 1993). In general, this philosophy is based on rationalizing unethical 
behaviour by contending the end justifies the means, which seems to conflict with the 
theory of justice (Wotruba, 1990).  
In the literature, there are several examples of malfeasance arising from utilitarianism. 
In her discourse, Galloway (1986, p. 167) provides an instance of a doctor “who 
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sacrifices a healthy person in order to obtain five of his organs each of which is needed 
by one of five other people”. In her trolley problem, Thomson (1985) provides another 
extreme example of how one person is pushed in front of an approaching trolley to save 
the lives of five others. Although extreme, these types of EQB would be ethically sound 
from a utilitarian perspective.   
Comparable to utilitarianism, altruism is based on the concept that individuals should 
advance the interests of others at the expense of themselves. Conversely, egoism 
involves advancing one’s long-term self-interest and not sacrificing one’s interests for 
others. These normative guidelines seem to form the crux of the debate within the 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) and business ethics literatures. The central debate 
within the CSR literature surrounds the relationship between business and society. It is 
argued managers and, by extension, corporations owe duties to: (1) their shareholders 
through the form of maximized profits, and; (2) society, in general, through a broader 
range of responsibilities. The former pertains to egoism, the latter is altruism.  
2.3.1 Altruism 
Altruism is based on the belief that individuals should advance the interests of others at 
the expense of (or prior to) themselves. It is believed that individuals have empathetic 
qualities and are sympathetic toward others and, as such, they should show concern for 
other people (Jones & Ryan, 1997). In the CSR literature, it is generally argued that 
organisations owe duties to society through a broad range of responsibilities, such as 
donating to charity (Carroll, 1991). In much of the CSR literature, researchers contend 
managers and, by extension, organisations are required to use corporate competencies to 
solve social problems (Geva, 2008). 
Altruism dates back to the philosophical discourse of Confucius. The central tenets of 
Confucianism involve charity, altruism, love, trust, fidelity, honesty, courtesy, and 
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benevolence (Luo, 2011; Zhu & Yao, 2008). When asked by one of his disciples the one 
word that can serve as a guideline throughout one’s life, “Confucius said, ‘it is the word 
altruism. Do not do to others what you do not want them to do to you’” (Kim, 2004, p. 
123). Confucians believe that communities flourish when individuals do not place their 
interests above the interests of others (Bailey, 2011). Indeed, Confucianism is concerned 
with altruism and building a system of morality. With the focus on advancing the 
interests of the community, altruism is philosophically consistent with communism or a 
socialist economic system. Considering Confucianism is allegedly the philosophical 
foundation of several Far East Asian nations and specifically China, this might be a 
contributing factor to the acceptance of socialism in China. Unfortunately, a thorough 
review of the relationship between altruism and communism is beyond the scope of this 
research. 
In a business ethics context, EQB can result from altruism. Specifically, with the 
objective of avoiding harms to local communities, managers could retain their 
manufacturing operations in less profitable locations. However, this decision would 
likely result in said company experiencing long-term viability concerns as profitability 
could decline. By squandering profitability for altruistic purposes, organisations would 
be losing focus of their core business, such as meeting customer demand, which might 
result in competitive disadvantages (Porter & Kramer, 2002) and, in the extreme, 
default. Ultimately, these results would be ethically questionable as employee wages 
would decrease, unemployment would increase, shareholders would lose their 
investments, and consumers would experience the ramifications in the marketplace 
through price adjustments (Friedman, 1970). In view of these issues, altruism appears to 
be inconsistent with capitalism (Rand, 1961).  
Capitalism is defined as:  
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 … the private ownership of resources and the use of markets and prices to 
 coordinate and direct economic activity… Each participant acts in his or her own 
 self-interest; each individual or business seeks to maximize its satisfaction or 
 profit through its decisions regarding consumption and production (McConnell 
 & Brue, 2004, p. 20).  
 
During the industrial revolution, capitalism emerged through the writings of Adam 
Smith (Doeke & Zilibotti, 2008). Capitalism differed from mercantilism in that the 
profit gained from market interactions would belong to the owners of the means of 
production (Chiapello, 2007). Adam Smith believed that the private ownership of goods 
would be effective in increasing profitability, employment, and fulfilling consumer 
demand (Bassiry & Jones, 1993).  
Inspired by Isaac Newton, Smith (1776) developed capitalism on the principle of nature 
guiding the self-interest of businesspeople toward “the production of wealth for the 
benefit of all by means of a free market system, which creates a natural balance of 
equity” (Klein, 2003, p. 387). In a capitalist economy, the market sets the prices of 
goods and services. These prices are adjusted when entities enter and exit the market; 
the inefficient and uncompetitive producers are removed whereas the most competitive 
gain market share. Adam Smith was not opposed to harming others through competition 
as this would advance the interests of society by increasing the options for consumers, 
reducing prices, improving quality, and removing inefficient producers (James & 
Rassekh, 2000). This system has been related to Darwin’s survival of the fittest (Klein, 
2003) in that the competitive market regulates itself through a natural process (Primeaux 
& Stieber, 1994) of supply and demand. Through this process, equilibrium is reached 
through the removal of ‘weaker’ participants by ‘fitter’ ones. However, it is important to 
note that Smith was against harming others through immoral competitive behaviour. He 
believed that market agents should compete through virtues and values that involve 
cooperation, trust, morality, and mutual benefit (Klein, 2003). 
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In a capitalist context, it is believed governments should avoid interfering in the 
marketplace beyond the enforcement of the rule of law, human rights, and personal 
liberty (Smith, 1776; Werhane, 2000), because a ‘laissez-faire’ approach is expected to 
result in the greatest benefits to society (Spencer, 1851). Capitalism provides 
individuals with the freedom to enter any market and business relationship. However, 
beyond establishing a level-playing field for all participants (Werhane, 2000), the 
benefits of capitalism cannot be realized with government intervention as the free-
market system is compromised (Spencer, 1851). In 1776, Adam Smith foresaw that 
government intervention in the marketplace can create incentives for individuals to 
maximize their short-term interests to the detriment of others and, eventually, 
themselves (James & Rassekh, 2000).  
Varying levels of capitalism are found in most developed economies. However, 
capitalism is most prevalent in the industrialized nations of North America, Western 
Europe, and Far East Asia. In the U.S., capitalism has been argued to be closer to the 
laissez-faire end of the spectrum (Midttun, Gautesen, & Gjolberg, 2006). Although 
there is criticism of the varying levels of governmental intervention in the U.S. (Rand, 
1964), it is believed that capitalism is the underlying principle of the economy. In the 
U.S., legislation dictates corporate agents are required to act in the best interest of 
shareholders (Jennings, 2006). With the focus of altruism on advancing the interests of 
others prior to oneself, capitalism and altruism are philosophical opposites that cannot 
co-exist in the same context (Rand, 1961). Therefore, altruism is perceived as an 
impractical normative guideline for managers of profit-oriented entities operating in a 
capitalist context. In lieu of the incompatibility of altruism with capitalism and the 
potential for EQB associated with non-strategic altruism (Kramer & Porter, 2002), 
egoism, which is naturally compatible with capitalism, is discussed in the next section. 
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2.3.2 Rational Egoism  
Rational egoism is contextualized using the philosophies of Adam Smith, the Nobel 
Laureate Milton Friedman, and Ayn Rand. Contrary to altruism, rational egoism centres 
on advancing the self-interests of individuals. Rational egoism involves advancing one’s 
long-term self-interest, pursuing one’s values, not sacrificing one’s interests for others, 
and avoiding the maximization of profitability through any means possible (Woiceshyn, 
2011). Milton Friedman contended that focusing on one’s self-interest is not myopic, 
but rather it involves pursuing one’s values and goals (James & Rassekh, 2000). In this 
context, “self-interest is not, in fact, a matter of following whims. To act in one’s own 
actual interests requires that one identify the actions necessary to attain one’s long-range 
happiness” (Locke & Woiceshyn, 1995, p. 406).  
Rational egoists are divergent from the egoists that focus on advancing their interests to 
the detriment of others and believe that no matter what the consequences, any action 
that advances their self-interest is acceptable (Rand, 1964). Through rational egoism, 
ethical behaviour contributes to social harmony whereas malfeasance harms or negates 
it (Woiceshyn, 2011). Rational egoists are concerned with the interests of others as, 
without cooperation, the egoist cannot maximize his or her long-term self-interest 
(Maitland, 2002). Adam Smith contended that “if everyone followed their own 
perceived best interest, an invisible hand would so coordinate the attempts to maximize 
individual self-interest that the good of all would result” (Bowie, 1991, p. 10). It is 
suggested that when individuals pursue their own long-term self-interests, they promote 
the interests of society more effectively than if they attempted to promote them directly 
(James & Rassekh, 2000). 
Rational egoism not only condones competition, but expects it (Smith, 1759). Smith 
believed that as long as managers do not conflict with the law of morality, they have the 
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freedom to compete against any organisation within any context. When competing, 
managers are expected to advance the long-term interests of their employers by 
maximizing shareholder value and profitability (Friedman, 1970). 
Although rational egoism centres on advancing the long-term self-interests of 
individuals, advancing one’s interests at the expense of others is unacceptable because 
to:  
 … hurt in any degree the interests of one order of citizens for no other purpose 
 but to promote that of some other, is evidently contrary to that justice and 
 equality of treatment which the sovereign owes to all different orders of his 
 subjects (Smith, 1776, p. 654).  
 
Friedman (1970) indicated that managers are to maximize profitability whilst operating 
within the confines of legislation, social, and ethical norms. Indeed, the theories of 
Adam Smith and Milton Friedman are consistent with ethical conduct and advancing the 
interests of society (James & Rassekh, 2000).  
According to Rand (1964), rational egoism is based on a system of morality and 
individuals are to acknowledge the importance of ethics in their decisions. She argued 
that: 
 … ethics is not a mystic fantasy – nor a social convention – nor a dispensable, 
 subjective luxury, to be switched or discarded in any emergency. Ethics is an 
 objective, metaphysical necessity of man’s survival – not by the grace of the 
 supernatural nor of your neighbours nor of your whims, but by the grace of 
 reality and the nature of life (p.19).  
 
The central tenet of the rational egoism philosophy involves not sacrificing yourself for 
others and not sacrificing others for yourself. 
Within rational egoism, a level playing field in the market is advocated, meaning that 
“… the rules of the game are not biased in favour of certain actors (no economic micro-
management by government), and that the rules of the game are fairly enforced to 
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prevent or at least reduce cheating by competitors” (Wells & Graafland, 2012, p. 323). 
It is expected that managers should refrain from injuring others through political rent 
seeking1 as this results in one group benefiting at the expense of another, which violates 
the laws of justice and does not advance the interests of greater society (James & 
Rassekh, 2000). In his discourse, Adam Smith believed that political rent seeking 
contributes to monopolistic markets and does not result in the most effective companies 
gaining market share through quality improvements, innovation, and lower prices 
(James & Rassekh, 2000). 
With its focus on maximizing profitability, rational egoism is clearly applicable to 
modern organisations and capitalism. Indeed, rational egoism is a system of morality 
that is against sacrificing the interests of others for one’s own (Yang, 1996). As a result 
of this, rational egoism has been cited in the CSR (James & Rassekh, 2000) and 
business ethics literature (Woiceshyn, 2011). Therefore, rational egoism is not only a 
suitable framework for contextualizing EQB, but the value system also appears to be a 
suitable normative framework for marketing professionals. 
2.3.2.1 Contextualization of Ethically Questionable Behaviour 
Jones (1991) defines EQB as any action that is “… illegal or morally unacceptable to 
the larger community” (p. 367). Jones’s (1991) contextualization is consistent with 
other definitions in the ethics paradigm (Kish-Gephart et al., 2010) and has been cited 
extensively within the business ethics literature (Barsky, 2008). The main criticism of 
the definition involves judging the ethicality of behaviours using social norms. This 
approach tends to ignore the EQBs within the norms of society or those that are legal 
                                                 
1 Political rent seeking involves lobbying government officials for special treatment (James & Rassekh, 
2000). 
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but perceived as ethically questionable. This is problematic as various activities are 
legal but not necessarily ethical. 
For example, pollution is accepted in certain emerging markets but not in more 
developed nations. As indicated, limited regulation exists in emerging markets and 
managers of multinational organisations have been accused of exploiting the 
environment and local populations for temporary gains. In Ecuador, Texaco was sued 
for $18.2 billion for dumping toxic waste in indigenous communities (Barrett, 2011). 
Cost-cutting measures and a lack of regulations were also associated with the Union 
Carbide tragedy in Bhopal, India that killed 23,000 and injured 120,000 (Trotter et al. 
1989).  
Beyond the issues abroad, there are behaviours that are legal, but not necessarily ethical 
within the U.S. context. The U.S. usury laws were effectively abolished in 1978 (White, 
2007), which has resulted in the subsequent exploitation of vulnerable members of 
society (Karpatkin, 1999). Specifically, certain U.S. firms have targeted the 
impoverished with exploitative interest rates (Karpatkin, 1999), a practice that has 
contributed to the deterioration of the U.S. economic system (White, 2007). 
Consistently, Flannery and May (2000) found managers often frame ethical problems 
within a legal framework. Morality is considered largely irrelevant. By integrating 
legislation with morality, McCarty (1988) argued U.S. executives often believe ethics is 
less important than the law, or ethics are based on legislation.  
This mentality can be partially explained by the social norms of U.S. society involving 
self-interest profit maximization. As indicated, U.S. legislation requires businesspeople 
to implement strategies associated with increasing shareholder value (van Griethuysen, 
2010). However, it appears that decision-makers are taking egoism and, by extension, 
capitalism out-of-context. Instead of concentrating on their long-term self-interests, they 
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are focusing on perpetuating their short-term concerns, which is to the detriment of 
greater society. Richard Dawkins (1976) suspected that if individuals advance their 
short-term self-interests at the expense of other people, others will begin to follow suit if 
perceived benefits are attainable from this behaviour. With that said, this change of 
behaviour will negatively affect the long-term interests of all parties operating within 
the market economy.  
Indeed, a narrow focus on behaving within societal or legislative norms can result in 
decision-makers believing they are behaving ethically, when they are not (Brooks, 
2010). Through Jones’s (1991) definition, pollution within the legal limits and targeting 
usurious rates toward the impoverished are considered ethical. Using more extreme 
examples, the 18th century American witch trials, genocides in Germany, Rwanda, 
Cambodia, and Sri Lanka, and the 18th century slavery in America, which were all 
within the norms of their respective societies, would be ethical according to Jones’s 
(1991) definition.  
From this deduction, Jones’s (1991) definition is clearly unsuitable as actions that are 
legal, but not necessarily ethical are judged as morally acceptable. In other words, EQBs 
that are within the norms of society are perceived as ethical. However, Jones’s (1991) 
definition does not consider globalization or cross-cultural interactions where certain 
behaviours might be within the norms of one society, but against the norms of another. 
From Jones’s (1991) definition, the subsequent empirical research (Abdolmohammadi 
& Sultan, 2002) is primarily based on analyses of behaviours that are unethical and 
illegal. This research direction has resulted in a dearth of studies that are based on 
analyzing actions that are legal, but not necessarily ethical.  
For these reasons, a revised contextualization of EQB is warranted. In this research, 
EQB is approached within the broader context of rational egoism. As indicated, rational 
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egoism involves advancing one’s long-term self-interest, pursuing one’s values, not 
sacrificing one’s interests for others, and avoiding the maximization of profitability 
through any means possible (Woiceshyn, 2011).  
When individuals act in their long-term self-interests, they do not exploit, deceive, or 
pollute. By focusing on long-term profitability, decision-makers behave ethically 
(Primeaux & Stieber, 1994) as ethical behaviour is beneficial to one’s long-term self-
interest or good ethics is good business (Gaski, 1999). In contrast, unethical behaviour 
is unprofitable in the long-term (Le Menstrel, 2002). Considering obeying the law 
results in a reduction of fines, litigation, and the implicit costs of productivity losses, 
acting in one’s long-term self-interests can result in both legal and ethical behaviour. 
Therefore, EQB is contextualized as any action that conflicts with one’s long-term self-
interest (Greetman, 2006). As indicated, there are two dimensions of EQB: (1) actions 
that are illegal and unethical, and; (2) actions that are legal, but not necessarily ethical. 
To advance Jones’s (1991) definition, both dimensions are included in the 
contextualization of EQB for this research. Throughout this research, when ‘EQBs’, 
‘unethical behaviours’, or ‘malfeasance’ are discussed, the behaviour is considered 
unethical. 
2.3.3 Irrational Egoism and Machiavellianism 
Beyond rational egoism, there are varying interpretations of egoism. Egoism is often 
misconstrued, taken out-of-context, and perceived to be ethically problematic (e.g., 
Fukukawa, 2003), amoral, or immoral. For example, egoists are interpreted as managers 
that consider exploiting or compromising the interests of others to advance their own 
(Schwartz & Carroll, 2003). This form of egoism can be best described as ‘cynical 
egoism’ or ‘irrational egoism’. Cynical egoists reject any standard of morality and 
behave in any way they see fit. “In other words, cynical egoism advocates dishonesty if 
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one feels like it, if it helps gratify one’s immediate desires, and if its cost (likelihood of 
getting caught) is low” (Locke & Woiceshyn, 1995, p. 405-6). Rand (1964) contended 
that focusing on one’s self-interest “is not a license ‘to do as he pleases’ and it is not 
applicable... to any man motivated by irrational emotions, feelings, urges, wishes, or 
whims (p. 8).”  
According to the results of Wood, Longenecker, McKinney, and Moore’s (1988) 
empirical study of U.S. business professionals and business students, irrational egoism 
was determined to be a contributing factor to EQB. In addition, irrational egoism was 
found to not only be firmly ingrained in U.S. business, but also among business school 
students (Wood et al., 1988). 
Irrational egoism is often used interchangeably with Machiavellianism (Fukukawa, 
2003), which is a personality trait that involves “… manipulating others for personal 
gain, often against the other’s self interest” (Wilson, Near, & Miller, 1996, p. 285). For 
centuries, since the publication of his famed opus, Machiavelli has been synonymous 
with deviant and manipulative behaviour, seen in political leaders, diplomats, and 
bureaucracy. In the literature, Machiavellians are less concerned with others and have a 
tendency to behave unethically (O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005). Machiavellians are 
conniving, ruthless manipulators who detach from social norms (Robinson & Shaver, 
1969) and behave unethically to advance their selfish ends (Calhoon, 1969).  
Clearly, Machiavellians are antithetical to rational egoism; they are the epitome of 
irrational egoism and are inclined to behave unethically (O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005). 
The Machiavellian personality might be perceived as an isolated phenomenon, one that 
is not well-represented in the marketing population. However, Hunt and Chonko (1984) 
found that marketing professionals had medium to high-levels of the Machiavellian 
personality trait. Interestingly, marketing professionals were found to be no more 
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Machiavellian than the general public (Hunt & Chonko, 1984). Consistent with the 
results from Wood et al.’s (1988) study, it appears Machiavellianism and irrational 
egoism seems to be prevalent in U.S. society. Therefore, Machiavellianism is analyzed 
as a potential influential factor in corporate malfeasance. 
2.3.4 Critique of Normative Theory 
Beyond the philosophical normative theories discussed in this section, researchers often 
suggest how managers should curb malfeasance. However, these suggestions are often 
based on assumptions of ethicality and are premature without empirical support (Crane, 
1999; Goldman, 1993).  
By offering recommendations without adequate evidence, issues can arise. For example, 
several researchers often conclude the solution to unethical behaviour is ethical training, 
which many contend can improve ethical decision-making and, subsequently, behaviour 
(Lee & Sirgy, 1999). However, according to the empirical literature, Sparks and Hunt 
(1998) did not find ethical training improved ethical behaviour. In addition to ethical 
training, other researchers contend unethical behaviour can be cured by establishing 
codes of conduct and ethical corporate cultures (Singhapakdi & Vitell, 1991).  
Conversely, Cleek and Leonard (1998) offer support that ethical codes do not influence 
behaviour. Given there is no clear indication that codes of ethics and ethical training can 
reduce malfeasance, by implementing these programs, organisations could be fruitlessly 
squandering their resources. 
Beyond these recommendations, other researchers suggest unethical behaviour can be 
remedied through altering the economic system to focus less on profit maximization 
(Alexander, 2007). However, the economic system might not be the central contributor 
to unethical behaviour. Using Dawkins’s (1976) theory, the cause could be the survival 
of the fittest mentality derived from natural selection. If Dawkins’s arguments are a true 
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reflection of reality, any suggestion of altering society might be futile as the problem 
would not be society, the problem would be humans and perhaps, incurable. 
Foundationally, these proposals do not address the issue and the implementation of 
recommendations without understanding malfeasance can result in its perpetuation 
(Leget, Borry, & de Vries, 2009).  
Although useful at providing behavioural guidelines for decision-makers and 
contextualizing EQB, on their own, normative theories are incapable of providing 
researchers with knowledge of how decisions are made. As a general criticism of the 
business ethics literature, Bartlett (2003, p. 225) argues that the “business ethics 
literature has a misplaced emphasis upon underlying philosophical theory and that 
resources should focus instead upon the more psychological aspects of business ethics, 
such as behavioural intentions and the beliefs that shape those intentions”. Thus, the 
main criticism of the normative literature involves the gap between theory and practice 
(Bartlett, 2003). To explain ethically questionable behavioural intentions, descriptive 
theories are needed.  
2.4 Descriptive Theories 
Descriptive theories involve analyzing what individuals actually do. Descriptive 
theories are useful for providing a schematic outline of the process individuals follow 
when making decisions. The two decision-making theories discussed in this section are 
the rationalist decision-making approaches and the intuitive models. The rationalist 
researchers suspect individuals make their decisions using a logical and linear process 
whereas the intuitionist theorists believe decision-makers make most of their decisions 
below the level of consciousness. The latter process is argued to be instantaneous and 
decision-makers only reason or explain their behaviour ex post facto. Both of these 
theories are the basis of the models discussed in depth in chapters three and four. The 
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purpose of the following discourse is to provide the reader with a general understanding 
of the difference between the normative and descriptive theories and, secondly, to 
outline the difference between the rationalist and intuitionist approaches. 
2.4.1 Rationalist Approach 
When decision-makers encounter ethical problems, rationalist theorists contend 
individuals make active judgments. Active judgments involve an examination of the 
relevant alternatives to an ethical problem, the facts associated with the situation, and an 
abstract set of moral rules that apply to the dilemma (Reynolds, 2006). As a result of 
this process, active judgments are deliberate and analytical (Reynolds, 2006).  
When individuals make active judgments, the process is argued to be linear in that 
decision-makers first recognize that their ethical dilemma affects other people (Rest, 
1986). The next step involves making a moral judgment by reviewing the possible 
alternatives and selecting the most moral option. In stage three, managers form their 
behavioural intention, which subsequently, leads to their behaviour. In general, it is 
believed that these active judgments are rational and often result in ethical decisions.  
In their review of the ethical decision-making models, Bommer, Gratto, Gravander, and 
Tuttle (1987) determined that most frameworks are within the rationalist context. It was 
argued that most researchers have determined that several stages are followed in a linear 
process. First, decision-makers set their objectives. Second, individuals search for 
alternatives that enable them to reach their objectives. Third, each alternative solution is 
evaluated against these objectives. Fourth, an option is selected, intentions are formed, 
and the individual reacts. In the final stage, the decision-maker monitors and controls 
the results. It is further expected that each stage in this decision process is influenced by 
the continuous selection, filtering, and processing of information within the context of 
the individual’s value-system (Bommer et al., 1987). 
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Consistent with the aforementioned approaches, Cooper (1998) suspected that 
individuals make decisions at two levels: (1) by reviewing moral rules, such as codes of 
ethics, legislation, values, or theology, and; (2) at a higher level of ethical analysis 
(Scott, 2002). These two levels of decision-making form Cooper’s (1998) rationalist 
model that consists of five linear stages. Comparable to Rest (1986), the first stage 
involves recognizing an ethical problem. The second phase involves defining the ethical 
issue. In phase three, decision-makers review the potential alternatives, which lead to 
the fourth phase of evaluating the perceived alternatives. In stage four, the alternatives 
are evaluated against the varying rules outlined in the aforementioned first level of 
decision-making. Once the preferred alternative is selected, the decision-maker enters 
stage five – the resolution or behaviour stage (Scott, 2002). 
In Ajzen and Fishbein’s (1980) theory of reasoned action, the decision-making process 
is influenced by various individual factors such as personality, social status, knowledge, 
values, culture, and past behaviour. These factors are argued to influence one’s beliefs: 
(1) toward a particular action and that the behaviour will lead to certain outcomes, and; 
(2) perceptions of the norms of society. These beliefs influence one’s attitude (or 
judgment) toward a particular behaviour, which in turn affects one’s intentions and 
subsequent action.  
Similarly, Trevino (1986) included individual and situational components in her model. 
In the model, EQB is said to be influenced by the ethical dilemma, the stage of 
cognitive moral development, individual moderators, such as ego, field dependence, and 
locus of control, and situational moderators that often involve immediate job context, 
organisational culture, and characteristics of the work environment. As will be 
discussed further in chapter three, cognitive moral development theorists (Kohlberg, 
1976) contend that as individuals progress with age, they become increasingly 
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sophisticated with their decision-making abilities and are able to make decisions 
involving increasing complexity. 
Fishbein and Ajzen (2010) argue their model takes into account the ability for decision-
makers to misrepresent or bias their perceptions of an ethical dilemma to suit their 
interests. In the model, the potential for past experiences to influence subsequent 
behaviour is taken into account (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010). Although argued to primarily 
be a deliberative or rational model free from subconscious motives (Ajzen & Fishbein, 
1980), Fishbein and Ajzen (2010) contend the model accounts for decisions that are 
made either rationally or intuitively. Consistently, Simon (1955) argued that if social 
scientists are to understand how decisions are made, decisions should not be assumed to 
be logical, linear, or rational.  
2.4.2 Intuitionist Approach 
By contrast, the intuitionist researchers contend that individuals make their decisions 
reflexively and instantaneously. Reynolds (2006) argued that decision-makers do not 
necessarily make decisions through a rational process such as by following various 
stages linearly. It is believed decisions are made subconsciously and, in many cases, 
they are made intuitively. Through this process, it is argued decision-makers do not 
actually deliberate on the issue as extensively as the rationalist researchers suggest.  
When reflexive judgments are made, the first step involves gathering the most relevant 
information to a particular decision. The next step involves processing the extracted 
information, which engages the cognitive process (Reynolds, 2006). It is believed a 
comparison of various normative rules occurs below the level of consciousness, which 
ultimately leads to the decision. However, this comparison of moral rules might be 
grounded in norms the decision-maker might consciously disagree with (Reynolds, 
2006). For example, a marketer might argue that exploiting vulnerable consumers is 
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wrong but subconsciously said marketer might believe it is acceptable to do so in order 
to retain one’s employment. 
These subconscious decisions are formed from intuition, which is based on a marketer’s 
previous experiences. For example, if a marketer has bribed an official in the past, when 
the opportunity is presented again, the marketer might rely on previous knowledge and 
simply react without thinking at a conscious level. To address any external challenges, 
such as other people expressing opposing views associated with a particular decision, 
the conscious stage is engaged to form rationalizations (Reynolds, 2006). It is only after 
the decision is made and the marketer is challenged by others that excuses are made 
(Freud, 1900).  
Consistent with these post-hoc explanations, the intuitionist researchers argue the 
rational models do not account for reflection or intuitive decision-making (Reynolds, 
2006). Indeed, individuals are often bothered by their decisions after they are made. 
Depending on the consequences associated with their decision, individuals can 
experience trouble eating; they cannot enjoy themselves away from work, or even sleep 
as they are plagued by their actions (Reynolds, 2006). 
2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the normative philosophical theories were presented. Considering the 
U.S. economic system is founded on capitalism, rational egoism was argued to not only 
be most applicable to the U.S. population, but also most likely to result in ethical 
behaviour. As such, the broader theory of rational egoism was used to contextualize 
EQB. In the second part of the chapter, the two broad schools of descriptive theory were 
discussed. Discourse centred on the rationalist decision-making models and the 
intuitionist approaches. Consistent with capitalism and the suspected self-interest nature 
of human behaviour, the rational decision-making approaches are largely based on the 
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theory of economic rationality. Meaning the motivation of decision-makers is solely 
concerned with advancing their self-interests – they do not have altruistic inclinations 
(Dawkins, 1976). However, the intuitionist models are based on a divergent theory – the 
irrationality of decision-makers and their inability to be perfectly rational. This debate is 
a central theme of the next chapter involving the theoretical frameworks in irrational 
decision-making. 
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Theoretical Frameworks in 
Irrational Decision-Making 
3.1 Introduction 
In the last chapter, the methodology of this thesis concerned with understanding how 
marketing professionals rationalize their ethically questionable intentions and what 
influence Machiavellianism has on the decision-making process was introduced. The 
normative philosophical theory of rational egoism, which was demonstrated to be not 
only compatible with the American capitalist system, but also most likely to result in 
ethical behaviour, was discussed. As a result, rational egoism was used to contextualize 
ethically questionable behaviour (EQB). In the latter portions of the chapter, the 
descriptive theories involving the two streams of decision-making research, the 
rationalist and intuitionist approaches, were outlined.  
Built on the foundation of these two themes, the decision-making theories of economic 
rationality, bounded rationality, and irrationality are discussed in the first section of this 
chapter. Within the context of irrational decision-making, the techniques of 
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neutralization (TON), which are used by individuals to justify their irrational decisions 
(Sykes & Matza, 1957), are presented. Discussions in the latter portion of the chapter 
centre on the decision-making frameworks within the business ethics paradigm. To 
emphasize the relationships found between the relevant latent variables, the results of 
the empirical literature are included in these discussions.  
3.2 Decision-Making Theories 
In this section, economic rationality, which is founded on the belief that individuals are 
perfectly rational and focus solely on maximizing their wealth, is discussed first. 
Conversely, relying on Herbert Simon’s (1955) thesis, the bounded rationality of 
decision-makers is discussed second. It is believed decision-makers are incapable of 
being perfectly rational and, at times, can be irrational. In the third section, the 
irrationality of decision-makers is discussed. By relying on the criminology, 
delinquency, and social cognition literatures, the rationalization models used to explain 
irrational decision-making are presented. 
3.2.1 Economic Rationality 
Adam Smith’s (1776) writings on capitalism have been associated with the development 
of economic rationality (Wells & Grafland, 2012). Economic rationality theorists 
contend that the motivations for all human behaviour are oriented toward advancing the 
self-interests of the individual. The assumption is that organisational decision-makers 
strive for maximum payoff and that humans are incapable of any behaviour that does 
not promote their self-interests. In fact, in some circles, it is believed that through 
natural selection, the human mind is programmed solely to behave in its own self-
interest (Dawkins, 1976). This theory forms the foundation of all economic principles 
(Chiapello, 2007) and free-market competition.  
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Objectively, it is contended that economic rationality is a universal phenomenon 
(Simon, 1986). However, the ‘survival of the fittest’ mentality (Spencer, 1872) of 
economic rationality might only be a ‘Western’ discourse. It is perhaps debatable that 
economic rationality is even valid from an American context let alone internationally 
(Zouboulakis, 2001). As contended in chapter two, Confucianism, which is an altruistic 
philosophical framework, was a founding philosophy in Far East Asia and countless 
examples contrary to economic rationality exist in that context.  
For example, altruistic business practices date back to 520 B.C. to traditional China 
(Wang & Juslin, 2009). During this era, merchants believed in righteousness and 
sincerity (two Confucian principles) in their business practices. These traditional 
Chinese merchants sought harmonious relationships with their stakeholders and the 
profits gained from their operations were used to assist scholars and the impoverished 
(Wang & Juslin, 2009).  
Various Chinese dynasties lasting several centuries operated under an agricultural-based 
economy focused on capped production growth and altruistic values (Deng, 2003). For 
most of the 20th century, China embraced socialist values and primarily operated under 
a communist economic system. Although closer to the capitalist end of the spectrum in 
the 21st century, the economy in China remains planned and continues to embrace 
socialist values. Moreover, Far East Asians continue to demonstrate collectivist 
orientations at the individual level (Fang, 2006). 
Indeed, it seems plausible that economic rationality might be inapplicable in Far East 
Asia. However, a thorough analysis of the compatibility of economic rationality cross-
culturally is beyond the scope of this research. The purpose of this discourse is to 
illustrate that decision-makers are expected to be perfectly rational whereas there is a 
vast literature that evidences otherwise. 
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Beyond this evidence, even when individuals behave altruistically, economic 
rationalists contend that the decision-maker was seeking an intangible benefit from the 
behaviour and, thus, the behaviour was actually selfishly motivated (Greetman, 2006). 
Even in the face of evidence contrary to economic rationality, theorists retain the 
position that all behaviours are in some way associated with advancing the self-interest 
of the individual (Hunt & Vasquez-Parraga, 1993). However, these arguments appear 
tautological because when the theory does not match empiricism, economic rationalists 
interpret the evidence to support their theory nonetheless (Greetman, 2006). 
Rand (1961) contended individuals have the capacity to behave rationally; however, she 
believed that rationality is a choice. Individuals can choose to behave rationally and act 
in their long-term self-interest or they can choose to be irrational by sacrificing their 
interests for others or sacrificing the interests of others for their own. It is further 
contended by some economists that perfect rationality is merely an assumption. It is 
believed that digressions from rationality are rare and that they will become 
insignificant under the natural functionality of the market (Kahneman, 2003). From this 
perspective it is believed that when these anomalies occur, the issue resides in the 
cognitive abilities of the decision-maker (Holton & Naquin, 2005), which might be 
related to Machiavellian personality traits, cognitive moral development, or situational 
factors (Jones, 1991).  
Consistently, Herbert Simon believed that individuals are rational, but argued it is 
unreasonable to assume there are no limitations to their level of rationality (Holton & 
Naquin, 2005). At times, decision-makers do not have the capacity to be rational – they 
have imperfect decision-making abilities. Simon believed decision-makers have 
bounded rationality and that instances of less optimal decision-making are not rare, but 
perhaps more prevalent than contemporary economic theorists care to admit. 
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3.2.2 Bounded Rationality 
Many psychologists challenge the economic rationality discourse and the cognitive 
abilities of decision-makers (Simon, 1986). It is believed that decision-makers have 
cognitive limitations (Campitelli & Gobet, 2010) and attempt to make expedient 
decisions at the expense of accuracy (Jones, 1991). Simon (1955) contended that 
contemporary economists ignore the psychology literature, everyday work experience, 
and observations of human behaviour that evidence the inability of individuals to make 
rational choices (Burrell & Morgan, 1979).  
Through his rejection of perfect rationality, Simon developed his bounded rationality 
theory (Campitelli & Gobet, 2010). Bounded rationality explains the knowledge and 
computational limitations of decision-makers and their inability to make perfectly 
rational choices (Lipman, 1995). It is believed that the complexity of the environment 
coupled with the limited cognitive ability of humans cause maximization to be elusive 
in administrative contexts (Simon, 1955). Bommer et al. (1987) argue individuals make 
decisions perceived as ‘satisfactory’ or ‘sufficient’ with imperfect information. A full-
cost benefit analysis of all available alternatives is not conducted; decision-makers 
choose an acceptable option that fulfils a preconceived adequacy criterion (Campitelli & 
Gobet, 2010). This process results in biased decisions (Jones, 1991) as alternative 
scenarios conflicting with the bias are rejected (Russo, Carlson, & Meloy, 2006).  
From the psychology literature, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) demonstrated using 
prospect theory that individuals make less-optimal and riskier decisions when they 
perceive the potential to lose monetarily. From the prisoner’s dilemma research, which 
involves a laboratory assessment consisting of a hypothetical vignette, it is rare that 
participants select the most optimal choice (Rubinstein, 1986). Beyond the laboratory, 
numerous instances of bounded rationality are apparent in organisational contexts. For 
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example, executives in Far East Asia are often unwilling to hire the most skilled 
employee for a position; they frequently rely on nepotism (Redfern & Crawford, 2010).  
When decision-makers are threatened or perceive negative consequences, their bounded 
rationality often results in irrational decisions (Beams et al., 2003). When these 
irrational decisions conflict with the decision-makers’ values, cognitive dissonance can 
occur (Maruna & Copes, 2004). To alleviate dissonance, individuals have the ability to 
distort their perceptions through the use of various psychological manoeuvres, such as 
rationalization (Bersoff, 1999). This phenomenon is the focus of discussion in the next 
section.  
3.2.3 Irrationality and the Techniques of Neutralization 
Berns, Zink, Pagnoni, Martin-Skurski, and Richards (2005) found that when individuals 
are exposed to social pressure, they alter their perceptions. In a laboratory assessment, 
decision-makers were asked to participate in a simple task involving making judgments 
about the length of various line segments. Although a basic task, decision-makers 
provided incorrect answers to follow the responses of a group. Neurological imaging of 
the decision process revealed that decision-makers actually perceive their incorrect 
responses as correct. Clearly, decision-makers altered their perceptions to conform to a 
group and in the process of doing so, believed their incorrect judgments were in fact 
correct. When queried about their incorrect judgments, a large majority of participants 
refused to provide an explanation (Berns et al., 2005). 
Indeed, decision-makers are not perfectly rational (Simon, 1979), if they encounter the 
appropriate situation, they will satisfy their immediate concerns by making an irrational 
decision. By doing this, they will fail to maximize the possible utility associated with 
behaving rationally. When individuals make irrational (and unethical) decisions, they 
rely on cognitive distortions to make perceived ‘rational’ arguments to justify their 
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choices. Through rationalization, decision-makers can not only opt to perceive a 
dilemma in a certain way, but they can also choose the way they wish to think 
(Seligman, 1991). Indeed, decision-makers have the ability to deceive themselves by 
believing their malfeasance is excusable; however, this is not a new discovery. 
“Demosthenes referred to this phenomenon in 349 B.C. when he wrote ‘nothing is 
easier than to deceive one’s self; what a man wishes he generally believes to be true’” 
(Waldmann, 2000, p. 260).  
In the criminology and social psychology literatures, two main theories of 
rationalization assist decision-makers in relieving themselves of the cognitive burden 
associated with irrational decision-making. In the first part of this subsection, the TON 
developed from the criminology and delinquency literatures (Sykes & Matza, 1957) are 
discussed. In the latter parts, a brief description of Bandura’s (1999) moral 
disengagement theory from the social psychology paradigm follows.  
Sykes and Matza (1957) contended that deviant behaviour is facilitated by 
neutralization techniques. Neutralization has been defined as “a mechanism that 
facilitates behaviour that is either norm violating or in contravention of expressed 
attitudes” (Chatzidakis et al., 2007, p. 89). Through the use of the TON, decision-
makers are able to psychologically detach from the norms of society by justifying their 
malfeasance as a temporary exemption from conventional norms (Siponen & Vance, 
2010). However, it is believed that individuals who use neutralization techniques do not 
reject the norms of society or believe the EQB should be excusable in all situations 
(Sykes & Matza, 1957). The TON include the denial of responsibility (I had no choice), 
denial of injury (no one was hurt), denial of victim (they deserved it), appeal to higher 
loyalties (I did it for my family), and condemning the condemners (everyone else does 
it). 
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Neutralizations have been contextualized as defence mechanisms that enable decision-
makers to minimize the consequences of their behaviour (McGregor, 2009). According 
to theory, when neutralizations are used to explain EQB, researchers assume that 
decision-makers feel guilty for behaving illicitly (Christensen, 2010). The precondition 
for neutralization and a central assumption of the theory is that individuals perceive 
themselves as ethical (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008), but feel guilty when they behave 
unethically. In this context, the TON can be used to reemphasize one’s self-concept as 
an ethical person. Neutralizations are impression management devices that reduce 
cognitive dissonance (Christensen, 2010) and enable decision-makers to maintain their 
self-esteem (Maruna & Copes, 2004). Although capable of minimizing guilt, the TON 
cannot completely eradicate guilt. In addition, neutralization does not occur in all 
instances of malfeasance (Minor, 1981) or, more specifically, neutralization is not 
required if feelings of guilt are not felt.  
Using a social cognitive approach, Bandura (1999) developed the theory of moral 
disengagement (MD), which comprises a list of rationalization techniques that facilitate 
corruption. These rationalization techniques include moral justification, euphemistic 
labelling, advantageous comparison, displacement of responsibility, diffusion of 
responsibility, disparaging victims, attribution of blame, and minimizing consequences. 
It is argued these rationalization techniques can facilitate unethical behaviour by 
enabling decision-makers to perceive their actions as ethical whilst minimizing 
cognitive dissonance. Individuals that morally disengage convince themselves (and 
others) their illicit behaviours are excusable, socially acceptable, and in the service of 
moral purposes (Barsky, 2006). 
It has been argued that Bandura’s rationalization construct overlaps conceptually with 
Sykes and Matza’s (1957) TON (Maruna & Copes, 2004). MD has been slated as a 
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replication of the TON. Howard and Levinson (1985, p. 191) call the similarities 
between the two theories “a wasteful duplication of effort that follows from mutual 
interdisciplinary ignorance” (in Maruna & Copes, 2004, p. 6). Both rationalization 
techniques are used to excuse decision-makers from social norms (Barsky, Islam, 
Zyphur, & Johnson, 2006). Pornari and Wood (2010) argue both the TON and MD are 
rationalizations that facilitate unethical behaviour by minimizing guilt. Ribeaud and 
Eisner (2010) found the TON and MD explain how decision-makers minimize the 
cognitive dissonance associated with their malfeasance. These researchers also found 
that both theories conceptually and empirically overlap. It was determined that the 
constructs describe the same cognitive processes (Ribeaud & Eisner, 2010).  
According to this discourse, it is acknowledged that the TON and MD constructs are 
based on the same theoretical rational and it appears they can both be used to investigate 
how marketers rationalize their ethically questionable intentions. However, the moral 
disengagement construct has been studied most frequently at the organisational 
decision-making level (Tsang, 2002) or system wide level (Bandura, 2002) whereas the 
TON have been studied most consistently at the individual level (Chatzidakis et al., 
2007). For this reason, the TON seem to be most applicable to this research. 
It is important to note that rationalizations, neutralizations, or excuses do not occur in all 
instances (Maruna & Copes, 2004). There is empirical evidence that demonstrates if 
individuals are detached or in disagreement with social norms, they do not rationalize 
their behaviour as they feel as though they have done nothing wrong (Maruna & Copes, 
2004). Therefore, the precondition for rationalization is cognitive dissonance or guilt. 
3.3 Decision-Making Frameworks in Business Ethics 
In this section, the main decision-making frameworks in the business ethics paradigm 
are presented. Briefly mentioned at the close of chapter two, the discussions focus on 
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Rest’s (1986) four-component model within the rationalist decision-making context and 
Jones’s (1991) issue-contingent model centred on the perceived moral intensity (PMI) 
construct. In the latter portion of the section, the factors that have been found to 
influence malfeasance are discussed.  
3.3.1 The Four-Component Model 
Rest (1986) developed a useful ethical decision-making framework (see Figure 3.1), 
which includes four components: (1) recognizing an ethical problem, (2) judging the 
ethicality of the action, (3) forming intentions, and (4) behaving. The model is widely 
cited in the ethical decision-making paradigm (O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005) and forms 
the basis of several contemporary frameworks (Jones, 1991). In his text, Rest (1986) 
acknowledged the four components of the decision-making process may not occur 
sequentially; however, it is believed that each component occurs prior to behaviour. 
Rest and several researchers (Jones, 1991) follow the assumption that if decision-
makers do not recognize an ethical problem, the individual would not follow through 
the decision-making process and the model would be unable to explain EQB. According 
to the empirical literature, decision-makers that fail to recognize an ethical problem are 
most likely to develop illicit intentions (O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005).   
                
 
  
 
              
                
                
Source: Rest (1986) Moral development advances in research and theory 
Figure 3.1 The Four-Component Model 
Cognitive moral development (CMD) is argued to be of central importance to the moral 
judgment stage of Rest’s (1986) model (Jones, 1991). Kohlberg’s (1976) CMD theory is 
based on six hierarchical stages of moral development, which fall into three categories: 
obedience, conformity, and higher-level universal ethical principles. It is suggested that 
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when individuals progress through the six hierarchical stages, they are capable of 
resolving moral dilemmas of increasing complexity. CMD can be measured through 
Kohlberg’s (1976) structured interview approach.  
However, the CMD instrument cannot be used to appraise issue-contingent (or 
situational specific) factors associated with an ethical problem (Jones, 1991). The CMD 
research fails to consider the context-dependency of the decision-making process and 
how individuals behave according to variation in particular situations (Valentine & 
Barnett, 2007). In addition, CMD is solely based on the Kantian philosophical norms of 
deontology and not necessarily descriptive theory (Valentine & Barnett, 2007). Given 
an aim of this research is to understand the relationship between issue-contingent 
phenomenon and the willingness of marketers to minimize the consequences on others 
to advance their own (McGregor, 2009), Kohlberg’s (1976) theory will not be used. 
Beyond the omission of issue-contingency, it has been argued that Kohlberg’s 
hierarchical approach may inaccurately depict the stages of moral development of 
women. Gilligan (1982) argued that Kohlberg developed his theory using male subjects 
and, at best, the model can appraise the stages of moral development for men, but not 
women (Carroll & Bucholtz, 2006).  
Consistent with Kohlberg (1976), Rest’s (1979) defining issues test (DIT) is directly 
applicable to the moral judgment stage (Jones, 1991). The DIT is the most cited 
instrument in the CMD research (Abdolmohammadi & Sultan, 2002) and has been 
validated in over 500 business ethics studies (Tsui & Windsor, 2001). However, the DIT 
is based on Kohlberg’s model and also cannot be used to appraise issue-contingent 
factors. For this reason, the DIT is inapplicable to this research.  
Empirically, Rest’s (1986) four-component model has not been tested in its entirety 
(O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005). The relationship between recognition and judgment has 
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been studied sparingly (Trevino, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006). Researchers that have 
analyzed this relationship (Valentine & Fleishman, 2003) have shown conflicting results 
(O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005). A suspected reason for the conflict and the dearth of 
research on examining the entire model might be associated with the difficulty in testing 
recognition followed by judgment. For example, if a participant does not recognize an 
ethical issue, according to the theory, the model would not function (Jones, 1991). 
Therefore, if participants do not recognize an ethical problem, it would seem illogical 
for participants to be asked to judge the ethicality of an action in an ethical problem they 
do not recognize. Moreover, the very fact the recognition item is included in a 
questionnaire might artificially prompt participants to recognize the vignette as an 
ethical problem, when in reality they might not have. Specifically, “comments about a 
situation’s moral issues can highlight what is right, emphasizing moral norms, 
prompting moral awareness, and suggesting that moral action is appropriate” (Gunia, 
Wang, Huang, Wang, & Murnighan, 2012, p. 17). 
Further to this issue, Rest (1986) argues that because of the ability of decision-makers to 
rationalize, individuals might not recognize an ethical problem. Consistently, Trevino et 
al. (2006) argue that if rationalizations are used, an individual has disengaged from the 
ethicality of the dilemma and, therefore, is not morally aware. However, given 
rationalizations can be used to minimize guilt, it would seem unnecessary for moral 
disengagement to be related to awareness in this way. The fact that the individual 
rationalized is based on their awareness of an ethical problem. If they were unaware and 
subsequently behaved unethically, they would not need to rationalize as they would not 
be experiencing any cognitive dissonance associated with developing ethically 
questionable intentions. 
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As indicated in chapter two, the Rest (1986) model seems most applicable to ethical 
decisions that derive from active judgment (Reynolds, 2006). Considering the focus of 
this research is centred on understanding ethically questionable intentions whilst taking 
into consideration issue-contingent phenomenon, the Rest framework is inapplicable. In 
the next section, the issue-contingent model is discussed. 
3.3.2 Issue-contingent Model 
To address the issue-contingent factors associated with ethical dilemmas, Rest’s (1986) 
four-component framework forms the basis of Jones’s (1991) moral intensity model. 
Jones (1991) defines moral intensity as “a construct that captures the extent of issue-
related moral imperative in a situation” (p. 372). Each stage in Rest’s (1986) model is 
directly influenced by the intensity of an ethical dilemma (see Figure 3.2).  
Jones (1991) argues moral intensity is constructed of six variables: proximity, 
probability of effect, temporal immediacy, concentration of effect, magnitude of 
consequences, and social consensus. Jones (1991) defines the magnitude of 
consequences as “the sum of the harms (or benefits) done to victims (or beneficiaries) of 
the moral act in question” (p. 374). Social consensus is defined as “the degree of social 
agreement that a proposed act is evil (or good)” (Jones, 1991, p.375). Probability of 
effect is associated with the likelihood the harms or rewards will occur. Proximity is 
based on the closeness of the harms (or benefits) to the decision-maker. Temporal 
immediacy involves the lapse of time between the decision and the harm (or benefit). 
Concentration of effect is based on the number of people that will be harmed (or 
benefited) by the decision. According to Jones, the dimensions of moral intensity and 
one’s perception of them collectively represent the PMI construct, which in turn 
influences decision-making. 
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* Adapted from Jones (1991) An Issue-Contingent Model of Ethical Decision Making in Organisations 
 
Figure 3.2 Issue-Contingent Model 
According to the empirical literature, the magnitude of consequences was found to have 
a significantly positive relationship to recognizing a moral problem, the first stage in 
Rest’s model (May & Pauli, 2002). Singer (1996) found social consensus and the 
magnitude of consequences were predictor variables of ethical judgment, the second 
stage in Rest’s model (O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005). Weber (1996) found a 
significantly positive relationship between the magnitude of consequences and ethical 
judgment whereas a decrease in magnitude of consequences resulted in less ethical 
judgments (O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005). Of the 14 studies reviewed by O’Fallon and 
Butterfield (2005), PMI had a strongly negative relationship to unethical judgments and 
unethical intentions (McMahon & Harvey, 2007). When individuals fail to perceive the 
negative consequences to others or acknowledge the norms of society, ethically 
questionable intentions are likely.  
Most of the research on the magnitude of consequences has been studied within the 
context of harms (or benefits) to others rather than focusing on the consequences to 
decision-makers themselves (Gurley, Wood, & Nijhawan, 2007). Although not 
explicitly stated by Jones (1991), the magnitude of consequences associated with an 
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ethical quandary could be within the context of the decision-maker as they are often the 
victim (or beneficiary) of an ethical problem. Through the ‘perceived consequences’ 
construct of their marketing ethics framework, Hunt and Vitell (1986, p. 10) argued that 
“an individual may perceive a particular alternative as the most ethical alternative and, 
nevertheless, intend to choose another alternative because of certain preferred 
consequences (e.g., there might be significant positive consequences to oneself as a 
result of choosing the ‘less ethical’ alternative)”. Indeed, the harms and benefits to 
decision-makers seem issue-contingent and susceptible to varying levels of intensity. 
The empirical literature presented in Table 3.1 represents a portion of the literature 
review conducted for this research. The literature was compiled using a systematic 
approach. Searches were conducted primarily through ProQuest, EBSCOhost, and 
Google Scholar. The key word searches included, but were not limited to, variations and 
combinations of unethical behaviour, perceived threats (consequences or harms), 
corporate malfeasance, moral intensity, moral decision-making, ethical decision-
making, unethical decisions, organisational pressures, risks versus reward, and 
corruption. After removing articles that did not fit the aforementioned search criterion, 
397 empirical articles were reviewed and 292 were found to be consistent with the 
context of this research.      
According to Table 3.1 of the empirical work involving the perceived consequences to 
decision-makers, Decker and Calo (2007) found that if decision-makers perceived 
greater consequences for EQB, ethical judgments were more likely. If greater benefits 
were perceived, less ethical decisions were likely. In eight studies, perceived increases 
in financial rewards consistently resulted in decision-makers forming unethical 
intentions (Schweitzer, Ordonez, & Douma, 2004). In most studies, participants were 
willing to deceive others for personal gain (Honeycutt, Glassman, Zugelder, & Karande, 
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2001). Consistently, if decision-makers perceived they would be punished for 
malfeasance, unethical behaviour declined (DeConinck, 2003; Gurley et al., 2007). 
When decision-makers perceived an employment risk for ethical behaviour, they were 
more inclined to behave illicitly (Nill & Schibrowsky, 2005). From these consistent 
findings, harms or benefits to the decision-maker are clearly an important issue-
contingent phenomenon that could have a significant effect on the decision-making 
process. 
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Table 3.1 Influential Factors in the Unethical Decision-making Process* 
SOURCE INFLUENTIAL FACTOR FINDINGS 
(Bellizzi & Hite, 1989) Organisational pressures 
Managers may only be willing to sanction unethical behaviour if the actions 
are conducted by poor performers. 
(Cadsby, Song & 
Tapon, 2010) Organisational pressures 
Goal difficulty, the specificity of the goal, outcome-based performance, and 
rewards can potentially increase unethical behaviour. 
(Deconinck, 2003) Organisational pressures 
Organisational pressures of reprimanding previous behaviour can influence 
future behaviour. 
(Hegarty & Sims, 1979) Organisational pressures 
Unethical behaviour can decrease in the presence of an organisational ethics 
policy.  
(Jones & Kavanagh, 
1996) Organisational pressures Unethical behaviour can be affected by social norms.  
(Nill & Schibrowsky, 
2005) Organisational pressures 
The willingness to act ethically was dependent on the ethical climate of the 
corporation. 
(Powpaka, 2002) Organisational pressures 
Decision-makers might be willing to engage in unethical behaviour involving 
the survival of their employers. 
(Robertson & 
Anderson, 1993) Organisational pressures 
Individuals operating under output-based control systems provided less 
ethical responses.  
(Schepers, 2003) Organisational pressures Machiavellianism does not interact with organisational profit. 
(Schweitzer, Ordonez 
& Douma, 2004) Organisational pressures Found a link between specific financial goals and unethical behaviour. 
(Schwepker & Good, 
2007) Organisational pressures 
Positive relationship between management's perceived quota difficulty and 
the probability of them allowing salespeople to act unethically. 
(Schwepker, 1999a) Organisational pressures 
Negative relationship between perceived competitive intensity and 
salespeople’s’ intention to behave unethically.  
(Vitell & Festervand, 
1987) Organisational pressures 
33% of executives would pay a bribe to obtain business but felt it was 
unethical; 49% would pay a bribe to obtain business. 
(Vitell & Festervand, 
1987) Organisational pressures 
When ethical conflicts were encountered, executives were likely to select 
the most profitable alternative.  
(Beams et al., 2003)  Perceived consequences (self) 
“The results indicate that subjects are more likely to trade based on insider 
information to avoid a loss than to achieve an abnormal gain” (Beams et. al., 
2003, p. 309). 
(Beams, et al., 2003) Perceived consequences (self) 
Americans that anticipated higher profits were more likely to behave 
unethically.  
(Bellizzi, 1995) Perceived consequences (self) 
Pressure to attain intra-firm competitive bonuses had the potential to 
encourage unethical behaviour. 
(Blodgett, Lu, Rose & 
Vitell, 2001) Perceived consequences (self) 
Americans more willing to act in their own interest above their employer 
and disparage a competitor. 
(Cadogan, Lee, 
Tarkiainen & 
Sundqvist, 2009) Perceived consequences (self) Greater job insecurity resulted in lower ethical standards. 
(Dunkelberg & Jessup, 
2001) Perceived consequences (self) Six individuals chose to act unethically for additional monetary gains. 
(Grover & Hui, 1994) Perceived consequences (self) People more willing to lie if they are rewarded. 
(Hegarty & Sims, 1978) Perceived consequences (self) Rewarding unethical behaviour results in an increase in said behaviour.  
(Hegarty & Sims, 1979) Perceived consequences (self) High economic orientation positively related to unethical behaviour. 
(Honeycutt, Glassman, 
Zugelder & Karande, 
2001) Perceived consequences (self) 
Salespeople with commission-based compensation are more likely to engage 
in unethical behaviour than those with salary-based compensation. 
(Laczniak & 
Inderrieden, 1987) Perceived consequences (self) Proposed sanctions had the only significant effect on behaviour. 
(Mazar, Amir & Ariely, 
2008) Perceived consequences (self) 
This research shows that people behave dishonestly enough to profit but 
honestly enough to delude themselves of their own integrity. 
(Millington, Eberhardt 
& Wilkinson, 2005) Perceived consequences (self) Gift giving appears to be associated with the pursuit of self-interest. 
(Nill & Schibrowsky, 
2005) Perceived consequences (self) Respondents would act unethically if self-interest was affected. 
          Continued… 
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Table 3.1 Influential Factors in the Unethical Decision-making Process (Continued)* 
SOURCE INFLUENTIAL FACTOR FINDINGS 
(Nill & Schibrowsky, 
2005) Perceived consequences (self) Rewarding unethical behaviour results in an increase in said behaviour.  
(Schwepker & Good, 
1999) Perceived consequences (self) 
Salespeople believe they will suffer negative consequences for failing to 
achieve quota, they are more likely to behave unethically. 
(Shapeero, Koh & 
Killough, 2003) Perceived consequences (self) 
Participants who perceive a greater likelihood of reward are more likely to 
underreport. 
(Sims, 2002) Perceived consequences (self) 
"As employees reported increased financial dependence to the organisation, 
they also reported increased likelihood of ethical rule breaking." 
(Street & Street, 2006) Perceived consequences (self) 
Results found strong support that exposure to an escalation situation 
increases the likelihood of unethical behaviour on the part of decision 
makers.  
(Tang & Chen, 2008) Perceived consequences (self) Love of money is directly related to unethical behaviour. 
(Tang & Chiu, 2003) Perceived consequences (self) Love of money related to unethical behaviour. 
(Tenbrunsel, 1998) Perceived consequences (self) 
The larger a focal actor's incentive, the more likely it is that the actor will 
misrepresent information. 
(Decker & Calo, 2007) Perceived consequences (self) 
If decision-makers perceive higher costs for unethical behaviour, ethical 
judgments were more likely. 
* Portion of the literature review of the empirical studies in business ethics 
 
Further to the empirical work, Schwepker and Good (1999) found an employment threat 
for failing to achieve a quota resulted in marketers judging deception to achieve the 
quota as a minor moral issue. Interestingly, when ethical judgment was analyzed 
without the self-interest threat, most participants judged deception as ethically 
questionable. Clearly, the self-interest threat resulted in the change of judgment and 
provides evidence that when threatened, decision-makers are more sympathetic toward 
malfeasance. In this context, self-interest becomes more important than the 
consequences to others.  
Indeed, decisions that involve higher levels of intensity tend to be increasingly complex 
and given their limited cognitive abilities, decision-makers are unable to process all the 
relevant facts (Marquardt, 2010). When decisions involving a trade-off have to be made, 
certain values could be traded-off for other more salient interests (Galperin, Bennett, & 
Aquino, 2011). However, when trade-offs are made and other people are harmed, the 
self-concept of the decision-maker is negatively affected, which contributes to cognitive 
dissonance (Maruna & Copes, 2004). 
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When cognitive dissonance occurs, decision-makers either compromise or maintain 
their values (Maertz, Hassan, & Magnusson, 2009). If values are compromised, 
dissonance is remedied through rationalization (Maruna & Copes, 2004) and the self-
concept is preserved (Hoshino-Browne, Zanna, Spencer, Zanna, & Kitayama, 2005). 
However, Schwepker and Good (1999) did not include rationalization in their study and, 
unfortunately, Jones’s (1991) model does not account for the cognitive distortions of 
decision-makers and their ability to misperceive ‘moral intensity’ (Barsky, 2011). 
Although Jones’s (1991) and Rest’s (1986) frameworks have been heavily cited within 
an organisational context, neither model accounts for rationalization. Rationalization 
has yet to be integrated within the ethical decision-making frameworks as an influential 
factor. 
Beyond this limitation, the Jones (1991) or Rest (1986) models do not account for other 
influential factors that could have a profound effect on the decision-making process. It 
is believed that EQB cannot necessarily be explained by one or two constructs, 
malfeasance is complex and can be caused by multiple factors (Kish-Gephart et. al., 
2010; Trevino & Youngblood, 1990). To investigate rationalization within the decision-
making process and the potential for Machiavellian personality traits to influence the 
process, the frameworks that consider these constructs are discussed in the following 
section.  
3.3.3 Influential Factors 
Vitell and Grove (1987) advanced a decision-making model consisting of the TON. 
Through the aid of neutralization, it was conceptualized that decision-makers might 
judge an illicit behaviour as acceptable in one situation, but not in another. In this 
context, neutralizations enable marketers to judge their behaviours as ethical prior to 
their implementation (Anand et al., 2005). By believing the behaviour is temporarily 
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excusable, feelings of guilt are minimized (Bersoff, 1999). However, the model was 
advanced prior to the development of Jones’s (1991) issue-contingent framework and, 
therefore, Vitell and Grove (1987) did not consider the varying levels of intensity 
associated with ethical problems in their framework.  
To fill the lacuna left by Vitell and Grove (1987), Chatzidakis et al. (2007) suggested 
that the TON be integrated with Jones’s (1991) theory of moral intensity. Through this 
synthesis, it has been suggested that the TON would have the greatest relationship to 
judgment and intentions within the decision-making process (Detert, Trevino, & 
Sweitzer, 2008). In the synopsis of their review of the business ethics empirical 
literature, O’Fallon and Butterfield (2005) called for researchers to study additional 
influential factors that can assist in explaining judgments and intentions. 
Beyond neutralization as an influential factor in the decision-making process, 
researchers have demonstrated that various organisational factors seem to influence 
EQB. In several empirical studies (see Table 3.1), a consistent relationship between 
aberrant and aggressive organisational cultures and EQB was found (Jones & 
Kavanagh, 1996). Within the context of these aggressive cultures, a relationship 
between stringent organisational objectives and malfeasance was found (Bellizzi & 
Hite, 1989). In their study, Jones and Kavanagh (1996) found participants were willing 
to behave unethically if their peers were perceived to behave similarly. From this 
consistent discourse, it appears organisational pressures, which appear to be issue-
contingent and subject to varying degrees of intensity, seem to influence the decision-
making process.  
Beyond organisational pressures, researchers (Trevino & Youngblood, 1990) have 
contended that EQB is influenced by deviant personality types or those who are 
predisposed to malfeasance. In the empirical literature, individuals with external locus 
CHAPTER THREE  
 63 
of control, Machiavellian personalities (Ford & Richardson, 1995; Loe, Ferrell, & 
Mansfield, 2000; O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005), narcissistic tendencies, and higher 
levels of psychopathology (Stevens, Deuling, & Armenakis, 2012) were found to be 
more likely to behave illicitly compared to those that did not have these personality 
attributes.  
Individuals with external locus of control personalities believe “… that outcomes and 
events in life are determined primarily by external forces (e.g., luck, fate, social, 
context, and other people)” (O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005, p. 401). It is argued these 
individuals tend to pass blame onto others, which could be a form of rationalization 
(Kish-Gephart et al., 2010). In this context, Detert et al. (2008) found rationalization 
mediated the relationship between locus of control and unethical decision-making. 
Individuals with external locus of control are not typically inclined to advance their self-
interests to the detriment of others through manipulation or exploitation. However, these 
tendencies are of central importance to the rational egoism normative theme of this 
research and, therefore, external locus of control is inapplicable to this research.  
According to the irrational egoist personalities, an emerging field of personality 
research involves the dark-triad personality (Paulhus & William, 2002). It is argued that 
the dark-triad personality comprises narcissism, psychopathology, and 
Machiavellianism. All three personalities have been found to be moderately correlated. 
Campbell, Hoffman, Campbell, and Marchisio (2011) define narcissism as “a relatively 
stable individual difference consisting of grandiosity, self-love, and inflated self-views” 
(p. 269). In general, narcissists believe they are deserving of special treatment and they 
have been found to contribute to counterproductive work behaviours (Campbell et al., 
2011). However, narcissists are vain, erratic and not necessarily, most inclined to 
exploit the interests of others to advance their own. 
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According to the psychopathology research, psychopaths are insensitive, callous, and 
lack remorse (Jonason & Webster, 2010). It is argued psychopathic traits are not only 
found among criminals and the mentally deranged. On the contrary, psychopaths are 
found among the general public or more specifically, the general public can possess 
psychopathic characteristics (Jakobwitz & Egan, 2006). Stevens et al. (2012) argue 
psychopaths possess the minimal moral aptitude to decipher between right and wrong, 
but through rationalization, psychopaths can reframe their conception of morality. 
Stevens et al. (2012) provide empirical evidence that rationalization mediates the 
relationship between psychopathology and unethical decision-making.  
However, compared to Machiavellians, psychopaths are not as manipulative or 
exploitative in their desire to advance their self-interests. According to the findings 
compiled in three literature reviews that cover the empirical research in the business 
ethics paradigm from 1965 to 2005 (Ford & Richardson, 1995; Loe et al., 2000; 
O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005) and meta-analyses (Kish-Gephart et al., 2010), it was 
determined that Machiavellians are consistently inclined to behave illicitly by advancing 
their interests to the detriment of others. For this reason, Machiavellianism is studied in 
this research. 
Moreover, Chatzidakis et al. (2007) suspected a mediating relationship between 
personalities, the TON, and the dependent variables in the decision-making process 
would exist. Indeed, it appears situational, deviant personality traits, organisational 
pressures, and neutralization factors can influence the decision-making process (Jones 
& Kavanagh, 1996; Brass, Butterfield & Skaggs, 1998).  
3.3.4 Intuitionist Models 
It is suspected that when individuals experience stress, they fail to adhere to rational 
decision-making frameworks (Keinan, 1987). As demonstrated in the previous section, 
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stress appears to be a function of issue-contingent factors. In stressful situations and 
perhaps as a consequence of bounded rationality, decision-makers fail to compile all the 
relevant details associated with an ethical dilemma (Keinan, 1987), which results in the 
forming of decisions with incomplete information.  
As discussed briefly at the close of chapter two, it is believed individuals form most of 
their decisions reflectively, which occurs below the level of consciousness. According 
to Freud, “we cannot account for our behaviour solely in terms of our conscious desires, 
intentions and wishes. There are also unconscious desires and wishes, largely unknown 
to our conscious selves, and these provide the basis for much of our behaviour” 
(Greetman, 2006, p. 228). 
Built on Freud’s discourse, Reynolds (2006) advanced a neurological cognitive model 
of ethical decision-making. The model is fundamentally based on neural network 
modelling, which involve schematic analyses of brain activity whilst individuals make 
decisions. It is argued neurological transmitters (or prototypes) are used in the decision-
making process. Prototypes are multi-dimensional stimuli that operate at the 
subconscious-level and enable decision-makers to recognize certain situations. When 
these situations are recognized, individuals make decisions based on their previous 
experiences. It is contended that this process “… is more unthinking or mechanical and 
emanates from reflexive judgment” (Kish-Gephart et al., 2010, p. 22). As indicated, it is 
believed that most decisions are not made through deliberations. They are made 
intuitively and instantaneously.   
Conversely, when individuals rationalize, Reynolds (2006) demonstrates a similar 
process occurs as outlined by Rest (1986). Specifically, various interactions occur 
between rationalization and the stages in the decision-making process (Reynolds, 2006). 
The process of rationalization is argued to be more reflective and occurs at the 
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conscious level. Freud (1900) argued judgments are controlled by the unconscious mind 
and rationalizations are used to make publicly acceptable arguments for one’s behaviour 
(Haidt, 2001). In this context, rationalization refers to moral reasoning, which is “an ex 
post facto process used to influence the intuitions (and hence judgments) of other 
people” (Haidt, 2001, p. 814). Simply put, to convince others (and themselves) their 
behaviour is justifiable, decision-makers rationalize. 
In general, Reynolds (2006) argues malfeasance occurs through four processes. First, an 
individual does not recognize an ethical problem. Second, the decision-maker believes 
the EQB is ethical. Third, even if the decision-maker follows social norms, they can be 
misapplied in certain contexts. For example, a marketer might believe deception is 
wrong; however, the marketer might believe deception is excusable to gain a new 
customer. Finally, malfeasance can occur if the decision-maker is Machiavellian or of a 
personality type that is predisposed to EQB. 
3.4 Conclusion 
As presented in this chapter, it appears certain individuals are inclined to behave 
unethically. Specifically, Machiavellian personality types seem to be most consistent 
with a disposition to advance their self-interests to the detriment of others. However, 
according to the literature on issue-contingent factors and organisational pressures, it 
appears decent individuals could be coerced into malfeasance (Tepper, 2010) by 
perceived organisational pressures and personal harms (or rewards).  
The models that account for the less-optimal decision-making abilities of decision-
makers (Simon, 1955) and their willingness to satisfy their immediate concerns by 
addressing the threat from the ethical problem, but not maximize the possible utility 
associated with behaving ethically, were discussed. From these models, decision-makers 
are expected to ignore relevant information, which according to rational egoism, would 
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be in their best interests to consider, and make irrational (and unethical) decisions to the 
detriment of others. Through the aid of the TON, decision-makers can deceive 
themselves by enabling them to believe their EQBs are in fact acceptable.  
Even though progress has been made in understanding corporate malfeasance, each of 
the aforementioned models seem to be one-dimensional and can only paint a small, and 
perhaps distorted, portion of the greater picture of corporate malfeasance. By 
synthesizing these portions of the greater whole together, this amalgamated framework 
can perhaps adequately explain not only how marketers rationalize their EQB and the 
effect Machiavellianism has on the process, but also corporate malfeasance in general. 
This phenomenon is of central importance to the model for ethically questionable 
decision-making presented in the next chapter. 
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A Model for Ethically Questionable 
Decision-Making 
4.1 Introduction 
In the first chapter of this thesis, the research questions of ‘how do marketers rationalize 
their ethically questionable intentions’ and ‘what influence does Machiavellianism have 
on the process’, were introduced. In chapter two, the rational egoism normative 
philosophical framework was demonstrated to be compatible with American capitalism 
and, also appears to have the greatest propensity to result in ethical behaviour. This 
broader theory of rational egoism was used to contextualize ethically questionable 
behaviour (EQB). In chapter three, the economic rationality and bounded rationality 
decision-making theories were discussed. It was determined that under the right 
circumstances, such as when decision-makers perceive personal harms, they are 
incapable of behaving rationally or ethically. When decision-makers behave illicitly, it 
was demonstrated that rationalizations enable decision-makers to minimize their 
perceived guilt. In the latter sections of chapter three, the main decision-making models 
in the business ethics paradigm were presented.  
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Built from these frameworks, a model for ethically questionable decision-making is 
presented in this chapter. In the first section of the chapter, the model is outlined. In the 
latter sections of the chapter, the main variables of interest, which include perceived 
moral intensity (PMI), the techniques of neutralization (TON), Machiavellianism, 
behavioural intentions, and ethical judgment, are discussed.  
4.2 A Model for Ethically Questionable Decision-Making 
Ethicists have demonstrated that the severity of harms caused to stakeholders 
contributes to ethical decisions (O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005). However, researchers 
have yet to analyse the severity of consequences on managers. With this lack of 
advancement, it remains uncertain if individuals will maintain their ethical 
predispositions in the presence of personal threats. Indeed, when managers perceive 
negative consequences associated with an ethical dilemma, they become more tolerant 
toward malfeasance (Schwepker & Good, 1999). In this context, self-interest becomes 
more salient than the consequences of the harms inflicted on others. Without studying 
the consequences on managers involved in malfeasance, researchers are incapable of 
understanding how executives respond when they encounter many ethical problems. 
This research lacuna is the focus of this study. By studying harms to decision-makers 
and stakeholders, this research builds on Jones’s (1991) moral intensity construct, the 
most widely cited model in contemporary ethical decision-making research (O’Fallon & 
Butterfield, 2005). 
When decision-makers harm others, their self-concept can be negatively affected, which 
contributes to cognitive dissonance (Maruna & Copes, 2004). To develop ethically 
questionable intentions while maintaining a positive self-concept, decision-makers 
distort their perceptions and misconstrue the ethical dilemma (Bersoff, 1999). These 
cognitive distortions are often facilitated by neutralization techniques. As indicated, 
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neutralization techniques are used by individuals to convince themselves their 
malfeasance is temporarily excusable (Sykes & Matza, 1957). 
However, Jones’s (1991) model unfortunately does not account for rationalization and 
the ability of decision-makers to misperceive moral intensity (Barsky, 2011). Even 
though O’Fallon and Butterfield (2005) suggested researchers should study various 
interaction effects in the decision-making process, researchers have yet to integrate 
rationalization within Jones’s (1991) or Rest’s (1986) decision-making frameworks. 
Without this integration, researchers are unable to fully understand the intermediary 
steps in the decision-making process, how managers rationalize their ethically 
questionable intentions, and the cognitive limitations of managers. To improve 
knowledge of the decision-making process, Chatzidakis et al. (2007) urged researchers 
to integrate neutralization within Jones’s (1991) model. These researchers believed that 
neutralization is likely to influence each stage in Jones’s (1991) issue-contingent model. 
Detert et al. (2008) echoed Chatzidakis et al. (2007) and called for neutralization to be 
integrated within Rest’s (1986) and Jones’s (1991) frameworks. In addition, Barsky 
(2008) argued Jones’s (1991) and Rest’s (1986) models were incomplete without the 
use of neutralization.  
Considering the Jones (1991) and Rest (1986) models omit rationalization, which are 
the dominant models in ethics research (O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005), a significant gap 
in the business ethics research paradigm exists. Beyond this gap, a dearth of research 
involving the study of neutralization within an organisational context exists. Given this 
lack of development, the exact stages in the decision-making process influenced by the 
TON and the strength of the relationships remain largely unknown (Chatzidakis et al., 
2007). In view of this conceptual gap, additional theoretical advancement amalgamating 
the TON within an organisational decision-making context is warranted. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
71 
 
Decision-making theorists (Trevino & Youngblood, 1990) suggest illicit behaviour is 
the result of deviant personalities or the term commonly used in business ethics, bad 
apples. Using simple regression models, researchers have validated direct relationships 
between various personality traits, such as Machiavellianism, and the dependent 
variables in the decision-making process (O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005). Even though 
significant relationships were found, the coefficient of determination or the effect size is 
rarely shown in these studies. Without this information, researchers are incapable of 
understanding how much of a contribution these personality constructs make on the 
dependent variables in the decision-making process. Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) 
acknowledge that personality can influence the decision-making process, but personality 
has not consistently been found to cause significant differences in behaviour. In 
addition, complex structural equation modelling is rarely undertaken in the business 
ethics paradigm. Without conducting complex analyses with multiple latent variables 
present, researchers are unable to understand the impact these variables have on the 
dependent variables in the decision-making process. 
Beyond these analytical issues, the aforementioned validated relationships between 
Machiavellianism and the dependent variables in the decision-making process, such as 
intentions might be indirect, mediated through the TON (Chatzidakis et al., 2007). In 
their study, Detert et al. (2008) found rationalization mediated the relationship between 
the external locus of control personality and unethical decision-making. If the same 
results apply to Machiavellianism, deviant personalities might not be the major 
contributors to the decision-making process; cognitive and situational factors might be 
the most salient. 
It is possible that when decision-makers experience intense consequences to their 
personal interests, individuals in general could be coerced into behaving in ways 
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contrary to their typical behaviour (Gellerman, 1989). Examples of this can be found in 
Nazi Germany (Tsang, 2002). In the Milgram (1964) studies where the vast majority of 
participants followed orders from an ‘authority figure’ and gave electric shocks of 
increasing severity to subjects. The Stanford prison experiment (Zimbardo, 1973), 
which consisted of a two-week role playing scenario involving psychology students; the 
students that played the role of the ‘guards’ behaved heinously by psychological 
torturing the student ‘prisoners’. In fact, the study had to be terminated prematurely as 
the abuse was becoming increasingly severe. Indeed, depending on the consequences or 
rewards to decision-makers, the Machiavellian personality trait might be an 
inconsequential factor in the decision-making process (Gellerman, 1989).  
As outlined in chapter one, corporate malfeasance is thought to be widespread, costly, 
and harmful to stakeholders. Indeed, researchers have not approached this problem by: 
(1) analyzing the consequences for managers within Jones’s (1991) model, and; (2) 
including rationalization within the decision-making models. To address this void, a 
model is developed in this research by synthesizing the TON within Jones’s (1991) 
issue-contingent framework (see Figure 4.1).  
In this research, it is argued that decision-makers often fail to recognize moral issues 
(Jones, 1991). However, when individuals recognize the consequences on others 
associated with an ethical problem, they often consider the issue irrelevant and the 
harms trivial (Sparks & Hunt, 1998). In this latter instance, how individuals ‘minimize’ 
the importance of the consequences on others, is investigated. By amalgamating PMI 
with the TON, an understanding of this phenomenon can be gained. 
Before describing the framework in detail, there are three general assumptions based on 
the extant literature that are associated with the model for ethically questionable 
decision-making. First, marketers are not criminals and in general, are good people 
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(Collins, 2012). Second, marketers perceive themselves as ethical (Detert et al., 2008), 
but feel guilty when they need to make decisions that are ethically questionable (Sykes 
& Matza, 1957). Third, marketers will seek to minimize the guilt associated with 
forming ethically questionable intentions (Bersoff, 1999).  
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Figure 4.1 – A Model for Ethically Questionable Decision-making 
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4.3 Study Variables 
For the remainder of this chapter, the main variables of interest in the model for 
ethically questionable decision-making are discussed. The independent variables 
include PMI, the TON, and Machiavellianism. The dependent variables are ethical 
judgment and behavioural intentions. The established empirical relationships between 
the aforementioned variables are discussed, which leads to the development of the 
hypotheses for this thesis.  
4.3.1 Perceived Moral Intensity 
Founded in moral philosophy, tort law, and retribution (Morris & McDonald, 1995), 
Jones (1991) provides a useful framework for ethical decision-making with his moral 
intensity construct. As discussed in chapter three, Jones (1991) defines moral intensity 
as a multidimensional construct that captures the most salient factors pertinent to an 
ethical problem. PMI is comprised of six dimensions: proximity, probability of effect, 
temporal immediacy, concentration of effect, magnitude of consequences, and social 
consensus. In empirical studies, the magnitude of consequences and social consensus 
are the most robust factors of the PMI construct (Stein & Ahmad, 2009) and are most 
relevant to the decision-making process. The other four factors were found to be 
insignificant (Singer & Singer, 1997; Singhapakdi et al., 1996). Therefore, only the 
magnitude of consequences and social consensus are included in the PMI construct 
within the model for ethically questionable decision-making.  
In the literature, researchers have modelled the dimensions of moral intensity as first-
order reflective constructs (McMahon & Harvey, 2007). Meaning the dimensions of 
moral intensity independently influence the decision-making process. However, this 
approach is inconsistent with Jones’s (1991) multidimensional theory. According to 
Jones (1991), the dimensions of moral intensity and one’s perception of them 
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collectively represent the PMI construct, which in turn influences decision-making. 
Jones (1991) argues the dimensions of moral intensity are all characteristics of the 
ethical problem. The construct is: 
 … expected to increase (monotonically) if there is an increase in any one (or 
 more) of its components, and it is expected to decrease if there is a decrease in 
 any one (or more) of its components, assuming the remaining components 
 remain constant (Jones, 1991, p. 378). 
 
Consistent with this theory, McMahon and Harvey (2006) demonstrated that each 
dimension of moral intensity measures a different facet of the PMI construct. Kish-
Gephart et al. (2010) emphasize that as any of the dimensions of moral intensity change, 
the PMI construct changes proportionately. Moreover, the dimensions are relatively 
independent weighted contributions of PMI, are not highly correlated, and so variation 
in one dimension has no effect on the remaining dimensions. In view of this 
contextualization, the PMI construct is conceptualized as a Type II second-order 
formative model (Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer, 2001; Jarvis, Mackenzie, Podsakoff, 
Mick, & Bearden, 2003).  
Social consensus. Jones defines social consensus as “the degree of social agreement 
that a proposed act is evil (or good)” (1991, p. 375). Researchers using this definition 
measure social consensus by how one perceives others appraise an EQB. However, 
Jones (1991) emphasized that illicit behaviour can result from managers that 
misperceive the morality of a situation (or social consensus). In this case, social 
consensus is normative (Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007) and managers are influenced by 
their perceptions of social norms (Valentine & Bateman, 2011). Thus, an individual 
level perspective of social norms is associated with social consensus. To this end, social 
consensus is defined broadly as the degree managers perceive that other people agree 
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with a proposed act and the degree that they also accept the behaviour. In this research, 
social norms and social consensus are used interchangeably. 
Consistent with this discourse, Agnew (1994) argued researchers (i.e., Hindelang, 1970) 
typically fail to test the approval of social norms effectively and ultimately, the 
relationship between neutralization, judgment, and behaviour. In self-administered 
questionnaires, researchers (Hindelang, 1970) often ask participants if they approve of 
an EQB. When participants answer affirmatively, researchers (i.e., Hindelang, 1970) 
conclude inaccurately that neutralization is unrelated to malfeasance as individuals are 
perceived to be disconnected from social norms and would not feel guilty for behaving 
illicitly.  
However, the aforementioned approach does not adequately test social norms as it does 
not measure participants’ acceptance of conventional norms in general. The measure is 
perceived as vague and could be interpreted as testing either a participant’s agreement 
with the behaviour in general or as an exception involving extenuating circumstances 
(Agnew, 1994). In other words, the measure is likely to confuse the individuals that 
believe an EQB is conditionally acceptable (i.e., those more inclined to neutralize) with 
those that believe an EQB is unconditionally acceptable (i.e., those that reject social 
norms) (Agnew, 1994). Put plainly, “at the heart of neutralization theory lays the 
acceptance of both a conventional norm and the situational exceptions to it” 
(Chatzidakis et al., 2007, p. 95). To test if neutralization is related to EQB, it is argued 
researchers must measure one’s acceptance of social norms at the general level (Agnew, 
1994). 
To address this methodological concern, Agnew (1994) and Minor (1981) tested 
participants’ general approval of an EQB. Through this method, if decision-makers 
accept the norms of society, agree with various neutralizations, and behave unethically, 
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it is assumed neutralization facilitated EQB (Agnew, 1994). By using this method, the 
Agnew (1994) and Minor (1981) studies have been hailed as methodologically superior 
(Maruna & Copes, 2004).  
Conversely, by only testing social norms using the Agnew (1994) and Minor (1981) 
approach, the broader level of how decision-makers perceive other people agree with 
the norms of society is omitted. To ensure social consensus is adequately represented, 
the construct is contextualized in this research through a: (1) context-specific focus of 
how one perceives others appraise an EQB (Singhapakdi et al., 1996), and; (2) general 
focus of how decision-makers perceive social norms at the individual level (Agnew, 
1994). By including all facets of social consensus, the construct is advanced beyond the 
contextualization used by both Singhapakdi et al. (1996) and Agnew (1994), which can 
not only enhance internal consistency, but can also ensure one’s reliance on 
neutralization is adequately measured.  
Magnitude of consequences. Jones defines the magnitude of consequences as “the sum 
of the harms (or benefits) done to victims (or beneficiaries) of the moral act in question” 
(1991: 374). As previously observed, most research on the magnitude of consequences 
has been within the context of others rather than that for the decision-makers themselves 
(Gurley et al., 2007). However, Hunt and Vitell (1986) argue that if decision-makers 
perceive preferred consequences, such as attractive financial benefits associated with an 
ethically questionable alternative, they are likely to pursue a less optimal decision if it is 
favourable to their performance. In his research on white collar criminals, Heath (2008) 
contended that for reasons of financial desperation, these criminals behaved illicitly out 
of fear and anxiety as opposed to merely greed.  
Clearly, there are consequences to managers for certain behaviours as they are often the 
victim (or beneficiary) of an ethical problem. As such, it is logical to include the 
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magnitude of consequences to the manager within Jones’s (1991) model. To this end, 
the construct is divided into two first, the magnitude of consequences, as defined by 
Jones (1991) and second, as a construct involving consequences to managers. The first 
is called the magnitude of consequences (others); the second is the magnitude of 
consequences (self). Therefore, the PMI construct is formatively comprised of three first 
order latent variables (magnitude of consequences (self and others) and social 
consensus). 
Hypothesis 1a: The magnitude of consequences (self) is a formative dimension 
of perceived moral intensity. 
Hypothesis 1b: The magnitude of consequences (others) is a formative 
dimension of perceived moral intensity. 
Hypothesis 1c: Social consensus is a formative dimension of perceived moral 
intensity. 
Marta and Singhapakdi (2005) found participants respond to ethical problems by 
perceiving moral intensity (PMI) through varying levels. To quantify the varying levels 
of PMI, Stein and Ahmad (2009) conducted an analysis using American legislative data. 
They analyzed the economic awards within the American judicial system in relation to 
various harms. According to the results, moral intensity was categorized within 
physical, economic, and psychological harms. Ethical problems involving physical 
harms were rated the highest in intensity, economic harms were considered moderately 
intense, and psychological harms were considered of lower levels of intensity. 
Consistent with this discourse, Collins (1989) also defined harms within the context of 
physical, economic, and psychological. It is generally argued that as harms increase, 
PMI increases (McMahon & Harvey, 2007).  
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According to the empirical work involving ethical recognition, O’Fallon and Butterfield 
(2005) found a higher level of PMI was related to participants recognizing an ethical 
problem. Within the context of Rest’s (1986) model, Singhapakdi et al. (1996) found 
ethical intensity significantly influenced ethical recognition (O’Fallon & Butterfield, 
2005), which was further found by Singhapakdi, Vitell, and Franke (1999) in that 
increases in intensity would result in increases in recognition. Barnett (2001) argues that 
“when moral intensity is low, decision-makers are unlikely to devote extensive 
cognitive effort when forming ethical judgments, but when issues or actions have 
greater moral intensity, they should elicit more sophisticated reasoning” (p. 1042). To 
ensure participants perceive the ethical problems in this study as intense, economic 
harms are used as the primary harm against both decision-makers and other stakeholders 
(Stein & Ahmad, 2009).  
Jones (1991) argued that when moral intensity increases “judgments regarding the 
appropriate action to be taken in the situation should lean more toward ethical action; 
behavioural intention should be to act in a more ethical manner; and behaviour should 
be more ethical” (McMahon & Harvey, 2007, 352). According to the empirical work, 
PMI has been positively related to ethical judgments (Singer, 1996) and behavioural 
intentions (Barnett & Valentine, 2004; Singhapadi et al., 1996). These relationships are 
well-established in the literature (Harrington, 1997). According to their literature 
review, O’Fallon and Butterfield (2005) demonstrated that PMI had an empirical 
relationship to judgment in 14 studies and intentions in eight studies.  
For completeness, the paths between PMI and intentions and PMI and ethical judgment 
are included in the model to represent the corresponding relationships. As indicated in 
the introduction of the model for this research, it is expected that marketers recognize 
the consequences on others associated with an ethical problem. However, when they 
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encounter personal harms for ethical behaviour, they consider the harms against other 
stakeholders as inconsequential (Sparks & Hunt, 1998) and, subsequently, develop 
ethically questionable intentions. Similarly, they are likely to judge their ethically 
questionable intentions as ethical. These relationships are reflected in the following 
hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 2: The perceived moral intensity construct is negatively related to 
ethical judgment in which an ethically questionable behaviour is judged as 
ethical. 
Hypothesis 3: The perceived moral intensity construct is negatively related to 
unethical intentions. 
In summary, when decision-makers encounter equal threats to their self-interests as 
other stakeholders, a utility analysis of the ethical problem is conducted (Smith, 
Simpson, & Huang, 2007). If the benefits associated with the EQB outweigh the costs 
of ethical behaviour, malfeasance is likely to occur (Murphy, 2008). Through this cost-
benefit analysis, marketers are expected to distort their perceptions of the harms on 
others (Sonenshein, 2007), perceive the harms against their self-interest as most salient, 
and misperceive social norms. In these situations, Barsky (2008, p. 65) argues that 
marketers:  
 … may be less willing to behave ethically, as they may link harmful or deceitful 
 actions to worthy purposes… rationalizations serve to morally disengage the 
 individual by neutralizing internal and social pressures to act ethically when the 
 opportunity for wrongdoing is presented.  
 
Marketers perceive their self-interest as most salient (Bersoff, 1999) and in order to 
behave unethically, neutralization is used to justify the decision. In this context, 
neutralization will likely facilitate the implementation of biased judgments, “which in 
turn leads to the belief that the act is legitimate. Thus, the belief appears, at least 
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superficially, to emanate from a rational procedure rather than a selfish motive” 
(Bersoff, 1999, p. 422). For example, marketers might argue a perceived choice did not 
exist and their self-interests had to be preserved (Vitell & Grove, 1987).  
4.3.2 Techniques of Neutralization 
To understand how marketers rationalize their ethically questionable intentions, 
neutralization theory, a literature drawn from criminology and delinquency, is discussed 
in this section. To explain norm-violating behaviours, criminologists Sykes and Matza 
(1957) developed a framework of neutralization. As indicated, the five original TON 
that construct Sykes and Matza’s (1957) model include the denial of responsibility 
(DOR), denial of injury (DOI), denial of victim (DOV), condemning the condemners 
(CTC), and appeal to higher loyalties (AHL).  
The DOR is used when decision-makers believe they have no choice, they have to 
behave unethically (Anand et al., 2005). Reasons might be associated with financial 
threats or employment repercussions. The magnitude of consequences (self) could 
trigger the use of the DOR. When managers believe they have no choice and have to 
behave illicitly, they use the DOR to justify this (Anand et al., 2005). When this occurs, 
managers blame their behaviour on the situation and argue there was no other 
reasonable option.  
When managers perceive the magnitude of consequences (others) as benign 
(Chatzidakis et al., 2007) they are likely to use the DOI to convince themselves (and 
others) an injury has not occurred (Anand et al., 2005). In situations involving bribery, 
decision-makers have argued bribery does not directly harm others (Vitell & Grove, 
1987). In this context, bribery is considered a cost of business or an overhead 
expenditure. In a pollution context, managers could argue the consequences could be 
worse in other circumstances (Ashforth & Anand, 2003). For example, individuals will 
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likely perceive pollution in an urban setting as more heinous than pollution in a rural 
location due to the relative number of individuals affected. In this context, marketers 
can convince themselves an injury has not occurred (Anand et. al., 2005) and the action 
is simply unimportant (McDonald & Pak, 1996).  
The DOV occurs when a marketer does not recognize a victim as the target wilfully 
participated (Anand et al., 2005). To minimize the consequences on others, managers 
use the DOV (Vitell & Grove, 1987). This neutralization can occur in instances of 
exploitation. For example, marketers could justify pursuing subprime lending strategies 
by arguing consumers seek credit and therefore, are not victims. To further deny a 
victim, marketers could argue they have no control if consumers over-borrow and 
cannot afford their repayments. To deny consumers as victims, marketers categorize 
consumers by income level when segmenting their markets (Kotler & Keller, 2007), 
which can assist marketers in dehumanizing consumers as they can appear in a lesser 
socioeconomic class. 
Sykes and Matza (1957) developed the condemning the condemners (CTC) variable; 
however, Anand et al. (2005) argue CTC is within a broader category known as social 
weighting (SW). SW “refers to how much attention and credence one actor gives to the 
values and beliefs of another. Condemning condemners involves impugning the 
legitimacy of those who would cast the act or actor as corrupt” (Ashforth & Anand, 
2003, p.20). Individuals who condemn their condemners are often cynical and believe 
their accusers are illegitimate themselves. Similar to the denial of injury, SW can be 
used to compare an EQB with more extreme behaviours. Anand et al. (2005) argue 
“because corrupt acts can make individuals appear bad, they are motivated to find 
examples of others who are even more corrupt and thereby demonstrate that ‘we’re not 
so bad’” (p. 13). The SW neutralization is also used by decision-makers when society 
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condones certain EQBs or if the behaviour is perceived as common. To assist managers 
in misperceiving social consensus, individuals use social weighting when they 
erroneously believe they are only behaving similarly to everyone else (Vitell & Grove, 
1987).  
The appeal to higher loyalties (AHL) is similar to the denial of responsibility in that 
participants believe their actions are excusable as no other choice was present that 
would achieve their higher goals. Marketers use the AHL when they believe their 
behaviour is associated with attaining a higher good. This neutralization is often used 
when illicit actions benefit one’s employer (Vitell & Grove, 1987). In addition, Heath 
(2008) found that corporate criminals often justify their behaviour by arguing they 
behaved illicitly for their family. Therefore, to implement unethical intentions that 
benefit their employers or their families, decision-makers might neutralize through the 
AHL and judge their behaviour as acceptable.  
Beyond the original techniques, Ashforth and Anand (2003) developed the legality 
neutralization technique. Legality is based on the philosophy that if an act does not 
conflict with any legislation, the behaviour is morally acceptable (Aguilera & Vadera, 
2008). When neutralizing, “actors may excuse corrupt practices on the grounds that they 
are not actually illegal” (Ashforth & Anand, 2003, p. 18). This neutralization technique 
could be particularly useful for executives when they rationalize behaviours that are 
legal but not necessarily ethical.  
To demonstrate this in a pollution context, executives of multinational corporations 
have used the legality neutralization when rationalizing their illicit behaviours abroad. 
For example, in response to the allegations that Chevron Texaco devastated the rain 
forests of Ecuador, executives argued no specific legislation prohibited their behaviour 
(The Economist, 2003). According to the empirical literature, Laczniak and Inderrieden 
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(1987) found participants’ responses to illegal scenarios were more ethical compared to 
the responses to the legal but not necessarily ethical scenarios.  
According to Kohlberg’s (1976) cognitive moral development theory, it is suggested 
that when individuals progress through the six hierarchical stages in the model, they are 
capable of resolving moral dilemmas of increasing complexity. However, empirical 
evidence of the higher levels is rare (Rest, 1986). Researchers have also demonstrated 
that the majority of the U.S. population typically relies on rules or legislation to 
formulate their ethical judgments, which is stage four (Wood et al., 1988). Therefore, 
managers may use the legality neutralization to justify pursuing an ethically 
questionable activity when this is within the confines of the law. 
In addition to the aforementioned neutralization techniques, Minor (1981) developed the 
defence of necessity (DON) neutralization. The DON is derived from the defence of 
necessity used within a judicial context. In the criminology literature, defendants often 
argue they behaved illegally to avoid a greater evil and, therefore, their illegal act is 
justified (Arnolds & Garland, 1974). Within the context of neutralization, Minor (1981) 
defines the DON as an act that is perceived as necessary and by its commission, 
deviants need not feel guilty.  
In general, the DON is used by individuals when they feel their behaviour is associated 
with a necessary purpose (Christensen, 2010). These individuals typically acknowledge 
their behaviour is illicit, but claim their actions are necessary. In these situations, 
decision-makers feel they have no other recourse. They believe the sustainability of 
their self-interests and the interests of their family are more important than acting within 
the norms of society (McGregor, 2009). In the literature, the DON was used by 
decision-makers when an EQB was implemented to improve the financial performance 
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of their employer, to feed their family (Christensen, 2010), to defend their employment 
or business (Enticott, 2011), and to avoid possible layoffs (Gray, 2006). 
To summarize, it is argued neutralizations can assist decision-makers in forming biased 
decisions by believing the magnitude of consequences are more benign than actuality 
(Chatzidakis et al., 2007). In other words, PMI appears to inform the TON. “For Sykes 
and Matza, people who commit deviant acts are generally committed to mainstream 
norms and know that they will feel shame and guilt over their violations of conventional 
norms” (Christensen, 2010, p. 559). Conversely, it is argued that if one is indifferent to 
perceived social norms, neutralizations are unnecessary. In these cases, individuals or 
most likely delinquents follow divergent norms from conventional society and when 
they behave illicitly, they are behaving within these alternative norms (Agnew, 1994). 
Subsequently, they do not experience guilt or require the aid of neutralization 
techniques. However, researchers (Agnew, 1994) have found that individuals rely on 
neutralizations when they misperceive social norms. In this context, managers are often 
motivated to perceive their intentions and judgments as consistent with other people 
(Flynn & Wiltermuth, 2010). They appreciate that certain people will believe the 
behaviour is wrong, but believe most do not (Harris & Dumas, 2009); ultimately they 
use neutralization techniques to minimize cognitive dissonance.  
As outlined in the general assumptions of this chapter, a priori, it is anticipated that 
most marketers are not delinquents (Tepper, 2010), are therefore attached to social 
norms, but can use them inappropriately (Reynolds, 2006). When marketers 
misperceive social consensus, they experience cognitive dissonance. Thus, it is expected 
that social consensus and the magnitude of consequences (self and others), which are 
formative dimensions of PMI, are negatively related to the TON.   
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Hypothesis 4: Perceived moral intensity is negatively related to the techniques 
of neutralization. 
Empirically, Harrington (1996) was one of the pioneers to study the TON within 
business ethics. In an information systems context, Harrington (1996) found high-levels 
of the denial of responsibility are highly correlated to judging an EQB as ethical and the 
willingness to behave concurrently. Unfortunately, the other TON were excluded from 
the study. Agnew (1994) found neutralization techniques informed the EQBs of 
adolescents. Based on these findings, it is expected that the TON are positively related 
to judging an EQB as ethical. It is also anticipated that individuals who use 
neutralization techniques are more likely to develop ethically questionable intentions.  
Hypothesis 5a: The techniques of neutralization are positively related to ethical 
judgment in which an ethically questionable behaviour is judged as ethical. 
Hypothesis 5b: The techniques of neutralization are positively related to 
unethical intentions. 
In their study of neutralization within a professional protocol context and not an 
ethically questionable context, Siponen and Vance (2010) conceptualized the TON as a 
second-order formative construct. Conversely, Ribeaud & Eisner (2010) conducted 
factor analyses using five neutralization techniques within an ethically questionable 
context. Based on their findings, the construct is unidimensional and best represented as 
a single factor, which is consistent with other studies in the ethics paradigm (McDonald 
& Pak, 1996).  
Consistent with these empirical results, many of the neutralization techniques overlap 
theoretically. For example, denial of responsibility (DOR) and the defence of necessity 
(DON) are based on decision-makers arguing there was no choice. The appeal to higher 
loyalties also overlaps with DOR and DON. As having to keep one’s job, ‘doing it for 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 88 
my family’, and ‘I had no choice’ are all essentially the same justification. In addition, 
Enticott (2011) contend there is little difference between the denial of injury and the 
denial of victim. Using Jarvis et al.’s (2003) framework for categorizing latent 
variables, the TON have the same antecedent (PMI), have the same consequences 
(unethical intentions), are reasonably highly correlated, and have a common theme 
(minimizing guilt). In view of this theoretical categorization and Ribeaud and Eisner’s 
(2010) empirical findings, the TON are conceptualized as a first-order reflective latent 
variable. 
4.3.3 Reflexive Decision-making 
As indicated in chapters two and three, rationalist decision-making theorists (Rest, 
1986) suggest individuals make active judgments through four processes: recognizing 
an ethical problem, making an ethical judgment, developing intentions to behave, and 
subsequently, acting on these intentions. Although rare, active judgments are linear, 
reasoned, and deliberate analytical processes. When active judgments are made, 
individuals are consciously aware of their decisions, which can result in greater 
instances of ethical behaviour (Reynolds, 2006).  
According to the empirical work, Singhapakdi, Vitell, Lee, Nisius, and Yu (2012) found 
that the marketers, who were most willing to make an ethical judgment by judging an 
EQB as illicit, were more inclined to behave ethically. Barnett (2001) found when 
participants judged an action as ethical, they were more willing to form intentions to act 
similarly. Wagner and Zanders (2001) noted participants that judged an EQB as 
unethical were less willing to behave unethically (O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005). 
According to these consistent findings, if participants judge an EQB as unethical, they 
will typically behave ethically. If the EQB is judged as ethical, participants will behave 
as they perceive ethically (O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005).  
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By contrast, the intuitionist theorists argue individuals make decisions reflexively 
without deliberation. When individuals make reflexive judgments, it is believed 
decision-makers have a greater propensity to behave illicitly (Gunia et al., 2012). As 
indicated in chapter three, judgments are expected to occur subconsciously and 
individuals subsequently use rationalizations to make publicly acceptable arguments for 
their behaviour (Haidt, 2001).  
In comparing Rest’s (1986) model with the intuitive decision-making process, Reynolds 
(2006) argues rationalists fail to account for reflection. Through his neurological 
cognitive model, Reynolds (2006) demonstrated retrospection is intrinsic to the 
decision-making process and decision-makers are often troubled by their actions. In 
their study, Gunia et al. (2012) found individuals felt remorse for lying. Similarly, Vitell 
and Festervand (1987) found managers were willing to pay bribes to increase 
profitability, but considered bribery to be ethically questionable. It therefore appears 
managers might believe their unethical intentions are ethically questionable. 
Notwithstanding, after individuals behave unethically and experience dissonance, 
Murphy and Dacin (2011) argued decision-makers reduce their guilt by changing their 
attitudes toward their behaviour. Rick and Lowenstein (2008) contended that if 
decision-makers encounter significant pressures to behave illicitly, they can “persuade 
themselves of almost anything, including why behaviour they normally would consider 
unethical is morally acceptable” (p. 645). Consistent with the purpose of the TON, 
Palazzo, Krings, and Hoffrage (2012) found that depending on the situation, ethicality 
might not be readily perceived by decision-makers. It is possible for them to behave 
illicitly without being fully aware and if their behaviour is challenged after the fact, they 
are convinced their malfeasance was appropriate (Palazzo et al., 2012). 
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Schwepker and Good (1999), in their study of marketing managers in the financial 
services industry, found when they faced an employment threat for failing to achieve a 
sales quota, marketers judged deception, as a minor moral issue. Interestingly, when 
ethical judgment was analyzed without any negative employment repercussions, most 
participants judged deception as ethically questionable. This attitude adjustment is 
further consistent with neutralization theory in that to preserve their self-concept; 
managers believe their malfeasance is excusable. Therefore, when decision-makers 
develop ethically questionable intentions, they believe their intentions are acceptable. 
To wit, a relationship between unethical intentions and ethical judgment is expected: 
Hypothesis 6: Unethical intentions are positively related to ethical judgments in 
which managers judge an ethically questionable behaviour as ethical. 
To this point, PMI was hypothesized as a second-order formative construct. PMI is 
expected to be negatively related to the unethical intentions, unethical judgment, and 
TON. The TON are hypothesized as positively related to unethical intentions, and 
neutralization is argued to be positively related to ethical judgment. Finally, unethical 
intentions are expected to be positively related to ethical judgment. To complete the 
theoretical model of this research, Machiavellianism is discussed in the next section. 
4.3.4 Machiavellianism 
As contextualized in the second chapter, Machiavellianism is defined as “a personality 
style marked by the use of such tactics as deception and manipulation so as to perform 
well and achieve power, status, or material wealth” (Verbeke, Rietdijk, van den Berg, 
Dietvorst, 2011, p. 205). Wilson et al. (1996) contend Machiavellians manipulate and 
exploit others for personal gain. Calhoon (1969) argues Machiavellians are conniving, 
ruthless manipulators who concern themselves only with advancing their selfish ends. In 
their meta-analysis, Kish-Gephart et al. (2010) found high levels of Machiavellianism 
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were positively related to unethical intentions. In their review, O’Fallon and Butterfield 
(2005) consistently found high Machiavellians judged more EQBs as ethical and had 
intentions to behave unethically.  
Based on these consistent findings, Machiavellians could therefore have a profound 
effect on all aspects of ethical decision-making. Intuitively, Machiavellians are most 
concerned with advancing their self-interest, usually to the detriment of others, and this 
influences their perception of moral intensity. They are likely inclined to behave 
unethically when exposed to ethical problems that involve a threat to their self-interest. 
McMahon and Harvey (2007) argued that by testing Machiavellianism within the 
context of PMI, a greater understanding of the ethical decision-making process would 
emerge. Considering a relationship between Machiavellianism and PMI has not been 
examined, the analysis is included in the empirical investigation of this study. 
Specifically, Machiavellians are likely to minimize or disregard the consequences on 
others, perceive the consequences against their self-interests as most salient, and 
misperceive social consensus. These expectations are reflected in the following 
hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 7a: Machiavellianism is positively related to the magnitude of 
consequences (self) in that Machiavellians will perceive the consequences 
against their self-interests as most salient. 
Hypothesis 7b: Machiavellianism is positively related to the magnitude of 
consequences (others) in that Machiavellians will minimize or disregard the 
consequences on others. 
Hypothesis 7c: Machiavellianism is positively related to social consensus in that 
Machiavellians will be indifferent to social consensus. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 92 
Machiavellians are argued to be egoistical and disinclined to feel remorse for behaving 
illicitly (Ferrell, Gresham, & Fraedrich, 1989). Individuals who lack remorse are less 
likely to use neutralization techniques. Given their selfish nature and lack of empathy 
(Jakobwitz & Egan, 2006), Machiavellians appear to fit into this category. However, 
Machiavellians are not immoral, in the sense that they continuously manipulate others. 
They simply have a ‘cool detachment’ from others (Robinson & Shaver, 1969) and 
selectively deviate from social norms when they perceive an opportunity for selfish gain 
(Dahling, Whitaker, & Levy, 2009). This predisposition is consistent with the purpose 
of the TON, namely, managers use them to exempt themselves, temporarily, from social 
norms. Neutralization theory “holds that most offenders are not involved in offenses all 
the time. They drift back and forth between acceptable and offensive, or delinquent, 
behaviour” (McGregor, 2009, p. 265).  
In general, high Machiavellians are inclined to implement manipulative and deceptive 
strategies to attain their personal ends. In this context, the denial of responsibility could 
be used to justify EQBs motivated by self-interest. By arguing their self-interest had to 
be advanced, Machiavellians could deny their responsibility associated with their EQB, 
which would enable them to justify said behaviour. Given this deduction, a relationship 
between Machiavellianism and the TON is expected.  
Hypothesis 8: Machiavellianism is positively related to the techniques of 
neutralization. 
In this study, the research questions are answered by measuring marketers’ acceptance 
of various neutralization techniques, testing if marketers judge their ethically 
questionable intentions as ethical and measuring marketers’ perception of moral 
intensity. The primary objective is to synthesize the TON within the framework of 
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Jones’s (1991) model. The secondary objective is to understand if Machiavellianism 
influences the decision-making process.  
4.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the model for ethically questionable decision-making was presented. 
This model is built on the synthesis of four main decision-making theories: (1) the 
bounded rationality of individuals and their less-optimal decision-making abilities 
(Simon, 1955), (2) the moral intensity construct (Jones, 1991) and the willingness of 
decision-makers to satisfy their immediate concerns by perceiving their self-interests as 
most salient, perceiving the harms against others as inconsequential, and misapplying 
the norms of society, (3) the techniques of neutralization (Sykes & Matza, 1957) in 
which decision-makers can deceive themselves by enabling them to believe their EQBs 
are in fact acceptable, and; (4) the bad apples thesis (Trevino & Youngblood, 1990) in 
which deviant personalities are expected to influence the decision-making process. As 
such, the main variables of interest in the model include PMI, which is a second-order 
formative construct comprised of the magnitude of consequences (self), magnitude of 
consequences (others), and social consensus, the techniques of neutralization, 
Machiavellianism, ethical judgment, and unethical intentions. 
The major contribution of knowledge of this research is the synthesis of two streams of 
theories: one theory involves decision-making and the situational factors (Jones, 1991); 
the other theory is centred on influencing factors, such as cognitive and individual 
(Chatzidakis et al., 2007). The aims of the research are to understand: (1) the 
rationalization techniques used in the decision-making process, (2) the irrational egoism 
tendencies of decision-makers, (3) the relationship between perceived moral intensity 
and the techniques of neutralization, and; (4) if decision-makers believe their illicit 
behaviours are acceptable.  
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As indicated in chapter two, a dearth of research involving analyses of various legal, but 
not necessarily ethical behaviours is apparent. In view of this void in the empirical 
literature and considering the consequences of such behaviour can be severe (i.e., the 
subprime lending crisis), ethically questionable but legal behaviours are studied in this 
research. By studying behaviours that are legal and unethical, this research uniquely 
contributes to knowledge by offering a deeper understanding of the EQBs marketers are 
willing to implement. In the next chapter, the methods used to test the model for 
ethically questionable decision-making are presented. 
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Methodology 
5.1 Introduction 
In the last chapter, the model for ethically questionable decision-making was presented. 
As outlined, the main variables of interest are the perceived moral intensity (PMI) 
construct, the techniques of neutralization (TON), Machiavellianism, behavioural 
intentions, and ethical judgment. In this chapter, Robson’s (2002) research design (see 
Figure 5.1) is used to outline the strategies to test the model of this research. Robson’s 
(2002) model is consistent with other designs used in business ethics research 
(McDonald & Pak, 1996). Included in Robson’s (2002) model is the purpose of the 
project, the theory, the research question, the methods, and the sampling strategy. As 
defined in chapter one, the purpose of this research is to: (1) identify the impact between 
PMI and the TON, (2) investigate how Machiavellianism influences the decision-
making process, (3) examine the effect of the TON on judgments and intentions, (4) 
understand if marketers believe their malfeasance is acceptable, and; (5) understand if 
decision-makers are willing to behave illicitly in certain contexts but not in others. 
As defined in chapter four, this research is guided by the synthesis of two streams of 
theories. One theory involves decision-making and the situational factors (Jones, 1991); 
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the other theory is centred on the influencing factors (Chatzidakis et al., 2007). As 
indicated, the research questions of this thesis are: ‘how do marketers rationalize their 
behaviours in (an) ethically questionable context(s)’ and ‘what influence does 
Machiavellianism have on the decision-making process.’ The first research question 
addresses purposes one, three, and four whilst the second research question addresses 
the second purpose. To address the fifth purpose, various EQBs are manipulated and 
compared in this study. 
In the first section of this chapter, the major issues in the business ethics research 
paradigm are discussed. Discourse centres on socially desirable response bias, vignette-
based questionnaires, and the use of intentions as proxies of behaviour. In further 
reference to Figure 5.1, the choice of methods is outlined in section two. Specifically, 
justifications for using self-administered questionnaires (i.e., methods) and using 
surrogates for marketers (i.e., sampling strategy) are provided. In section three, the 
procedures used to develop the measurement instrument are discussed. In the final 
section, the data collection strategy is presented.  
 
 
  
 
        
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
 
 Source: Robson (2002) Real world research 
Figure 5.1 – Robson (2002) Research Design Framework 
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5.2 Current Issues in Ethics Research 
The main methodological issues pertain to socially desirable response bias (SDRB), 
using intentions as proxies for behaviour, and the use of vignettes. Discussions are 
focused on how these issues are overcome in this research, the strengths of these 
methods, and the possible limitations. 
5.2.1 Socially Desirable Response Bias 
O’Fallon and Butterfield (2005) argue that the most prevalent methodological issue 
within the business ethics research paradigm involves SDRB. SDRB is caused by 
participants who provide responses they believe the researcher is seeking (Robson, 
2002), which can negatively affect the reliability and validity of a study (Lalwani, 
Shrum, & Chiu, 2009). It is argued, socially desirable responses (SDR) can occur 
among participants through self-administered instruments (Robertson & Anderson, 
1993). It is also argued that offering participants’ anonymity and using a self-
administered questionnaire distributed through a neutral medium such as, mail can 
minimize SDRB (Flannery & May, 2000; Mick, 1996). It is believed that online 
questionnaires are less intimidating, can further minimize SDR as an additional element 
of anonymity is offered (Shulruf, Hattie, & Dixon, 2011), and can therefore enhance 
internal validity (Gattiker & Kelley, 1999).  
Alexander and Becker (1978) argued the use of vignettes can increase face validity and 
internal reliability whilst minimizing SDRB (Robertson & Anderson, 1993). The 
vignettes used in this research are short-stories that involve typical ethical problems 
encountered by marketers during their careers. To minimize SDRB, indirect questioning 
or projective reasoning through the use of vignettes is useful. Projective reasoning 
involves using indirect question wording by asking participants how the protagonist 
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depicted in a hypothetical scenario should resolve the ethical dilemma (Robertson and 
Anderson, 1993).  
Fisher (1993) argues that compared to direct questioning; the use of indirect questioning 
can effectively reduce SDRB. Indirect questioning enables participants to dislocate 
themselves from the social implications associated with responding to questions, which 
does not appear to bias their responses (Fisher, 1993). In general, projective techniques 
elicit more candid responses and have significant advantages over direct questioning 
(Robertson & Anderson, 1993). Although projection is useful in reducing SDRB, 
projection cannot completely eliminate SDRB. To further minimize it, questionnaire 
items should be created using non-threatening language (Flannery & May, 2000).  
On its own, projective reasoning is less useful in eliciting actual intentions and the 
strategy might limit external validity. However, by using both direct and indirect 
question wording, the problem could be addressed. To understand if SDRB is a 
problem, Fisher (1993) included both direct and indirect items; the items were 
compared to assess if any differences existed. This method was also used by Vitell and 
Festervand (1987) and the strategy appears to be a useful tool in developing a more 
informed understanding of behavioural intentions. A similar approach will be used in 
this study. 
In her study based on Jones’s (1991) magnitude of consequences and the denial of 
responsibility (DOR) from the TON, Harrington (1997) tested for SDRB and noted that 
it moderated the relationship between DOR and unethical intentions. However, a 
relationship between the DOR and unethical intentions was found and given SDRB was 
an issue, participants were understating their unethical intentions. Therefore, the results 
were conservative in explaining the relationship between the DOR and unethical 
intentions.  
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Considering the participants of this study might also be conservative when revealing 
their behavioural intentions, the results could be an underestimate if SDRB poses a 
problem. However, Detert et al. (2008) found U.S. respondents often speak candidly 
about their history of malfeasance and SDRB is not typically a concern among U.S. 
samples. Consistent with the discourse of this section, to reduce SDRB, projective 
techniques, non-threatening language, anonymity, vignettes (Flannery & May, 2000), 
and online questionnaires (Schwepker & Good, 2011) will be used. As a test for SDRB, 
Fisher’s (1993) method of comparing direct and indirect question wording will also be 
conducted. 
5.2.2 Vignette-based Questionnaires 
To test models of ethical decision-making, vignette-based questionnaires are 
advantageous as participants respond through the variables the researcher intends to 
measure, the variables can be manipulated (O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005), and vignettes 
can offer a clear account of the decision-making process. In addition to the control held 
by researchers, “subjects may also find a vignette more interesting and involving than 
an abstract question, thereby improving the representativeness and candour of their 
responses” (Robertson & Anderson, 1993, p. 626). A vignette-based approach enables 
intentions (or behaviour) to be tested prospectively whereas traditional questionnaires 
(Agnew, 1994) rely on past behaviour as the dependent variable, which has the potential 
to cause measurement error (Siponen & Vance, 2010). In general, measuring intentions 
through the use of vignette-based questionnaires come highly recommended in the TON 
literature (Siponen & Vance, 2010). The use of vignettes is also widely supported in the 
business ethics literature (Bass, Barnett, & Brown, 1999; Weber, 1992). 
Although a useful tool, the most significant problem with vignettes pertains to the 
implied assumption that it represents an ethical problem for the participant (O’Fallon & 
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Butterfield, 2005). However, the issue raised by O’Fallon and Butterfield (2005) is 
inconsequential as an interest of this research is not to understand if the vignettes 
represent ethical issues to marketers, but rather to understand how marketers rationalize 
their ethically questionable intentions when they encounter ethical dilemmas. It is 
anticipated that participants in this research might suppress the ethicality of the problem 
and by doing so, will likely believe the vignette does not represent an ethical problem. 
When participants form ethically questionable intentions, O’Fallon and Butterfield’s 
(2005) concern is expected as it is associated with Hypothesis 6. 
Robertson and Anderson (1993) argued vignettes can be subject to errors and 
misinterpretations. However, by using multiple scenarios, the issue can be minimized 
whilst improving reliability and validity. Most importantly, self-administered 
questionnaires are argued to be an effective tool at addressing the most significant 
research issue in business ethics - reducing socially desirable responses (Alexander & 
Becker, 1978). To address these advantages, a vignette-based approach through multiple 
scenarios is used in this research. 
5.2.3 Intentions as Approximates for Behaviour 
Considering actual behaviour cannot be tested through self-administered questionnaires 
(Vitell & Ho, 1997), actual behaviour will not be tested in this research. However, 
examining proxies for behaviour by testing intentions, which is widely accepted in 
business ethics research (Singhapakdi et al., 1999), will be used. Ethically questionable 
behavioural intentions are defined as “the expression of one’s willingness or 
commitment to engage in unethical behaviour” (Kish-Gephart et al., 2010, p. 2).  
Consistent with the theory of reasoned action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980) discussed in 
chapter two, Hunt and Vitell (1986) suspected that intentions are predictors of 
behaviour. According to their review of the empirical literature, O’Fallon and 
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Butterfield (2005) found intentions led to behaviour, which is consistent with the work 
of Rest (1986), Jones (1991), and Ajzen (1991). Al-Jabri and Abdul-Gader (1997) found 
the participants that developed intentions to behave ethically followed through with 
their intentions and behaved ethically. Fishbein and Ajzen (2010) demonstrated 
intentions are antecedent to behaviour and when there are changes in intentions, 
behaviour changes accordingly.  
However, there is a debate in the literature with researchers arguing that intentions do 
not always lead to behaviour. According to the results of their meta-analysis, Kish-
Gephart et al. (2010) concluded that intentions do not always precede behaviour. They 
found other independent variables, such as locus of control held stronger relationships 
to behaviour than intentions. From a neurological cognitive perspective, it is argued 
intentions and behaviour are the same phenomenon. Conversely, intentions established 
in a hypothetical setting do not necessarily translate to behaviour in reality. Specifically, 
different sensory receptors are used in hypothetical contexts (e.g., reading) versus 
reality (e.g., hearing a voice), which is “not surprising that these differences can and do 
lead to different outcomes” (Reynolds, 2006, p. 742). Given the potential for 
differences, when intentions are measured, the results should only be generalized to 
behaviour when the intentions to behave are strong. In other words, the stronger the 
intentions to behave, the greater the propensity decision-makers will act on their 
intentions (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010).  
5.3 Choice of Methods 
In this section, the instruments chosen to measure the independent and dependent 
variables of this research are discussed. In the first subsection, the types of vignettes 
covering: environmental pollution, packaging deception, and subprime lending, are 
discussed. These vignettes are exhibited in Appendix C. In the remaining subsections, 
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the scales used to measure the TON, PMI, Machiavellianism, behavioural intentions, 
and ethical judgment are discussed. To address the dearth of research on the TON in the 
business ethics literature (Chatzidakis et al., 2007), magnitude of consequences (self), 
and social consensus using the contextualization developed in this research, existing 
questionnaire items were appropriately modified to fit the context of this research. 
These modified questionnaire items are both included in Appendix B. The complete 
questionnaire can be found in Appendix C. 
5.3.1 Vignettes 
The major studies that deal with the ethically questionable behaviours (EQBs) examined 
in the business ethics paradigm and that has influenced this research, are summarized in 
Table 5.1 and exhibited in Appendix A. Interestingly, only one illicit action was 
examined in the majority of the studies (approximately 49%). By investigating only one 
EQB, generalizations cannot be made across various behaviours and secondarily, 
researchers are unable to understand if marketers would be willing to behave illicitly in 
one context, but not in another. Of the studies that include several EQBs, most of these 
behaviours were pooled together (Blodgett, Lu, Rose, & Vitell, 2001). However, the 
relationships between the variables of interest were not compared across the vignettes. 
Without these, only limited conclusions can be made as certain behaviours might be 
perceived as more salient than others.  
In their study of neutralization within an information systems context, Siponen and 
Vance (2010) designed three vignettes. By using three vignettes, it is proposed that the 
study results can be generalized across divergent contexts and by including various 
behaviours, it is argued that knowledge of the affect EQB has on intentions will be 
gained (Siponen & Vance, 2010). Therefore, consistent with Siponen and Vance (2010), 
three vignettes are used in this research.  
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Table 5.1 Summary Table of Types of Ethically Questionable Behaviours in 
Business Ethics 
 
TYPE OF BEHAVIOUR STUDIED NUMBER OF TIMES APPEARED 
  Deception 59 
  Bribery and gift giving 50 
  Exploitation 16 
  Pollution 14 
  Industrial espionage 12 
  Insider trading 7 
  Poor labour practices 5 
  * Total of 146 articles reviewed; there were multiple vignettes included in 51% of the articles. 
 
As discussed, each vignette in this research contains comparable harms to stakeholders 
and the decision-maker. To ensure participants perceive the ethical problems in this 
study, as at least, moderately intense, economic harms are used as the primary harm 
against decision-makers, stakeholders, and the decision-makers’ employer (Stein & 
Ahmad, 2009). Specifically, three harms are included in each vignette: harm to 
stakeholders for unethical behaviour, harm to one’s employer for ethical behaviour, and 
personal harm to the protagonist for ethical behaviour. If the protagonist behaves 
ethically, they could be dismissed for squandering short-term profitability. However, if 
unethical behaviour is selected, stakeholders could be negatively affected, but the 
protagonist would not experience any legal ramifications. In this context, it is 
anticipated that the negative personal harms will cause decision-makers to diminish the 
importance of the perceived harms on others (Davis, Johnson, & Ohmer, 1998). It is of 
interest to see if trade-offs would occur when marketers are equally threatened. If trade-
offs occur, the harms to stakeholders are expected to induce feelings of guilt, which 
would typically result in the individual relying on neutralization techniques to justify 
their actions.  
As indicated, behaviours that are legal, but not necessarily ethical are studied in this 
research. Prior to each vignette, participation respondents were notified that the 
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behaviour depicted within the scenarios of each vignette was legal. In each scenario, the 
protagonist was given a gender-neutral name to help participants from both genders to 
engage in the scenarios (Butterfield et al., 2000). To ensure the vignettes are perceived 
as realistic, it is argued that studies using neutralization techniques should include 
specific details in the vignettes such as names and companies (Siponen & Vance, 2010). 
This approach was adopted in the vignettes for this research. Each vignette was 
carefully crafted to contain similar ethical content, length, and composition, such as: 
company name, protagonist name, and harms (Butterfield et al., 2000). The only 
manipulation in the study involved the three marketing behaviours. Through this 
approach, the results of each vignette could be pooled together to facilitate data 
presentation (Butterfield et al., 2000). Discussions of the specific procedure used are 
provided in chapter six.  
Considering all decisions involving consumers are marketing decisions (Ferrell & 
Gresham, 1985), the package downsizing, exploitation, and pollution vignettes in this 
research involve customer driven requests and, thus, are within the marketing context. 
In addition, the vignettes were derived from the marketing literature (Gupta et al., 2007) 
and industry examples. Generally, it is argued vignettes must describe common or 
realistic situations (Siponen & Vance, 2010). To ensure the vignettes represent typical 
marketing situations, marketers were consulted during each stage of instrument 
development. The process here is discussed in a subsequent section of this chapter. The 
resulting vignettes presented scenarios for package deception, environmental pollution, 
and subprime lending.  
5.3.1.1 Packaging Deception  
Package downsizing has not been studied empirically within the business ethics 
paradigm. Given the dearth of research and suitable available vignettes, Gupta et al.’s 
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(2007) work was used as a template for vignette development. According to Gupta et al. 
(2007), package downsizing involves reducing the product quantity without changing 
the package or the price of the product. The only change to the package is the fine print 
stating the updated product quantity. Given consumers typically fail to notice the 
change, the strategy effectively supports an ‘invisible’ cost-increase to consumers. This 
strategy has been used by many major brand consumer product manufacturers, such as 
Clorox Bleach, Maxwell House, and Pizza Hut (Gupta et al., 2007).  
In the vignette used for this scenario, a customer-driven cost-reduction was the 
antecedent of the desire for the marketer to consider implementing a package 
downsizing strategy 2 . Consistent with each vignette in this research, the package 
downsizing vignette includes three harms: harm to other stakeholders for unethical 
behaviour, harm to one’s employer for ethical behaviour, and personal harm to the 
protagonist for ethical behaviour. Specifically, consumers would be financially harmed 
for not receiving similar value for their purchases. If the marketer depicted in the 
vignette failed to offer the cost-reductions, the customer would likely source a new 
supplier and the marketer could be penalized for losing the account.  
5.3.1.2 Environmental Pollution  
For the environmental pollution vignette, Paternoster and Simpson’s (1996) air 
pollution vignette was used as a template. In the vignette, an employee was coerced into 
releasing emissions that failed to meet pollution standards. If the emissions were 
released, the employee could be dismissed. In a similar context, Premeaux and Mondy 
(1993) developed a pollution vignette within a manufacturing context. According to the 
                                                 
2 In each vignette, a business-to-business context was used. In the packaging deception vignette the 
‘account’ or ‘customer’ requested a cost-reduction from the marketer depicted in the scenario. To provide 
the cost-reduction, the marketer would need to implement a packaging deception strategy.   
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vignette, an increase in production output would cause the emissions of a factory to 
exceed the legal limit.  
Both vignettes represent useful templates and were modified to fit a marketing context. 
Here, a customer-driven increase in demand would cause the manufacturing facility 
depicted in the vignette to exceed the safety limits for water pollution which, if violated, 
would affect a local agricultural economy. Given that the U.S. pollution legislation is 
stringent and to ensure the vignette is perceived as realistic, the manufacturing facility 
in the vignette is located abroad. This presentation is consistent with various examples 
of international entities operating in nations with low or non-existent pollution 
legislation, examples of which are Chevron Texaco in Ecuador and Shell in the Niger 
Delta, which have resulted in devastating pollution and a destruction of crops. 
5.3.1.3 Subprime Lending 
Vignettes with a subprime lending context are nonexistent in business ethics research. 
To develop a hypothetical vignette within a marketing context, industry cases were 
used. For example, subprime lending was used by the General Motors Company as the 
company targeted loans to consumers with poor credit ratings (Krisher, 2010). 
Numerous U.S. retailers offer in-store credit cards to consumers. As of 2010, Sears 
charged an annual interest rate of 25.24% on purchases at their retail outlets (Anderson 
& Jackson, 2010), a rate substantially in excess of inflation rates.  
In the U.S., credit card companies or retailers that extend credit to consumers are 
unregulated (Jekot, 2005). Given the lack of constraints, creditors increase the interest 
rates to consumers with low-incomes and poor credit ratings (Tribue, 2009). These 
consumers often pay interest rates within the 30% range (Somer, 2011) and if these 
subprime consumers do not default, they represent a lucrative market (Jekot, 2005). 
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However, the potential repercussion associated with subprime lending is default and this 
led to the 2008 U.S., and subsequent worldwide recession.  
In the associated vignette, the customer-driven subprime lending strategy has the 
potential to negatively affect the finances of borrowers. The interest rate included in the 
vignette is 38%. As indicated, this interest rate is consistent with the rates offered to 
subprime borrowers by U.S. creditors (Somer, 2011).  
5.3.2 Techniques of Neutralization 
In this section, the available instruments to test the TON are presented. The TON are 
mechanisms that facilitate norm-violating behaviours for the decision-maker 
(Chatzidakis et al., 2007). As discussed in chapter four, the TON to be studied in this 
research include the denial of responsibility (DOR), denial of injury (DOI), denial of 
victim (DOV), social weighting (SW), appeal to higher loyalties (AHL), defence of 
necessity (DON), and legality.  
Maruna and Copes (2004) argue that testing neutralization as an antecedent of EQB is 
complex and has rarely been completed successfully. Ward and Beck (1980) argued that 
testing the TON as an antecedent of EQB can be successfully conducted using 
longitudinal studies. Through a longitudinal study, Minor (1981) found the TON were 
used pre-behaviourally. Similar results were found by Agnew (1994) and more recently, 
Ribeaud and Eisner (2010) also used a longitudinal analysis to successfully test 
neutralization pre-behaviourally.  
Although this research is concerned with analyzing ethically questionable intentions, 
that also occur pre-behaviourally, longitudinal studies may not, however, be required. 
For example, using cross-sectional data, De Bock and Kenhove (2011) found 
neutralization was positively related to ethical judgments. Through cross-sectional data, 
Siponen and Vance (2010) found neutralization sustained a significant relationship with 
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behavioural intentions. Given these results and considering that intentions precede 
behaviour (Ajzen, 1991), cross-sectional data was used. 
Boardley and Karvassanu (2007) argue the instruments used to appraise neutralization 
should be context specific. To develop context specific questionnaire items, researchers 
are often required to create new instruments to address the various nuances of their 
studies (Maruna & Copes, 2004). As opposed to developing new testing instruments, 
other researchers have modified existing questionnaire items (Ribeaud & Eisner, 2010).  
According to their review of neutralization theory from 1957 to 2004, Maruna and 
Copes (2004) noted the survey work typically included a list of statements and 
participants were required to state their level of agreement or disagreement through 
Likert-scales. The statements were within hypothetical vignettes. In their business ethics 
study, McDonald and Pak (1996) used a vignette approach to test the TON. In an 
organisational context, Siponen and Vance (2010) tested six neutralizations through 
three hypothetical vignettes.  
Given a TON instrument has not been developed within the marketing context, an 
instrument is developed specifically for this study. To increase the likelihood that the 
instrument is valid, the items were modified from existing questionnaire items (Agnew, 
1994; Minor, 1981; Siponen & Vance, 2010) and in most cases, only the context 
changed. Neutralization theory (Anand et al., 2005; Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Heath, 
2008; Vitell & Grove, 1987) was also used to assist in modifying the existing items. As 
indicated, the original questionnaire items and the modified items are exhibited in 
Appendix B. 
Neutralization items were created to fit the context of each vignette. In the study, 
participants were presented with the aforementioned hypothetical vignettes, which 
followed with a list of neutralization statements and participants were asked to respond 
CHAPTER FIVE 
 109 
with their level of agreement or disagreement. Each vignette had eight neutralization 
items (composite reliability = 0.96). To test internal consistency, researchers often use 
Cronbach alpha. However, Cronbach alpha is argued to underestimate the reliability of 
measures (Henseler, Ringle, & Sinkovics, 2009). To address this concern and consistent 
with Cordano and Frieze (2000), internal consistency is appraised in this research using 
the composite reliability measure of Dillon and Goldstein (Wertz, Linn, & Joreskog, 
1974). It is argued that composite reliability scores above 0.7 for the early stages of 
research development and 0.8 to 0.9 for more established stages are considered 
acceptable (Hair, Tatham, Anderson, & Black, 1998; Henseler et al., 2009). 
5.3.3 Perceived Moral Intensity 
The PMI construct is formatively comprised of how managers construe the issue-
contingent characteristics of an ethical problem. Jones (1991) contends the six PMI 
variables are characteristics of the ethical problem, all variables interact at the same 
level, and the six variables should be included within a single construct. However, 
Singhapakdi et al. (1996) found the six variables load onto two constructs, which 
involve the magnitude of consequences (sum of harms or benefits associated with the 
behaviour) and social consensus (degree of societal acceptance of the behaviour). As 
argued in chapter four, these two variables are: all that are needed to test PMI (Gurley et 
al., 2007), the most robust factors of PMI (Stein & Ahmad, 2009), and; most relevant to 
the decision-making process (O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005). Consistent with the 
development of the TON items, the PMI items were appropriately modified to fit the 
context of the vignettes for this research. 
To test PMI, several researchers (Flannery & May, 2000) did not test participants’ 
perceptions of moral intensity directly; they relied on the varying response patterns for 
the manipulated construct in the scenarios. Specifically, Flannery and May (2000) used 
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a scenario approach by manipulating the harm in the vignettes, the scenarios were than 
coded as low and high harm and the outcomes were studied using regression models. 
Through this method, researchers do not test directly a participant’s perception of the 
level of intensity; however, participants might not have perceived the scenario as 
intended (Marshall & Dewe, 1997). Participants’ might not perceive the low harm 
scenario as intended and without testing perceptions directly, researchers are unable to 
claim with confidence if PMI influenced the decision. Similarly, the magnitude of 
consequences might not have influenced their decision, which occurred in Marshall and 
Dewe’s (1997) study. To address this concern, the decision-makers’ perception of the 
intensity of the vignettes is tested directly in this research. 
To measure the magnitude of consequences, Barnett (2001) used three-items with 
semantic differential anchors. Respondents were asked “do you believe any harm 
resulting from the depicted action will be minor versus severe, insignificant versus 
significant, and slight versus great” (p. 1044)? Social consensus was also tested through 
the use of three-items. However, social consensus is only measured by testing how one 
believes other people perceive the EQB. An individual-level perspective is not included. 
Therefore, Barnett’s (2001) instrument was not used in this research.  
Singhapakdi et al.’s (1996) instrument and, the work of Frey (2000) were used in the 
development of McMahon and Harvey’s (2006) perceived moral intensity scale (PMIS), 
which had an internal reliability Cronbach alpha value of 0.79. In the instrument, each 
dimension of moral intensity has two-items. In this research, McMahon and Harvey’s 
(2006) items measured on a 7-point Likert scale were used to test the magnitude of 
consequences (self) and the magnitude of consequences (others).  
The items for the other PMI dimensions from McMahon and Harvey’s (2006) scale 
such as proximity of effect, concentration of effect, and temporal immediacy, were 
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excluded as these were found to not contribute significantly to the decision-making 
process (Singer & Singer, 1997). Considering a revised contextualization of social 
consensus was used in this research, the two items for social consensus from McMahon 
and Harvey’s (2006) scale were also excluded. 
As a test for social consensus, using a mono-method approach, Singhapakdi et al. 
(1996) asked participants through a 9-point Likert-type scale to agree or disagree with 
the following statement: “most people would agree that the [marketer’s] action is 
wrong” (p. 43). Singhapakdi et al.’s (1996) instrument has been used extensively in 
business ethics research (Marta & Singhapakdi, 2005) and the instrument represents a 
suitable measure of social consensus for this study.  
In this research, social consensus is contextualized broadly as the degree marketers 
perceive that other people agree with a proposed act and the degree that they also accept 
the behaviour. To this end, the social consensus scale is advanced by measuring both: 
(1) a context-specific focus of how one perceives others appraise an EQB (Singhapakdi 
et al., 1996), and; (2) a general focus of how decision-makers perceive social norms at 
the individual level (Agnew, 1994). To develop the second social consensus item, the 
work of Minor (1981) and Agnew (1994) was used. Through a five-point Likert scale 
involving ‘agree’ versus ‘disagree’ anchors, Minor (1981) asked participants if “it is all 
right for J. to do this, whatever the reason” (p. 305). Somewhat differently, Agnew 
(1994) used the question “how wrong is it for someone your age to hit or threaten to hit 
someone without any reason” (p. 559). Consistent with these examples, participants 
were asked to ‘agree’ or ‘disagree’ with an evaluative statement. For example, ‘it is 
alright for someone to pollute the environment without any reason,’ was used.  
Therefore, to measure the magnitude of consequences (others) (composite reliability = 
0.87), the two items from McMahon and Harvey’s (2006) instrument were used (see 
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Appendix B). To measure the magnitude of consequences (self) (composite reliability = 
0.85), the same two items from McMahon and Harvey’s (2006) instrument were 
modified. To measure social consensus (composite reliability = 0.76), the item from 
Singhapakdi et al.’s (1996) scale and the item from Agnew’s (1994) work were 
modified. This approach not only provides a broader perspective of social consensus by 
enhancing internal consistency, but can also be used to test one’s reliance on 
neutralization to justify malfeasance (Agnew, 1994).  
It is argued that 9-point rankings are cognitively demanding and participants often have 
difficulties in choosing appropriate responses. Miller (1956) argued that “the human 
mind has a span of absolute judgment that can distinguish about seven distinct 
categories, a span of immediate memory for about seven items, and a span of attention 
that can encompass about six objects at a time” (Colman, Norris & Preston, 1997, 
p.355-6). This issue can result in fatigue, missing data, and inaccurate responses 
(Tadepalli, 1995). It is therefore recommended to avoid scales beyond seven points 
(Colman et al., 1997). Colman et al. (1997) found that converting scale items did not 
alter the reliability of the instrument and the results of both instruments compared 
between two samples were essentially equivalent. Consistent with these arguments, 
Tadepalli (1995) converted a marketing behaviour instrument from 9-point ratings to 
the more conventional 7-point format. Similarly, McMahon and Harvey (2006) 
converted Singhapakdi et al.’s (1996) 9-point items to a 7-point rating scale. Moreover, 
Paolillo and Vitell (2002) used the 7-point version of Singhapakdi et al.’s (1996) PMI 
scale.  
Consistent with McMahon and Harvey (2006) and Paolillo and Vitell (2002), the social 
consensus item for this research is converted to a 7-point rating. In his study, Dawes 
(2008) found “that the 5 and 7-point scales produced the same mean score as each other, 
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once they were rescaled” (p. 61). They were also highly correlated and showed higher 
statistical power. Given these findings, the item modified from Agnew’s (1994) work 
was rescaled to a 7-point rating.  
5.3.4 Ethical Judgment 
Barnett (2001) defines ethical judgment as the ethicality associated with the behaviour 
depicted in an ethical problem. Bass et al. (1998) define ethical judgment as the degree 
an action is perceived as ethically acceptable. Barnett and Valentine (2004) define 
ethical judgments as the “beliefs about the moral rightness or wrongness of an action” 
(p. 340). To address the varying definitions and discourse used to explain ethical 
judgments, participants in the questionnaire were asked to evaluate the ethicality of an 
EQB through various semantic differential items all with 7-point scales. 
To test ethical judgments, Rest’s (1979) defining issue test (DIT), which was discussed 
in chapter three, could be used. “Theoretically, the DIT is designed to measure how 
concepts of justice influence the process of moral judgment; in contrast, attitude 
measures are characterizations of the conclusions of judgments” (Rest, 1986, p. 152). 
As indicated, ethical judgments or attitudes involve the participants’ appraisals of the 
rightness or wrongness of an action within the context of an ethical problem (Barnett & 
Valentine, 2004). As mentioned in chapter three, the DIT is also incapable of testing 
judgments within various issue-contingent contexts and for this reason, the DIT was not 
used. Moreover, Kohlberg’s CMD hierarchy is not a predictor of ethical judgments and 
for this reason (Robin, Gordon, Jordan, & Reidenbach, 1996), Kohlberg’s instrument 
was also not used. 
To test context specific ethical judgments, several instruments are available (Cherry & 
Fraedrich, 2000). In general, these items are useful as they can be easily customized and 
adapted to newly developed vignettes. For example, Harrison (1996) asked participants 
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in her study if the protagonist depicted in the vignette ‘was justified’ or ‘did nothing 
wrong’. Similarly, the moral equity portion of Robin and Reidenbach’s (1990) 
multidimensional ethics scale consisted of four semantic differential scale items with 
anchors involving ‘just’ versus ‘unjust’, ‘fair’ versus ‘unfair’, ‘morally right’ versus 
‘not morally right’, and ‘acceptable to my family’ versus ‘not acceptable to my family’. 
This four-item scale sustains a reliability measure of 0.93 and has been found to 
correlate highly with single item measures (Barnett & Valentine, 2004). Robin and 
Reidenbach’s (1990) instrument could be used in this study; however, the semantic 
differential items do not include ‘ethical’ versus ‘unethical’ anchors. Given the ethical 
judgment construct involves asking participants to judge the ethicality of scenarios 
depicted in vignettes, ‘ethical’ versus ‘unethical’ anchors should be included. In lieu of 
their omission, Robin and Reidenbach’s (1990) and Harrison’s (1996) instruments were 
consequently not used in this study. 
Dabholkar and Kellaris (1992) developed a six-item instrument to appraise ethical 
judgments. Through semantic differential anchors involving ‘acceptable’ versus 
‘unacceptable’, ‘ethical’ versus ‘unethical’, ‘correct’ versus ‘incorrect’, ‘moral’ versus 
‘immoral’, ‘right’ versus ‘wrong’, and ‘good’ versus ‘bad’, participants were asked to 
answer “now, given the limited information available, how would you evaluate the 
salesman’s behaviour as described above” (p. 319)? To reduce the length of Dabholkar 
and Kellaris’s (1992) instrument, Cherry and Fraedrich (2000) used a modified four 
item scale. The anchors used in their study included ‘correct’ versus ‘incorrect’, 
‘immoral’ versus ‘moral’, ‘good’ versus ‘bad’, and ‘right’ versus ‘wrong’. The refined 
instrument had a reliability Cronbach alpha measure of 0.92. However, consistent with 
the issues described with Reidenbach and Robin’s (1990) and Harrison’s (1996) work, 
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Cherry and Fraedrich’s (2000) instrument omits the ‘ethical’ versus ‘unethical’ anchors. 
Given this omission, Cherry and Fraedrich’s (2000) revised instrument was not used.  
In general, most of the aforementioned scales can be used to test ethical judgments, as 
typically, the items are not all that different semantically, and most scales tend to have 
high levels of internal consistency (Dabholkar & Kellaris, 1992). For example, Weeks, 
Moore, McKinney, and Longenecker (1999) include anchors pertaining to acceptability, 
Robin and Reidenbach (1990) focus on morality and similarly, Dabholkar and Kellaris’s 
(1992) scale involves ‘ethicality’, ‘acceptability’, and ‘rightness’ anchors. However, 
several of these instruments contain far too many manifest variables and given the high 
internal consistency, many of these variables could be redundant.  
To attain the objective of reducing the length of Dabholkar and Kellaris’s (1992) 
instrument, the scale developed for this study follows Cherry and Fraedrich’s (2000) 
approach. Within the context of the question wording derived from Dabholkar and 
Kellaris’s (1992) work, the semantic differential anchors used for this questionnaire 
involve ‘ethical’ versus ‘unethical’, ‘acceptable’ versus ‘unacceptable’, ‘good’ versus 
‘bad’, and ‘right’ versus ‘wrong’ (composite reliability = 0.98). Given the extremely 
high composite reliability, the ethical judgment construct appears to be robust and 
therefore adequately represented. 
5.3.5 Unethical Intentions 
As indicated, Kish-Gephart et al. (2010, p. 2) define unethical intentions as “the 
expression of one’s willingness or commitment to engage in unethical behaviour”. 
Consistent with the ethical judgment scale, most scales that measure behavioural 
intentions are quite similar in question wording. For example, most scales contain 
anchors that are essentially identical semantically (Valentine & Barnett, 2007). Given 
the similarity, the internal consistency of the behavioural intentions scales are typically 
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in the high 0.90s. However, consistent with the ethical judgments instruments, many of 
the available scales contain excessive questionnaire items and considering the high 
internal consistency, the additional associated manifest variables are unlikely to be 
representing varying dimensions of the construct. Therefore, condensed versions of the 
available instruments are used in this research.   
To test ethical intentions directly, several instruments are available. Through ‘highly 
probable’ to ‘highly improbable’ anchors, Schwepker (1999) asked participants “what is 
the probability of you behaving in the same manner as did the individual in the 
scenario?” (p. 307). Using Likert scale items with agree versus disagree as anchors, 
Harrison (1996) asked participants to respond to the item “I would do the same thing if I 
knew how” (p. 267). However, the Schwepker (1999) and Harrison (1996) studies used 
a mono-method approach and thus, might not have sufficient internal consistency, and 
cannot be reproduced as only a single method is used.  
To enhance instrument reliability, multiple item instruments to appraise behavioural 
intentions have been developed. Specifically, Cherry and Fraedrich (2000) measured 
behavioural intentions by modifying Fritzsche and Becker’s (1984) instrument. Through 
semantic differential scales with the anchors ‘definitely would’ versus ‘definitely would 
not’, ‘likely’ versus ‘unlikely’, ‘possible’ versus ‘impossible’, and ‘probable’ versus 
‘improbable’, participants were asked to respond to the item “if you were responsible, 
what are the chances that you would make the payment” (p. 188). The instrument is 
widely cited in ethics research (Barnett & Valentine, 2004; Valentine & Barnett, 2007). 
Given the acceptance in the business ethics literature, the instrument was used in this 
research. Through identical semantic differential scale measures, participants were 
asked to answer an item stating ‘if you were responsible, what are the chances you 
would provide the cost-reductions?’  
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To address socially desirable response bias, Robertson and Anderson’s (1993) work was 
used to develop the projective reasoning item. Specifically, through the use of a 7-point 
scale involving ‘definitely should’ versus ‘definitely should not’ anchors, Robertson and 
Anderson (1993, p. 629) asked participants “whether his/her colleague, John, should 
undertake an action suggested in the scenario”. Using this item as a template and 
identical anchors, the projective items for this research involve asking participants to 
respond to the item ‘in this situation, Jessie should implement the behaviour depicted in 
the scenario’. Therefore, including the direct items, unethical intentions was measured 
through five items (composite reliability = 0.99). 
As discussed, business ethics studies are often criticized for eliciting socially desirable 
responses (O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005). To address this concern, Fisher’s (1993) 
approach of comparing the means of the indirect questions and direct items was used. 
Using a one-way ANOVA, the direct questions were compared to the indirect questions 
and no significant differences were found in the mean values (Vignette 1: F4,2770  = 0.35; 
p = 0.86; Vignette 2: F4,2770  = 0.89; p = 0.47; Vignette 3: F4,2770  = 0.71; p = 0.59), which 
implies socially desirable response bias, is unlikely. 
5.3.6 Machiavellianism 
The Machiavellian test (Mach IV) was developed through the use of scale items derived 
directly from the works of Nicolo Machiavelli and also, items that were considered 
Machiavellian (Dahling et al., 2009). It is believed that Machiavellians have three 
personality attributes: interpersonal tactics, lack of abstract morality, and views of 
human nature (Christie & Geis, 1970). Individuals with interpersonal tactics manipulate 
others to get what they want and lack a moral view in their interactions with others. 
Machiavellians further take an unflattering and cynical view of human nature (Christie 
& Geis, 1970). Mach IV initially comprised 71-items, but was refined through four pilot 
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studies and eventually condensed to a 20-item scale (Christie & Geis, 1970). The items 
consist of three types of statements representing cynical views of human nature, 
interpersonal tactics, and abstract morality.  
In general, the Mach IV test has been criticized for eliciting socially desirable responses 
(Christie & Geis, 1970). To address this issue, Christie and Geis (1970) developed the 
Mach V scale. However, dichotomous items are used and the data derived from this 
form of questioning cannot be used to validate structural equation models. In addition, 
the Mach V has been criticized for low reliability with regular Cronbach alpha 
coefficients below 0.6 (Dahling et al., 2009). In a review of various studies using the 
Mach IV test, Christie and Geis (1970, p. 49) found that “the material examined to date 
indicates that high as contrasted to low Machiavellians have a negative view of people 
in general and are more likely to admit to socially undesirable statements about 
themselves”. Consistent with this argument and as demonstrated in the foregoing 
section, socially desirable responses does not appear to be a problem in this study. 
Christie and Geis (1970) developed their Mach IV a priori and not through a factor 
analysis, which has subsequently resulted in inconsistent findings in the literature. 
Researchers have found the construct was represented best by: five factors (Ahmed & 
Stewart, 1981), four factors (Corral & Calvete, 2000; Hunter, Gerbing, & Boster, 1982), 
and; three factors (O’Hair & Cody, 1987). In each study, the factor structures were 
different from Christie and Geis’s single-factor model (1970). In addition to the 
inconsistent factors, researchers have found large variability in the reliability of Mach 
IV (Dahling et al., 2009). As a result of these issues, researchers have removed 
indicators to fit their models: Ahmed and Stewart (1981) deleted four items, O’Hair and 
Cody (1987) deleted five, and Hunter et al. (1982) deleted seven.  
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Clearly, there are issues with the Mach IV construct; however, the only alternatives in 
the literature are Dahling et al.’s (2009) Machiavellian Personality Scale (MPS) and the 
dirty dozen instruments (Jonason & Webster, 2010). Jonason and Webster’s (2010) 
dirty dozen instrument is a measure of the dark-triad which, as discussed in chapter 
three, is a personality type comprising Machiavellianism, narcissism, and 
psychopathology. Conversely, the dirty dozen only tests Machiavellianism through 
four-items and the instrument has been criticized for low internal consistency (Jonason 
& Webster, 2010). Considering the low consistency, the instrument might be incapable 
of appraising Machiavellianism as effectively as the Mach IV. In addition, reliability 
issues might also be apparent if the Machiavellian items are tested separately from the 
other personalities. Given these concerns, Jonason and Webster’s (2010) instrument was 
not used. 
The MPS developed by Dahling et al. (2009) has been shown to have greater reliability 
and internal consistency than the Mach IV (Jain & Bearden, 2011). Notwithstanding 
some overlap, Dahling et al. defined Machiavellianism differently from Christie and 
Geis (1970). Notably, Dahling et al., (2009) conceptualized Machiavellianism through 
four constructs comprising: a distrust of others, amoral manipulation, the desire for 
control, and a desire for status. Each construct is defined as follow: (1) distrust of others 
pertains to “a cynical outlook on the motivations and intentions of others with a concern 
for the negative implications that those intentions have for the self” (p. 227), (2) amoral 
manipulation involves “a willingness to disregard standards of morality and see value in 
behaviours that benefit the self at the expense of others” (p. 228), (3) desire for control 
pertains to “a need to exercise dominance over interpersonal situations to minimize the 
extent to which others have power” (p. 228), and (4) desire for status was not included 
on the Mach IV, but the researchers included it on the MPS defined as “a desire to 
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accumulate external indicators of success” (p. 228). In general, this contextualization is 
inconsistent with the focus on Machiavellians as cynical manipulators that lack a moral 
view when interacting with others. Therefore, this research was limited to the Mach IV 
construct. 
Even though the Mach IV has been criticized for low reliability and inconsistent factor 
structures, several studies have shown internal consistencies for the Mach IV between 
0.70 and 0.76 (Dahling et al., 2009). According to recent neurological MRI analyses, 
high Machiavellians showed brain activity related to manipulative tendencies associated 
with advancing one’s self-interest (Verbeke et al., 2011). Furthermore, significant 
cognitive differences were found between those scoring high on the test compared to 
those scoring low. Considering these results and with acknowledgement of the 
limitations, the Mach IV might be a useful tool in measuring the propensity for one to 
exploit others to attain one’s objectives.  
To address the issues with the Mach IV and considering none of the aforementioned 
researchers conducted discriminant and convergent validity testing, Dahling et al.’s 
(2009) suggestion was followed and the model was validated. Given the vagaries in the 
literature, it is anticipated that various Mach IV items will not contribute significantly 
and will need to be deleted during validation. Inconsistent factor structures to Christie 
and Geis’s (1970) a priori single factor structure are also expected because, as 
demonstrated, the factor structures were found to be ambiguous (Dahling et al., 2009). 
Following Dahling et al.’s (2009) theoretical framework and Christie and Geis’s (1970) 
a priori single factor structure, the Machiavellian personality was modelled as a second-
order reflective latent variable. Abstract morality (composite reliability = 0.74), 
interpersonal tactics (composite reliability = 0.88), and views of human nature 
(composite reliability = 0.78) are manifestations of the Machiavellian personality.  
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5.3.7 Demographic Factors 
In their seven-year review of the empirical literature in the business ethics paradigm, 
involving a comparison of the results of Ford and Richardson (1994) and Loe et al.’s 
(2000) reviews, O’Fallon and Butterfield (2005) found several demographic variables 
directly and indirectly influenced the ethical decision-making process. Although 
minimal difference was found, gender had a minor effect on the decision-making 
process with males behaving, overall, less ethical. In general, “the research indicates 
that more education, employment or work experience is positively related to ethical 
decision-making” (O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005, p. 387). The studies on age showed 
inconsistent findings.  
These findings are also consistent with the theory of reasoned action developed by 
Fishbein and Ajzen (2010). Fishbein and Ajzen (2010) argue demographic variables 
sustain weak affects on behaviour and, in general, are unlikely to directly influence the 
main constructs of behavioural models. Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) acknowledge that 
demographic factors can influence behaviour, but are unlikely to make a significant 
contribution to the coefficient of determination. For example, to account for any 
variance in their regression models that involved testing the mediating effect of 
neutralization between the locus of control personality and unethical intentions, Detert 
et al. (2008) controlled for demographic variables. According to the results, 11% of the 
variance in neutralization was accounted for by gender and educational experience, 
which from a coefficient of determination perspective, is insignificant.  
Given this discourse, the role of age, education, and gender is recognized, but these 
factors do not make a sufficiently important contribution to the model to be included in 
the hypotheses. However, the demographic variables were collected and, consistent with 
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most studies (Detert et al., 2008); were controlled for using post-hoc analyses to 
examine if they have any effect.  
5.3.8 Summary 
For the PMI construct, two items were used to measure the magnitude of consequences 
(self) (composite reliability = 0.85), two items were used to measure the magnitude of 
consequences (others) (composite reliability = 0.87), and two items were used to 
measure social consensus (composite reliability = 0.76). The TON were measured using 
eight items (composite reliability = 0.96). Unethical intentions were measured through 
five items (composite reliability = 0.99). Ethical judgments were measured using four 
items (composite reliability = 0.98). Finally, two items were used to test abstract 
morality (composite reliability = 0.74), nine items were used to measure interpersonal 
tactics (composite reliability = 0.88), and nine items were used to measure the views of 
human nature (composite reliability = 0.78) associated with the Machiavellian 
construct. Given three vignettes were included in the questionnaire, a total of 89 
questionnaire items are included in this study. 
As outlined in the foregoing sections, several measures for the dependent and 
independent variables of this study are tested through Likert-scales. The Likert and 
Likert type scales are used frequently in the business ethics paradigm (Zhuang & Tsang, 
2008) and is advantageous for appraising attitudes (Dittrich, Francis, Hatzkinger, & 
Katzenbeisser, 2007). However, acquiescence can occur through the use of such scales. 
It is argued acquiescence typically occurs among individuals of lower social status, with 
less formal education, and low intelligence (Krosnick, 1999). According to the 
demographic data reported by researchers that analyse marketing professionals 
(Singhapakdi et al., 1996), marketers possess higher levels of formal education. They 
are also within the middle- to upper-middle classes of society. Given these demographic 
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factors, acquiescence is unlikely to be a problem in this research. However, to minimize 
the potential for acquiescence, reverse coded items can be used (Krosnick, 1999) and 
considering the Mach IV and McMahon and Harvey’s (2006) instruments contain such 
reverse items, the issue is consequently minimized.  
The data derived from Likert-scales has been characterized as both ordinal and interval 
in scale (Jamieson, 2004). Jamieson (2004) argues Likert-scales are traditionally ordinal 
and when comparing means, non-parametric methods should be used. Conversely, it is 
argued through a substantial amount of literature that parametric analyses can be 
conducted if Likert-scale items comprise five or more points (Rasmussen, 1989). Using 
over 80 years of empirical evidence, Norman (2010) argues parametric analyses can be 
used with Likert data without arriving at unfounded conclusions. By treated the data 
derived from Likert-scales as integer value interval data, parametric tests could be 
conducted, which are considered stronger and hold greater statistical power than non-
parametric methods (Jamieson, 2004). Type I and Type II error rates are also not 
expected to be compromised through this method (Lauring & Selmen, 2011).  
It is further argued that 5- to 7-point scales are the most appropriate ranking points for 
structural equation models (Weijters, Cabooter, & Schillewaert, 2010). Compared to 
studies using fewer scaling points, 5- to 7-point rating scales improve reliability and 
validity (Dawes, 2008). Consistent with the format used for the questionnaire in this 
research, it is argued that the use of endpoint labels without intermediary labels is more 
in line with an interval assumption (Weijters et al., 2010). In the business ethics 
paradigm, most researchers characterize the data derived from Likert-scales as interval 
and conduct parametric tests accordingly (e.g., Singhapakdi et al., 1999). To follow the 
research paradigm, the data derived from Likert-scales are considered interval data in 
this research, and a 7-point scale is used throughout.  
CHAPTER FIVE 
 124 
5.4 Measurement Development 
In this section, the processes used to develop and validate the questionnaire for face 
validity are discussed. In the first subsection, discourse centres on the various pre-tests 
and pilot study used to develop the testing instrument. In the second subsection, the 
ethical approval process for the questionnaire is discussed. 
5.4.1 Pre-testing and Pilot Study 
To develop a questionnaire, it is argued that researchers must ensure the scale contains 
“clear and appropriate language, has no obvious errors or omissions, and has at least 
adequate psychometric properties before it is used” (Johanson & Brooks, 2010, p. 394). 
This process is suggested for newly developed questionnaires, modified scales, and 
existing questionnaire items. 
To develop the questionnaire for this study, three rounds of pre-testing and a pilot study 
were conducted. During the pre-tests, participants were asked to comment on the clarity, 
realism, and moral intensity of the questionnaires. Participants were also asked to 
confirm if the vignettes contained ethical problems and if they were perceived as legal 
but not necessarily ethical. After each round of pretesting, if these requirements were 
not met, adjustments were made and pretesting continued. 
In the first pre-test, four marketing academics, four doctoral students, and four 
practicing professional marketers were asked to comment on each vignette and 
questionnaire item. After round one, several changes to the questionnaire were made to 
improve clarity. In the second pre-test, five doctoral students (one from the first round) 
and three marketers (two from the first round) were asked to comment on the 
questionnaire. After round two, additional adjustments to the vignettes and 
questionnaire items were made. In the third pre-test, two marketing academics, four 
doctoral students (one from round one), and four marketers (one from rounds one and 
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two) were asked to complete the questionnaire and provide comments. After round 
three, minor adjustments were made. In general, participants in each round believed the 
vignettes contained ethical issues, were clear, and the problems were ethically intense, 
realistic, related to marketing, and were perceived as legal but not necessarily ethical.  
Different participants were used throughout the pre-tests for two main reasons. First, 
feedback on the questionnaire was sought from as many different perspectives as 
possible. Second, although it was not necessarily desired, because of the lack of 
availability, several of the same participants were asked to review subsequent versions 
of the questionnaire. In hindsight, this situation proved invaluable as these same 
participants were able to comment on the changes made from preceding versions and, 
specifically, to confirm if their earlier concerns had been satisfied through the 
subsequent modifications. In addition, several communications, both verbal and written, 
were exchanged with these participants to ensure the issues raised were addressed. From 
this procedure, the questionnaire appears to have face validity.  
In the pilot study, 50 MBA and doctoral students studying at the Bradford University 
School of Management accessed the survey website and provided responses. By 
removing incomplete questionnaires, the final pilot study sample was left with 34 
completed questionnaires. According to the literature, this sample size is sufficient. 
Specifically, it is well supported in Johanson and Brooks’s (2010) review of the 
literature that pilot studies with sample sizes between 10 and 30 are more than adequate 
for preliminary scale development. After the pilot study, no additional adjustments to 
the questionnaire were made.  
5.4.2 Ethical Clearance 
To access prospective participants, individuals that have opted in to the mailing list of a 
leading national data collection agency in the U.S. received an e-mail invitation to 
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participate in the questionnaire for this research. Participants were notified that the 
completion time for the survey is approximately 15 to 20 minutes and a low-value 
inducement involving sweepstakes entries and donations to charities were offered for 
participation. Specifically, when a participant completes a questionnaire, $0.50USD is 
donated to a charity of the participant’s choice and they are entered into a lottery to win 
$100USD. From an ethical perspective, it was felt that the offering of a low-value 
incentive was a fair exchange for participation. 
The study involves a self-administered questionnaire with coded data without the 
requirement for respondents to provide their names, and so anonymity was guaranteed. 
In general, participants were clearly advised the questionnaire is associated with 
studying marketing behaviours and participation is voluntary. Fully-informed consent 
involves informing participants of the research purpose by providing participants with 
the research question. If full disclosure was offered, convergent validity could be 
negatively affected. To ensure validity was not jeopardized whilst ensuring participants 
are informed of the study, participants were offered partially-informed consent. Through 
this process, the questionnaire was granted full ethics approval from the University of 
Bradford. 
5.5 Data Collection and Sample 
In this section, the data collection process is described. The sampling method, which 
involves a self-administered questionnaire, is discussed. In the latter portions of the 
section, the sample involving surrogates as proxies for marketers is justified. 
5.5.1 Sampling Method 
The self-administered testing instrument was distributed to prospective participants 
using an electronic web portal. The questionnaire was uploaded to the website of a 
leading organisation specializing in hosting online questionnaires. To access 
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participants, an e-mail list of marketing professionals was purchased from a leading data 
collection organisation. Prospective participants were contacted by this organisation and 
invited to participate.  
The response rates using online questionnaires solicited through e-mail have historically 
been low (Wright, 2005). In comparison to paper and pencil questionnaires, the 
response rates in the U.S. are approximately 23% less (Nulty, 2008). The average 
response rates for online questionnaires found by Nulty (2008) were approximately 
30%, which is consistent with the average response rates found through various meta-
analyses of online questionnaires (Miller, Sexton, Koontz, Loomis, Koontz, & 
Hermans, 2011). Although the averages are 30%, researchers have also reported 
response rates of 2% (Andrews, Nonnecke, & Preece, 2003) and 10% (Horng & Teng, 
2011).  
It is argued that response rates for online questionnaires are a function of completion 
time and the offer of low-value incentives (Nulty, 2008). According to Nulty, 
researchers have used lottery prizes involving low-value inducements, which have 
shown to be promising (Nulty, 2008). However, the use of inducements has the 
potential to result in systematic bias (Andrews et al., 2003) and researchers have 
suggested avoiding them when possible. It is acknowledged the use of incentives, in 
general, might cause bias, but with the objective of compensating recipients for 
participation whilst increasing response rates, low-value inducements were offered. 
From an ethical perspective, offering prospective respondents an incentive for 
participation in a questionnaire provides a fair exchange for their time. It is argued that 
low-value inducements are unlikely to be considered of significant substance to warrant 
participants to complete the questionnaire strictly for the incentive (Birnholtz, Finholt, 
& Bae, 2003).  
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Considering unsolicited e-mail notifications are often filtered by spam mechanisms, it 
has been argued that the use of e-mail invitations can result in systematic bias (Birnholtz 
et al., 2003). However, obtaining the services of a professional organisation to facilitate 
the invitation process could circumvent this concern. For example, Schwepker and 
Good (2011) used a leading national data collection organisation to send notifications to 
prospective participants. According to the results, 51% of the sample responded to the 
electronic questionnaire. Given these response rates, this sampling strategy appears to 
be useful in increasing response rates and potentially, reducing systematic bias.  
In general, self-administered questionnaires have been criticized for lacking interaction 
between the researcher and participants, and with this lack of interaction; participants 
cannot be probed for additional details which limit the information content of the data. 
The dislocation of participants from the researcher can also result in participants 
haphazardly completing the questionnaire. In the worst-case, participants could 
complete the questionnaire whilst undertaking other tasks.  
It is believed that “the unconstrained setting and instant-feedback possibilities of a web-
based survey make it particularly vulnerable to the vagaries of self-reported data” 
(Howard, Shegog, Grussendorf, Benjamins, Stelzig, & McAlister, 2007, p. 568). In 
particular, online questionnaires are less effortful than laboratory assessments, 
participants are not monitored during the data collection procedure, and a point-and-
click method can introduce error variance (McMahon & Harvey, 2007). However, these 
issues can also occur in other forms of self-administered questionnaires, such as mail 
surveys, and these issues are acknowledged as disadvantages of online questionnaires 
and self-administered surveys in general.  
In comparison to other methods such as interviews, self-administered questionnaires are 
most effective at reducing socially desirable responses, which can improve the 
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reliability of the data. Although disadvantages are apparent, self-administered 
questionnaires are widely accepted in the business ethics paradigm. As indicated, 81% 
of the business ethics empirical studies included in Randall and Gibson’s (1990) meta-
analysis were based on self-administered questionnaires. 
5.5.2 Sample 
To estimate the required sample size, Hair et al., (1998) suggested conducting a priori 
power calculations. To conduct an a priori sample size calculation, an estimated effect 
size is required. In multivariate analyses, the coefficient of determination (R²) results 
are used as a metric for the effect size (Cohen, 1992).  
According to a study involving the analysis of the PMI construct among marketing 
professionals, the average effect size was 0.34 (Singhapakdi et al., 1996). In a study 
involving Machiavellianism and EQB among a national sample of marketing 
professionals, the effect size was 0.18 (Ross & Robertson, 2003). Detert et al. (2008) 
found the effect size for an analysis of rationalization as the mediator in the relationship 
between the locus of control personality and unethical decision-making was 0.2.  
Using these examples, the estimated effect size for this study is approximately 0.2. 
From the a priori power calculation developed by Soper (2011) for multiple regression 
with an anticipated effect size of 0.2, four predictors, a level of significance of α=0.01, 
and a recommended power of 0.8 (Cohen, 1992), a minimum sample of 91 participants 
would be required. If a 0.05 level of significance is used, the required sample size would 
be 65.  
Although useful in testing relationships between latent variables, it is argued that 
statistical limitations are apparent with regression models. The most significant 
limitation pertains to unreliability in measurement (Frazier, Tix, and Barron, 2004). To 
CHAPTER FIVE 
 130 
address this limitation, structural equation modelling (SEM) can be used to control for 
the unreliability in measurement (Frazier et al., 2004) and SEM is more flexible than 
regression (Frazier et al., 2004). The minimum sample size for SEM is 200 (Hair et al., 
1998).  
According to a review of studies using an identical sample frame as that used in this 
research, a difference was often found between completed questionnaires and usable 
questionnaires. The range was between 3% and 30% for unusable questionnaires. Using 
a similar sample frame and identical sampling method as those used in this research, 
which will be discussed in the following paragraphs, Schwepker and Good (2011) found 
20% of their completed questionnaires were unusable. The typical issues involved 
incomplete questionnaires or unqualified participants completing the questionnaire. To 
ensure a minimum of 200 usable responses are attained, 250 completed questionnaires 
was the target for this research.  
To access marketing professionals, researchers have used part-time MBA students 
(Lewicki & Robinson, 1998) and marketing professional databases such as that for the 
American Marketing Association (Singhapakdi & Vitell, 1992). However, O’Fallon and 
Butterfield (2005) and others (Wood et al., 1988) have criticized the use of student 
samples as they are not representative of the target population and generalization is 
limited. This lack of generalization can negatively affect external validity. In addition, 
non-random convenience samples can result in population bias, which can lead to 
unfounded conclusions (Lyons, Cude, Lawrence, & Gutter, 2009).  
To address the concerns with using proxies for marketing professionals, an identical 
approach to Schwepker and Good’s (2011) study of marketing professionals was used. 
Data collection was facilitated by a leading organisation specializing in web-based 
questionnaire distribution. Through their services, the target population was accessed 
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using a systematic random sampling approach. Despite being resource efficient, this 
data collection method is unconventional compared to posted questionnaires to 
members of the American Marketing Association (AMA). However, researchers have 
criticized the continued reliance on AMA members (Singhapakdi & Vitell, 1992); these 
samples might not represent the typical marketer and studies using these samples are 
limiting. To address this limitation, Singhapakdi et al. (1996) suggested researchers 
should use non-AMA members and the call for improvement was heeded here through 
the use of a national sample of marketing practitioners.  
The organisation contracted for this study forms their database from the 30 million 
people that participate in their online questionnaires per month. After 
participants complete a survey, they are redirected to a site asking them to join their 
database. After joining and when satisfied specific demographic parameters, individuals 
are contacted to complete questionnaires. As of May 2012, the company had over 
1,000,000 U.S. members.  
After balancing for gender, the company selected potential marketing professional 
candidates. To minimize overexposure to questionnaires, the organisation limits the 
surveys each member completes. To control for overexposure to questionnaires on 
marketing practices, an item was included in the study. According to the results, 91% of 
participants declared they had not completed a questionnaire on marketing practices 
within the past six months and therefore, overexposure is not expected to be a problem 
in this study. 
A total of 589 marketing professionals received an e-mail inviting them to participate in 
the online questionnaire. Of these invitees, 437 marketers accessed the survey website 
and provided responses, which yields an initial response rate of 74%. After removing 
incomplete questionnaires, the final sample size was 276 participants with a final 
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response rate of approximately 47%. This response rate is well-above the typical 
response rates of 20% found in the business ethics paradigm using an identical sample 
frame (Schwepker & Good, 2011). In these studies, non-response bias was not found to 
be a problem (Singhapadki & Vitell, 1993). Given the high response rate in this study, it 
is expected that non-response bias was also not a problem. 
According to the sample profile, an overwhelming majority of participants were born in 
the U.S. and declared themselves as U.S. nationals (approximately 97%). The survey 
participants were balanced for gender with 51.8% male. The majority of participants 
were over 40 with the largest age category of 60 and over (30.8%). Many participants 
had over 10 years of marketing experience and approximately 44% had some college 
education. Based on past studies using AMA members (Singhapakdi et al., 1996), the 
demographic profiles of the participants are comparable to those present in the 
literature. In addition, the results on the Mach IV personality test are consistent with 
Hunt and Chonko’s (1984) study of marketing professionals. The mean score for this 
study was 88 whereas the marketing professionals from Hunt and Chonko’s (1984) 
study scored approximately 86. Based on these comparable results, the participants of 
this study appear to be suitable representatives of U.S. based marketers. 
5.6 Methods of Analysis 
As the developed model contains a formative construct (PMI) (Diamantopoulos & 
Winklhofer, 2001), a variance-based SEM approach involving partial least squares 
(PLS) was conducted through the PLS path modelling software application (SmartPLS) 
(Ringle, Wende, & Will, 2005). Variance-based SEMs can accommodate formative 
variables, are better suited to exploratory work involving complex models comprising 
various networks with interactions among the constructs and with second order 
variables present (Gefen, Rigdon, & Straub, 2011). PLS is also most suitable for 
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exploratory work involving newly developed instruments (Gefen et al., 2011; Henseler 
et al., 2009).  
To estimate the confidence intervals and the corresponding t-values in the PLS path 
coefficients, a bootstrapping technique was used (Henseler et al., 2009). The familywise 
level of significance set for this study is 0.05. To control for the effect of the 
demographic variables on the models, MANOVA, ANOVA, and Tukey’s post-hoc tests 
were conducted.  
5.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the main methodological issues associated with the business ethics 
research paradigm were presented. To address socially desirable response bias, self-
administered vignette-based questionnaires, anonymity, non-threatening language, 
projective techniques, and an online distribution method were used. According to the 
comparison between the direct and indirect question items, socially desirable response 
bias is not expected to be a problem in this study.  
In the latter portions of this chapter, the questionnaire items that were excluded and 
those that were modified were discussed. To develop the questionnaire, several pre-tests 
and a pilot study were conducted. According to the results of these development 
procedures, the majority of participants believed the questionnaire items were realistic, 
clear, related to marketing, contained ethical issues, and were morally intense. From the 
composite reliability results derived from a factor analysis, the questionnaire items 
contain sufficient and acceptable levels of reliability. 
As indicated, the sampling strategy for this study involved relying on the services of a 
leading data collection organisation to facilitate questionnaire distribution. The 
questionnaire was distributed to members of the aforementioned leading organisation 
and 276 marketing professionals fully completed the questionnaire. This sampling 
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frame marks an improvement over the typical studies that include members of the 
American Marketing Association or students. In the next chapter, the results of the data 
analysis are presented.   
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Results  
6.1 Introduction 
As indicated in chapter two, a positivist philosophical framework was used to answer 
the research questions of ‘how do marketers rationalize their ethically questionable 
intentions’ and ‘what influence does Machiavellianism have on the decision-making 
process’. As discussed in chapter five, the target population of this study is U.S. 
marketing professionals. To test the hypotheses, the data collection instrument was 
developed from existing questionnaire items. These items were modified for context, 
pretested among marketing professionals and pilot tested on MBA and doctoral students 
(n = 34). Based on these developmental procedures, the questionnaire has sufficient face 
validity. For the main study of this research, the questionnaire was distributed 
electronically via a leading organisation specializing in data collection.  
In this chapter, the results of the main study are presented. In the first section, the 
methods used to test and validate the models are discussed. In the second section, an 
alternative model of the decision-making process is presented. This model is based on 
the perceived moral intensity (PMI) empirical research. In this alternative model, the 
PMI constructs are tested independently and directly against neutralization, judgment, 
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and intention. The formative second-order model was replaced by three first-order 
reflective latent variables representing the magnitude of consequences (self), magnitude 
of consequences (others), and social consensus. In the subsequent sections, the 
formative model is argued to be the most accurate representation of the ethical decision-
making process and thus, is the model put forward as the main contribution of this 
thesis.  
In the final sections of the chapter, the R² results of the latent variables across each 
vignette are discussed. To answer the research questions, the results of the hypothesis 
tests are presented, which include brief discussions of the contributions to knowledge. 
In the final section, the results of the post-hoc tests of the demographic variables are 
presented. 
6.2 Measurement Model 
To test the hypotheses, three separate models were developed to represent each of the 
vignettes in this research: subprime lending, environmental pollution, and package 
downsizing. To develop a composite representation of the overall omnibus behavioural 
intentions of marketers, a parcelling technique was used to construct the fourth model. 
Specifically, the measurement indicators across the three vignettes were averaged and 
the fourth model was fitted to these data. In addition to analyzing the variances from a 
context specific perspective, the parcelling technique offers an overall perspective of the 
unethical decision-making process used by marketers, which is applicable to a broad 
spectrum of behavioural contexts. Although parcelling is well-established in the 
structural equation modelling (SEM) research (Little, Cunningham, & Shahar, 2002), 
arguments have been raised regarding the lack of validity associated with this technique. 
To address this concern, the omnibus model was exposed to validity and reliability tests, 
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and as discussed in the forthcoming sections, the omnibus framework is valid and 
reliable.  
6.2.1 Vignette #1 Package Downsizing 
According to the package downsizing model (see Figure 6.1), a consistent structure is 
sustained with the hypothesized conceptual framework presented in chapter four. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 – Package Downsizing Model 
6.2.2 Vignette #2 Environmental Pollution  
Consistent with the structure of the package downsizing model, the model representing 
the environmental pollution vignette (see Figure 6.2) also follows the paths defined in 
the hypothesized framework. However, the path between the techniques of 
neutralization (TON) and ethical judgment was insignificant and excluded from the 
model. As will be discussed in chapter seven, several of the path coefficients in the 
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second vignette appear stronger than the paths found in the package downsizing and 
subprime lending models. Specifically, the paths from Machiavellianism to the TON, 
the path from social consensus to PMI, and the path from magnitude of consequences 
(others) to PMI appear to differ.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2 – Environmental Pollution Model 
 
 
6.2.3 Vignette #3 Subprime Lending  
From Figure 6.3, the model representing the subprime lending vignette sustains several 
similarities to the package downsizing model. Each of the path coefficients remain 
constant in both models, which provides evidence of structural integrity as the basic 
composition is held across the three vignettes. 
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Figure 6.3 – Subprime Lending Model 
 
 
6.2.4 Omnibus Model 
According to the omnibus model depicted in Figure 6.4, the framework maintains each 
of the 16 path coefficients found in the conceptual framework and the first and third 
models. As indicated, this aggregate model offers an overall perspective of the decision-
making process used by marketers when ethically questionable behavioural intentions 
are formed. The preceding three models offer a ‘snapshot’ of the decision-making 
framework whereas the omnibus offers a more robust model of unethical decision-
making, which can be applied to a broad spectrum of behaviours.  
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Figure 6.4 – Omnibus Model 
 
 
6.3 Validity and Reliability 
In this section, the procedures used to validate each model are discussed. In the first 
section, convergent and discriminant validity are assessed. Consistent with the partial 
least squares (PLS) literature (Henseler et al., 2009); discriminant and convergent 
validity are tested using Fornell and Larcker’s (1981) framework. To test the 
measurement instrument for common method bias (CMB), Harman’s Test, which is the 
most widely cited model to test for CMB (Malhotra, Kim, & Patil, 2006), is used. CMB 
was further tested by reviewing the correlation matrix for each latent variable (Bagozzi, 
Yi, & Philips, 1991). 
Prior to conducting the validity testing, the dimensionality of the four models was tested 
using a principal component factor analysis with a varimax rotation. From Table 6.1, the 
total percentage variability explained by the four models is above the recommended 
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level of 70% (Hair et al., 1998), which is considered satisfactory. The additional 
complexity introduced by the extra factor is not merited and the more parsimonious nine 
factor model is preferred. 
Table 6.1 – Dimensionality Test for the Four Models 
Model Total %var – 9 Factor Total %var – 10 Factor 
Model 1 76.3 78.8 
Model 2 75.7 78.0 
Model 3 76.8 79.3 
Omnibus  78.4 80.7 
 
6.3.1 Convergent and Discriminant Validity 
To test for convergent validity, the average variance extracted (AVE) scores for each 
latent variable was reviewed to ensure they were above 0.50. Internal consistency was 
checked to make sure the composite reliability results for each latent variable were 
above the minimum level of 0.70 (Henseler et al., 2009). To test for discriminant 
validity, each manifest variable was analyzed using the cross-loading results derived 
from a factor analysis. The first step in assessing discriminant validity involved 
ensuring each indicator loaded satisfactorily onto its designated construct and that these 
loading are greater than any cross-loading for the indicator on any other construct. The 
second step in assessing discriminant validity involves ensuring the square root of the 
AVE for each construct is greater than the correlation of the construct with any of the 
remaining constructs. 
6.3.1.1 Vignette #1 Package Downsizing 
According to Table 6.2, each of the AVE values are beyond 0.50. The composite 
reliability results are all above 0.70.  
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Table 6.2 – Vignette #1 Package Downsizing AVE, Composite Reliability, and R² 
          AVE Composite Reliability R Square 
    AM 0.5838 0.7370 0.5464 
    EI 0.9169 0.9822 0.7447 
    EJ 0.9180 0.9781 0.6183 
    IT 0.5862 0.8754 0.8063 
MC (o) 0.7393 0.8499 0.0305 
MC (s) 0.5951 0.7263 0.0173 
    SC 0.5797 0.7339 0.0638 
   TON 0.7766 0.9542 0.5186 
   VHN 0.5450 0.7817 0.3560 
Mach 0.5600 0.8400 N/A 
AM: Abstract morality; EI: Unethical intentions; EJ: 
Ethical judgment; IT: Interpersonal tactics; MC (o): 
Magnitude of consequences (others); MC (s): Magnitude 
of consequences (self); SC: Social consensus; TON: 
Techniques of neutralization; VHN: Views of human 
nature; Mach: Machiavellianism. 
 
From Table 6.3, the square root of the AVE for each latent variable was greater than the 
corresponding latent variable correlations. However, the TON construct had initial 
validity concerns but these were resolved by removing the defence of necessity (DON) 
and social weighting (SW) indicators. Once removed, the square root of the AVE for the 
TON improved to 0.88. Given that the TON were modelled as a reflective construct, 
removing these indicators did not alter the meaning of this latent variable (Jarvis et al., 
2003). 
Table 6.3 – Vignette #1 Latent Variable Correlations 
           AM      EI      EJ      IT  MC (o)  MC (s)      SC     TON     VHN 
    AM 0.7641 
            EI 0.1494 0.9575 
           EJ 0.0901 0.7574 0.9581 
          IT 0.4996 0.1647 0.0906 0.7656 
     MC (o) 0.1487 0.6261 0.6025 0.1386 0.8598 
    MC (s) 0.0663 0.2883 0.1451 0.1010 0.1365 0.7714 
       SC 0.1752 0.4780 0.4588 0.2112 0.3680 0.0816 0.7614 
     TON 0.2148 0.8502 0.7363 0.1860 0.6275 0.2580 0.4990 0.8812 
    VHN 0.4044 0.2296 0.1243 0.2560 0.1173 0.1432 0.1909 0.2211 0.7382 
AM: Abstract morality; EI: Unethical intentions; EJ: Ethical judgment; IT: Interpersonal tactics; MC (o): 
Magnitude of consequences (others); MC (s): Magnitude of consequences (self); SC: Social consensus; TON: 
Techniques of neutralization; VHN: Views of human nature. 
 
The final step in attaining discriminant validity involved ensuring the factor loadings for 
each manifest variable loaded onto their designated latent variable better than the 
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remaining constructs. According to Table 6.4, the measurement indicators load highest 
onto their putative constructs. Noteworthy, the measurement indicator loadings for three 
manifest variables (magnitude of consequences (self), views of human nature, and 
interpersonal tactics) were below the acceptable threshold of 0.70 (Henseler et al., 
2009). However, the outer loadings of these variables were above 0.40 and considering 
these manifest variables are argued to be representative of their respective latent 
variables (Christie & Geis, 1970; McMahon & Harvey, 2006), they were retained for 
theoretical purposes (Henseler et al., 2009). Therefore, the latent variables for the first 
vignette have sufficient reliability and validity. 
Table 6.4 – Vignette #1 Cross Loadings 
               SC      EI      EJ  MC (o)  MC (s)     VHN      AM      IT     TON 
SC 1 0.7623 0.3137 0.2605 0.2506 0.1117 0.2323 0.2257 0.2757 0.3444 
SC 2 0.7604 0.4143 0.4384 0.3098 0.0123 0.0582 0.0408 0.0454 0.4156 
EI 1 0.4767 0.9781 0.7369 0.6058 0.2905 0.2329 0.1351 0.1682 0.8316 
EI 2 0.3780 0.8857 0.6740 0.5540 0.2682 0.1778 0.1061 0.1070 0.7602 
EI 3 0.4654 0.9663 0.7380 0.5843 0.2699 0.2211 0.1565 0.1488 0.8125 
EI 4 0.4764 0.9785 0.7450 0.6328 0.2793 0.2312 0.1593 0.1952 0.8306 
EI 5 0.4858 0.9759 0.7300 0.6181 0.2724 0.2331 0.1554 0.1647 0.8333 
EJ 1 0.4028 0.7431 0.9617 0.5594 0.1389 0.1241 0.0969 0.0815 0.6900 
EJ 2 0.4424 0.6911 0.9476 0.5953 0.1084 0.0945 0.0683 0.0824 0.6913 
EJ 3 0.4380 0.7413 0.9605 0.5758 0.1576 0.1337 0.0851 0.0864 0.7038 
EJ 4 0.4741 0.7266 0.9626 0.5790 0.1502 0.1234 0.0946 0.0966 0.7357 
MC (o) 1 0.2506 0.4545 0.4632 0.8238 0.0952 0.0785 0.1300 0.0697 0.4368 
MC (o) 2 0.3706 0.6083 0.5651 0.8944 0.1356 0.1192 0.1271 0.1591 0.6245 
MC (s) 1 0.1006 0.2863 0.1450 0.1419 0.9735 0.1463 0.0767 0.1181 0.2760 
MC (s) 2 -0.0403 0.1204 0.0573 0.0329 0.4924 0.0443 -0.0138 -0.0255 0.0326 
Mach 13 0.0881 0.1069 0.0706 0.0044 0.1550 0.6815 0.2515 0.1617 0.1254 
Mach 15 0.1209 0.1450 0.0727 0.0609 0.0881 0.7911 0.3376 0.2235 0.1556 
Mach 18 0.2121 0.2548 0.1332 0.1896 0.0826 0.7382 0.3003 0.1768 0.2073 
Mach 16 0.1021 0.0279 0.0029 0.0035 0.0469 0.2164 0.7429 0.4078 0.1003 
Mach 2 0.1635 0.1942 0.1300 0.2158 0.0541 0.3952 0.7846 0.3580 0.2234 
Mach 3 0.2006 0.1266 0.0821 0.1422 0.0526 0.1204 0.2935 0.6272 0.1262 
Mach 6 0.1399 0.0820 0.0195 0.0360 0.0373 0.1682 0.4252 0.8156 0.0870 
Mach 7 0.1712 0.1722 0.1179 0.1056 0.1386 0.2323 0.3352 0.7708 0.1773 
Mach 9 0.1747 0.1523 0.0919 0.1643 0.0627 0.2301 0.4165 0.8048 0.1848 
Mach 10 0.1356 0.1024 0.0422 0.0929 0.0941 0.2164 0.4269 0.7941 0.1372 
T 1 0.4956 0.7670 0.6752 0.5368 0.2513 0.2036 0.1762 0.1964 0.8967 
T 2 0.4537 0.6451 0.5735 0.4769 0.2585 0.2263 0.2445 0.2220 0.8417 
T 3 0.4225 0.7762 0.6634 0.5483 0.2038 0.2030 0.1555 0.1000 0.8967 
T 5 0.3921 0.7665 0.6179 0.5734 0.2493 0.1952 0.1841 0.1307 0.8483 
T 6 0.4201 0.7440 0.6352 0.5498 0.2291 0.2107 0.2247 0.2134 0.8984 
T 7 0.4544 0.7864 0.7177 0.6240 0.1791 0.1375 0.1599 0.1291 0.9035 
AM: Abstract morality; EI: Unethical intentions; EJ: Ethical judgment; IT: Interpersonal tactics; MC (o): 
Magnitude of consequences (others); MC (s): Magnitude of consequences (self); SC: Social consensus; TON: 
Techniques of neutralization; VHN: Views of human nature; Mach: Machiavellianism. 
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As expected, poor loadings and low-AVE values for Christie and Geis’s (1970) a priori 
factor structure were found. Consistent with the literature, these issues were resolved by 
eliminating 10 manifest variables from the 20-item Mach IV construct. Several of the 
resulting loadings for the retained items remain inconsistent with those for the Christie 
and Geis (1970) factor structure (see Table 6.5). However, the loadings found in this 
research are consistent with empirical studies. The factor structure for the interpersonal 
tactics construct is consistent with Panitz’s (1989) two-item factor. As the original 
structure of the abstract morality construct also had two items, content validity was 
consequently not lost through validation. The factor loading of the interpersonal tactics 
construct is consistent with Ahmed and Stewart (1981), O’Hair and Cody (1987), 
Hunter et al. (1982), and Corral and Calvete (2000). The factor loading for the views of 
human nature is also consistent with Ahmed and Stewart (1981), O’Hair and Cody 
(1987), and Corral and Calvete (2000). 
Specifically, the Mach IV items #2 and #16 from the interpersonal tactics construct had 
a better fit on the abstract morality variable, which is identical to Panitz’s (1989) two-
item factor. Similarly, item #9 from the abstract morality construct had a better fit on 
the interpersonal tactics construct, which is consistent with the literature. For example, 
Ahmed and Stewart (1981), O’Hair and Cody (1987), and Hunter et al. (1982) found 
items #6, 7, 9, and 10 loaded on the interpersonal tactics variable. Corral and Calvete 
(2000) also found item #3 loaded on this construct. Finally, item #15 from the 
interpersonal tactics fitted better on the views of human nature. This finding is 
consistent with those of Ahmed and Stewart (1981) and O’Hair and Cody (1987). In 
addition, Ahmed and Stewart (1981) found item #18 loaded on the views of human 
nature, O’Hair and Cody (1987) found item #13 also loaded better on this construct, and 
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Corral and Calvete (2000) found items #18 and 13 load on the variable, which represent 
the three items from the views of human nature construct of this study.  
Considering Machiavellianism was modelled as a second-order reflective construct, 
removing the items did not alter the meaning of the personality. Content validity of this 
construct was not compromised, but rather an improved factor structure emerged. 
Furthermore, the factor structures in this research are consistent with the definitions of 
each dimension of the personality (Christie & Geis, 1970). 
Table 6.5 – Factor Loadings for the Machiavellian (Mach IV) Construct 
Mach IV 
Item 
Number 
Manifest Variable 
Factor 
Loading of 
Current Study 
Factor Score 
of Current 
Study 
Christie & 
Geis's (1970) 
structure 
Mach 2 The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear. AM 0.78 IT 
Mach 16 It is possible to be good in all respects. AM 0.74 IT 
Mach 6 Honesty is the best policy in all cases. IT 0.82 IT 
Mach 3 One should take action only when sure it is morally right. IT 0.63 IT 
Mach 9 All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than important and dishonest. IT 0.80 AM 
Mach 7 There is no excuse for lying to someone else. IT 0.77 IT 
Mach 10 When you ask someone to do something for you, it is best to give the real reasons for 
wanting it rather than giving reasons which might carry more weight. 
IT 0.79 IT 
Mach 18 It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and there. VHN 0.74 VHN 
Mach 15 It is wise to flatter important people. VHN 0.79 IT 
Mach 13 The biggest difference between most criminals and other people is that criminals are 
stupid enough to get caught. 
VHN 0.68 VHN 
AM: Abstract morality; IT: Interpersonal tactics; VHN: Views of human nature. 
 
Disappointingly, the path coefficients for the views of human nature (β = 0.61) onto the 
Mach IV construct were below the acceptable threshold (β = 0.70) for an exploratory 
model (see Figure 6.1). However, considering the views of human nature are a facet of 
the Machiavellian personality and the outer loading is above 0.40 (Henseler et al., 
2009), the construct was retained as the low-value was likely to be the result of the 
aforementioned issues with the Mach IV. To understand these issues, researchers should 
conduct a post-hoc investigation by way of confirming the factor structure attained in 
this study. If the results are consistent, researchers should reword the Mach IV or 
CHAPTER SIX 
 146 
develop a revised scale of Machiavellianism within the context of Christie and Geis’s 
(1970) contextualization. 
Even though a low path coefficient was found for the views of human nature, from 
Table 6.6, the path coefficients for each of the first order latent variables to the second 
order Machiavellian construct are highly significant. Specifically, the path coefficient 
from Machiavellianism to the views of human nature was highly significant at the 0.01 
level (Model 1: β = 0.59, p < 0.001; Model 2: β = 0.59, p < 0.001; Model 3: β = 0.59, p 
< 0.001; Model 4: β = 0.59, p < 0.001). The path coefficient from Machiavellianism to 
abstract morality was highly significant at the 0.01 level (Model 1: β = 0.74, p < 0.001; 
Model 2: β = 0.74, p < 0.001; Model 3: β = 0.73, p < 0.001; Model 4: β = 0.73, p < 
0.001). Finally, the path coefficient from Machiavellianism to interpersonal tactics was 
also supported at the 0.01 level (Model 1: β = 0.90, p < 0.001; Model 2: β = 0.90, p < 
0.001; Model 3: β = 0.90, p < 0.001; Model 4: β = 0.90, p < 0.001).  
Table 6.6 Path Coefficient Loadings for the Machiavellian Construct 
  Path Coefficient  
Machiavellian Relationship Vignette 1 Vignette 2 Vignette 3 Vignette 4 
Machiavellianism -> views of human nature 0.59*** 0.59*** 0.59*** 0.59*** 
Machiavellianism -> abstract morality 0.74*** 0.74*** 0.73*** 0.73*** 
Machiavellianism -> interpersonal tactics 0.90*** 0.90*** 0.90*** 0.90*** 
* p < 0.05                 
** p < 0.01                 
*** p < 0.001                 
 
6.3.1.2 Vignette #2 Environmental Pollution 
Consistent with the discriminant and convergent validity tests in vignette #1, the latent 
variables for the remaining models were exposed to identical procedures. From Table 
6.7, the AVE scores for the latent variables in vignette #2 are all above 0.50. The 
composite reliability results are above 0.70. From these findings, the measurements for 
the second vignette sustain acceptable convergent validity. 
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Table 6.7 – Vignette #2 Environmental Pollution AVE, Composite Reliability, and R² 
          AVE Composite Reliability R Square 
    AM 0.5838 0.7371 0.5442 
    EI 0.9088 0.9803 0.6830 
    EJ 0.9016 0.9734 0.5549 
    IT 0.5862 0.8754 0.8090 
MC (o) 0.6515 0.7878 0.0670 
MC (s) 0.7324 0.8442 0.0227 
    SC 0.6082 0.7545 0.0869 
   TON 0.7269 0.9551 0.6102 
   VHN 0.5451 0.7818 0.3536 
Mach 0.5600 0.8400 N/A 
AM: Abstract morality; EI: Unethical intentions; EJ: 
Ethical judgment; IT: Interpersonal tactics; MC (o): 
Magnitude of consequences (others); MC (s): Magnitude 
of consequences (self); SC: Social consensus; TON: 
Techniques of neutralization; VHN: Views of human 
nature; Mach: Machiavellianism. 
 
From Table 6.8, the latent variables for the second vignette sustain sufficient 
discriminant validity. Specifically, the square roots of the AVE for each latent variable 
are greater than the correlations for the other latent variables. Similar to vignette #1, the 
TON had initial validity concerns until these were resolved by removing the social 
weighting (SW) indicator.  
Table 6.8 – Vignette #2 Latent Variable Correlations 
          AM      EI      EJ      IT  MC (o)  MC (s)      SC     TON     VHN 
    AM 0.7641 
            EI 0.3247 0.9533 
           EJ 0.2165 0.7282 0.9495 
          IT 0.4999 0.3691 0.2105 0.7656 
     MC (o) 0.1610 0.5634 0.4975 0.2443 0.8072 
    MC (s) 0.1022 0.2332 0.1810 0.1006 0.0680 0.8558 
       SC 0.2629 0.5721 0.5098 0.2195 0.3873 -0.0311 0.7799 
     TON 0.3434 0.8111 0.6437 0.3905 0.5852 0.1758 0.6356 0.8526 
    VHN 0.4038 0.3254 0.2671 0.2560 0.1505 0.1749 0.2289 0.3335 0.7383 
AM: Abstract morality; EI: Unethical intentions; EJ: Ethical judgment; IT: Interpersonal tactics; MC (o): 
Magnitude of consequences (others); MC (s): Magnitude of consequences (self); SC: Social consensus; TON: 
Techniques of neutralization; VHN: Views of human nature. 
 
According to Table 6.9, the factor loadings for all measurement indicators were highest 
on their putative constructs compared to the remaining latent variables. Consistent with 
vignette #1, the measurement indicator loadings for three manifest variables (social 
consensus, views of human nature, and interpersonal tactics) were below the acceptable 
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threshold of 0.70 (Henseler et al., 2009). However, again, the outer loadings of these 
variables were above 0.40 and thus, were retained for theoretical purposes (Henseler et 
al., 2009). From these results, each latent variable from vignette #2 has sufficient 
convergent and discriminant validity. 
Table 6.9 – Vignette #2 Cross Loadings 
 
     SC      EI      EJ  MC (o)  MC (s)     VHN      AM      IT     TON 
SC 1 0.8535 0.4728 0.4313 0.3526 0.0112 0.2148 0.2588 0.2204 0.6008 
SC 2 0.6985 0.4209 0.3614 0.2403 -0.0737 0.1333 0.1363 0.1079 0.3638 
EI 1 0.5286 0.9770 0.7083 0.5381 0.2178 0.3156 0.2982 0.3374 0.7746 
EI 2 0.5650 0.9094 0.6944 0.5477 0.2253 0.3185 0.3073 0.3420 0.7808 
EI 3 0.5251 0.9500 0.6646 0.5273 0.2277 0.3137 0.2987 0.3313 0.7499 
EI 4 0.5465 0.9709 0.7055 0.5210 0.2091 0.3152 0.3048 0.3557 0.7778 
EI 5 0.5599 0.9576 0.6960 0.5497 0.2312 0.2878 0.3374 0.3913 0.7804 
EJ 1 0.4850 0.7042 0.9562 0.4761 0.1965 0.2534 0.2281 0.2259 0.6019 
EJ 2 0.4555 0.6380 0.9254 0.4194 0.1574 0.2248 0.1587 0.1418 0.5562 
EJ 3 0.4883 0.7259 0.9464 0.5067 0.1556 0.2633 0.2190 0.2172 0.6548 
EJ 4 0.5056 0.6931 0.9696 0.4824 0.1772 0.2705 0.2121 0.2090 0.6268 
MC (o) 1 0.2241 0.3577 0.2826 0.7367 -0.0115 0.0776 0.1228 0.2272 0.3813 
MC (o) 2 0.3821 0.5328 0.4945 0.8720 0.1039 0.1553 0.1374 0.1788 0.5464 
MC (s) 1 -0.0371 0.2432 0.1947 0.0969 0.9382 0.1618 0.1240 0.1190 0.1752 
MC (s) 2 -0.0091 0.1327 0.0920 -0.0096 0.7646 0.1380 0.0258 0.0310 0.1152 
Mach 13 0.1851 0.2221 0.1862 0.1663 0.1252 0.6883 0.2512 0.1620 0.2713 
Mach 15 0.1890 0.2511 0.2102 0.1407 0.0923 0.7915 0.3372 0.2235 0.2491 
Mach 18 0.1328 0.2473 0.1946 0.0267 0.1764 0.7315 0.3001 0.1765 0.2220 
Mach 16 0.1903 0.2125 0.1221 0.1233 0.0201 0.2159 0.7449 0.4080 0.2104 
Mach 2 0.2109 0.2816 0.2060 0.1229 0.1323 0.3953 0.7828 0.3581 0.3111 
Mach 3 0.1966 0.2857 0.1456 0.1351 0.1132 0.1199 0.2934 0.6270 0.2809 
Mach 6 0.0860 0.2927 0.1595 0.1795 0.1078 0.1679 0.4255 0.8150 0.2518 
Mach 7 0.0851 0.2735 0.1624 0.1412 0.0948 0.2314 0.3353 0.7692 0.2400 
Mach 9 0.2552 0.3010 0.1873 0.2214 0.0500 0.2310 0.4167 0.8059 0.3701 
Mach 10 0.2211 0.2671 0.1508 0.2461 0.0321 0.2169 0.4270 0.7952 0.3494 
T I 0.6068 0.7455 0.5846 0.5465 0.1227 0.2582 0.3014 0.3609 0.8875 
T 2  0.5331 0.6822 0.5541 0.5078 0.1215 0.3018 0.3271 0.3825 0.8753 
T 3  0.4109 0.6553 0.4710 0.4689 0.2145 0.2164 0.2316 0.2386 0.7962 
T 4  0.5034 0.7426 0.5658 0.5172 0.2064 0.3430 0.3317 0.3586 0.8482 
T 5 0.4969 0.6802 0.5790 0.4876 0.1527 0.3236 0.2520 0.2755 0.8469 
T 6 0.5957 0.6079 0.5045 0.4728 0.0845 0.2834 0.2967 0.3767 0.8098 
T 7  0.5504 0.7383 0.5671 0.5221 0.1811 0.2745 0.2580 0.2656 0.8807 
T 8  0.6233 0.6706 0.5557 0.4632 0.1205 0.2695 0.3347 0.3930 0.8713 
AM: Abstract morality; EI: Unethical intentions; EJ: Ethical judgment; IT: Interpersonal tactics; MC (o): 
Magnitude of consequences (others); MC (s): Magnitude of consequences (self); SC: Social consensus; TON: 
Techniques of neutralization; VHN: Views of human nature; Mach: Machiavellianism. 
 
6.3.1.3 Vignette #3 Subprime Lending 
The latent variables for vignette #3 show sufficient convergent validity as all AVE 
scores are above 0.50 (see Table 6.10). The composite reliability scores are above 0.70. 
Similarly, the latent variables sustain acceptable levels of discriminant validity (see 
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Table 6.11); the square roots of the AVE for each latent variable are greater than the 
correlation of the construct with any of the remaining constructs.  
Table 6.10 – Vignette #3 Subprime Lending AVE, Composite Reliability, and R² 
           AVE Composite Reliability R Square 
    AM 0.5838 0.7371 0.5316 
    EI 0.9199 0.9829 0.7036 
    EJ 0.9044 0.9743 0.5012 
    IT 0.5862 0.8754 0.8185 
MC (o) 0.7705 0.8701 0.0773 
MC (s) 0.6598 0.7949 0.0000 
    SC 0.5872 0.7385 0.0980 
   TON 0.7653 0.9580 0.5693 
   VHN 0.5451 0.7818 0.3483 
Mach 0.5600 0.8400 N/A 
AM: Abstract morality; EI: Unethical intentions; EJ: 
Ethical judgment; IT: Interpersonal tactics; MC (o): 
Magnitude of consequences (others); MC (s): Magnitude 
of consequences (self); SC: Social consensus; TON: 
Techniques of neutralization; VHN: Views of human 
nature; Mach: Machiavellianism. 
 
Table 6.11 – Vignette #3 Latent Variable Correlations 
          AM      EI      EJ      IT  MC (o)  MC (s)      SC     TON     VHN 
    AM 0.7641 
            EI 0.1072 0.9591 
           EJ 0.0291 0.6685 0.9510 
          IT 0.4997 0.2926 0.2027 0.7656 
     MC (o) 0.1006 0.6571 0.5475 0.2511 0.8778 
    MC (s) 0.0069 0.2346 0.0837 0.0555 0.0800 0.8123 
       SC 0.1670 0.5524 0.4395 0.3103 0.5221 -0.0519 0.7663 
     TON 0.1721 0.8177 0.6733 0.3151 0.6824 0.1532 0.5662 0.8748 
    VHN 0.4041 0.2463 0.0768 0.2560 0.2452 0.1203 0.1693 0.2746 0.7383 
AM: Abstract morality; EI: Unethical intentions; EJ: Ethical judgment; IT: Interpersonal tactics; MC (o): 
Magnitude of consequences (others); MC (s): Magnitude of consequences (self); SC: Social consensus; TON: 
Techniques of neutralization; VHN: Views of human nature. 
 
In reference to Table 6.12, the cross loading results confirm the manifest variables load 
onto their designated factor structures better than the other latent variables. Again, the 
measurement indicator loadings for three manifest variables (social consensus, views of 
human nature, and interpersonal tactics) were below the acceptable threshold of 0.70 
(Henseler et al., 2009), yet above 0.40, and were retained accordingly (Henseler et al., 
2009). These findings provide evidence that each of the latent variables for the third 
vignette show acceptable validity and reliability.  
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Table 6.12 – Vignette #3 Cross Loadings 
               SC      EI      EJ  MC (o)  MC (s)     VHN      AM      IT     TON 
SC 1 0.8285 0.4296 0.2941 0.4655 -0.0194 0.2259 0.2374 0.3214 0.4459 
SC 2 0.6986 0.4218 0.3964 0.3226 -0.0663 0.0089 -0.0099 0.1345 0.4251 
EI 1 0.5210 0.9804 0.6435 0.6319 0.2310 0.2383 0.0878 0.2717 0.7715 
EI 2 0.5512 0.8892 0.6685 0.6573 0.1956 0.2262 0.1302 0.2978 0.8092 
EI 3 0.5238 0.9717 0.6259 0.6223 0.2389 0.2276 0.1080 0.2814 0.7820 
EI 4 0.5210 0.9818 0.6414 0.6249 0.2350 0.2452 0.0953 0.2713 0.7782 
EI 5 0.5278 0.9693 0.6209 0.6091 0.2242 0.2427 0.0907 0.2784 0.7742 
EJ 1 0.3952 0.6344 0.9575 0.4889 0.1112 0.0671 0.0015 0.1992 0.6310 
EJ 2 0.4526 0.6241 0.9244 0.5289 0.0429 0.0389 0.0109 0.1729 0.6496 
EJ 3 0.3905 0.6290 0.9599 0.5300 0.0840 0.1055 0.0398 0.1924 0.6416 
EJ 4 0.4321 0.6548 0.9617 0.5335 0.0810 0.0807 0.0578 0.2064 0.6385 
MC (o) 1 0.2878 0.4558 0.3533 0.8309 0.0810 0.1696 0.0550 0.1393 0.4704 
MC (o) 2 0.5829 0.6686 0.5755 0.9223 0.0637 0.2498 0.1126 0.2797 0.6965 
MC (s) 1 -0.0590 0.2049 0.0920 0.0412 0.8342 0.1619 0.0209 0.1194 0.1633 
MC (s) 2 -0.0234 0.1750 0.0413 0.0915 0.7898 0.0265 -0.0114 -0.0375 0.0815 
Mach 13 0.1524 0.1369 0.0585 0.1883 0.0612 0.6854 0.2513 0.1619 0.1849 
Mach 15 0.1063 0.1633 0.0341 0.1774 0.0353 0.7906 0.3374 0.2235 0.1730 
Mach 18 0.1224 0.2458 0.0811 0.1802 0.1755 0.7352 0.3002 0.1767 0.2548 
Mach 16 0.0825 0.0286 0.0202 0.0604 -0.0018 0.2162 0.7441 0.4078 0.0565 
Mach 2 0.1697 0.1316 0.0241 0.0922 0.0118 0.3952 0.7835 0.3581 0.2013 
Mach 3 0.2876 0.2174 0.1569 0.1632 0.0695 0.1201 0.2934 0.6271 0.1881 
Mach 6 0.1941 0.1901 0.1242 0.1202 0.0456 0.1680 0.4254 0.8152 0.1814 
Mach 7 0.2129 0.2140 0.1624 0.1446 0.1104 0.2318 0.3352 0.7701 0.2660 
Mach 9 0.2672 0.2257 0.1846 0.2854 0.0331 0.2305 0.4166 0.8054 0.2895 
Mach 10 0.2420 0.2758 0.1517 0.2406 -0.0344 0.2166 0.4269 0.7947 0.2739 
T 1 0.5681 0.7423 0.5767 0.6387 0.1678 0.2608 0.1483 0.2420 0.8787 
T 2 0.5470 0.7219 0.5606 0.6206 0.1320 0.2940 0.2029 0.2865 0.8824 
T 3  0.4508 0.6931 0.5843 0.5949 0.1062 0.2015 0.0447 0.2324 0.8697 
T 4 0.4656 0.7211 0.5537 0.5291 0.1780 0.2867 0.2512 0.3378 0.8471 
T 5 0.4777 0.7412 0.5985 0.6199 0.1553 0.2654 0.1856 0.2940 0.8919 
T 6 0.4466 0.6596 0.6453 0.5744 0.0872 0.1437 0.1238 0.2641 0.8633 
T 7  0.5051 0.7245 0.6061 0.5970 0.1087 0.2240 0.0937 0.2729 0.8897 
AM: Abstract morality; EI: Unethical intentions; EJ: Ethical judgment; IT: Interpersonal tactics; MC (o): 
Magnitude of consequences (others); MC (s): Magnitude of consequences (self); SC: Social consensus; TON: 
Techniques of neutralization; VHN: Views of human nature; Mach: Machiavellianism. 
 
6.3.1.4 Omnibus Model 
Consistent with the results of the foregoing models, the omnibus model, which was 
constructed from averaging the manifest variables from the three vignettes, sustains 
sufficient convergent validity. According to Table 6.13, the AVE scores for each latent 
variable are above 0.50. The composite reliability results are also above the 
recommended level of 0.70. 
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Table 6.13 – Omnibus Model AVE, Composite Reliability, and R² 
          AVE Composite Reliability R Square 
    AM 0.5837 0.7370 0.5358 
    EI 0.9342 0.9861 0.7878 
    EJ 0.9257 0.9803 0.5803 
    IT 0.5862 0.8754 0.8096 
MC (o) 0.7759 0.8736 0.1272 
MC (s) 0.7428 0.8517 0.0247 
    SC 0.6141 0.7584 0.1512 
   TON 0.8169 0.9640 0.6323 
   VHN 0.5451 0.7818 0.3582 
Mach 0.5600 0.8400 N/A 
AM: Abstract morality; EI: Unethical intentions; EJ: 
Ethical judgment; IT: Interpersonal tactics; MC (o): 
Magnitude of consequences (others); MC (s): Magnitude 
of consequences (self); SC: Social consensus; TON: 
Techniques of neutralization; VHN: Views of human 
nature; Mach: Machiavellianism. 
 
According to Table 6.14, the latent variables for the omnibus sustain acceptable 
discriminant validity as the square roots of the AVE for each latent variable are greater 
than the correlation of the construct with any of the remaining constructs. Consistent 
with vignettes #1 and #3, the social weighting (SW) and defence of necessity (DON) 
manifest variables were removed to resolve initial validity concerns associated with the 
TON. Even though two neutralization items were removed, six manifest variables were 
retained, which provide satisfactory representation of this reflective latent variable.  
Table 6.14 – Omnibus Latent Variable Correlations 
           AM      EI      EJ      IT  MC (o)  MC (s)      SC     TON     VHN 
    AM 0.7640 
            EI 0.2504 0.9665 
           EJ 0.1484 0.7447 0.9621 
          IT 0.4994 0.3639 0.2260 0.7656 
     MC (o) 0.2017 0.6450 0.6224 0.3182 0.8809 
    MC (s) 0.0729 0.3943 0.2323 0.1082 0.1491 0.8619 
       SC 0.2714 0.5781 0.4687 0.3362 0.5134 0.0790 0.7836 
     TON 0.2955 0.8791 0.7157 0.3701 0.7109 0.2941 0.5988 0.9038 
    VHN 0.4048 0.3536 0.2077 0.2559 0.2586 0.1993 0.2653 0.3492 0.7383 
AM: Abstract morality; EI: Unethical intentions; EJ: Ethical judgment; IT: Interpersonal tactics; MC (o): 
Magnitude of consequences (others); MC (s): Magnitude of consequences (self); SC: Social consensus; TON: 
Techniques of neutralization; VHN: Views of human nature. 
 
In reference to the cross loading results from Table 6.15, each of the manifest variables 
sustain higher loadings onto their putative latent variables than the remaining constructs. 
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Thus, discriminant validity has been attained. Consistent with the aforementioned 
models, the measurement indicator loadings for three manifest variables (social 
consensus, views of human nature, and interpersonal tactics) were below the acceptable 
threshold of 0.70 (Henseler et al., 2009). However, as indicated, the outer loadings of 
these variables were above 0.40 and were retained for theoretical purposes (Henseler et 
al., 2009). 
Table 6.15 – Omnibus Cross Loadings 
                 SC      EI      EJ  MC (o)  MC (s)     VHN      AM      IT     TON 
SC 1 0.8707 0.5035 0.3730 0.4717 0.0892 0.2855 0.3046 0.3505 0.5398 
SC 2 0.6857 0.3962 0.3734 0.3154 0.0241 0.1012 0.0850 0.1451 0.3835 
EI 1 0.5598 0.9848 0.7276 0.6262 0.3888 0.3490 0.2251 0.3444 0.8556 
EI 2 0.5242 0.9123 0.7071 0.6324 0.3542 0.3283 0.2428 0.3407 0.8264 
EI 3 0.5524 0.9705 0.7067 0.6034 0.3776 0.3355 0.2445 0.3355 0.8478 
EI 4 0.5698 0.9823 0.7296 0.6303 0.3851 0.3546 0.2455 0.3678 0.8566 
EI 5 0.5860 0.9809 0.7272 0.6246 0.3986 0.3408 0.2523 0.3693 0.8611 
EJ 1 0.4177 0.7259 0.9579 0.5684 0.2543 0.2022 0.1478 0.2322 0.6579 
EJ 2 0.4376 0.6865 0.9498 0.5992 0.1791 0.1621 0.1078 0.1841 0.6798 
EJ 3 0.4418 0.7134 0.9698 0.6066 0.2125 0.2187 0.1487 0.2182 0.6948 
EJ 4 0.5035 0.7391 0.9709 0.6200 0.2468 0.2148 0.1651 0.2341 0.7200 
MC (o) 1 0.3102 0.4388 0.4519 0.8416 0.0782 0.1749 0.1601 0.2338 0.5151 
MC (o) 2 0.5607 0.6686 0.6243 0.9184 0.1716 0.2688 0.1923 0.3172 0.7138 
MC (s) 1 0.0736 0.3917 0.2208 0.1543 0.9242 0.2155 0.1024 0.1629 0.3029 
MC (s) 2 0.0620 0.2699 0.1750 0.0923 0.7947 0.1086 0.0022 -0.0140 0.1844 
Mach 13 0.1948 0.2037 0.1396 0.1809 0.1532 0.6855 0.2518 0.1619 0.2450 
Mach 15 0.1871 0.2458 0.1398 0.1907 0.0995 0.7899 0.3382 0.2235 0.2407 
Mach 18 0.2088 0.3331 0.1827 0.2021 0.1966 0.7359 0.3005 0.1767 0.2912 
Mach 16 0.1699 0.1113 0.0633 0.0928 0.0246 0.2162 0.7401 0.4078 0.1392 
Mach 2 0.2420 0.2650 0.1595 0.2106 0.0842 0.3951 0.7872 0.3581 0.3055 
Mach 3 0.3070 0.2768 0.1731 0.2220 0.1045 0.1201 0.2936 0.6276 0.2409 
Mach 6 0.1916 0.2463 0.1350 0.1678 0.0782 0.1680 0.4249 0.8148 0.2155 
Mach 7 0.2165 0.2906 0.1995 0.1947 0.1460 0.2318 0.3351 0.7699 0.2846 
Mach 9 0.3147 0.2988 0.2082 0.3381 0.0614 0.2305 0.4161 0.8056 0.3557 
Mach 10 0.2714 0.2865 0.1540 0.2909 0.0351 0.2165 0.4267 0.7947 0.3144 
T 1 0.6437 0.8252 0.6829 0.6722 0.2622 0.3130 0.2631 0.3384 0.9054 
T 2 0.5967 0.7593 0.5882 0.6231 0.2067 0.3545 0.3305 0.3796 0.8906 
T 3 0.4416 0.7749 0.6279 0.6092 0.2856 0.2846 0.1961 0.2629 0.9030 
T 5 0.4897 0.8124 0.6277 0.6053 0.3230 0.3584 0.2850 0.3212 0.8829 
T 6 0.5570 0.7840 0.6672 0.6849 0.2435 0.2914 0.2935 0.3921 0.9157 
T 7 0.5091 0.8087 0.6823 0.6554 0.2747 0.2924 0.2324 0.3087 0.9249 
AM: Abstract morality; EI: Unethical intentions; EJ: Ethical judgment; IT: Interpersonal tactics; MC (o): 
Magnitude of consequences (others); MC (s): Magnitude of consequences (self); SC: Social consensus; TON: 
Techniques of neutralization; VHN: Views of human nature; Mach: Machiavellianism. 
 
6.3.2 Common Method Variance 
Common methods bias (CMB) involves “variance that is attributable to the 
measurement method rather than to the constructs the measures represent” (Podsakoff, 
CHAPTER SIX 
 153 
Mackenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003, p. 879), which can negatively affect convergent 
validity. CMB is often caused by testing procedures that measure both independent and 
dependent variables using the same instrument (Malhotra, Patil, & Kim, 2007). This 
method of data collection can artificially inflate any correlations found in the data.  
According to the literature, CMB is often considered a domain-specific problem. For 
example, higher levels of common methods bias are typically found in the education, 
psychology, and sociology research; marketing and other business research show lower 
levels of CMB (Malhotra et al., 2007). Given the domain of this study is marketing, 
CMB is unlikely to be a problem. However, precautions were taken to reduce the 
potential for CMB. Specifically, the instrument items were randomized, which can 
ensure participants are unable to detect the construct patterns and ultimately, adjust their 
responding styles to fit these patterns (Siponen & Vance, 2010). 
Beyond these precautions, statistical methods were used on a post-hoc basis to test if 
CMB has occurred. In this study, Harman’s test, which is the most widely used method 
to test for CMB (Malhotra et al., 2006), was the first test conducted. In Harman’s test, a 
factor analysis of all manifest variables is conducted and if any factor accounts for the 
majority of the variance in the variables, CMB would be problematic (Tiwana & Keil, 
2007). From the results, no single factor explained the majority of the variance (Model 1 
= 0.32; Model 2 = 0.32; Model 3 = 0.32; Model 4 = 0.35). To further check for CMB, 
the correlation matrix (see Table 6.16) was checked for any highly correlated variables 
(i.e., r > 0.90) (Bagozzi et al., 1991). From these, CMB does not seem to be a plausible 
alternative explanation for the results of this study. 
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Table 6.16 Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations among All Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Magnitude of consequences (self) 4.30 1.08                 
1. Magnitude of consequences (others) 3.41 0.99 0.14*               
3. Social consensus 2.72 0.93 0.07 0.48**             
4. Techniques of neutralization 3.25 1.18 0.28** 0.70** 0.60**           
5. Unethical intentions 3.32 1.36 0.39** 0.63** 0.58** 0.88**         
6. Ethical judgment 3.35 1.31 0.23** 0.61** 0.47** 0.71** 0.74**       
7. Abstract morality 2.98 1.28 0.06 0.20** 0.25** 0.32** 0.24** 0.14*     
8. Interpersonal tactics 2.71 1.34 0.10 0.31** 0.32** 0.40** 0.37** 0.29** 0.50**   
9. Views of human nature 3.50 1.26 0.20** 0.25** 0.25** 0.36** 0.35** 0.21** 0.39** 0.25** 
Calculated by averaging the raw data scores for the manifest variables associated with each latent variable in the omnibus model.   
* p < 0.05                     
** p < 0.01                     
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6.4 Alternative Model 
As discussed in chapter four, researchers in the PMI literature have studied the 
dimensions of the PMI construct as first-order reflective models. McMahon and Harvey 
(2007) studied PMI through three independent factors in their regression analysis; 
Singhapakdi et al. (1999) studied PMI using a two factor structure through covariance-
based SEM. Using this approach, the PMI latent variables were modelled as first-order 
reflective variables. The purpose of this endeavour is to illustrate that an alternative 
model to the second-order formative approach exists. However, as is explained in the 
summary of this section, this alternative model is inconsistent with the theoretical 
framework of the moral intensity construct conceptualized by Jones (1991). 
Consistent with the preceding section, PLS was used to analyse the alternative models. 
Although the formative model was removed, which would enable a covariance-based 
SEM to be used, the model is exploratory, relatively complex with various interactions 
among the constructs, and with second-order variables present (Gefen et al., 2011). For 
these reasons, it is argued a variance-based SEM is most appropriate (Henseler et al., 
2009). In the first part of this section, the four models are presented. In the second 
section, the models are tested for discriminant validity, convergent validity, and 
reliability.  
6.4.1.1 Vignette #1 Package Downsizing 
According to Figure 6.5, most of the first-order issue-contingent characteristics 
pertaining to the magnitude of consequences (others and self) and social consensus 
sustain direct and independent causal relationships to the TON, unethical intentions, and 
ethical judgment. Consistent with the formative model, the PMI constructs are directly 
related to the TON; the three PMI variables sustain direct relationships to unethical 
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intentions. However, the magnitude of consequences (self) does not have a direct 
relationship to ethical judgment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5 – Alternative Package Downsizing Model 
 
 
6.4.1.2 Vignette #2 Environmental Pollution  
Consistent with the foregoing model, the framework depicting the environmental 
pollution vignette shows the same basic structure. Specifically, Machiavellianism has 
causal relationships to the three PMI constructs; identical relationships are maintained 
from the three PMI variables to unethical intentions and ethical judgment. However, the 
path between the TON and ethical judgment was insignificant and excluded from the 
model; this result was also found in the second-order formative approach.  
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Figure 6.6 – Alternative Environmental Pollution Model 
 
 
6.4.1.3 Vignette #3 Subprime Lending  
From Figure 6.7, comparable to the formative models, the model representing the 
subprime lending vignette has several similarities to the package downsizing vignette. 
Most of the paths are apparent in both models; however, slight divergences exist 
between the constructs. Specifically, the path between social consensus and ethical 
judgment was found to be insignificant and removed from the model.  
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Figure 6.7 – Alternative Subprime Lending Model 
 
 
6.4.1.4 Omnibus Model 
Figure 6.8 represents the omnibus model and consistent with the formative approach, 
the basic structure is maintained. However, the path coefficient between the magnitude 
of consequences (others) and unethical intentions was insignificant and removed. 
Beyond this difference, the omnibus model offers an aggregate of the previous three 
vignettes.  
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Figure 6.8 – Alternative Omnibus Model 
 
 
6.4.2 Convergent and Discriminant Validity  
In this section, the alternative models are validated. Consistent with the formative 
approach, convergent and discriminant validity is assessed using Fornell and Larcker’s 
(1981) framework.   
6.4.2.1 Vignette #1 Package Downsizing 
From Table 6.17, each of the AVE scores are above 0.50, the composite reliability 
results are above 0.70. These results are mirror images of the formative results for 
vignette #1. According to Table 6.18, the square root of the AVE for each construct is 
greater than the correlation of the construct with any of the remaining constructs. 
Consistent with the formative model, the TON construct had initial validity concerns 
but these were resolved by removing the social weighting and defence of necessity 
indicators.  
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Table 6.17 – Vignette #1 Package Downsizing AVE, Composite Reliability, and R² 
          AVE Composite Reliability R Square 
    AM 0.5838 0.7370 0.5466 
    EI 0.9169 0.9822 0.7459 
    EJ 0.9180 0.9781 0.6264 
    IT 0.5862 0.8754 0.8063 
MC (o) 0.7381 0.8490 0.0308 
MC (s) 0.5918 0.7218 0.0176 
    SC 0.5787 0.7323 0.0556 
   TON 0.7766 0.9542 0.5135 
   VHN 0.5450 0.7817 0.3559 
Mach 0.5600 0.8400 N/A 
AM: Abstract morality; EI: Unethical intentions; EJ: 
Ethical judgment; IT: Interpersonal tactics; MC (o): 
Magnitude of consequences (others); MC (s): Magnitude 
of consequences (self); SC: Social consensus; TON: 
Techniques of neutralization; VHN: Views of human 
nature; Mach: Machiavellianism. 
 
Table 6.18 – Vignette #1 Latent Variable Correlations 
           AM      EI      EJ      IT  MC (o)  MC (s)      SC     TON     VHN 
    AM 0.7641 
            EI 0.1494 0.9575 
           EJ 0.0901 0.7573 0.9581 
          IT 0.4996 0.1648 0.0906 0.7656 
     MC (o) 0.1485 0.6277 0.6035 0.1398 0.8591 
    MC (s) 0.0671 0.2886 0.1453 0.1023 0.1375 0.7693 
       SC 0.1633 0.4827 0.4684 0.1964 0.3718 0.0769 0.7607 
     TON 0.2149 0.8501 0.7362 0.1862 0.6295 0.2598 0.5019 0.8812 
    VHN 0.4044 0.2296 0.1243 0.2560 0.1178 0.1437 0.1797 0.2212 0.7382 
AM: Abstract morality; EI: Unethical intentions; EJ: Ethical judgment; IT: Interpersonal tactics; MC (o): 
Magnitude of consequences (others); MC (s): Magnitude of consequences (self); SC: Social consensus; TON: 
Techniques of neutralization; VHN: Views of human nature. 
 
According to Table 6.19, the measurement indicators load highest on their putative 
latent variables. Noteworthy, the measurement indicator loadings for three manifest 
variables (magnitude of consequences (self), views of human nature, and interpersonal 
tactics) were below the acceptable threshold of 0.70 (Henseler et al., 2009). However, 
considering the outer loadings of these variables were above 0.40, they were retained 
for theoretical purposes (Henseler et al., 2009). Therefore, the latent variables for the 
first vignette have sufficient reliability and validity. 
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Table 6.19 – Vignette #1 Cross Loadings 
               SC      EI      EJ  MC (o)  MC (s)     VHN      AM      IT     TON 
SC 1 0.7084 0.3137 0.2606 0.2523 0.1115 0.2323 0.2257 0.2757 0.3446 
SC 2 0.8097 0.4143 0.4385 0.3103 0.0148 0.0582 0.0408 0.0454 0.4155 
EI 1 0.4809 0.9781 0.7368 0.6071 0.2911 0.2329 0.1351 0.1682 0.8315 
EI 2 0.3848 0.8856 0.6740 0.5553 0.2681 0.1778 0.1061 0.1070 0.7601 
EI 3 0.4697 0.9663 0.7379 0.5860 0.2702 0.2211 0.1565 0.1488 0.8123 
EI 4 0.4784 0.9785 0.7450 0.6345 0.2797 0.2313 0.1593 0.1952 0.8305 
EI 5 0.4914 0.9759 0.7299 0.6197 0.2729 0.2331 0.1554 0.1647 0.8331 
EJ 1 0.4104 0.7431 0.9616 0.5604 0.1386 0.1241 0.0969 0.0815 0.6899 
EJ 2 0.4508 0.6911 0.9478 0.5961 0.1090 0.0945 0.0683 0.0824 0.6912 
EJ 3 0.4478 0.7413 0.9603 0.5764 0.1575 0.1337 0.0851 0.0864 0.7038 
EJ 4 0.4847 0.7266 0.9626 0.5798 0.1508 0.1234 0.0946 0.0966 0.7356 
MC (o) 1 0.2554 0.4545 0.4632 0.8150 0.0963 0.0785 0.1299 0.0697 0.4368 
MC (o) 2 0.3706 0.6084 0.5652 0.9011 0.1357 0.1192 0.1271 0.1591 0.6243 
MC (s) 1 0.0967 0.2863 0.1449 0.1421 0.9770 0.1463 0.0767 0.1181 0.2761 
MC (s) 2 -0.0521 0.1204 0.0571 0.0340 0.4786 0.0443 -0.0138 -0.0255 0.0326 
Mach 15 0.0752 0.1069 0.0705 0.0040 0.1558 0.6814 0.2515 0.1617 0.1255 
Mach 18 0.1115 0.1450 0.0726 0.0612 0.0879 0.7911 0.3376 0.2235 0.1557 
Mach 2 0.2090 0.2549 0.1331 0.1907 0.0832 0.7382 0.3003 0.1768 0.2073 
Mach 16 0.0943 0.0279 0.0029 0.0028 0.0476 0.2164 0.7429 0.4078 0.1005 
Mach 3 0.1532 0.1942 0.1300 0.2161 0.0547 0.3952 0.7846 0.3580 0.2235 
Mach 6 0.1944 0.1266 0.0820 0.1448 0.0533 0.1204 0.2935 0.6272 0.1263 
Mach 7 0.1318 0.0820 0.0195 0.0371 0.0386 0.1682 0.4252 0.8156 0.0871 
Mach 9 0.1578 0.1723 0.1180 0.1063 0.1398 0.2323 0.3352 0.7708 0.1774 
Mach 10 0.1614 0.1523 0.0919 0.1647 0.0640 0.2301 0.4165 0.8048 0.1848 
Mach 13 0.1210 0.1024 0.0422 0.0931 0.0949 0.2164 0.4269 0.7941 0.1374 
T 1 0.4949 0.7670 0.6752 0.5385 0.2525 0.2036 0.1762 0.1964 0.8970 
T 2 0.4487 0.6451 0.5735 0.4780 0.2606 0.2263 0.2445 0.2220 0.8423 
T 3 0.4318 0.7762 0.6634 0.5505 0.2059 0.2030 0.1555 0.1000 0.8963 
T 5 0.3957 0.7665 0.6179 0.5756 0.2508 0.1952 0.1841 0.1307 0.8480 
T 6 0.4195 0.7440 0.6353 0.5512 0.2301 0.2107 0.2247 0.2134 0.8985 
T 7 0.4618 0.7864 0.7177 0.6263 0.1803 0.1375 0.1599 0.1291 0.9032 
CN: Conventional norm; AM: Abstract morality; EI: Unethical intentions; EJ: Ethical judgment; IT: Interpersonal 
tactics; MC (o): Magnitude of consequences (others); MC (s): Magnitude of consequences (self); SC: Social 
consensus; TON: Techniques of neutralization; VHN: Views of human nature; Mach: Machiavellianism. 
 
6.4.2.2 Vignette #2 Environmental Pollution 
In reference to Table 6.20, the AVE scores for the latent variables are all above 0.50. 
The composite reliability results are above 0.70. From these results, the measurements 
for the second vignette sustain acceptable convergent validity. According to Table 6.21, 
the square root of the AVE for each construct is greater than the correlation of the 
construct with any of the remaining constructs.  
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Table 6.20 – Vignette #2 Environmental Pollution AVE, Composite Reliability, and R² 
          AVE Composite Reliability R Square 
    AM 0.5838 0.7371 0.5443 
    EI 0.9088 0.9803 0.6873 
    EJ 0.9016 0.9734 0.5527 
    IT 0.5862 0.8754 0.8089 
MC (o) 0.6496 0.7858 0.0665 
MC (s) 0.7335 0.8450 0.0226 
    SC 0.6083 0.7547 0.0868 
   TON 0.7269 0.9551 0.6113 
   VHN 0.5451 0.7818 0.3537 
Mach 0.5600 0.8400 N/A 
AM: Abstract morality; EI: Unethical intentions; EJ: 
Ethical judgment; IT: Interpersonal tactics; MC (o): 
Magnitude of consequences (others); MC (s): Magnitude 
of consequences (self); SC: Social consensus; TON: 
Techniques of neutralization; VHN: Views of human 
nature; Mach: Machiavellianism. 
 
Table 6.21 – Vignette #2 Latent Variable Correlations 
          AM      EI      EJ      IT  MC (o)  MC (s)      SC     TON     VHN 
    AM 0.7641 
            EI 0.3247 0.9533 
           EJ 0.2165 0.7283 0.9495 
          IT 0.4999 0.3691 0.2105 0.7656 
     MC (o) 0.1608 0.5653 0.5005 0.2425 0.8060 
    MC (s) 0.1016 0.2327 0.1805 0.1001 0.0696 0.8564 
       SC 0.2627 0.5722 0.5099 0.2194 0.3894 -0.0312 0.7799 
     TON 0.3434 0.8110 0.6438 0.3906 0.5868 0.1753 0.6356 0.8526 
    VHN 0.4038 0.3254 0.2671 0.2560 0.1516 0.1749 0.2288 0.3334 0.7383 
AM: Abstract morality; EI: Unethical intentions; EJ: Ethical judgment; IT: Interpersonal tactics; MC (o): 
Magnitude of consequences (others); MC (s): Magnitude of consequences (self); SC: Social consensus; TON: 
Techniques of neutralization; VHN: Views of human nature. 
 
In addition, the factor loadings for all measurement indicators were highest on their 
putative constructs compared to the remaining latent variables (see Table 6.22). 
Interestingly, the measurement indicator loadings for only two manifest variables 
(views of human nature and interpersonal tactic) were below the acceptable threshold of 
0.70 (Henseler et al., 2009), which might be related to the aforementioned issues with 
the Mach IV construct. As indicated, considering the outer loadings of these variables 
were above 0.40, they were retained (Henseler et al., 2009). Based on these findings, the 
model depicting vignette #2 is valid. 
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Table 6.22 – Vignette #2 Cross Loadings 
               SC      EI      EJ  MC (o)  MC (s)     VHN      AM      IT     TON 
SC 1 0.8524 0.4729 0.4313 0.3534 0.0117 0.2148 0.2588 0.2204 0.6011 
SC 2 0.7001 0.4209 0.3614 0.2433 -0.0740 0.1333 0.1363 0.1079 0.3639 
EI 1 0.5286 0.9770 0.7084 0.5406 0.2172 0.3156 0.2982 0.3374 0.7744 
EI 2 0.5651 0.9094 0.6944 0.5501 0.2246 0.3185 0.3073 0.3420 0.7806 
EI 3 0.5252 0.9500 0.6646 0.5283 0.2274 0.3137 0.2987 0.3313 0.7498 
EI 4 0.5465 0.9709 0.7056 0.5226 0.2088 0.3152 0.3048 0.3557 0.7777 
EI 5 0.5599 0.9576 0.6960 0.5512 0.2308 0.2878 0.3374 0.3913 0.7803 
EJ 1 0.4850 0.7042 0.9560 0.4790 0.1962 0.2534 0.2281 0.2259 0.6018 
EJ 2 0.4555 0.6380 0.9253 0.4218 0.1567 0.2248 0.1587 0.1418 0.5562 
EJ 3 0.4884 0.7259 0.9465 0.5097 0.1550 0.2633 0.2190 0.2172 0.6548 
EJ 4 0.5056 0.6930 0.9696 0.4850 0.1769 0.2705 0.2121 0.2090 0.6268 
MC (o) 1 0.2239 0.3577 0.2827 0.7199 -0.0123 0.0776 0.1228 0.2272 0.3812 
MC (o) 2 0.3821 0.5328 0.4946 0.8837 0.1036 0.1553 0.1374 0.1788 0.5463 
MC (s) 1 -0.0372 0.2432 0.1947 0.0984 0.9359 0.1618 0.1240 0.1190 0.1750 
MC (s) 2 -0.0094 0.1328 0.0920 -0.0068 0.7689 0.1380 0.0258 0.0310 0.1150 
Mach 15 0.1850 0.2221 0.1863 0.1690 0.1255 0.6883 0.2513 0.1620 0.2712 
Mach 18 0.1889 0.2511 0.2102 0.1397 0.0922 0.7915 0.3372 0.2235 0.2490 
Mach 2 0.1328 0.2473 0.1946 0.0281 0.1762 0.7315 0.3001 0.1765 0.2220 
Mach 16 0.1904 0.2125 0.1221 0.1220 0.0197 0.2159 0.7449 0.4080 0.2104 
Mach 3 0.2106 0.2816 0.2060 0.1238 0.1318 0.3953 0.7828 0.3581 0.3111 
Mach 6 0.1966 0.2858 0.1456 0.1339 0.1126 0.1199 0.2934 0.6270 0.2809 
Mach 7 0.0859 0.2927 0.1594 0.1783 0.1071 0.1679 0.4255 0.8150 0.2519 
Mach 9 0.0850 0.2735 0.1624 0.1406 0.0947 0.2314 0.3353 0.7692 0.2400 
Mach 10 0.2551 0.3010 0.1873 0.2196 0.0501 0.2310 0.4167 0.8059 0.3703 
Mach 13 0.2209 0.2671 0.1509 0.2442 0.0316 0.2169 0.4270 0.7952 0.3495 
T I 0.6065 0.7455 0.5847 0.5488 0.1225 0.2582 0.3014 0.3609 0.8877 
T 2  0.5327 0.6822 0.5542 0.5091 0.1214 0.3018 0.3271 0.3825 0.8754 
T 3  0.4108 0.6553 0.4711 0.4702 0.2141 0.2164 0.2316 0.2386 0.7958 
T 4  0.5032 0.7427 0.5658 0.5187 0.2063 0.3430 0.3317 0.3586 0.8477 
T 5 0.4969 0.6802 0.5790 0.4887 0.1528 0.3236 0.2520 0.2755 0.8468 
T 6 0.5953 0.6079 0.5045 0.4741 0.0843 0.2834 0.2967 0.3767 0.8104 
T 7  0.5503 0.7383 0.5672 0.5237 0.1810 0.2745 0.2580 0.2656 0.8806 
T 8  0.6232 0.6706 0.5557 0.4640 0.1204 0.2695 0.3347 0.3930 0.8716 
CN: Conventional norm; AM: Abstract morality; EI: Unethical intentions; EJ: Ethical judgment; IT: Interpersonal 
tactics; MC (o): Magnitude of consequences (others); MC (s): Magnitude of consequences (self); SC: Social 
consensus; TON: Techniques of neutralization; VHN: Views of human nature; Mach: Machiavellianism. 
 
6.4.2.3 Vignette #3 Subprime Lending 
According to Table 6.23, the latent variables for vignette #3 show sufficient convergent 
validity as all AVE scores are above 0.50. The composite reliability scores are above 
0.70. The square root of the AVE for each construct is greater than the correlation of the 
construct with any of the remaining constructs (see Table 6.24). Thus, the latent 
variables sustain acceptable levels of discriminant validity.  
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Table 6.23 – Vignette #3 Subprime Lending AVE, Composite Reliability, and R² 
           AVE Composite Reliability R Square 
    AM 0.5838 0.7371 0.5307 
    EI 0.9199 0.9829 0.7100 
    EJ 0.9044 0.9743 0.5009 
    IT 0.5862 0.8754 0.8178 
MC (o) 0.7688 0.8689 0.0784 
MC (s) 0.6500 0.7850 0.0093 
    SC 0.5881 0.7399 0.0950 
   TON 0.7652 0.9580 0.5599 
   VHN 0.5451 0.7818 0.3499 
Mach 0.5600 0.8400 N/A 
AM: Abstract morality; EI: Unethical intentions; EJ: 
Ethical judgment; IT: Interpersonal tactics; MC (o): 
Magnitude of consequences (others); MC (s): Magnitude 
of consequences (self); SC: Social consensus; TON: 
Techniques of neutralization; VHN: Views of human 
nature; Mach: Machiavellianism. 
 
Table 6.24 – Vignette #3 Latent Variable Correlations 
           AM      EI      EJ      IT  MC (o)  MC (s)      SC     TON     VHN 
    AM 0.7641 
            EI 0.1072 0.9591 
           EJ 0.0292 0.6685 0.9510 
          IT 0.4997 0.2926 0.2027 0.7656 
     MC (o) 0.1013 0.6594 0.5502 0.2529 0.8768 
    MC (s) 0.0107 0.2346 0.0886 0.0738 0.0724 0.8062 
       SC 0.1619 0.5536 0.4428 0.3069 0.5242 -0.0567 0.7669 
     TON 0.1722 0.8178 0.6731 0.3150 0.6851 0.1609 0.5674 0.8748 
    VHN 0.4041 0.2464 0.0769 0.2559 0.2461 0.1351 0.1649 0.2749 0.7383 
AM: Abstract morality; EI: Unethical intentions; EJ: Ethical judgment; IT: Interpersonal tactics; MC (o): 
Magnitude of consequences (others); MC (s): Magnitude of consequences (self); SC: Social consensus; TON: 
Techniques of neutralization; VHN: Views of human nature. 
 
From Table 6.25, the cross loading results confirm the manifest variables load onto their 
putative factor structures better than the other latent variables. These findings provide 
evidence that each of the latent variables for the third vignette show acceptable validity 
and reliability. Consistent with the previous vignettes, the measurement indicator 
loadings for three manifest variables (magnitude of consequences (self), views of 
human nature, and interpersonal tactic) were below the acceptable threshold of 0.70 
(Henseler et al., 2009). Given the outer loadings of these variables were above 0.40, 
they were retained (Henseler et al., 2009). Therefore, the latent variables for vignette #3 
have sufficient reliability and validity. 
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Table 6.25 – Vignette #3 Cross Loadings 
              SC      EI      EJ  MC (o)  MC (s)     VHN      AM      IT     TON 
SC 1 0.8122 0.4295 0.2941 0.4681 -0.0189 0.2259 0.2374 0.3214 0.4464 
SC 2 0.7186 0.4218 0.3964 0.3263 -0.0731 0.0090 -0.0099 0.1345 0.4250 
EI 1 0.5217 0.9804 0.6434 0.6343 0.2308 0.2384 0.0879 0.2717 0.7716 
EI 2 0.5524 0.8892 0.6685 0.6593 0.1946 0.2263 0.1302 0.2978 0.8092 
EI 3 0.5256 0.9717 0.6259 0.6246 0.2393 0.2277 0.1081 0.2814 0.7821 
EI 4 0.5225 0.9818 0.6414 0.6273 0.2327 0.2453 0.0953 0.2713 0.7782 
EI 5 0.5284 0.9693 0.6208 0.6115 0.2274 0.2428 0.0907 0.2784 0.7743 
EJ 1 0.3982 0.6343 0.9575 0.4915 0.1121 0.0671 0.0015 0.1992 0.6308 
EJ 2 0.4567 0.6240 0.9242 0.5314 0.0485 0.0390 0.0109 0.1729 0.6496 
EJ 3 0.3939 0.6290 0.9601 0.5325 0.0926 0.1055 0.0398 0.1924 0.6414 
EJ 4 0.4345 0.6548 0.9617 0.5363 0.0844 0.0807 0.0578 0.2064 0.6384 
MC (o) 1 0.2850 0.4558 0.3533 0.8223 0.0689 0.1696 0.0550 0.1393 0.4704 
MC (o) 2 0.5821 0.6686 0.5755 0.9281 0.0610 0.2498 0.1126 0.2797 0.6967 
MC (s) 1 -0.0607 0.2049 0.0921 0.0415 0.9040 0.1621 0.0209 0.1195 0.1634 
MC (s) 2 -0.0236 0.1750 0.0413 0.0905 0.6947 0.0266 -0.0114 -0.0374 0.0815 
Mach 15 0.1492 0.1369 0.0586 0.1883 0.0782 0.6852 0.2514 0.1619 0.1850 
Mach 18 0.1013 0.1633 0.0341 0.1793 0.0419 0.7902 0.3374 0.2235 0.1732 
Mach 2 0.1210 0.2458 0.0812 0.1802 0.1854 0.7359 0.3002 0.1767 0.2548 
Mach 16 0.0783 0.0286 0.0203 0.0603 0.0099 0.2162 0.7439 0.4078 0.0566 
Mach 3 0.1661 0.1316 0.0242 0.0934 0.0066 0.3951 0.7837 0.3581 0.2014 
Mach 6 0.2859 0.2174 0.1568 0.1645 0.0843 0.1201 0.2934 0.6272 0.1880 
Mach 7 0.1930 0.1901 0.1242 0.1211 0.0535 0.1680 0.4254 0.8152 0.1813 
Mach 9 0.2108 0.2140 0.1625 0.1466 0.1215 0.2318 0.3352 0.7703 0.2658 
Mach 10 0.2633 0.2257 0.1846 0.2869 0.0507 0.2305 0.4166 0.8053 0.2895 
Mach 13 0.2379 0.2758 0.1517 0.2421 -0.0157 0.2165 0.4269 0.7945 0.2740 
T 1 0.5667 0.7423 0.5766 0.6414 0.1751 0.2609 0.1484 0.2419 0.8794 
T 2 0.5445 0.7219 0.5605 0.6230 0.1386 0.2940 0.2029 0.2865 0.8831 
T 3  0.4539 0.6931 0.5843 0.5970 0.1179 0.2016 0.0447 0.2324 0.8692 
T 4 0.4644 0.7211 0.5537 0.5307 0.1780 0.2869 0.2512 0.3378 0.8470 
T 5 0.4784 0.7412 0.5985 0.6231 0.1543 0.2655 0.1856 0.2940 0.8917 
T 6 0.4489 0.6595 0.6453 0.5757 0.0961 0.1438 0.1239 0.2641 0.8630 
T 7  0.5103 0.7245 0.6062 0.5994 0.1218 0.2241 0.0937 0.2729 0.8893 
CN: Conventional norm; AM: Abstract morality; EI: Unethical intentions; EJ: Ethical judgment; IT: Interpersonal 
tactics; MC (o): Magnitude of consequences (others); MC (s): Magnitude of consequences (self); SC: Social 
consensus; TON: Techniques of neutralization; VHN: Views of human nature; Mach: Machiavellianism. 
 
6.4.2.4 Omnibus Model  
Consistent with the results of the foregoing models, the omnibus, which was 
constructed from averaging the manifest variables from each of the three vignettes, 
sustains sufficient convergent validity. According to Table 6.26, the AVE scores for 
each latent variable are above 0.50 and the composite reliability results are above 0.70.  
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Table 6.26 – Omnibus Vignette AVE, Composite Reliability, and R² 
          AVE Composite Reliability R Square 
    AM 0.5837 0.7370 0.5358 
    EI 0.9342 0.9861 0.7998 
    EJ 0.9257 0.9803 0.5926 
    IT 0.5862 0.8754 0.8096 
MC (o) 0.7756 0.8734 0.1274 
MC (s) 0.7408 0.8502 0.0255 
    SC 0.6139 0.7581 0.1516 
   TON 0.8169 0.9640 0.6304 
   VHN 0.5451 0.7818 0.3582 
Mach 0.5600 0.8400 N/A 
AM: Abstract morality; EI: Unethical intentions; EJ: 
Ethical judgment; IT: Interpersonal tactics; MC (o): 
Magnitude of consequences (others); MC (s): Magnitude 
of consequences (self); SC: Social consensus; TON: 
Techniques of neutralization; VHN: Views of human 
nature; Mach: Machiavellianism. 
 
From Tables 6.27 and 6.28, the latent variables for the omnibus show discriminant 
validity. Again, the outer loadings for manifest variables for the social consensus (0.68), 
views of human nature (0.69), and interpersonal tactics (0.63) were below 0.70, yet 
above 0.40 and thus, were retained.   
Table 6.27 – Omnibus Latent Variable Correlations 
           AM      EI      EJ      IT  MC (o)  MC (s)      SC     TON     VHN 
    AM 0.7640 
            EI 0.2504 0.9665 
           EJ 0.1483 0.7446 0.9621 
          IT 0.4994 0.3639 0.2259 0.7656 
     MC (o) 0.2017 0.6455 0.6228 0.3184 0.8807 
    MC (s) 0.0742 0.3953 0.2324 0.1106 0.1500 0.8607 
       SC 0.2719 0.5781 0.4683 0.3366 0.5142 0.0792 0.7835 
     TON 0.2957 0.8790 0.7157 0.3703 0.7115 0.2951 0.5994 0.9038 
    VHN 0.4048 0.3536 0.2076 0.2559 0.2588 0.2005 0.2657 0.3492 0.7383 
AM: Abstract morality; EI: Unethical intentions; EJ: Ethical judgment; IT: Interpersonal tactics; MC (o): 
Magnitude of consequences (others); MC (s): Magnitude of consequences (self); SC: Social consensus; TON: 
Techniques of neutralization; VHN: Views of human nature. 
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Table 6.28 – Omnibus Cross Loadings 
                 SC      EI      EJ  MC (o)  MC (s)     VHN      AM      IT     TON 
SC 1 0.8723 0.5035 0.3728 0.4722 0.0888 0.2855 0.3046 0.3505 0.5404 
SC 2 0.6833 0.3962 0.3734 0.3160 0.0246 0.1012 0.0850 0.1451 0.3835 
EI 1 0.5599 0.9849 0.7275 0.6268 0.3899 0.3490 0.2251 0.3444 0.8556 
EI 2 0.5243 0.9119 0.7070 0.6329 0.3549 0.3283 0.2428 0.3407 0.8264 
EI 3 0.5523 0.9707 0.7067 0.6040 0.3783 0.3355 0.2445 0.3355 0.8478 
EI 4 0.5698 0.9824 0.7295 0.6310 0.3861 0.3546 0.2455 0.3678 0.8565 
EI 5 0.5860 0.9810 0.7270 0.6252 0.3999 0.3408 0.2523 0.3693 0.8612 
EJ 1 0.4176 0.7258 0.9578 0.5688 0.2539 0.2022 0.1478 0.2322 0.6579 
EJ 2 0.4373 0.6864 0.9500 0.5996 0.1795 0.1621 0.1078 0.1841 0.6798 
EJ 3 0.4415 0.7133 0.9698 0.6070 0.2129 0.2187 0.1487 0.2182 0.6948 
EJ 4 0.5033 0.7391 0.9707 0.6204 0.2472 0.2148 0.1651 0.2341 0.7201 
MC (o) 1 0.3105 0.4386 0.4520 0.8399 0.0791 0.1749 0.1601 0.2338 0.5153 
MC (o) 2 0.5608 0.6685 0.6243 0.9197 0.1719 0.2688 0.1923 0.3172 0.7139 
MC (s) 1 0.0736 0.3917 0.2206 0.1545 0.9297 0.2155 0.1024 0.1629 0.3027 
MC (s) 2 0.0622 0.2699 0.1749 0.0926 0.7857 0.1086 0.0022 -0.0140 0.1841 
Mach 15 0.1951 0.2036 0.1396 0.1811 0.1544 0.6855 0.2518 0.1619 0.2452 
Mach 18 0.1875 0.2458 0.1397 0.1909 0.1001 0.7899 0.3382 0.2235 0.2408 
Mach 2 0.2088 0.3332 0.1826 0.2024 0.1976 0.7359 0.3005 0.1767 0.2911 
Mach 16 0.1702 0.1113 0.0632 0.0926 0.0261 0.2162 0.7401 0.4078 0.1394 
Mach 3 0.2425 0.2650 0.1595 0.2108 0.0848 0.3951 0.7872 0.3581 0.3057 
Mach 6 0.3071 0.2768 0.1730 0.2223 0.1064 0.1201 0.2936 0.6276 0.2411 
Mach 7 0.1917 0.2462 0.1350 0.1679 0.0802 0.1680 0.4249 0.8148 0.2155 
Mach 9 0.2168 0.2907 0.1994 0.1950 0.1476 0.2318 0.3351 0.7699 0.2848 
Mach 10 0.3151 0.2987 0.2080 0.3381 0.0631 0.2305 0.4161 0.8056 0.3558 
Mach 13 0.2719 0.2866 0.1539 0.2909 0.0373 0.2165 0.4267 0.7947 0.3147 
T 1 0.6439 0.8252 0.6829 0.6727 0.2634 0.3131 0.2631 0.3384 0.9059 
T 2 0.5971 0.7593 0.5882 0.6234 0.2085 0.3545 0.3306 0.3796 0.8912 
T 3 0.4414 0.7748 0.6278 0.6097 0.2866 0.2846 0.1961 0.2629 0.9024 
T 5 0.4898 0.8123 0.6277 0.6059 0.3232 0.3584 0.2850 0.3212 0.8824 
T 6 0.5572 0.7839 0.6671 0.6851 0.2449 0.2915 0.2935 0.3921 0.9159 
T 7 0.5089 0.8087 0.6822 0.6560 0.2754 0.2924 0.2324 0.3087 0.9245 
CN: Conventional norm; AM: Abstract morality; EI: Unethical intentions; EJ: Ethical judgment; IT: Interpersonal 
tactics; MC (o): Magnitude of consequences (others); MC (s): Magnitude of consequences (self); SC: Social 
consensus; TON: Techniques of neutralization; VHN: Views of human nature; Mach: Machiavellianism. 
 
6.4.3 Summary 
The alternative model presented in this section provides additional details of the path 
coefficients between the PMI constructs and the other latent variables in the model. 
These details are beyond the capabilities of the formative approach and given the 
additional information, it could be argued the alternative model is superior (Valentine & 
Hellingworth, 2012). However, Jones (1991) conceptualized the moral intensity 
construct as multidimensional. The characteristics of the ethical problem and one’s 
perception of them collectively represent PMI (Jones, 1991). It is argued that the 
characteristics of the ethical problem define how one perceives the intensity of a 
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situation and these characteristics do not independently influence the dependent 
variables in the decision-making process. The issue-contingent characteristics are 
determinants of PMI.  
Using this contextualization within the context of Jarvis et al.’s (2003) characterization 
of latent variables, PMI has the characteristics of a second-order formative construct. 
Specifically, Jarvis et al. (2003) argued that for constructs to be considered formative, 
changes in the “indicators should cause changes in the construct” (p. 203). Further to 
Jarvis et al. (2003), the magnitude of consequences (self and others) and social 
consensus are relatively independent weighted contributions of PMI. These first order 
variables are reasonably uncorrelated from the latent variable correlation results (see 
Tables 6.3, 6.8, 6.11, and 6.14). According to theory, these dimensions are conceptually 
distinct and are defining factors of PMI (Jarvis et al., 2003).  
In general, the characteristics of the ethical problem are not independently causal to the 
other variables in the study, such as judgment and intention. These characteristics 
comprise the aggregate PMI construct (Singhapakdi et al., 1999) and causality comes 
about by PMI as the driving variable. In turn, this multidimensional construct influences 
how one forms decisions involving ethically questionable content (Jones, 1991). Based 
on this discourse, PMI is clearly a Type II second-order formative model comprised of 
first-order reflective latent variables (Jarvis et al., 2003).  
This research represents the first empirical study of PMI as a Type II construct. As is 
discussed in chapter seven, this conceptualization contributes to the theory of moral 
intensity. For the remainder of this research, the formative framework is considered the 
most logical representation of the decision-making process. However, for the benefit of 
the reader, the results of the hypothesis tests from both models are included.  
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6.5 Results 
In the first part of this section, the R² results of the latent variables are briefly discussed. 
In the second subsection, the results of the hypothesis tests are presented. Where 
applicable, the results of the hypothesis tests within the context of the alternative 
approach are presented. However, if the results are consistent between the two models, 
only the results from the formative model are shown. In general, the alternative 
framework is contrary to the theory founding the model of this research and therefore, 
the independent relationships of PMI are argued to be spurious notwithstanding the 
highly significant path coefficients. Considering the PMI constructs should not be 
studied independently within the decision-making process; the divergences between the 
hypothesis results of the two models will not be interpreted. The results of the 
alternative approach are presented for the interpretation of the reader. 
The R² results for the first-order latent variables associated with Machiavellianism 
(abstract morality, views of human nature, and interpersonal tactics) remained constant 
across the three vignettes and the omnibus. These consistent results can simply be 
explained by the independence of the Mach IV test to the vignettes; the Mach IV scores 
were introduced within each SEM. Within the context of PLS path modelling, Chin 
(1998) argues that the R² values of 0.67, 0.33, and 0.19 are defined as substantial, 
moderate, and weak, respectively (Henseler et al., 2009). 
From Table 6.29, the interpersonal tactics construct was highly explained by the Mach 
IV measurements items (R² ≈ 0.8). Similarly, the abstract morality latent variable (R² ≈ 
0.54) was moderately explained by the manifest variables derived from the Mach IV 
test. The views of human nature were moderately explained by the Mach IV items (R² ≈ 
0.35).  
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The unethical intentions construct sustained high R² results (≈ 0.75) across the four 
models. These results emphasize the strong fit of the latent variables synthesized in the 
framework and in general, the relevance of these constructs within the unethical 
decision-making process. Indeed, the most significant predictor of unethical intentions 
was the TON. Contrary to the empirical research (O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005), 
Machiavellianism did not have a significant relationship to unethical intentions. 
However, this finding is consistent with Chatzidakis et al.’s (2007) theory - the 
relationship between the Machiavellian personality and unethical intentions is expected 
to be indirect through the TON. Based on these findings, it can be argued that the TON 
and PMI explained unethical intentions most appropriately.  
Further to Table 6.29, ethical judgment sustained moderate R² results (≈ 0.55), which 
provides evidence the latent variable was best explained by unethical intentions and, 
secondarily, the TON and PMI. Consistent with the foregoing discussion involving 
unethical intentions, ethical judgment was not explained by Machiavellianism. Given 
the TON or PMI were not included in the Machiavellianism empirical literature 
(O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005), the direct relationships between Machiavellianism and 
unethical intentions and Machiavellianism and ethical judgment were likely spurious; 
the relationship is clearly indirect through a network of constructs.  
PMI was highly explained by the first-order constructs of the magnitude of 
consequences (self and others) and social consensus (R² ≈ 0.99). Although 
Machiavellianism poorly explained these first-order latent variables with R² results of 
0.06, 0.02, and 0.09 for the magnitude of consequences (self), magnitude of 
consequences (others), and social consensus constructs, respectively, the results were 
significant at the 0.05 level nonetheless. 
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From Table 6.29, the TON were moderately explained by PMI and secondarily, 
Machiavellianism (R² ≈ 0.55). Based on these findings, it appears individuals with 
deviant personalities rely on rationalization whilst forming unethical intentions. 
However, it is worth emphasizing that when Machiavellianism was removed from the 
model, the R² for the TON decreased by less than 1%.  
Table 6.29 R² Results for each Latent Variable 
Latent Variable Vignette #1 (R²) Vignette #2 (R²) Vignette #3 (R²) Omnibus (R²) 
    AM 0.5464 0.5442 0.5316 0.5358 
    EI 0.7447 0.6830 0.7036 0.7878 
    EJ 0.6183 0.5549 0.5012 0.5803 
    IT 0.8063 0.8090 0.8185 0.8096 
  MACH 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
MC (o) 0.0305 0.0670 0.0773 0.1272 
MC (s) 0.0173 0.0227 0.0000 0.0247 
   PMI 0.9935 0.9987 0.9876 0.9956 
    SC 0.0638 0.0869 0.0980 0.1512 
   TON 0.5186 0.6102 0.5693 0.6323 
   VHN 0.3560 0.3536 0.3483 0.3582 
AM: Abstract morality; EI: Unethical intentions; EJ: Ethical judgment; IT: Interpersonal tactics; 
MC (o): Magnitude of consequences (others); MC (s): Magnitude of consequences (self); SC: 
Social consensus; TON: Techniques of neutralization; VHN: Views of human nature; PMI: 
Perceived moral intensity 
 
6.5.1 Hypothesis Testing 
As indicated, the results of the hypothesis tests from both frameworks are shown in this 
section; however, where the results are consistent between the models, only the results 
from the formative model are presented. Although further discussions are provided in 
chapter seven, the results that contribute to knowledge are briefly mentioned in this 
section. Prior to delving into the hypothesis tests, it is worth reemphasizing that multiple 
comparisons were not expected to be a problem with the path coefficients within the 
vignettes. Given the path coefficients within the three vignettes represent independent 
tests, which are argued to be isolated tests, Bonferroni’s significance level adjustment 
was not used.  
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As hypothesized, it was expected that the magnitude of consequences (self), magnitude 
of consequences (others), and social consensus are formative dimensions of the PMI 
construct. Specifically,  
Hypothesis 1a: The magnitude of consequences (self) is a formative dimension 
of perceived moral intensity. 
Hypothesis 1b: The magnitude of consequences (others) is a formative 
dimension of perceived moral intensity. 
Hypothesis 1c: Social consensus is a formative dimension of perceived moral 
intensity. 
From Table 6.30, Hypothesis 1a (Model 1: β = 0.23, p < 0.001; Model 2: β = 0.22, p < 
0.001; Model 3: β = 0.16, p < 0.001; Model 4: β = 0.28, p < 0.001), Hypothesis 1b 
(Model 1: β = 0.66, p < 0.001; Model 2: β = 0.55, p < 0.001; Model 3: β = 0.64, p < 
0.001; Model 4: β = 0.61, p < 0.001), and Hypothesis 1c (Model 1: β = 0.46, p < 0.001; 
Model 2: β = 0.61, p < 0.001; Model 3: β = 0.47, p < 0.001; Model 4: β = 0.45, p < 
0.001) are highly supported in all four models. Indeed, PMI functions well as a second-
order formative model. From these findings, Hypothesis 1 is supported in each 
model, which contributes to the moral intensity literature as an additional 
dimension of magnitude of consequences is introduced.  
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Table 6.30 Hypothesis Testing 
  Path Coefficient  
Hypotheses Vignette 1 Vignette 2 Vignette 3 Vignette 4 
H1a: MC (s) -> PEI 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.16*** 0.28*** 
H1b:  MC (o) -> PEI 0.66*** 0.55*** 0.64*** 0.61*** 
H1c: SC -> PEI 0.46*** 0.61*** 0.47*** 0.45*** 
H2: PMI -> EJ -0.18** -0.22*** -0.12* -0.16** 
H3: PMI -> EI -0.21*** -0.24*** -0.28*** -0.20*** 
H4: PMI -> TON -0.70*** -0.67*** -0.71*** -0.73*** 
H5a: TON -> EJ 0.26*** NS 0.33*** 0.19** 
H5b: TON -> EI 0.70*** 0.63*** 0.61*** 0.72*** 
H6: EI -> EJ 0.41*** 0.57*** 0.31*** 0.45*** 
H7a: Mach -> MC (s) 0.13** 0.15*** NS 0.16** 
H7b: Mach -> MC (o) 0.17*** 0.26*** 0.28*** 0.36*** 
H7c: Mach -> SC 0.25*** 0.30*** 0.31*** 0.39*** 
H8: Mach -> TON 0.08** 0.23*** 0.11*** 0.13*** 
* p < 0.05                 
** p < 0.01                 
*** p < 0.001                 
  
For Hypothesis 2, it was postulated that PMI was positively related to ethical judgment. 
Specifically,  
Hypothesis 2: The perceived moral intensity construct is negatively related to 
ethical judgment in which an ethically questionable behaviour is judged as 
ethical. 
Consistent with the moral intensity literature (O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005), 
Hypothesis 2 is supported in all four models (Model 1: β = -0.18, p < 0.01; Model 2: β = 
-0.22, p < 0.001; Model 3: β = -0.12, p < 0.05; Model 4: β = -0.16, p < 0.01). Based on 
these results, Hypothesis 2 is supported in each model. 
To test Hypothesis 2 in the alternative model, the path coefficients for the three PMI 
constructs were independently tested to ethical judgment. According to Table 6.30, the 
relationship between magnitude of consequences (self) and ethical judgment 
(Hypothesis 2a) is not supported. Hypothesis 2b is supported in all four models (Model 
1: β = -0.16, p < 0.001; Model 2: β = -0.12, p < 0.05; Model 3: β = -0.11, p < 0.05; 
Model 4: β = -0.21, p < 0.01). From Table 6.31, Hypothesis 2c is supported in models 
one and two, but not the other models (Model 1: β = -0.09, p < 0.05; Model 2: β = -0.13, 
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p < 0.01; Model 3: not significant; Model 4: not significant). Based on these results, 
Hypothesis 2 receives partial support in the alternative model. 
Table 6.31 Hypothesis Testing for the Alternative Model 
  Path Coefficient  
Hypotheses Vignette 1 Vignette 2 Vignette 3 Vignette 4 
H2a: MC (s) -> EJ NS NS NS NS 
H2b: MC (o) -> EJ -0.16*** -0.12* -0.11* -0.21** 
H2c: SC -> EJ -0.09* -0.13** NS NS 
H3a: MC (s) -> EI -0.08** -0.12*** -0.14*** -0.16*** 
H3b: MC (o) -> EI -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.16*** NS 
H3c: SC -> EI -0.07* -0.12*** -0.13*** -0.11*** 
H4a: MC (s) -> TON -0.16*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.18*** 
H4b: MC (o) -> TON -0.49*** -0.35*** -0.50*** -0.49*** 
H4c: SC -> TON -0.29*** -0.44*** -0.28*** -0.28*** 
* p < 0.05                 
** p < 0.01                 
*** p < 0.001                 
 
According to Hypothesis 3, it was expected that PMI was positively related to unethical 
intentions.  
Hypothesis 3: The perceived moral intensity construct is negatively related to 
unethical intentions. 
Consistent with the moral intensity literature (O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005), 
Hypothesis 3 is supported, again, in all four models (Model 1: β = -0.21, p < 0.001; 
Model 2: β = -0.24, p < 0.001; Model 3: β = -0.28, p < 0.001; Model 4: β = -0.20, p < 
0.001). Indeed, individuals that minimize the consequences of their actions, are 
indifferent to the norms of society, and perceive the consequences against themselves as 
most salient, have a greater tendency to develop unethical intentions. From these 
results, Hypothesis 3 is supported in each model. 
To test Hypothesis 3 in the alternative framework, the path coefficients for the three 
PMI constructs were independently tested to unethical intentions. From Table 6.31, the 
relationship between magnitude of consequences (self) and unethical intentions 
(Hypothesis 3a) is highly supported in all four models (Model 1: β = -0.08, p < 0.001; 
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Model 2: β = -0.12, p < 0.001; Model 3: β = -0.14, p < 0.001; Model 4: β = -0.16, p < 
0.001). Hypothesis 3b is supported in models one, two, and three, but not in the 
omnibus (Model 1: β = -0.15, p < 0.001; Model 2: β = -0.14, p < 0.001; Model 3: β = -
0.16, p < 0.001; Model 4: not supported). From Table 6.31, Hypothesis 3c is supported, 
again, in all four models (Model 1: β = -0.07, p < 0.05; Model 2: β = -0.12, p < 0.001; 
Model 3: β = -0.13, p < 0.001; Model 4: β = -0.11, p < 0.001). From these results, 
Hypothesis 3 is partially supported in the alternative model. 
In Hypothesis 4, it was expected that PMI would be positively related to the TON.  
Hypothesis 4: Perceived moral intensity is negatively related to the techniques 
of neutralization. 
Contrary to neutralization theory, but consistent with empirical studies, Hypothesis 4 is 
highly supported in all four models (Model 1: β = -0.70, p <0.001; Model 2: β = -0.67, p 
< 0.001; Model 3: β = -0.71, p < 0.001; Model 4: β = -0.73, p < 0.001). To test 
Hypothesis 4 within the alternative model, the path coefficients from each of the PMI 
constructs were tested directly to the TON. From Table 6.31, Hypotheses 4a (Model 1: 
β = -0.16, p <0.001; Model 2: β = -0.13, p < 0.001; Model 3: β = -0.13, p < 0.001; 
Model 4: β = -0.18, p < 0.001), Hypothesis 4b (Model 1: β = -0.49, p <0.001; Model 2: 
β = -0.35, p < 0.001; Model 3: β = -0.50, p < 0.001; Model 4: β = -0.49, p < 0.001), and 
Hypothesis 4c (Model 1: β = -0.29, p <0.001; Model 2: β = -0.44, p < 0.001; Model 3: β 
= -0.28, p < 0.001; Model 4: β = -0.28, p < 0.001) are highly supported in all four 
models. These consistent findings for Hypothesis 4 contribute to the ethical 
decision-making theory as when marketers minimize the consequences of their 
actions on others, are indifferent to social norms, and perceive the consequences 
against their self-interest as most salient, they rely on various neutralization 
techniques to justify this.  
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In Hypothesis H5a, it was postulated that neutralization would be positively related to 
judging an ethically questionable behaviour as ethical.  
Hypothesis 5a: The techniques of neutralization are positively related to ethical 
judgment in which an ethically questionable behaviour is judged as ethical. 
From Table 6.30, Hypothesis 5a is supported in models one, three, and the omnibus, but 
not in model two (Model 1: β = 0.26, p < 0.001; Model 2: not supported; Model 3: β = 
0.33, p < 0.001; Model 4: β = 0.19, p < 0.01). From these results, Hypothesis 5a 
receives partial support. 
In Hypothesis 5b, it was expected that the TON would be positively related to unethical 
intentions.  
Hypothesis 5b: The techniques of neutralization are positively related to 
unethical intentions. 
Hypothesis 5b is highly supported in all four models (Model 1: β = 0.70, p < 0.001; 
Model 2: β = 0.63, p < 0.001; Model 3: β = 0.61, p < 0.001; Model 4: β = 0.72, p < 
0.001). From these results, Hypothesis 5b is supported in each model, which 
contributes to the empirical neutralization research as marketers appear to rely on 
neutralizations when forming ethically questionable intentions.  
In Hypothesis 6, it was anticipated that unethical intentions would be positively related 
to ethical judgment. Specifically,  
Hypothesis 6: Unethical intentions are positively related to ethical judgments in 
which managers judge an ethically questionable behaviour as ethical. 
Hypothesis 6 was highly supported in each model (Model 1: β = 0.41, p < 0.001; 
Model 2: β = 0.57, p < 0.001; Model 3: β = 0.31, p < 0.001; Model 4: β = 0.45, p < 
0.001). Thus, consistent with the intuition theorists, marketers believe their illicit 
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intentions are ethical. As is discussed in chapter seven, this finding contributes to the 
reflexive judgment theoretical and empirical research. This finding provides evidence 
that marketers rationalize their ethically questionable intentions by suppressing the 
ethicality associated with an ethical problem. Rationalization provides decision-makers 
with the ability to remain consciously unaware of ethical problems. Through this 
cognitive bias, marketers are able to maintain their self-concept by appearing to 
themselves (and others) as ethical, which can assist them in minimizing guilt and 
cognitive dissonance. 
In Hypothesis 7, it was anticipated that Machiavellianism would be positively related to 
the first order PMI constructs.  
Hypothesis 7a: Machiavellianism is positively related to the magnitude of 
consequences (self) in that Machiavellians will perceive the consequences 
against their self-interests as most salient. 
Hypothesis 7b: Machiavellianism is positively related to the magnitude of 
consequences (others) in that Machiavellians will minimize or disregard the 
consequences on others. 
Hypothesis 7c: Machiavellianism is positively related to social consensus in that 
Machiavellians will be indifferent to social consensus. 
In Hypothesis 7a, the relationship between Machiavellianism and the magnitude of 
consequences (self) is not supported in the third model but is in the other three models 
(Model 1: β = 0.13, p < 0.001; Model 2: β = 0.15, p < 0.001; Model 3: not significant; 
Model 4: β = 0.16, p < 0.01). In Hypothesis 7b, the relationship between 
Machiavellianism and the magnitude of consequences (others) was highly supported in 
each model (Model 1: β = 0.17, p < 0.001; Model 2: β = 0.26, p < 0.001; Model 3: β = 
0.28, p < 0.001; Model 4: β = 0.36, p < 0.001). In Hypothesis 7c, the relationship 
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between Machiavellianism and social consensus was highly supported (Model 1: β = 
0.25, p < 0.001; Model 2: β = 0.30, p < 0.001; Model 3: β = 0.31, p < 0.001; Model 4: β 
= 0.39, p < 0.001). From these results, Hypothesis 7a receives partial support whilst 
Hypotheses 7b and 7c are supported in each model, which contributes to the moral 
intensity theoretical research as Machiavellianism appears to influence one’s 
perceptions of moral intensity.  
In Hypothesis 8, a positive relationship between Machiavellianism and the TON was 
expected. Specifically, 
Hypothesis 8: Machiavellianism is positively related to the techniques of 
neutralization. 
This relationship was supported in all four models (Model 1: β = 0.08, p < 0.01; Model 
2: β = 0.23, p < 0.001; Model 3: β = 0.11, p < 0.001; Model 4: β = 0.13, p < 0.001). 
From the results, Hypothesis 8 is supported in each model, which contributes to 
neutralization theory as the Machiavellian personality appears to influence one’s 
acceptance of rationalization. Indeed, as presented in chapter four, Machiavellians are 
not perpetually immoral; they are selectively willing to engage in ethically questionable 
behaviour (EQB). This mentality is consistent with the purpose of the TON in that 
delinquents selectively deviate from the norms of society and use rationalization to rid 
themselves of guilt. 
From the summary table of the hypothesis testing results (see Table 6.32); most of the 
hypotheses were highly supported. However, two hypotheses received partial support. 
Specifically, Hypothesis 5a was supported in Modules 1, 3, and 4, but not supported in 
Model 2. Hypothesis 7a was supported in Modules 1, 2, and 4 whereas the hypothesis 
was not supported in Module 3. Discussions of these findings are included in chapter 
seven. 
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Table 6.32 Summary of Hypothesis Testing Results 
HYPOTHESIZED RELATIONSHIPS Result 
H1a: The magnitude of consequences (self) is a formative dimension of perceived moral intensity. 
Supported 
H1b: The magnitude of consequences (others) is a formative dimension of perceived moral intensity. 
Supported 
H1c: Social consensus is a formative dimension of perceived moral intensity. 
Supported 
H2: The perceived moral intensity construct is negatively related to ethical judgment in which an ethically 
questionable behaviour is judged as ethical. 
Supported 
H3: The perceived moral intensity construct is negatively related to unethical intentions. Supported 
H4: Perceived moral intensity is negatively related to the techniques of neutralization. Supported 
H5a: The techniques of neutralization are positively related to ethical judgment in which an ethically 
questionable behaviour is judged as ethical. 
Supported in Modules 1, 3, and 
4; not supported in Module 2. 
H5b: The techniques of neutralization are positively related to unethical intentions. 
Supported 
H6: Unethical intentions are positively related to ethical judgments in which managers judge an ethically 
questionable behaviour as ethical. 
Supported 
H7a: Machiavellianism is positively related to the magnitude of consequences (self) in that Machiavellians 
will perceive the consequences against their self-interests as most salient. 
Supported in Modules 1, 2, and 
4; not supported in Module 3. 
H7b: Machiavellianism is positively related to the magnitude of consequences (others) in that 
Machiavellians will minimize or disregard the consequences on others. 
Supported 
H7c: Machiavellianism is positively related to social consensus in that Machiavellians will be indifferent to 
social consensus. 
Supported 
H8: Machiavellianism is positively related to the techniques of neutralization. Supported. 
 
6.5.2 Post-hoc testing on Control Variables 
To understand if the demographic variables influence the constructs in the model for 
ethically questionable decision-making, MANOVA tests were conducted on gender, 
age, education, and work experience. According to the results for vignette #1, none of 
the demographic variables had a significant effect on the model at the 0.05 level. 
However, age was found to be significant in the MANOVA test for the second vignette 
(Wilks’ test, F36,949 = 2.92, p < 0.001). Following the MANOVA test, a general linear 
ANOVA was used to analyse the latent variables influenced by age. From Table 6.33, 
age affected the interpersonal tactics variable associated with Machiavellianism (F4,271 = 
4.56, p < 0.01), social consensus (F4,271  = 4.10, p < 0.01), views of human nature 
associated with Machiavellianism (F4,271  = 4.18, p < 0.003), and the magnitude of 
consequences (self) (F4,271  = 4.32, p < 0.01). Similar to vignette #1, none of the control 
variables had an effect on the model representative of vignette #3. According to the 
MANOVA results for the omnibus model, age was significant (Wilks’ test, F36,949 = 
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1.492, p < 0.05) and essentially mirrored the results from vignette #2. Specifically, age 
significantly influenced interpersonal tactics (F4,271 = 4.56, p < 0.001), magnitude of 
consequences (self) (F4,271 = 4.17, p < 0.003), and views of human nature (F4,271 = 4.18, p 
< 0.003) in the ANOVA test.  
To understand the age disparities, Tukey’s post-hoc tests were conducted. According to 
the vignette #2 results, marketers under the age of 50 had the greatest inclinations 
toward using interpersonal tactics of the Machiavellian construct. Similarly, marketers 
under the age of 30 held the most cynical views of human nature, another Machiavellian 
construct. These results are consistent with the Machiavellian literature as younger 
individuals are often found to be more Machiavellian (Hunt & Chonko, 1984). 
Similarly, participants 30 and younger were more indifferent to social norms, which is 
likely consistent with their Machiavellian tendencies. Finally, individuals within the 40 
to 50 age category were more sensitive to the consequences against their self-interests. 
This sensitivity might be attributed to their career stage, likelihood of dependents, and 
financial responsibilities compared to younger participants that may not have entered 
this phase or older participants that have left this stage. Perhaps these individuals might 
be most dependent on their employment.  
According to the findings of Tukey’s test for the omnibus framework, the results were 
mirroring those from vignette #2. Specifically, individuals below the age of 30 were 
more inclined to use interpersonal tactics and hold cynical views of human nature. 
Similarly those individuals in the 40 to 50 age category were most sensitive to the 
harms against themselves.  
From these post-hoc analyses, none of the other demographic variable had an effect on 
unethical intentions, ethical judgment, and the TON at the 0.05 level of significance in 
any of the vignettes. In general, these results are consistent with the literature as it has 
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been argued that demographic variables do not significantly influence the dependent 
variables in the decision-making process (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). Although the 
demographic variables had a significant effect on the aforementioned study variables, 
the contribution to the adjusted coefficient of determination (R²) was clearly 
insignificant as these contributions were all below 5% (see Table 6.33), which is below 
the threshold of 19% to be considered a weak contribution (Henseler et al., 2009). 
Indeed, demographic factors are inconsequential to the ethically questionable decision-
making process. Based on these findings, the fundamental structure of the omnibus 
model is therefore seen to hold across each model. 
Table 6.33 Results of Analysis of Variance for Demographic Variables 
  Sum of          
Source Squares df Mean Squares   F R² 
Vignette #2             
 
      
Age * IT 17.42 4 4.36  4.56** 4.93% 
Error 258.58 271 0.95     
            
Age * MC (s) 16.53 4 4.13   4.32** 4.60% 
Error 259.47 271 0.96     
            
Age * SC 15.76 4 3.94   4.10** 4.32% 
Error 260.24 271 0.96     
            
Age * VHN 16.02 4 4.01   4.18** 4.42% 
Error 259.98 271 0.96     
                      
Omnibus                     
Age * IT 17.42 4 4.36   4.56** 4.93% 
Error 258.58 271 0.95     
                      
Age * MC (s) 16.04 4 4.00   4.17** 4.41% 
Error 259.98 271 0.96     
                      
Age * VHN 16.04 4 4.01   4.18** 4.42% 
Error 259.96 271 0.96     
* p < 0.05                     
** p < 0.01                     
*** p < 0.001                     
IT: Interpersonal tactics; MC (s): Magnitude of consequences (self); SC: Social consensus; VHN: Views of human 
nature. 
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6.6 Conclusion 
As was evidenced throughout this chapter, the measurement instrument developed for 
this research demonstrates acceptable levels of reliability and validity. The omnibus 
framework was found to provide a general perspective of the unethical decision-making 
process and considering the basic structure was held through each model, the omnibus 
can explain how marketers rationalize their ethically questionable intentions across 
various behaviours. As was emphasized, the model comprised of the second-order 
formative latent variable is most closely representative of the decision-making process. 
This model is the main contribution put forward from this research. As was shown, the 
path coefficients for each model are significant at the 0.05 level whilst many paths are 
significant at the 0.01 level. In the next chapter, these results are interpreted and 
discussed. 
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Discussion 
7.1 Introduction 
In the last chapter, the validity and reliability of the three models representing the 
subprime lending, environmental pollution, and package downsizing vignettes was 
demonstrated. The omnibus framework, which was developed from averaging the 
manifest variables from each vignette, was introduced. As argued, the omnibus model 
provides a composite representation of the overall decision-making process marketers 
follow when ethically questionable intentions are formed. It is believed that this 
omnibus framework can be generalized across a broad assortment of behaviours.  
Further to chapter six, an alternative framework, which involved removing the second-
order formative latent variable from the perceived moral intensity (PMI) construct, was 
presented. In this alternative model, the first-order PMI dimensions were tested 
independently against the endogenous variables in the decision-making process. This 
model was shown to be valid and reliable. The hypothesis tests were in general, largely 
supported, which emphasizes the strength in the relationships between the constructs. 
However, considering Jones (1991) conceptualized PMI as a multidimensional 
construct, the dimensions of moral intensity are relatively independent, and reasonably 
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uncorrelated, the formative approach was argued to be the most appropriate 
representation of the moral intensity construct. Therefore, the formative model forms 
the basis of discussions for the remainder of this thesis. 
In the first section of this chapter, the path coefficients across each of the vignettes 
representing the various research hypotheses are compared. In the second section, the 
major findings of this research are interpreted. In the latter portion of the chapter, the 
results are discussed with a specific focus on answering the research questions and 
outlining the contributions of this research. 
7.2 Comparison of Vignettes 
As discussed in chapter five, many of the empirical studies (approximately 50%) in the 
business ethics research paradigm reviewed in this thesis were based on examinations of 
only a single ethically questionable behaviour (EQB). Of the studies that included 
several EQBs (Blodgett et al., 2001), the path coefficients between the variables of 
interest were most often not compared across the vignettes. By studying malfeasance in 
only one context, generalizations cannot be made across various behaviours and it 
remains unknown if marketers would be willing to behave illicitly in one situation, but 
not in another.  
To address this concern, the corresponding path coefficients for each model are 
compared in this section using two sample pooled t-tests. Considering 16 comparisons 
are required per vignette, multiple comparisons were expected to be an issue (Simes, 
1986), which could result in an increase in Type I errors. To address this concern and to 
attain a 0.05 level of significance, the familywise error rate was adjusted using a 
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Bonferroni correction3. The adjusted alpha using a two tailed t-test is 0.008 and the 
revised critical value for a 0.05 level of significance is 2.41. 
Structural integrity across each of the three models and the composite omnibus model is 
largely present, with most of the paths between the models being constant; however, 
differences are apparent. According to the participants’ perceptions of the various latent 
variables in this study (see Table 7.1), marketers have similar perceptions of subprime 
lending and package downsizing but clear differences were apparent with the 
perceptions of the environmental pollution vignette. From these descriptive statistics, it 
appears marketers perceive pollution as more heinous in comparison to the other two 
EQBs. Specifically, approximately 41%, 13%, and 32% of marketers were willing to 
behave unethically in the package downsizing, environmental pollution, and subprime 
lending contexts, respectively. Indeed, a near equal proportion of marketers judged the 
behaviours as ethical in each context.  
As indicated in chapter five, the vignettes used in this research were crafted similarly; 
the only manipulation was the EQB. Considering the EQB was the only manipulation, 
the differences can only be explained by the context. As mentioned, researchers have 
failed to analyse the difference between various behaviours. Due to this dearth of 
research, many of the differences found in this section are explained by logical 
reasoning as opposed to rich theory grounded in empirical studies.  
Table 7.1 Percentages of Perceptions of Ethically Questionable Behaviour 
Latent Variable Package downsizing Environmental pollution Subprime lending 
Judged behaviour as ethical 34.00% 18.10% 33.70% 
Unethical intentions 41.30% 13.40% 31.90% 
Minimizing consequences 35.50% 10.50% 25.70% 
Self-interest most salient 41.00% 47.10% 52.90% 
Indifferent to social norms 10.50% 4.70% 10.40% 
Acceptance of neutralizations 34.80% 8.00% 32.60% 
Calculated by averaging the raw data scores for the manifest variables for each latent variable.  
                                                 
3 Bonferroni’s critical value adjustment for alpha = 0.05 was calculated through the formula 
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7.2.1 Comparison between Package Downsizing and Environmental Pollution 
In this section, the differences between the path coefficients in vignettes #1 (package 
downsizing) and vignette #2 (environmental pollution) are discussed. From Table 7.2, 
the difference in the path coefficient between Machiavellianism and the techniques of 
neutralization (TON) was significantly stronger in the environmental pollution vignette 
after the Bonferroni adjustment (t = -2.94; p < 0.05). This discrepancy is likely 
attributed to the divergent perceptions of pollution compared to packaging deception. 
For example, 18.4% of participants judged pollution as ethical whereas 34% judged 
package downsizing as ethical. Clearly, individuals perceive various behaviours 
differently, which appears to influence one’s cognitive processes when exposed to 
ethical dilemmas.  
Given the perceived negative social implications associated with environmental 
pollution, Machiavellians would likely require additional rationalization to minimize 
feelings of guilt. This finding is consistent with the Machiavellian discourse. Here, 
Machiavellians are not necessarily immoral; they simply have a “cool detachment” from 
others (Robinson & Shaver, 1969) and perhaps feel remorse in contexts that have severe 
ethical implications. In these situations, additional neutralization would be expected.   
The factor loading between social consensus and PMI was found to be stronger in the 
environmental pollution vignette after the Bonferroni correction (t = -3.15; p < 0.05). 
Consistent with Singhapakdi et al.’s (1996) discourse, it appears that depending on the 
context, marketers perceive the dimensions of moral intensity as more intense than 
others, which supports Jones’s (1991) theory (Singhapakdi et al., 1996). 
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Table 7.2 Independent Samples t-tests comparing the Corresponding Path in Each Model 
Path coefficient  Model 1 - Model 2 Model 1 - Model 3 Model 2 - Model 3 
1. Magnitude of consequences (others) -> Perceived moral intensity 2.22 0.48 -2.05 
2. Magnitude of consequences (self) -> Perceived moral intensity 0.16 1.09 1.05 
3. Social consensus -> Perceived moral intensity -2.94*¹ -0.19 3.13*¹ 
4. Perceived moral intensity -> Techniques of neutralization 0.63 -0.39 -1.04 
5. Perceived moral intensity -> Unethical intentions -0.45 -1.20 -0.61 
6. Perceived moral intensity -> Ethical judgment -0.59 -0.65 1.30 
7. Techniques of neutralization -> Unethical intentions 1.05 1.57 -0.33 
8. Techniques of neutralization -> Ethical judgment 2.12 0.65 -2.85*² 
9. Unethical intentions -> Ethical judgment -1.87 1.11 2.93*¹ 
10. Machiavellianism -> Abstract morality 0.04 0.30 0.23 
11. Machiavellianism -> Interpersonal tactics -0.09 -0.41 0.33 
12. Machiavellianism -> Views of human nature 0.03 0.10 0.07 
13. Machiavellianism -> Magnitude of consequences (others) -1.17 -1.43 -0.28 
14. Machiavellianism -> Magnitude of consequences (self) -0.29 0.32 0.54 
15. Machiavellianism -> Social consensus -0.59 -0.85 -0.28 
16. Machiavellianism -> Techniques of neutralization -3.15*¹ -0.67 2.50*¹ 
Bonferroni adjustment to accommodate a familywise significance level of 0.05; adjusted critical value is 2.41     
* p < 0.05             
¹ Stronger in Model 2             
² Stronger in Model 3             
7.2.2 Comparison between Package Downsizing and Subprime Lending 
Further to Table 7.2, the path coefficients between vignettes #1 and #3 for package 
downsizing and subprime lending were relatively similar as no statistically significant 
differences were found after the Bonferroni adjustments. From this comparison, the 
model appears to have structural integrity. Considering this seeming universality of the 
fundamental model, these results imply that marketers typically follow a distinct 
unethical decision-making process when they are exposed to both package deception 
and subprime lending ethical dilemmas. 
7.2.3 Comparison between Environmental Pollution and Subprime Lending 
From Table 7.2, the path coefficient differences between the environmental pollution 
(vignette #2) and subprime lending situations (vignette #3) were significant across four 
paths. Surprisingly, the relationship between neutralization and ethical judgment was 
stronger in the subprime lending vignette compared to the pollution vignette after the 
Bonferroni adjustment (t = -2.85; p < 0.05). As pollution is perceived as psychologically 
distressing (Arza & Lopez, 2011), it was expected that additional rationalization would 
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be needed. Interestingly, the path between unethical intentions and ethical judgment was 
also significantly stronger in vignette #2 after the Bonferroni adjustment (t = 2.93; p < 
0.05).  
Consistent with the comparison between vignettes #1 and #2, a difference is apparent 
between Machiavellianism and the TON in the environmental pollution vignette (t = 
2.50; p < 0.05). As indicated, environmental pollution is perceived as heinous and 
would typically require additional rationalization to minimize guilt.  
A significant difference between social consensus and PMI was also found after the 
Bonferroni adjustment (t = 3.13; p < 0.05). The relationship was stronger in vignette #2. 
This divergence is interesting as one would assume marketers might be less willing to 
believe environmental pollution is socially acceptable. Despite the severe repercussions 
that occurred from subprime lending in the U.S., the consequences of pollution such as 
global warming are perhaps perceived as far more debilitating. In addition, subprime 
lending is legal in the U.S. whereas environmental pollution is heavily controlled and 
given the local legislation, these regulations might influence how U.S. marketers 
perceive the norms of society. For example, considering most U.S. citizens operate at 
stage four (obedience to authority) in Kohlberg’s cognitive moral development 
hierarchy (Wood et al., 1988), marketers might perceive morality on legislative terms. 
With pollution being heavily regulated, seemingly, it is perceived as immoral in any 
geographical context.  
7.2.4 Summary 
Several models developed prior to Jones’s (1991) framework (Rest, 1986) were based 
on the premise that individuals follow an identical decision-making process, regardless 
of context. However, through his issue-contingent construct, Jones (1991, p. 371) 
explicitly “rejects that view and formally includes characteristics of the moral issue as 
CHAPTER SEVEN  
 189 
an independent variable offering all four stages of moral decision making and 
behaviour”. From the results of this section, it can be argued that individuals perceive 
EQBs differently and, more specifically, the unethical decision-making process is 
context dependent. This finding makes both a theoretical and empirical contribution. 
Regardless that decision-makers perceive various ethical problems differently with 
disparities being found across the three vignettes, the basic structure of an unethical 
decision-making framework was nevertheless, maintained. Considering the seeming 
universality of the model, these results imply that marketers typically follow a distinct 
unethical decision-making process when they are exposed to various dilemmas. This 
structure is further emphasized through the omnibus model as this provides a composite 
representation of the overall decision-making process used by marketers whereas the 
other models provide more specific perspectives. Importantly, the relationships between 
PMI and unethical intentions, PMI and the TON, and the TON and unethical intentions 
remained constant across each vignette. This structural integrity emphasizes the 
robustness of the models and provides evidence these relationships remain stable across 
a wide spectrum of EQBs.  
7.3 Interpretation of Results 
In this section, the results of this research are interpreted. In the first subsection, 
discussions centre on the relationship between Machiavellianism and the TON and also, 
the relationship between Machiavellianism and PMI. In the subsequent subsection, the 
discourse is related to ethical recognition, the indifference to social norms and reliance 
on neutralization, and the relationship between PMI and unethical intentions. In the final 
section, the relationship between unethical intentions and ethical judgment is discussed.  
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7.3.1 Machiavellianism  
In this study, Machiavellians minimized the consequences on others, were shown to be 
indifferent to social norms, and perceived the consequences against their self-interests 
as most salient. To facilitate these perceptions, neutralizations were used. Consistent 
results were found in Stevens et al.’s (2012) study involving psychopaths. In their study, 
Stevens et al. (2012) demonstrated that psychopaths relied on rationalizations to justify 
their EQBs. As discussed in chapter three, the results between these studies are 
comparable as psychopaths and Machiavellians share similar personality traits (Paulhus 
& Williams, 2002). 
Stevens et al. (2012) suggest rationalization provides psychopaths with the ability to 
redefine their perceptions of morality.  
 For example, a successful psychopath may know that fraud is wrong in a purely 
 rational sense, but through moral disengagement, is able to redefine fraud – 
 through some combination of justification mechanisms – as a justified act of 
 personal gain with negligible consequences (p. 143).  
 
Haidt (2001) demonstrated that individuals with deviant personalities are aware they 
should feel remorse for their EQB but yet, they remain unaffected. This lack of concern 
can cause these decision-makers to be indifferent to social norms and focus more on 
protecting their self-interest (Sonenshein, 2007).  
The relationship between Machiavellianism and PMI contributes to the theory of moral 
intensity as, although the path coefficients were low, Machiavellianism appears to 
influence one’s perceptions of moral intensity. According to the relationship between 
Machiavellianism and the TON, this finding contributes to neutralization theory as the 
Machiavellian personality has been shown to influence acceptance of rationalization. 
This finding provides support to Chatzidakis et al.’s (2007) theory in that various 
background characteristics are likely to influence the acceptance of neutralization.  
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However, considering the low yet significant path coefficients between 
Machiavellianism and the constructs in the model, such as PMI and TON, non-
Machiavellians appear nearly as likely, on average, to follow the unethical decision-
making process. As discussed in chapter six, when Machiavellianism was removed from 
the model for ethically questionable decision-making, the coefficient of determination 
(R²) scores for the latent variables were not greatly affected. This provides evidence that 
Machiavellianism does not drastically influence EQB in certain contexts (Ajzen & 
Fishbein, 1980).  
Machiavellians, by their nature, might be predisposed to irrational egoist intentions, 
non-Machiavellians or low-Machiavellians can also behave as irrational egoists. 
Importantly, it is worth observing that other demographic factors (age, gender, and work 
experience) did not have a profound effect on the decision-making process as the 
contributions to the coefficient of determination were all below 5%. Therefore, 
marketers are, in general, capable of the malfeasance found in this study and most 
importantly, the Machiavellian personality is inconsequential to the ethically 
questionable decision-making process. 
7.3.2 Ethical Recognition  
As indicated in chapter three, Jones (1991) and other theorists (Hunt & Vitell, 1986) 
contend that the first stage in the ethical decision-making process involves recognizing a 
moral issue. It is argued that if a moral issue is not recognized, decision-makers would 
not make a moral judgment, develop intentions, and act on their intentions (Jones, 
1991). They might simply react (Murphy & Dacin, 2011).  
In chapter three, it was argued that including a questionnaire item to test one’s 
recognition of a moral issue would artificially prompt participants into becoming aware 
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of the ethical dilemma when they might not have previously (Gunia et al., 2012). For 
this reason, the ethical recognition item was not included in the questionnaire.  
In his study, Barnett (2001) found that perceived social consensus and the magnitude of 
consequences were positively related to ethical recognition. Considering that marketers 
in this research minimized the consequences on others and were indifferent to social 
norms, it could be argued that they did not notice the ethicality associated with the 
ethical problems or in other words, the ethical problem was unrecognized.  
However, the main assumption of neutralization theory is that individuals feel guilt 
when they behave unethically and, to minimize guilt, neutralization techniques are used 
(Sykes & Matza, 1957). As a highly significant relationship was found between PMI 
and the TON, decision-makers must have therefore recognized the ethical problem 
(consciously or subconsciously). If participants had not recognized the ethical problem, 
it is unlikely a significant relationship between PMI and the TON would have been 
found as feelings of guilt would not have been felt (Agnew, 1994). As discussed in 
chapter three, individuals rationalize and justify their decisions, but this does not occur 
in all circumstances (Maruna & Copes, 2004).  
Rest (1986) contended that for moral awareness to occur, at the minimum, decision-
makers must recognize that their behaviour affects others or there are competing claims 
of values (Bersoff, 1999). Considering competing claims were associated with each 
ethical problem in this study, marketers would likely have perceived these conflicts4 
but, due to their minimization of the harms on other people and rationalization, they 
failed to recognize the ethicality of the dilemmas. In these situations, decision-makers 
                                                 
4 As mentioned in chapter five, the participants in the pre-tests indicated that the dilemmas had ethical 
content. Therefore, most participants in the main study of this thesis would have also recognized the 
ethical problem. 
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might be subconsciously aware of an ethical problem but through rationalization, they 
are capable of suppressing the ethicality of the dilemma.  
Consequently, the empirical results of this research provide indirect evidence that 
individuals recognized the dilemmas had moral content. However, the minimization of 
the consequences on others and the cognitive biases associated with rationalization 
appear to have caused participants to fail to retain the ethicality of the problem and so, 
these psychological manoeuvres assisted decision-makers in suppressing ethical 
awareness.   
7.3.3 Indifference to Social Norms and Neutralization  
In their seminal work, Sykes and Matza (1957) contended that if decision-makers reject 
the norms of society, it is unlikely they will feel guilty when they behave abhorrently. 
Without guilt or cognitive dissonance, neutralizations would be unnecessary (Maruna & 
Copes, 2004). Contrary to neutralization theory, but consistent with the extant empirical 
literature, the results of this study provide evidence that if decision-makers are 
indifferent to social norms, they rely on neutralization techniques to justify their 
ethically questionable intentions. These findings are consistent with the results from 
Agnew’s (1994) cross-sectional study and Minor’s (1981) longitudinal work. 
To explain the gap between theory and practice, Minor (1984) argued that the continued 
use of neutralization techniques tends to weaken one’s connection to social norms in 
that over time, individuals rely less on neutralizations as they become indifferent. Prior 
to complete indifference, neutralizations remain necessary to assist decision-makers in 
maintaining a positive self-concept (Agnew, 1994). From the results of this study, it 
appears that marketers might be attached, perhaps loosely to social norms and, 
therefore, require neutralization techniques to alleviate the cognitive dissonance 
associated with their indifference.  
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In these situations, Flynn and Wiltermuth (2010) contend that individuals are often 
willing to perceive their decisions as consistent with the opinions of others. By doing 
this, individuals tend to “project their own opinions and alter their judgments about 
what others think is ethical, perhaps giving them a sense of being in the majority even 
when they are not” (Flynn & Wiltermuth, 2010, p. 1074). The consequence being that 
even if managers hold socially sanctioned rules, depending on the context, they can be 
applied inappropriately (Reynolds, 2006).    
7.3.4 Perceived Moral Intensity and Unethical Intentions  
Jones (1991) argued that when decision-makers perceive higher levels of moral 
intensity associated with a dilemma, they are more inclined to behave ethically. From 
the extant empirical research, the magnitude of consequences and social consensus were 
negatively related to unethical intentions (Barnett, 2001).  
Consistent with the literature (Davis et al., 1998), the marketers in this study that were 
indifferent to the norms of society, minimized the consequences on others and perceived 
the consequences against their self-interests as salient, were most willing to develop 
ethically questionable intentions. This negative relationship from PMI to unethical 
intentions provides evidence that decision-makers use their perceptions of moral 
intensity as rationalization mechanisms. Specifically,  
 … social consensus may, at times, connote a rationalization of questionable 
 behaviour, not an endorsement. For example, in the case of rampant cheating in 
 an examination, most students taking part would concede the practice is wrong, 
 but use social consensus to justify their actions (Davis et al., 1998, p. 384).  
 
When marketers behave unethically, they believe that there are no norms prohibiting the 
behaviour, the consequences against others are insignificant, and the consequences to 
their self-interest are most salient. Therefore, through their perception of moral 
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intensity, marketers are able to justifiably form, in their own mind, ethically 
questionable intentions.  
In each vignette, the protagonist’s employer would be harmed if he or she behaved 
ethically in the scenario. This harm was related to losing an account and if the account 
was lost, the protagonist could be penalized. It is acknowledged that this negative effect 
on the protagonist’s employer might have influenced participants’ decisions and, 
specifically, the magnitude of consequences (self) construct. In other words, the harm to 
the employer and the protagonist’s self-interest could have equally influenced 
participants’ perception of the magnitude of consequences (self) within each vignette. 
However, from the extant literature, it was found that U.S. participants are less 
concerned with harms against their employer (Schepers, 2003; Zarkada-Fraser & Fraser, 
2001). They are most concerned with their personal interests (Hofstede, 2007). As such, 
the results for the magnitude of consequences (self) were interpreted as most salient to 
the decision-makers’ interests. 
7.3.5 Intentions Leading to Judgment 
Contrary to the rationalist ethical decision-making frameworks (Rest, 1986), but 
consistent with the intuitionist theory, unethical intentions were positively related to 
judging an EQB as ethical. Neurological cognitive researchers (Reynolds, 2006) have 
demonstrated that most decisions are made intuitively through reflexive judgments, 
which is grounded in the decision-makers’ prior social experiences. Decision-makers 
recognize ethically questionable issues instantaneously (Haidt, 2001), which derive 
from their unconscious awareness and automatically arrive in their reflexive 
consciousness (Sonenshein, 2007). In this context, “action can unfold before the 
individual is cognizant of the rationale for doing so, and the explanations might emerge 
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only after the fact” (Reynolds, 2006, p. 743). When individuals make reflexive 
judgments, they develop explanations for their actions ex post facto (Haidt, 2001). 
From this discourse, the positive relationship between unethical intentions and judgment 
found in this research was interpreted as reflexive. It is likely the ethical issues were 
recognized subconsciously, but were suppressed through the perception of moral 
intensity, neutralization, and judgments. Once marketers made intuitive judgments, they 
relied on the aforementioned psychological manoeuvrings to maintain their self-concept 
(Haidt, 2001).  
In the 1970s, the Ford Pinto had a design fault - the gas tank was liable to rupture and 
ignite at low-impact causing numerous disfigurements and fatalities. However, the 
decision-makers at Ford decided the cost to rectify the design outweighed the costs of 
human life (Gioia, 1992). Gioia (1992, p. 358), a recall coordinator at the time, stated 
that:  
 … before I went to Ford I would have argued that Ford had an ethical obligation 
 to recall. After I left Ford I now argue and teach that Ford had an obligation to 
 recall. But, while I was there, I perceived no strong obligation to recall and 
 remember no strong ethical overtones to the case whatsoever.  
 
When he reviewed his behaviour, Gioia believed he committed no harm. In fact, he 
argued his decision was most appropriate to prolonging his employment.  
To map the decision-making process, Gioia perceived moral intensity by minimizing the 
harm on Ford customers, focused on his desire to minimize the costs to his employer 
and, ultimately, retain his employment. To further distort the ethical problem, Gioia 
suppressed his guilt by claiming the decision was made collectively among his 
colleagues (i.e., denial of responsibility), which assisted him in judging the decision to 
do nothing as acceptable. Indeed, when unethical intentions are developed, managers 
believe they are ethical. 
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7.4 Discussion 
The discussion portion of this chapter is segregated into two sections. In the first 
section, the research questions are answered. In the second section, the contributions of 
this research are discussed within theoretical, empirical, methods, and managerial 
contexts. Specific discussions centre on the main contribution of synthesizing Jones’s 
(1991) issue-contingent framework within the context of the TON, the impact of 
Machiavellianism on the decision-making process, and the positive relationship between 
unethical intentions and judging an EQB as ethical.  
7.4.1 The Research Questions 
Marketers rationalize malfeasance through their perception of moral intensity i.e., 
minimizing the harms on others, indifference to social consensus, and perceiving the 
harms against their self-interest as most salient. To reemphasize these perceptions, 
marketers rationalize their decision-making through various neutralization techniques. 
By neutralizing, marketers convince themselves there are no unacceptable consequences 
for others or social norms forbidding their actions, when clearly there are. Consistent 
with the intuitive models, unethical intentions were positively related to ethical 
judgment. Indeed, when marketers develop ethically questionable intentions, they 
suppress the ethicality of the problem and contend their behaviour is morally 
acceptable.  
Therefore, in response to the first research question, marketers rationalize their ethically 
questionable intentions through their: (1) perception of moral intensity, (2) reliance on 
various neutralization techniques, and; (3) judgment of their ethically questionable 
intentions as ethical. These findings explain the root of the problem, namely, the 
cognitive limitations of marketers and their disposition to sacrifice their long-term 
interests and the interests of others for the short-term.  
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Contrary to the bad apples thesis (Trevino & Youngblood, 1990), Machiavellianism did 
not contribute to explaining either the TON or PMI and by extension, the decision-
making process. As indicated, when Machiavellianism was removed from the omnibus 
model, the coefficient of determination for the TON decreased marginally. Moreover, as 
the only exogenous variable for the PMI dimensions, Machiavellianism only makes a 
weak positive contribution to these, also. Therefore, to answer the second research 
question, these results imply low-Machiavellians are also irrational egoists and so 
Machiavellianism does not influence the decision-making process. 
In this research, marketers were found to make less-optimal decisions (Simon, 1955) 
and were willing to satisfy their immediate concerns like addressing the threat from the 
ethical problem, but not maximizing the possible utility associated with behaving 
ethically. Indeed, marketers ignored relevant information which, according to rational 
egoism, would be in their best interests to consider and made irrational decisions to the 
detriment of others.  
7.4.2 Theoretical Contributions 
This research contributes to theory in four main areas. A significant contribution 
involves the mapping of the unethical decision-making process when an ethical problem 
is not recognized. Second, a contribution involves the synthesis of the TON within 
Jones’s (1991) issue-contingent model. Third, the introduction and validation of PMI as 
a second-order formative model contributes to knowledge. Using Chatzidakis et al.’s 
(2007) theoretical framework, a fourth contribution is establishing that TON mediates 
for the relationship between Machiavellianism and unethical intentions. Associated with 
these major contributions, secondary contributions were also made. 
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7.4.2.1 Synthesized Framework 
By linking the TON within Jones’s (1991) issue-contingent model, knowledge of the 
intermediary steps within the decision-making process has been gained. Consistent with 
the literature, direct relationships between PMI, unethical intentions, and ethical 
judgment were found. However, as an extension of Jones’s (1991) model, PMI had the 
strongest impact on the TON. In turn, the TON had the strongest positive impact on 
unethical intentions.  
The synthesis of the TON within the context of Jones’s (1991) issue-contingent 
framework not only offers insight into the intermediary steps within the decision-
making process, but also provides some evidence that decision-makers engage in 
retrospective analyses of their decisions. As a relationship was confirmed between 
unethical intentions and ethical judgment, marketers might not enter the judgment stage 
until later in the process, possibly when reflection occurs (Haidt, 2001; Reynolds, 
2006).  
7.4.2.2 Machiavellianism 
By answering Chatzidakis et al.’s (2007) call for additional study involving the TON 
and personality traits, Machiavellianism was found to sustain a significantly positive 
relationship to neutralization. This finding for U.S. marketers not only contributes to 
Machiavellian studies, but also provides support to Azjen and Fishbein’s (1980) theory. 
According to the former, researchers have found Machiavellianism is significantly 
related to unethical intentions (O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005). However, when the TON 
are included in the model, the relationship between Machiavellianism and unethical 
intentions becomes insignificant. This finding provides evidence that Machiavellianism 
is only related to unethical intentions through a network of latent variables, which 
involve PMI and the TON. This provides support to Chatzidakis et al.’s (2007) theory in 
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that the relationships between the background factors and unethical intentions might 
actually be indirect through neutralization.  
Considering Machiavellians maintain the same willingness to rationalize their EQBs as 
non-Machiavellians, Azjen and Fishbein’s (1980) theoretical framework is applicable to 
Machiavellianism. In general, Azjen and Fishbein (1980) argue personality traits may 
not influence behaviour significantly. Consistent with this argument, the other 
demographic factors investigated in this study, namely, age, gender, and work 
experience also did not have any differing effect on one’s acceptance of neutralization 
or unethical intentions. 
A further contribution from the research involves studying Machiavellianism within the 
context of PMI. Although the corresponding relationships proved to be weak, they were 
significant, nonetheless. Machiavellianism does effect one’s perception of the 
magnitude of consequences and social consensus, albeit, rather weakly. These findings 
demonstrate that Machiavellians are less concerned with the interest of others, which is 
consistent with the literature in that Machiavellians are, almost by definition, willing to 
manipulate and exploit others for personal gains (Calhoon, 1969).  
Additionally, the rationality theorists argue that when decision-makers behave 
irrationally, it is assumed a malfunction has occurred in the cognitive process (Holton & 
Naquin, 2005). By studying Machiavellianism, it was found that the malfunction in the 
cognitive process is related to context and rationalization. The Machiavellian 
personality was inconsequential. As Milgram (1974) had shown in his studies, “… 
perfectly ordinary people are able to commit very serious crimes or moral offenses 
when put in the right situation” (Heath, 2008, p. 598). 
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7.4.2.3 Formative Model 
A theoretical and empirical contribution of this research involves conceptualizing and 
testing PMI as a Type II formative second-order model. As was discussed in chapter six, 
Jones (1991) conceptualized PMI as a multi-dimensional construct that is comprised of 
various issue-contingent factors, such as social consensus and magnitude of 
consequences. The magnitude of consequences (self and others) and social consensus 
comprise one’s perception of moral intensity. These first order variables drive PMI, 
which in turn influences one’s acceptance of neutralizations, unethical intentions, and 
ethical judgments. The TON, unethical intentions, and ethical judgment come about by 
PMI, collectively, as the driver.  
Consistent with this framework, a further contribution of this research involves 
analyzing the magnitudes of consequences within the context of the decision-maker. 
This approach provides an additional dimension to the original six moral intensity 
variables developed by Jones (1991). Using this theoretical enhancement as a platform, 
researchers should focus on advancing Jones’s (1991) model by analyzing additional 
ethical intensity variables within the context of the decision-maker.  
Further to the PMI latent variable, a theoretical contribution is gained by broadening the 
social consensus construct. Social consensus has been studied by measuring 
participants’ perceptions of how other people would judge an EQB (Singhapakdi et al., 
1996). However, asking participants if they believe an EQB is acceptable measures an 
additional element of social consensus. By measuring one’s perception of social norms 
at the individual level and societal level, an improved representation of the social 
consensus construct is gained. 
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7.4.2.4 Unrecognized Ethical Problems 
Researchers following the rationalist decision-making paradigm (Rest, 1986) argue 
moral awareness is explicitly required for individuals to enter the moral decision-
making framework. If decision-makers are morally unaware, an alternative framework 
is used (Jones, 1991). However, other than the reflexive judgment researchers (Murphy 
& Dacin, 2011), business ethicists have neglected to investigate this elusive model.  
The model developed in this research provides insight into this alternative decision-
making process. By evidencing reflexive judgments and the suppression of the ethicality 
of a problem, the model tested in this research maps the decision-making process used 
when marketers remain unaware of an ethical problem.  
7.4.3 Empirical Contributions 
In this section the two main empirical contributions of this research are presented. These 
contributions pertain to the relationship found between unethical intentions and ethical 
judgment. A secondary contribution involves the influence context has on the decision-
making process.  
The relationship between unethical intentions and ethical judgment provides an 
empirical contribution within the reflexive judgment theory. This study provides 
evidence that marketers minimize their perceptions of moral intensity, rely on 
neutralizations to facilitate the suppression of the ethicality of the ethical problem and, 
by judging the behaviour as ethical, are able to reemphasize their self-concept. This 
finding emphasizes the post-decision reasoning associated with reflexive judgments 
(Haidt, 2001).  
Considering the only manipulation of this research was context, the findings provide 
evidence that marketers alter their decision-making process when they encounter 
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divergent situations. Although the decision-making structure studied remained robust 
across each vignette, differences were found among the strengths of various 
relationships. Based on these findings, the decision-making process is clearly influenced 
by context. 
7.4.4 Managerial Contributions  
Consistent with Flannery and May (2000), the marketers in this study form decisions in 
ethical contexts using a legal framework. They are primarily concerned with legal 
conformity and perceive morality as mostly immaterial. Marketers believe that if the 
behaviour is legal, than it is ethical. Unfortunately, this systematic approach is 
problematic and can result in creative compliance. Creative compliance involves 
manipulative problem-solving initiatives, which facilitate malfeasance by uncovering 
legal ‘loop holes’ that undermine the law (Parvez, 2007). By creatively complying with 
the law, marketers believe they have legal immunity (McBarnet, 2006) and use 
legislation to rationalize malfeasance. Through this systematic process, the marketers’ 
ability (or willingness) to think is lost; society or one’s employer provides the tools to 
make decisions. These decisions lack an element of humanity – marketers cannot 
perceive morality beyond the rules, they are blinded by the legality of their decisions. 
They believe that morality is defined by legislation. 
Hunt and Vitell (1986) argue deontological and teleological evaluations are important to 
ethical judgments. However, the findings of this research provide evidence that 
legislation is used as a normative framework of morality. This mentality is clearly 
problematic as marketers use legislation to fuel their short-term self-interests but to the 
long-term detriment of others. When this occurs, long-term profitability can decline, 
corporate reputations can suffer if stakeholders become aware of the malfeasance, and 
employee motivation can decline when marketers experience personal harms. 
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By investigating EQBs within the legal limits of society, it was found that legislation is 
used to rationalize one’s unethical intentions, which offers an additional perspective to 
Kohlberg’s (1974) cognitive moral development theory. In the extant literature, most 
U.S. managers have been found to operate within the law and order stage of Kohlberg’s 
model (Wood et al., 1988). Consistently, when marketers encountered an EQB within 
the legal limits of society in this research, they were willing to implement said 
behaviour through the aid of the legality neutralization. 
In this research, it was found that through rationalization and suppressing the harms on 
others, marketers are capable of sanctioning the pollution of the environment, 
exploitation of vulnerable members of society, and deceiving customers through 
packaging. These cognitive biases enable decision-makers to believe their illicit actions 
are ethical causing illegitimate behaviours to be perpetuated. Interestingly marketers, in 
general were capable of the cognitive distortions found in this study. Indeed, corporate 
governance is a function of legal procedures, incentives, and performance, however, the 
Machiavellian personality is inconsequential. When marketers perceive salient 
incentives (or disincentives), they appear willing to squander the wellbeing of others to 
advance their temporary concerns or ambitions. It can be argued that bad apples do not 
contribute to the decision-making process but rather situational and cognitive factors 
(Simon, 1976) do. It appears that the barrel (i.e., situational factors) is the problem, 
which could be turning good apples bad (Trevino & Youngblood, 1990). 
To ensure employees are well aware of the consequences of malfeasance, managers 
should emphasize to employees the harms they can cause society, their employer, and 
themselves. However, managers should proceed with caution as this solution might 
have limited success as employees regularly experience threats to their self-interests and 
mounting pressure to perform, which is a consequence of a competitive market. Indeed, 
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this research implies that irrational egoism is not readily solvable at the managerial 
level. 
Conversely, there are steps that organizations can take to minimize the occurrences of 
EQB. Specifically, the findings of this thesis suggest that to guard against EQB caused 
by employees adopting the TON to justify their illicit behaviour, organizations need to 
be far more transparent and inclusive in the decision-making process. Organizations 
might also consider implementing periodic reinforcing training for decision-makers and 
to institute independent review panels, at least for major decisions. In general, an 
awareness of rationalization, perpetual reminders to decision-makers and sufficient 
independent audits are essential for organizations in their attempts to minimize EQB.  
7.5 Conclusion 
The main objective of this research was to examine the effect of neutralization on 
ethical judgments and intentions. From the results of the analyses, the TON were found 
to have the strongest impact on unethical intentions. Consistent with the deviance 
literature (Agnew, 1994), this further provides evidence that neutralization leads to 
ethically questionable intentions. In addition, evidence was found that neutralization 
assists decision-makers in judging EQBs as ethical.  
According to the second objective of evaluating the effect Machiavellianism has on 
neutralization and PMI, it was found that Machiavellianism did have a weak positive 
effect on both constructs. However, for Machiavellianism this was not considered to be 
a profound or important effect on either construct.  
The third objective pertained to investigating the relationship between PMI and 
neutralization. As expected, when exposed to competing claims, individuals make trade-
offs and use various neutralizations to justify their decisions. By linking the TON with 
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the PMI construct, knowledge of the intermediary steps within the decision-making 
process has been gained.  
According to the fourth objective, which involved understanding if marketers believe 
their ethically questionable intentions are actually morally acceptable, a strong positive 
relationship between unethical intentions and judging an EQB as ethical was found. 
From this finding, when marketers develop ethically questionable intentions or by 
extension, when they behave illicitly, they believe their behaviours are ethical.  
The final objective was to understand if decision-makers are willing to behave illicitly 
in certain contexts but not in others. From the comparisons of relationships represented 
in the separate structural equation models for the vignettes, it was found that context 
does influence the unethical decision-making process. However, context did not appear 
to influence the main constructs of interest in the model or the relationship depicted by 
the path coefficients between PMI and the TON, the TON and unethical intentions, and 
PMI and unethical intentions. Through the attainment of this objective, it was found that 
the model for ethically questionable decision-making has structural integrity and can be 
considered reliable. Therefore, the omnibus model can not only be applied to marketers 
in general, but also a broad spectrum of behaviour. 
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Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
Over the past decade, in the aftermath of Wall Street scandals, the subprime lending 
crisis, and a range of well publicised large and small corporate misdemeanours, 
corporate malfeasance appears to be an unrelenting problem. To curb ethically 
questionable behaviour (EQB), managers have implemented ethical training 
programmes, governance practices, and codes of ethics (Cleek & Leonard, 1998). 
However, corruption persists, which leads to profit declines, costly fallout from 
litigation, damage to corporate reputation, and internal turmoil (Kish-Gephart et al., 
2010). 
To understand unethical decision-making, rational decision-making theorists (Rest, 
1986) believe managers follow a linear process of identifying an ethical problem, 
making an ethical judgment, developing intentions, and acting on their intentions. 
Intuitionists believe managers make decisions subconsciously and reflexively 
(Reynolds, 2006; Haidt, 2001). Numerous studies have been conducted to test these 
theories. However, many of these studies are based on one-dimensional analyses that 
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typically involve simple regression models. For the most part, researchers have failed to 
take into consideration the multidimensional nature of corporate malfeasance (Kish-
Gephart et al., 2010).  
In this research, a multidimensional approach to ethically questionable decision-making 
was taken through the amalgamation of several decision-making theories. This 
synthesized model was tested on U.S. marketing professionals and analyzed using 
partial least squares (PLS) structural equation modelling. In the first section of this 
concluding chapter, the findings of this research are summarized. In the second section, 
the implications of the results are discussed. In the third section, the limitations are 
presented. In the final section, the directions for future study are suggested.   
8.2 Thesis Summary 
In chapter one, marketers were demonstrated to be more likely to engage in EQB. In the 
extant literature, marketers were found to be less ethically sensitive compared to 
members of other organisational functional areas (O’Higgins & Keller, 2005). Based on 
the perceived greater propensity for EQB to occur among marketers, U.S. marketing 
professionals were selected as the target population for this research. 
In the chapter, corporate malfeasance was demonstrated to be widespread, costly, and 
detrimental to not only organisations, but stakeholders in general. Most of the 
behaviours presented in the chapter (subprime lending crisis and pollution abroad) were 
conducted to retain short-term objectives, which seemed to be detrimental in the long-
term. Indeed, these decisions appeared to be not only ethically questionable, but also 
illogical from a long-term profit maximization perspective. To understand how 
marketers make decisions that are against their long-term self-interests, the first research 
question posed was: ‘how do marketers rationalize their ethically questionable 
intentions’. 
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Business ethicists contend that organisational malfeasance is most often caused by 
deviant personality types. According to various reviews of the business ethics empirical 
studies (Loe et al., 2000), Machiavellian personality types were most consistently 
willing to behave illicitly (O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005) and Machiavellianism appears 
to have a profound effect on the unethical decision-making process. However, 
Chatzidakis et al. (2007) contended that these direct relationships might actually be 
indirect, mediated through rationalization. This conflicting discourse informed the 
second research question of this study, ‘what influence does Machiavellianism have on 
the unethical decision-making process.’ 
Further to chapter one, the U.S. context was presented next. From the discourse, U.S. 
marketers appear to operate within a compliance-based culture (Nakano, 2007) in which 
a legal framework is used when ethical dilemmas are encountered. As long as the 
behaviour fits within the confines of the legislation, the behaviour is perceived as 
acceptable (Flannery & May, 2000). From the current economic state of the country, it 
was shown that organisational members seem to be experiencing mounting pressure to 
attain aggressive organisational objectives, which appears to inform malfeasance 
(Tepper, 2010).  
In the latter portion of chapter one, the aims, objectives, and contributions to knowledge 
of the research were discussed. The main aim of this research was to examine the effect 
of neutralization on ethical judgments and intentions. A second aim was to evaluate the 
effect Machiavellianism has on neutralization and perceived moral intensity (PMI). The 
third aim involved investigating the relationship between PMI and neutralization. 
Fourth, an aim was to understand if marketers believe their illicit intentions are morally 
acceptable. The final aim was to examine if decision-makers are willing to behave 
illicitly in certain contexts, but not in others. 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
 210 
The main contribution to knowledge of this research is the synthesis of the TON and the 
PMI construct. Through this synthesis, it was anticipated that knowledge of the 
intermediary steps in the decision-making process would emerge. The second 
contribution pertains to the inclusion of Machiavellianism within the decision-making 
process, which would improve knowledge of the effect deviant personality traits have 
on the decision-making process. A final contribution involves understanding if 
individuals suppress the ethicality of their decisions when they form illicit intentions. 
Through this contribution, knowledge of the cognitive limitations of marketers was 
expected to improve. 
In the second chapter, the methodology was presented. In this research, positivism was 
the philosophy, the approach was deductive, the strategy involved using self-
administered questionnaire distributed online, and a mono-method approach involving 
cross-sectional data (Saunders et al., 2007). This methodology is consistent with the 
business ethics research because, as demonstrated, most research in business ethics 
follows the positivist paradigm (Nill & Schribowsky, 2005) involving self-administered 
questionnaires (Randall & Gibson, 1990). 
In the first part of chapter two, the normative theories pertaining to relativism, idealism, 
deontology, and teleology were presented. Discourse then focused on the 
consequentialist philosophical spectrum with an analysis of altruism and egoism. From 
the discussions, it was found that altruism can result in EQB and, from a socio-
economic perspective, altruism was found to be incompatible with capitalism. Through 
the work of Adam Smith, Milton Friedman, and Ayn Rand, the rational egoism 
philosophical framework was presented. From these discussions, it was discovered that 
rational egoism is most compatible with the capitalist economic system and, that a 
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greater propensity for ethical behaviour seems to occur from a rational egoism 
perspective.  
From this deduction, rational egoism was used to contextualize EQB. Specifically, EQB 
is contextualized as any action that conflicts with one’s long-term self-interest 
(Greetman, 2006). In the subsequent section, irrational egoism (or Machiavellianism), 
which is the anti-thesis of rational egoism was presented. In general, irrational egoism 
typically involves squandering the interests of others for one’s temporary satisfaction 
(Rand, 1964). 
In the latter sections of the second chapter, the two broad descriptive theories were 
presented. First, the rationalist decision-making approach, which involves an active 
judgment process consisting of becoming aware of an ethical dilemma, making a moral 
judgment, developing intentions and finally, acting on the intentions, was discussed. It 
is believed that these decisions are conscious (Rest, 1986) and linear. However, the 
intuitionist decision-making theorists contend that most decisions are made below the 
level of consciousness (Freud, 1900). 
In chapter three, the main decision-making theories were presented. In the first section, 
economic rationality, which is based on the premise that decision-makers are perfectly 
rational, was discussed. This theory is the foundation of all contemporary economic 
principles (Chiapello, 2007). However, through various examples, it was demonstrated 
that decision-makers are not perfectly rational. Using Simon’s (1955) discourse on 
bounded rationality, it was argued that individuals possess cognitive limitations, are 
unable to process all the relevant details pertinent to a particular decision, and they 
make satisfying decisions that might not maximize their self-interests. Built on the 
bounded rationality discourse, the irrationality of decision-makers and their ability to 
rely on rationalization techniques to justify their illicit decisions was presented. From 
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the discourse, it was argued that individuals are able to alter their perceptions and are 
capable of changing the way they think (Seligman, 1991).  
In the latter sections of chapter three, the business ethics frameworks were presented. 
Discussions centred on Rest’s (1986) four-component model, Jones’s (1991) issue-
contingent framework, the models that include influential factors (Chatzidakis et al., 
2007), and the intuitionist decision-making frameworks (Reynolds, 2006). From this 
discourse, the major gaps in theory were presented. Specifically, the Jones (1991) model 
does not account for the personal harms that decision-makers often encounter when 
exposed to ethical problems. The Rest (1986) and Jones (1991) models also do not 
account for rationalization or the influential factors that might have profound effects on 
the decision-making process.  
To address these theoretical gaps, a conceptual framework that amalgamates the 
aforementioned theories was presented in chapter four. This model for ethically 
questionable decision-making accounts for the less-optimal decision-making abilities of 
individuals (Simon, 1955). It is acknowledged that decision-makers will satisfy their 
immediate concerns, but not maximize the possible utility associated with behaving 
ethically. In the model, decision-makers can satisfy their concerns by behaving 
unethically and justify these decisions through rationalization. When decision-makers 
form illicit intentions, it is contended that they believe their intentions are in fact ethical. 
Once more, it is expected that the Machiavellian personality construct would have some 
influence on the decision-making process. 
The methods used to test the model for ethically questionable decision-making were 
presented in chapter five. In the first section, the main methodological issues associated 
with conducting research in the business ethics paradigm were discussed. These issues 
involve socially desirable response bias, vignette-based questionnaires, and using 
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intentions as proxies for behaviour. To address these issues, data was collected from 
U.S. based marketers using a self-administered questionnaire, which was distributed 
online. This enabled testing behaviour using intentions as proxies, and projective 
reasoning through vignettes. To ensure socially desirable response bias did not 
negatively influence the results of the study, direct and indirect questionnaire items 
were included in the instrument. From the results of the one-way ANOVA test 
comparing the direct and indirect items, socially desirable response bias was not shown 
to be a problem. 
In the questionnaire, three vignettes were included that represented legal but ethically 
questionable marketing behaviours. The vignettes pertained to subprime lending, 
environmental pollution, and packaging deception. After each vignette, participants 
were presented with a list of questions related to the vignette. Due to the dearth of 
research on the techniques of neutralization (TON) (Chatzidakis et al., 2007), magnitude 
of consequences (self), and social consensus, existing questionnaire items were slightly 
modified to fit the context of this study. In view of these modifications, each scale was 
revalidated.  
To develop the instrument, three pre-tests and a pilot study were conducted. After each 
round of pretesting, the results were assessed to understand if participants believed the 
behaviours exhibited in each vignette were perceived to be morally intense, clear, 
realistic, and legal but not necessarily ethical. If these requirements were not met, 
adjustments were made and pretesting continued.  
In the final section of chapter five, the sampling method used for this research was 
presented. A leading organisation specializing in questionnaire distribution was 
recruited for data collection. After removing incomplete questionnaires, the final sample 
size was 276.  
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As the framework contains a formative construct (Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer, 
2001), variance-based PLS structural equation modelling (SEM) was conducted using 
the SmartPLS software program (Ringle et al., 2005). Variance-based SEMs can 
accommodate formative variables, are better suited to exploratory work involving 
complex models comprising various networks with interactions among the constructs 
and with second-order variables present (Gefen et al., 2011). 
To test the hypotheses, three separate models representing each vignette were created. 
To develop a composite representation of the general behavioural intentions of 
managers, the average values for each of the measurement indicators across the three 
vignettes were taken and a fourth model was fitted with these data. This omnibus model 
offers an overall perspective of the unethical decision-making process used by 
managers, which is applicable to a broad spectrum of behavioural contexts. Using 
Fornell and Larckner’s (1981) framework, each model was shown to have discriminant 
and convergent validity.  
However, several poor loadings and low-AVE values for Christie and Geis’s (1970) a 
priori factor structure associated with the Machiavellian construct were found. 
Consistent with the literature, these issues were resolved by eliminating 10 manifest 
variables from the 20-item Mach IV construct. Several of the resulting loadings for the 
retained items remain inconsistent with those for the Christie and Geis (1970) factor 
structure, an occurrence consistent with other empirical studies (Hunter et al. 1982). 
Given Machiavellianism was modelled as a second-order reflective construct, removing 
the items did not alter the meaning of the personality.  
An alternative framework, which involved removing the second-order formative latent 
variable from the PMI construct, was introduced in chapter six. In this alternative 
model, the first-order PMI dimensions were tested independently against the 
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endogenous variables in the decision-making process. This model was shown to be 
valid and reliable. However, PMI was conceptualized as a multidimensional construct 
and the formative model was argued to be the most appropriate representation of the 
construct.  
From the fitted models, all but two hypotheses were supported in each vignette at the 
0.05 significance level. The positive relationship between Machiavellianism and the 
magnitude of consequences (self) was not found to be significant in the subprime 
lending vignette, but was supported in the other two vignettes and the omnibus model. 
The positive relationship between the TON and judging an EQB as ethical was also not 
supported in the pollution vignette, but was in the other two vignettes and the omnibus 
model. After controlling for the demographic variables, it was found that age had a 
significant effect on the Machiavellian and the PMI constructs. However, the 
contributions to the coefficient of determination (R²) were below 5% and deemed to 
have no important influence (Henseler et al., 2009). 
As a post hoc analysis, the path coefficients between each vignette were compared. 
Considering the dearth of research involving comparisons of the path coefficients 
between various vignettes, many of the differences found in this research were 
explained by logical reasoning as opposed to rich theory grounded in empirical studies. 
Considering differences were found, it appears that the unethical decision-making 
process can be influenced by context.  
Although differences were found, the relationships between PMI and unethical 
intentions, PMI and the TON, and the TON and unethical intentions remained constant 
across each vignette. This structural integrity emphasizes the robustness of the models 
and provides evidence that these relationships remain stable across a wide spectrum of 
EQBs. In general, the basic structure of an unethical decision-making framework was 
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maintained and therefore, marketers appear to follow a distinct unethical decision-
making process when they are exposed to various dilemmas.  
Whilst significant path coefficients were found between Machiavellianism and PMI and 
Machiavellianism and the TON, the contribution to the coefficient of determination (R²) 
was not significant. From these findings, Machiavellianism does not drastically 
influence behaviours in certain contexts (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980), but rather marketers 
in general are capable of the malfeasance found in this study.  
Considering a highly significant relationship was found between PMI and the TON, 
there is indirect evidence that marketers recognized the ethical problem (consciously or 
subconsciously). If participants had not recognized the ethical problem, neutralization 
would have been unnecessary as guilt would not have been felt (Agnew, 1994; Sykes & 
Matza, 1957). It was further found that marketers are able to rationalize their ethically 
questionable intentions through their perception of moral intensity.  
In response to the first question, it was found that marketers rationalize their ethically 
questionable intentions through their: (1) perception of moral intensity, (2) reliance on 
various neutralization techniques, and; (3) judgment of their ethically questionable 
intentions as ethical. Marketers are capable of redefining ethical dilemmas to suit their 
interests and when they behave unethically, they believe their behaviour is morally 
acceptable. To answer the second research question, contrary to the bad apples thesis 
(Trevino & Youngblood, 1990), Machiavellianism did not have a profound effect on the 
decision-making process and the results imply that low-Machiavellians or marketers, in 
general, are also irrational egoists. 
The research findings make a significant contribution to knowledge by identifying the 
mapping of the unethical decision-making process when an ethical problem is not 
recognized. An additional contribution involves the synthesis of the TON within Jones’s 
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(1991) issue-contingent model. Third, this research contributes to knowledge by testing 
PMI as a second-order formative model. Using Chatzidakis et al.’s (2007) theoretical 
framework, a fourth contribution involves testing the relationship between 
Machiavellianism and unethical intentions through the mediating variable of the TON. 
Two main empirical contributions are associated with this research. First, the empirical 
relationship found between unethical intentions and judging an EQB as ethical 
contributes to knowledge. Specifically, marketers minimize their perceptions of moral 
intensity, rely on neutralizations to facilitate the suppression of ethicality, and by 
judging the behaviour as ethical, are able to reemphasize their self-concept. A secondary 
contribution involves the influence context has on the decision-making process. From 
the comparisons of the path coefficients, the decision-making process is influenced by 
context. Decision-makers perceive certain contexts differently from others. 
As a contribution to managerial knowledge, U.S. marketers are primarily concerned 
with legal conformity and perceive morality as mostly immaterial. Marketers therefore 
believe that if a given behaviour is legal than it is ethical. Second, it was found that 
through various cognitive distortions, marketers are capable of polluting the 
environment, exploiting vulnerable members of society, and deceiving customers. This 
malfeasance is costly not only to external stakeholders, but also for the profitability and 
reputation of organisations. Indeed, when marketers behave illicitly, there are clear 
implications for managers as profitability tends to decline, corporate reputations suffer, 
and employee motivation declines.  
8.3 Implications 
The Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman (1970) argued that managers do not possess the 
astuteness to make social decisions. Indeed, no matter the amount of legislation, 
corporate governance models, social norms, and regardless of the harms inflicted on 
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others, humans are imperfect and if it suits their interests, they are capable of heinous 
behaviour. As the Nobel Laureate Herbert Simon (1976) determined, individuals have 
bounded rationality and are often incapable of analyzing all the relevant facts to a 
decision. The results of this research provide evidence that marketers select the option 
that satisfies their immediate concerns. They then make irrelevant excuses to justify 
their malfeasance. As a result of their cognitive limitations, marketers believe their poor 
decisions are most appropriate. Even though cognitive limitations are apparent, it is 
disconcerting that marketers are willing to threaten the wellbeing of society to retain or 
even progress their employment and to advance their employer’s short-term 
profitability.  
As evidenced in this research, individuals in general can be persuaded to behave 
heinously. Examples of this can not only be found within an organisational context, but 
also throughout history (e.g., Nazi Germany). The main implication of this research is 
that the imperfection of humans might not be readily solvable. However, policies can be 
implemented to perhaps minimize the adverse consequences of human imperfections. In 
this section, the policy implications associated with the marketing profession, the 
actions of U.S. marketers in foreign nations, and government intervention, are 
presented.  
Since the collapse of the stock market in September 1929, which subsequently spawned 
the most devastating global economic collapse in modern times, governments have 
embraced Keynesian economics. Keynesian economics, which is based on 
governmental intervention in the market to rectify imperfections, is used to address the 
bounded rationality of decision-makers (Akerlof & Shiller, 2009). From the results of 
this research, assuming U.S. marketers are typical decision-makers, a substantial 
minority are irrational dependent on situational factors.  
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The irrationality of decision-makers was clearly evidenced in the subprime lending 
collapse. This debacle caused chaos in credit markets across the globe. As opposed to 
allowing the institutions that contributed to the collapse to fail, $700 billion was paid 
out for corporate ‘bailouts’ by the U.S. Treasury. With this intervention in the market, 
the government sent a clear message that they were unwilling to allow substantial 
multinationals to fail as these failures could have far reaching economic and social 
consequences. However, most disconcerting is that in the aftermath of the crisis, and 
with clear knowledge of the consequences of subprime lending on organisations, 
stakeholders, and communities, legislation has not been implemented to curb predatory 
lending.  
By intervening in the market, modern governments do not follow the capitalism devised 
by Smith (1776) that envisioned a level-playing field for all participants (Werhane, 
2000). When governments interfere in the market, it is argued that they can upset the 
natural functionality of the marketplace (Spencer, 1851; Klein, 2003). Importantly, 
market interventions involving the creation of laws to protect human rights, which 
Smith advocated, are very different from providing corporate bailouts to malfeasant 
firms. 
Whilst governments intervene in the market to avoid ‘upsetting the apple-cart’ (Nell, 
2003), the rational egoists are critical of government intervention. Adam Smith (1776) 
foresaw governmental intervention as a tool that can be used to advance the interests of 
the few to the detriment of the many (James & Rassekh, 2000). The ramifications 
associated with Smith’s warning were clearly evidenced in this research – marketers 
remain unwittingly committed to malfeasance with, as in the case of subprime lending, 
the government is unwilling to permit failure. From the survival of the fittest discourse 
(Spencer, 1872; Dawkins, 1976), the companies that contributed to the subprime 
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lending failure should have been permitted to fail as only the fittest should survive. 
Indeed, governments should think critically about their interventions in the market as 
these interferences might circumvent failures in the short-term but in the long-term, the 
results might be far more debilitating.  
Although governmental intervention in the marketplace should be used sparingly, as 
Smith (1776) indicated, legislation is needed to curb malfeasance, enforce contracts, 
human rights, and the rule of law (Werhane, 2000). “Hobbes believed that if people 
were left free to pursue their interests without hindrances of a coercive system of law, 
there would be nothing to prevent everyone resorting to the extremes of violence and 
deception to get what they wanted” (Sorrell & Hendry, 1994, p.47). Therefore, policy 
implications should involve governments balancing the need to: (1) avoid direct 
manipulations in the market that can cause one group to gain an advantage over another, 
and; (2) create controls to limit the imperfections of human decision-making. 
Accounting professionals follow the stringent Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP). The operations of human resources managers are guided through 
labour legislation, human rights legislation, the equal employment opportunity acts, and 
professional accreditation standards. The consumer protection legislation in the U.S. can 
minimize deception and exploitation (Kotler & Keller, 2007). The packaging legislation 
in the U.S. can also curb certain forms of packaging deception but as found in this 
research, this legislation is clearly powerless against the deceptive practice of package 
downsizing (Gupta et al., 2007).  
Other than the code of ethics of the American Marketing Association, an all-
encompassing professional accreditation standard for marketing does not exist. 
Compared to the other functional areas, the marketing profession seems to be loosely 
regulated (Israel, 1993) and given the lack of normative policies (Hoek & Jones, 2011), 
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greater opportunities for malfeasance seem to exist in marketing. With the added 
pressures on employees to perform (Tepper, 2010) and the lack of regulation, the results 
of this research provide evidence that marketers appear willing to sacrifice the interests 
of others to protect their temporary concerns. Indeed, additional guidelines might be 
needed to address these issues.  
Moreover, from the descriptive statistics exhibited (Table 7.1), 10.5%, 4.7%, and 10.4% 
of marketers were indifferent to the norms against deceiving customers, polluting the 
environment, and exploiting consumers, respectively. Indeed, the overwhelming 
majority of marketers believed the aforementioned behaviours were against social 
norms. However, package downsizing and subprime lending remain legal. From the 
findings of this research, there are clear implications for policy makers to address the 
concerns society seems to have of these EQBs. 
U.S. firms have been accused of exploiting the natural resources of foreign nations, 
polluting the environment, and abusing local populations (Klein, 2000; Perkins, 2007). 
By outsourcing their operations, organisations are able to detach from malfeasance, 
avoid accountability, and move beyond the confines of the law in their respective 
countries (Zyglidopoulos & Fleming, 2011). Sarbanes and Oxley and the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Acts are far-reaching in relation to the manipulation of financial 
statements and bribery. However, these regulations are seemingly powerless at curbing 
the exploitation of vulnerable consumers domestically, restricting pollution abroad, or 
minimizing the poor treatment of foreign workers.  
In the environmental pollution vignette, marketers were willing to contaminate the 
water supply and adversely affect the crops of a small agricultural community if it only 
affected people living abroad. Clearly, there are policy implications to address the 
abhorrent behaviours of U.S. marketers in their operations abroad. 
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8.4 Limitations 
In this section, the limitations related to external validity, the use of new questionnaire 
items, using intentions as proxies for behaviour, and the issues with the 
Machiavellianism construct, are discussed. Given only marketing professionals were 
studied in this research, which were argued to be mostly inclined to behave illicitly 
compared to other functional areas (O’Higgins & Keller, 2005), managers from other 
organisational departments might not follow the same decision-making process. Based 
on this restriction, the findings of this research may not be generalizable beyond 
marketing professionals. However, it is worth reemphasizing that the demographic 
variables of age, gender, work experience, education, and the Machiavellian personality 
did not make an important contribution to the decision-making process. Therefore, it is 
possible that one’s organisational functional area might also be an inconsequential 
factor in the decision-making process as many of those engaged in marketing have 
migrated from other functional areas and these other areas would have recruited from 
marketing.  
Further to the limits of external validity, the target population of this study was U.S. 
marketing professionals. Marketing professionals from other nations were excluded. 
Therefore, the results of this study should not be generalized beyond U.S. marketers.   
From the SEM, the path coefficients for the views of human nature (β = 0.60) onto the 
Mach IV construct were below the acceptable threshold (β = 0.70) for an exploratory 
model. However, considering that the views of human nature are a known facet of the 
Machiavellian personality and the outer loading is above 0.40 (Henseler et al., 2009), 
the construct was retained as the low-value was likely the result of the issues with the 
Mach IV. Even though a low factor loading was found, it is important to reiterate 
Machiavellianism was integrated into the model to: (1) understand if marketers, in 
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general, are capable of behaving as irrational egoists, and; (2) for external validity. The 
limitations of the Machiavellian construct do not dissuade the significant findings 
associated with the model that has been developed.  
The use of a new questionnaire poses a potential limitation for this study. Conversely, 
the questionnaire used in this research was developed using the recommendations from 
the extant literature (Rungtusanatham, Wallin, & Eckerd, 2011). Specifically, marketing 
professionals were consulted during the development of the vignettes, several rounds of 
pretesting were conducted, and a pilot study was performed using the recommended 
sample size of 30 participants (Johanson and Brooks, 2010). Beyond these 
developmental procedures, each scale was tested and confirmed to exhibit convergent 
and discriminant validity (Siponen & Vance, 2010). To further validate the instrument, 
common method bias and socially desirable response bias testing was conducted and 
neither appears to offer valid alternative explanations for the findings of this research. 
Based on the statistical rigour followed in the development of the questionnaire, it is 
unlikely the newly developed instrument posed significant issues for this study.   
Although intentions are argued to be acceptable proxies for behaviour (Reynolds, 2006; 
Kish-Gephart et al., 2010), actual behaviour was not tested directly. According to 
neurological cognitive theory, intentions and behaviour are argued to be the same 
phenomenon (Reynolds, 2006). However, there have been reported instances of 
intentions not leading to behaviour (Kish-Gephart et al., 2010). Specifically, intentions 
established in a hypothetical setting do not necessarily mean the intended behaviour will 
actually occur in reality. Different sensory receptors are used in hypothetical contexts 
(e.g., reading) versus reality (e.g., hearing a voice), and so it is “not surprising that these 
differences can and do lead to different outcomes” (Reynolds, 2006, p. 742). This adds 
an element of uncertainty in generalizing the findings from any study that tests only 
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intentions. In view of this potential limitation, the findings of this research should not be 
generalized to behaviour.  
8.5 Directions for Future Study 
Whilst there are limitations with the main study of this research, several of these issues 
could be resolved through future study. The main areas for future study involve 
enhancing external validity by: testing the model on various populations; addressing the 
issues raised with the Machiavellian construct; and, if at all possible, studying actual 
behaviour.  
The literature review for this thesis was based on a systematic review of business ethics 
journal articles. Searches were primarily conducted through ProQuest, EBSCOhost, and 
Google Scholar. The key word searches included, but were not limited to, variations and 
combinations of unethical behaviour, corporate malfeasance, moral intensity, moral 
decision-making, ethical decision-making, unethical decisions, organisational pressures, 
and corruption. From the retained studies, 403 articles were sorted by culture with an 
interest on the U.S.A. and China; Far East Asia and North America. The publication 
dates ranged from 1957 to 2012 with 52% published within the period of 2000 to 2009. 
Of these 403 articles, studies that were based on Chinese participants were lacking 
(13.6%), Far East Asian and U.S. comparative studies were also limited (13.8%), the 
remainder (69.2%) being specifically focused on the U.S..  
Based on these figures, business ethics researchers have mostly focused on analyzing 
the unethical decisions of U.S. practitioners. Given the shortage of research that 
involves studying Chinese participants there is a clear need to analyse unethical 
decision-making within a Far East Asian context. Based on Chatzidakis et al.’s (2007) 
theoretical framework involving background characteristics, culture could influence 
acceptance of neutralization techniques. Vitell and Grove (1987) also argued that 
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culture could have a profound effect on the decision-making process. In several 
empirical studies (Chung et al., 2008), differences in the propensity to behave illicitly 
have been found between U.S. based participants and Far East Asians. Therefore, a 
fruitful area of research would involve studying the model in this ethnic specific cross-
cultural setting, as through these investigations, external validity could be further 
enhanced.  
To extend external validity, the model for ethically questionable decision-making 
should be studied on populations from other functional areas. In addition, non-
managerial participants from the general public or employees from outside an 
organisational context could be investigated to understand if the model developed has 
generality or ethical decision-making for managers is unique. 
By extending Jones’s (1991) PMI construct, the magnitude of consequences (self) was 
found to be a dimension of PMI. The construct also functioned well as a second-order 
formative latent variable. Using this theoretical foundation, researchers should address 
the PMI construct by analyzing all seven moral intensity dimensions within various 
contexts that have direct consequences to the decision-maker.  
Researchers should further consider composing new vignettes as opposed to 
consistently relying on the same scenarios. For example, Dornoff and Tankersley (1975) 
and Reidenbach, Robin, and Dawson’s (1991) vignettes have been used in numerous 
business ethics studies (Singhapakdi et al., 1999). Moreover, researchers should study 
behaviours that have not been exposed to rigorous study. Potential fruitful areas include 
exploitation, poor labour practices, and unsafe products.  
In their model, Vitell and Grove (1987) contended that the successful use of 
neutralizations can influence subsequent behaviour. This feedback process is consistent 
with Reynolds’s (2006) model, which involves decision-makers intuitively scanning 
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their memories and developing solutions based on social cognition. In other words, 
one’s post-behavioural evaluation can lead to future pre-decisional evaluations (Vitell & 
Grove, 1987); the latter of course, is likely to occur subconsciously (Reynolds, 2006). It 
can be further argued that once neutralizations have been used, they can dull awareness 
that future illicit behaviours are unethical (Anand et al., 2005). From this discourse, a 
fruitful area for future study involves investigating the relationship between behaviour 
and judgments, previous behaviour and future behaviour, and the intervening influence 
of rationalization. In addition, an emerging field of research involves using neurological 
imaging and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) methods to develop further 
knowledge of the intermediary steps in the unethical decision-making process. 
To address the issues with the Machiavellian construct, researchers should conduct a 
post-hoc investigation by way of confirming the factor structure found in this research. 
If the results are consistent, researchers should reword the Mach IV or develop a revised 
scale of Machiavellianism within the context of Christie and Geis’s (1970) 
contextualization. Beyond revising the Mach IV construct, researchers should conduct 
analyses comparing the various Machiavellian instruments. Specifically, researchers 
should compare the Machiavellian Personality Scale (Dahling et al., 2009), the Mach IV 
(Christie & Geis, 1970), and the dirty dozen (Jonason & Webster, 2010) to see if 
similarities are found among the responses. 
A potential area for future research would involve studying the model developed in this 
research in other decision-making contexts. Considering the behaviours studied in this 
research were poor business decisions, a natural area for future research would be to 
investigate the model in a business strategy context. Specifically, the model could be 
tested within the context of poor strategic decision-making.  
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A potential aim of this research would involve understanding the influential factors that 
lead to poor decisions and how managers justify their decisions. A possible construct to 
include as an influential factor would be organisational dependence (Wahn, 1993). 
Given the marketers tested in this research appear willing to develop ethically 
questionable intentions when their employment is threatened, organisational 
dependence might have a profound effect on the decision-making process.  
As was found in this research, EQB does not seem to be influenced by the 
Machiavellian personality substantially. EQB seems to be primarily institutional, which 
is facilitated by rationalization. In short, malfeasance is the result of institutional and 
individual factors. An important area for future research is to understand if EQB can be 
addressed, monitored and hopefully, minimized. As indicated in chapter seven, 
minimizing EQB could be challenging as: (a) humans have bounded rationality, and; (b) 
marketers and business people in general encounter pressure in their careers to perform, 
which is a by-product of a free-market system.  
To address the institutional problem, it is important to note that researchers have 
suggested that ethical training (Zhuang & Tsang, 2008), governance models, and codes 
of ethics (Singhapakdi & Vitell, 1991) be implemented to curb unethical behaviour. 
However, these suggestions have been shown to have minimal effect on minimizing 
corporate malfeasance (Cleek & Leonard, 1998; Sparks & Hunt, 1998). Establishing 
legislation might also have less desired results as it might provide managers with 
additional opportunities to creatively comply. To resolve malfeasance, perhaps 
regulation might not be the best approach, but rather professional accreditation 
standards similar to those found in the accounting and engineering professions might be 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
 228 
a useful tool. Through this solution, marketers might possess more of a duty or 
obligation to behave virtuously (Aristotle, 350 BC; Cornelius, 20125).  
From his encounter with an insurance salesman, Carson (1998) demonstrated the effect 
that professional standards can have on reducing unethical behaviour. Specifically, said 
insurance salesman had an opportunity to sell Carson insurance that would have left him 
uncovered for an extended period. Although the sale would have resulted in a 
commission, it would have been ethically questionable and the salesman decided against 
it. The following discourse summarizes his reasoning: 
 A client is someone with whom an insurance agent has a long-term relation and 
 who is likely to refer friends and acquaintances to the agent. Agents who have 
 clients and who act in the best interests of those clients will eventually find that 
 their business is largely self perpetuating… if insurance agents do this and make 
 it a policy to always give all information and always think of the interests of the 
 client then “people will see it and the sales will take care of themselves.” In a 
 letter to me, he wrote “I have always believed in and practiced the Principles and 
 Covenants of ‘The National Association of Life Underwriters’” (Carson, 1998, 
 p. 728). 
 
Indeed, professional codes and accreditation standards seem to instil a sense of pride 
among marketers, and perhaps they could be a useful tool in addressing corporate 
malfeasance. 
From the results of this research, it appears that corporate malfeasance is informed by 
individual factors. Meaning that humans have bounded rationality, they can be weak 
and in their weak moments, they can behave irrationally. To address this important 
contributor to corporate malfeasance, a solution might also reside at the individual level.  
Badaracco and Webb (1995) provided a suggestion to their commerce students to 
prepare them for the organisational pressure they might encounter in their careers. They 
suggested that students should “… get a ‘go to hell account.’ Get three to six months 
pay in the bank. Be prepared to tell someone to ‘go to hell’, and then walk” (p. 21). 
                                                 
5 N. Cornelius in an informal conversation on November 26th, 2012. 
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Indeed, the solution to corporate malfeasance might be for managers to not allow 
themselves to be vulnerable or overly dependent on their employers. Perhaps 
independence and mobility will provide managers with the freedom needed to avoid 
corporate pressures and thus, minimize the exposure of their inherent weakness (i.e., 
bounded rationality). If the aforementioned solutions are implemented at both the 
institutional and individual fronts, perhaps corporate malfeasance would decline. 
  230 
References 
 
Abdolmohammadi, M., Sultan, J. (2002) Ethical reasoning and the use of insider 
information in stock trading. Journal of Business Ethics, 37(2), pp.165-174. 
 
Abratt, R. Nel, D. & Higgs, N.S. (1992) An examination of the ethical beliefs of 
managers using selected scenarios in a cross-cultural environment. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 11(1), pp.29-36. 
 
Adebamwi, W. (2001) Nigeria: A shell of a state. Dollars and Sense. July/August, 
pp.19-37. 
 
Agarwal, J. & Malloy, D.C. (2002) The role of existentialism in ethical business 
decision-making. Business Ethics: A European Review, 9(3), pp.143-155. 
 
Agnew, R. (1994) The techniques of neutralization and violence. Criminology, 32, 
pp.555–80. 
 
Aguilera, R. & Vadera, A. (2008) The dark side of authority: Antecedents, 
mechanisms, and outcomes of organizational corruption. Journal of Business Ethics, 
77(4), pp.431-449. 
 
Ahmed, M.M. Chung, K.Y. & Eichenseher, J.W. (2003) Business students' perception 
of ethics and moral judgment: A cross-cultural study. Journal of Business Ethics, 
43(2003), pp.89-102. 
 
Ahmed, S.M.S. & Stewart, R.A.C. (1981) Factor analysis of the Machiavellian scale. 
Social Behavior & Personality, 9(1), pp.113-115. 
 
Ajzen, I. (1991) The theory of planned behaviour. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 50(1991), pp.179-211. 
 
Ajzen, I. Fishbein, M. (1980) Understanding attitudes and predicting social behaviour. 
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. 
 
Akerlof, G.A. & Shiller, R.J. (2009) Animal spirits. How human psychology drives 
the energy of the economy, and why it matters for global capitalism. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
 
Al-Jabri, I. & Abdul-Gader, A. (1997) Software copyright infringements: An 
exploratory study of the effects of individual and peer beliefs. Omega International 
Journal of Management Science, 25(3), pp.335-344. 
 
Alexander, C.S. & Becker, H.J. (1978) The use of vignettes in survey research. Public 
Opinion Quarterly, 42(1), pp.93-105. 
 
Alexander, J. (2007) Environmental sustainability versus profit maximization: 
Overcoming systemic constraints on implementing normatively preferable 
alternatives. Journal of Business Ethics, 76(2): 155-162. 
 
  231 
Anand, V. Ashforth, B.E. & Joshi, M. (2005) Business as usual: The acceptance and 
perpetuation of corruption in organizations. Academy of Management Executive, 
19(4), pp.9-23. 
 
Anderson, M.H. & Jackson, R. (2010) Perspectives on payday loans: The evidence 
from Florida. Review of Business Research, 10(5), pp.154-163. 
 
Andrews, D. Nonnecke, B. & Preece, J. (2003) Electronic survey methodology: A case 
study in reaching hard-to-involve internet users. International Journal of Human-
Computer Interaction, 16(2), pp.185-210. 
 
Ang, S.H. & Leong, S.M. (2004) Out of the mouths of babes: Business and youths in 
Asia, Journal of Business Ethics, 28(2), pp129-145. 
 
Aprioku, I.M. (1999) Collective response to oil spill hazards in the Eastern Niger 
Delta of Nigeria. Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 42(3), pp.389-
408. 
 
Aristotle (350 BC) The nicomachean ethics of Aristotle. Translated by W.D. Ross. 
United States: Pacific Publishing Studio. 
 
Armstrong, R.W. (1996) The relationship between culture and perception of ethical 
problems in international marketing. Journal of Business Ethics, 15(11), pp.1199-
1209. 
 
Armstrong, R.W. & Sweeney, J. (1994) Industry type, culture, mode of entry and 
perceptions international marketing ethics problems: A cross-culture comparison. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 13(10), pp.775-786. 
 
Arnolds, E.B. & Garland, N.F. (1974) The defense of necessity in criminal law: The 
right to choose the lesser evil. The Journal of Criminal Law of Criminology, 65(3), 
pp.289-301. 
 
Arza, V. & Lopez, A. (2011) Firms’ linkages with public research organizations in 
Argentina: Drivers, perceptions and behaviours. Technovation, 31(2011), pp. 384.400. 
 
Ashforth, B.E. & Anand, V. (2003) The normalization of corruption in organizations. 
Research in Organizational Behavior, 25, pp.1-52. 
 
Aslan, H.B. (2009) The final countdown in US investment banks: What about their 
employees? Banks and Bank Systems, 4(1), pp.4-11. 
 
Au, A.K.M. & Tse, A.C.B. (2001) Marketing ethics and behavioral predisposition of 
Chinese managers. Journal of Small Business Management, 39 (3), pp.272-279. 
 
Badaracco, J.L. & Webb, A.P. (1995) Business ethics: A view from the trenches. 
California Management Review, 37(2), pp.8-30. 
 
Badenhorst, J.A. (1994) Unethical behaviour in procurement: A perspective on causes 
and solutions. Journal of Business Ethics, 13(9), pp.739-746. 
  232 
Bagozzi, R.P. Yi, Y. & Philips, L.W. (1991) Assessing construct validity in 
organizational research. Administrative Science Quarterly, 36(3), pp.421-458. 
 
Bailey, A.D. (2011) Dialogue: The Confucian critique of rights-based business ethics. 
Confucianism-based rights skepticism and rights in the workplace, Business Ethics 
Quarterly, 21(4), pp.661-677.  
 
Bandura, A. (1999) Moral disengagement in the perpetration of inhumanities. 
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 3 (3), pp.193-209. 
 
Bandura, A. (2002) Selective moral disengagement in the exercise of moral agency. 
Journal of Moral Education, 31(2), pp.101-121. 
 
Bar-Gill, O. (2008) The law, economics, and psychology of subprime mortgage 
contracts. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Law & Economics 
Association, New York. 
 
Bartlett, D. (2003) Management and business ethics: A critique and integration of 
ethical decision-making models. British Journal of Management, 14(2003), pp.223-
235. 
 
Barnett, T. (2001) Dimensions of moral intensity and ethical decision-making: An 
empirical study. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 31(5), pp.1038-1057. 
 
Barnett, T. Bass, K. Brown, G. & Hebert, F.J. (1998) Ethical ideology and the ethical 
judgments of marketing professionals. Journal of Business Ethics, 17(7), pp.715-724. 
 
Barnett, T. & Valentine, S. (2004) Issue contingencies and marketers’ recognition of 
ethical issues, ethical judgments and behavioral intentions. Journal of Business 
Research, 57(4), pp.338-347. 
 
Barrett, P.M. (2011) Amazon crusader. Corporate pest. Fraud? Bloomberg 
Businessweek, 4220, pp.56-64. 
 
Barsky, A. (2008) Understanding the ethical cost of organizational goal-setting: A 
review and theory development. Journal of Business Ethics, 81 (1), pp.63-81. 
 
Barsky, A. (2011) Investigating the effects of moral disengagement and participation 
on unethical work behavior. Journal of Business Ethics, 104(1), pp.59-75. 
 
Barsky, A.J. Islam, G. Zyphur, M.J. & Johnson, E. (2006) Investigating the effects of 
moral disengagement and participation on unethical work behaviour. Insper Working 
Paper, 069/2006. 
 
Bass, K. Barnett, T. & Brown, G. (1998). The moral philosophy of sales managers and 
its influence on ethical decision making. The Journal of Personal Selling & Sales 
Management, 18(2), pp.183-205. 
 
Bassiry, G.R. & Jones, M. (1993) Adam Smith and the ethics of contemporary 
capitalism. Journal of Business Ethics, 12(8), pp.621-627. 
  233 
Batory, S.S. Neese, W. & Batory, A.H. (2005) Ethical Marketing Practices: An 
Investigation of Antecedents, Innovativeness and Business Performance. Journal of 
American Academy of Business, 6(2), pp.135-143. 
 
Baughn, C. Bodie, N.L. Buchanan, M.A. & Bixby, M.B. (2010) Bribery in 
international business transactions. Journal of Business Ethics, 92(2010), pp.15-32. 
 
Beams, J.D. Brown, R.M. & Killough, L.N. (2003) An experiment testing the 
determinants of non-compliance with insider trading laws. Journal of Business Ethics, 
45 (4), pp.309-321. 
 
Belk, R.W. Devinney, T. & Eckhardt, G. (2005) Consumer ethics across cultures. 
Consumption, Markets and Culture, 8(3), pp.275-289. 
 
Bellizzi, J.A. (1995) Committing and supervising unethical sales force behavior: The 
effects of victim gender, victim status, and sales force motivational techniques. The 
Journal of Personal Selling & Sales Management, 15(2), pp.1-16. 
 
Bellizzi, J.A. & Hite, R.E. (1989) Supervising unethical salesforce behavior. Journal 
of Marketing, 53(2), pp.36-48. 
 
Berns, G.S. Chappelow, J. Zink, C.F. Pagnoni, G. & Martin-Skurski, M.E. (2005) 
Neurological correlates of social conformity and independence during mental rotation. 
Biological Psychiatry, 58(2005), pp.245-253. 
 
Bersoff, D.M. (1999) Explaining unethical behaviour among people motivated to act 
prosocially. Journal of Moral Education, 28 (4), pp.413-430. 
 
Birger, J. (2012) Why Shell is betting billions to drill for oil… Here. Fortune, 165(8), 
pp.120-130. 
 
Birnholtz, J.P. Horn, D.B. Finholt, T.A. & Bae, S.J. (2003) The effects of cash, 
electronic, and paper gift certificates as respondent incentives for a web-based survey 
of a technologically sophisticated sample. 2003 American Association of Public 
Opinion Researchers Annual Conference, pp.1-12. 
 
Blodgett, J.G. Lu, L.C. Rose, G.M. & Vitell, S.J. (2001) Ethical sensitivity to 
stakeholder interests: A cross-cultural comparison. Academy of Marketing Science, 29 
(2), pp.190-203. 
 
Boardley, I.D. & Kavussanu, M. (2007) Development and validation of the moral 
disengagement in sport scale. Journal of Sport & Exercise Psychology, 29(2007), 
pp.608-628. 
 
Bommer, M. Gratto, C. Gravander, T. & Tuttle, M. (1987) A Behavioral Model of 
Ethical and Unethical Decision Making. Journal of Business Ethics, 6 (4), pp.265-280. 
 
Bowie, N.E. (1991) Challenging the egoistic paradigm, Business Ethics Quarterly, 
1(1), pp.1-21. 
 
  234 
Boyd, C. (2012) The Nestle infant formula controversy and a strange web of 
subsequent business scandals. Journal of Business Ethics, 106(2012), pp. 283-293. 
 
Brand, V. (2009) Empirical business ethics research and paradigm analysis. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 86 (4), pp.229-249. 
 
Brass, D.J. Butterfield, K.D. & Skaggs, B.C. (1998) Relationships and unethical 
behavior: A social network perspective. Academy of Management. The Academy of 
Management Review, 23 (1), pp.14-32. 
 
Brooks, S.B. (2010) CSR and the strait-jacket of economic rationality. International 
Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, 30 (11/12), pp.604-617. 
 
Burnaz, S. Atakan, M.G.S. Topcu, Y.I. & Singhapakdi, A. (2009) An exploratory 
cross-cultural analysis of marketing ethics: The case of Turkish, Thai, and American 
businesspeople. Journal of Business Ethics, 90(2009), pp.371-382. 
 
Burrell, G. & Morgan, G. (1979) Sociological paradigms and organisational analysis. 
Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Company. 
 
Butterfield, K.D. Trevino, L.K. & Weaver, G.R. (1996) Moral awareness in 
organizations: A socialization perspective. Academy of Management Proceeding, 
1996. 
 
Cadogan, J.W. Lee, N. Tarkiainen, A. & Sundqvist, S. (2009) Sales manager and sales 
team determinants of salesperson ethical behaviour. European Journal of Marketing, 
43(7/8), pp.907-937. 
 
Cadsby, C.B., Song, F., Tapon, F. (2010). Are you Paying your employees to cheat? 
An experimental investigation. The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 
10(1), pp.1-28. 
 
Calhoon, R.P. (1969) Niccolo Machiavelli and the twentieth century administrator. 
Academy of Management Journal, 12(2), pp.205-212. 
 
Campbell, H. (2006) Consultation, commerce and contemporary agri-food systems: 
Ethical engagement of new systems of governance under reflexive modernity. The 
Integrated Assessment Journal Bridging Sciences & Policy, 6(2): pp.117-136. 
 
Campbell, W.K. Hoffman, B.J. Campbell, S.M. & Marchisio, G. (2011) Narcissism in 
organizational contexts. Human Resource Management Review, 21(2011), pp.268-
284. 
 
Campitelli, G. & Gobet, F. (2010) Herbert Simon’s decision-making approach: 
Investigation of cognitive processes in experts. Review of General Psychology, 14(4), 
pp.354-364. 
 
Carroll, A.B. (1991) The pyramid of corporate social responsibility: Toward the moral 
management of organizational stakeholders, Business Horizons, 34(July/August), 
pp.39-48. 
  235 
Carroll, A.B. Buchholtz, A.K. (2006) Business & society: Ethics & stakeholder 
management. Mason: Cengage Learning.  
 
Carson, T.L. (1998) Ethical issues in sales: Two case studies. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 17(7), pp.725-729. 
 
Carson, T.L. Wokutch, R.E. & Cox, J.E.J. (1985) An ethical analysis of deception in 
advertising. Journal of Business Ethics, 4(2), pp.93-105. 
 
Chan, T.S. & Armstrong, R.W. (1999) Comparative ethical report card: A study of 
Australian and Canadian manager's perceptions of international marketing ethics 
problems. Journal of Business Ethics, 18(1), pp.3-16. 
 
Chatzidakis, H. Hibbert, S. & Smith, A.P. (2007) Why people don’t take their 
concerns about fair trade to the supermarket: The role of neutralization. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 74(1), pp.89-100. 
 
Chen, Y.J. Tang, T.L.P. (2006) Attitude toward and propensity to engage in unethical 
behaviour: Measurement invariance across major among university students. Journal 
of Business Ethics, 69 (2006), pp.77-93. 
 
Cherry, J. (2006) The impact of normative influence and locus of control on ethical 
judgments and intentions: A cross-cultural comparison. Journal of Business Ethics, 68 
(2), pp.113-132. 
 
Cherry, J. & Fraedrich, J. (2000) An empirical investigation of locus of control and the 
structure of moral reasoning: Examining the ethical decision-making processes of 
sales managers. Journal of Personal Selling & Sales Management, 20(3), pp.173-188. 
 
Cherry, J. Lee, M. & Chien, C.S. (2003) A cross-cultural application of a theoretical 
model of business ethics: Bridging the gap between. Journal of Business Ethics, 44 
(4), pp.359-377. 
 
Chiapello, E. (2007) Accounting and the birth of the notion of capitalism. Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting, 18(3), pp.263–296. 
 
Chin, W. W. (1998). The partial least squares approach to structural equation 
modeling. In: G. A. Marcoulides (Ed.), Modern methods for business research (pp. 
295–358). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
 
China Daily (2008) Subprime crisis may cost $945B worldwide: IMF.   
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2008-04/09/content_6603658.htm. Posted online 
April 19, 2008. 
 
Christensen, T. (2010) Presumed guilty: Constructing deviance and deviants through 
techniques of neutralization. Deviant Behavior, 31(6), pp.552-577. 
 
Christie, R. & Geis, F.L. (1970). Studies in Machiavellianism. New York: Academic 
Press.  
 
  236 
Chu, A.G.H. Du, X. Jiang, G. (2011) Buy, lie, or die: An investigation of Chinese ST 
firms’ voluntary interim audit motive and auditor independence. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 102, pp.135-153. 
 
Chung, K.Y. Eichenseher, J.W. & Taniguchi, T. (2008) Ethical perceptions of 
business students: Differences between East Asia and the USA and among 
‘‘Confucian’’ cultures. Journal of Business Ethics, 79 (1-2), pp.121-132. 
 
Cleek, M.A. & Leonard, S.L. (1998) Can corporate codes of ethics influence 
behavior? Journal of Business Ethics, 17 (6), pp.619-631. 
 
Cohen, J. (1992) A power primer. Quantitative methods in psychology. Psychological 
Bulletin, 112(1), pp.155-159. 
 
Collins, D. (1989) Organizational harm, legal condemnation and stakeholder 
retaliation: A typology, research agenda and application, Journal of Business Ethics, 
8(1989), pp.1–13. 
 
Collins, D. (2012) Business ethics. How to design and manage ethical organizations. 
Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons Inc. 
 
Colman, A. M. Norris, C. E. & Preston, C. C. (1997) Comparing rating scales of 
different lengths: Equivalence of scores from 5-point and 7-point scales. Psychological 
Reports, 80(1997), pp.355-362. 
 
Confucius (1938) The analects. Translated by A. Waley. London: George Allen & 
Unwin Ltd. 
Cooper, T.L. (1998) The Responsible Administrator: An Approach to Ethics for the 
Administrative Role. 4th ed. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers. 
Cordano, M. & Frieze, I.H. (2000) Pollution reduction preferences of U.S. 
environmental managers: Applying Ajzen’s Theory of Planned Behavior. Academy of 
Management Journal, 43(4), pp.627-641. 
 
Corral, S. & Calvete, E. (2000) Machiavellianism: Dimensionality of the Mach IV and 
its relation to self-monitoring in a Spanish sample. The Spanish Journal of 
Psychology, 3(1), pp.3-13. 
 
Coyne, M.P. & Traflet, J.M. (2008) Ethical issues related to the mass marketing of 
securities. Journal of Business Ethics, 78(2008), pp.193-198. 
 
Crane, A. (1999) Are you ethical? Please tick yes or no on researching ethics in 
business organizations. Journal of Business Ethics, 20 (3), pp.237-248. 
 
Dabholkar, P.A. & Kellaris, J.J. (1992) Toward understanding marketing students’ 
ethical judgment of controversial personal selling practices. Journal of Business 
Research, 24(4), pp.313-329. 
 
  237 
Dahling, J.J. Whitaker, B.G. & Levy, P.E. (2009) The development and validation of a 
new Machiavellianism scale. Journal of Management, 35(2), pp.219-257. 
 
Davis, M.A. Johnson, N.B. & Ohmer, D.G. (1998) Issue-contingent effects on ethical 
decision making: A cross-cultural comparison. Journal of Business Ethics, 17(4), 
pp.373-390. 
 
Dawes, J. (2008) Do data characteristics change according to the number of scale 
points used? International Journal of Market Research, 50(1), pp.61-79. 
 
Dawkins, R. (1976) The selfish gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
De Bock, T. & Van Kenhove, P. (2011) Double standards: The role of techniques of 
neutralization. Journal of Business Ethics, 99(2011), pp.283-296. 
 
Decker, W.H. & Calo, T.J. (2007) Observers’ impressions of unethical persons and 
whistleblowers. Journal of Business Ethics, 76(2007), pp.309-318. 
 
DeConinck, J.B. (2003) The effect of punishment on sales managers' outcome 
expectancies and responses to unethical sales force behavior. American Business 
Review, 21 (2), pp.135-141. 
 
Deng. K. (2003) Development and its deadlock in Imperial China, 221 B.C. – 1840 
A.D. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 51 (2), pp.479-522. 
 
Detert, J.R. Trevino, L.K. & Sweitzer, V.L. (2008) Moral disengagement in ethical 
decision making: A study of antecedents and outcomes. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 93(2), pp.374-391. 
 
Diamantopoulos, A. & Winklhofer, H.M. (2001) Index construction with formative 
indicators: An alternative to scale development. Journal of Marketing Research, 38, 
pp.269-277. 
 
Dittrich, R. Francis, B. Hatzinger, R. & Katzenbeisser, W. (2007) A paired 
comparison approach for the analysis of sets of Likert-scale responses. Statistical 
Modelling, 7(1), pp.3-28. 
 
Donoho, C.L. Polonsky, M.J. Roberts, S. & Cohen, D.A. (2001) A cross-cultural 
examination of the general theory of marketing ethics: Does it apply to the next 
generation of managers? Asia Pacific Journal of Marketing and Logistics, 13(2), 
pp.45-64. 
 
Dornoff, R.J. & Tankersley, C.B. (1975) Perceptual differences in market transactions: 
A source of consumer frustration. Journal of Consumer Affairs, 9(1975), pp.97-103. 
 
Dubinsky, A.J. Jolson, M.A. & Kotabe, M. (1991) A cross-national investigation of 
industrial salespeople's ethical perceptions. Journal of International Business Studies, 
22(4), pp.651-671. 
 
  238 
Dubinsky, A.J. Nataraajan, R. & Huang, W.Y. (2004) The influence of moral 
philosophy on retail salespeople’s ethical perceptions. The Journal of Consumer 
Affairs, 38(2), pp.297-321. 
 
Dunfee, T.W. Smith, N.C. & Ross, W.T.J. (1999) Social contracts and marketing 
ethics. Journal of Marketing, 63(3), pp.14-33. 
 
Dunkelberg, J. & Jessup, D.R. (2001) So then why did you do it? Journal of Business 
Ethics, 29(1/2), pp.51-64. 
 
Enticott, G. (2011) Techniques of neutralizing wildlife crime in rural England and 
Wales. Journal of Rural Studies, 27, pp.200-208. 
 
Eweje, G. (2007) Multinational oil companies’ CSR initiatives in Nigeria. Managerial 
Law, 49(5/6), pp.218-235. 
 
Fang, T. (2006) Negotiation: The Chinese style. Journal of Business & Industrial 
Marketing, 21(1), pp.50-61. 
 
Ferrell, O.C. & Gresham, L.G. (1985) A contingency framework for understanding 
ethical decision making in marketing. Journal of Marketing, 49 (3), pp.87-97. 
 
Ferrell, O.C. & Gresham, L.G. & Fraedrich, J. (1989) A synthesis of ethical decision 
models for marketing. Journal of Macromarketing, Fall(1989), pp.55-65. 
 
Ferrell, O.C. & Weaver, K.M. (1978) Ethical beliefs of marketing managers. Journal 
of Marketing, 42 (3), pp.69-74. 
 
Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. (2010). Predicting and changing behavior: The reasoned 
action approach. New York: Psychology Press (Taylor & Francis). 
 
Fisher, R.J. (1993) Social desirability bias and the validity of indirect questioning. 
Journal of Consumer Research, 20(2), pp.303-315. 
 
Fisher, R.J. (2000) The future of social-desirability bias research in marketing. 
Psychology & Marketing, 17(2), pp.73-77. 
 
Flannery, B.L. & May, D.R. (2000) Environmental ethical decision making in the U.S. 
metal-finishing industry. Academy of Management Journal, 43(4), pp.642-662. 
 
Fleischman, G. & Valentine, S. (2003) Professionals’ tax liability assessments an 
ethical evaluations in an equitable relief innocent spouse case. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 42(1), pp.27-45. 
 
Flynn, F.J. & Wiltermuth, S.S. (2010) Who’s with me? False consensus, brokerage, 
and ethical decision making in organizations. Academy of Management Journal, 
53(5), pp.1074-1089. 
 
  239 
Folkes, V.S. & Kamins, M.A. (1999) Effects of information about firms’ ethical and 
unethical actions on consumers’ attitudes. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 8(3), 
pp.243-259. 
 
Ford, R. C. & Richardson, W.D. (1994) Ethical decision making: A review of the 
empirical literature, Journal of Business Ethics, 13(1994), pp.205–221. 
 
Fornell, C. & Larcker, D.F. (1981) Evaluating structural equation models with 
unobservable variables and measurement error. Journal of Marketing Research, 18(1), 
pp.39-50. 
 
Fraedrich, J. Ferrell, O.C. & Pride, W. (1989) An empirical examination of three 
Machiavellian concepts: Advertisers vs. the general public. Journal of Business Ethics, 
8(1989), pp.687-695. 
 
Fraedrich, J.P. (1993) The Ethical Behavior of Retail Managers. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 12(1993), pp.207-218. 
 
Frazier, P.A. Barron, K.E. & Tix, A.P. (2004) Testing moderator and mediator effects 
in counselling psychology research. Journal of Counselling Psychology, 51(1), 
pp.115-134. 
 
Freud, S. (1976) The interpretation of dreams (J. Strachey, Trans.). New York: 
Norton. (Original work published 1900). 
 
Frey, B.F. (2000) The impact of moral intensity on decision making in a business 
context. Journal of Business Ethics, 26(3), pp.181-196. 
 
Friedman, M. (1970) The social responsibility of the corporation is to increase its 
profits. New York Times Magazine, September, 13, pp.27-33. 
 
Friedrich, T.L. Byrne, C.L. & Mumford, M.D. (2009) Methodological and theoretical 
considerations in survey research. The Leadership Quarterly, 20(2009), pp.57-60. 
 
Fritzsche, D.J. & Becker, H. (1984) Linking management behavior to ethical 
philosophy - An empirical investigation. Academy of Management Journal, 27(1), 
pp.166-175. 
 
Fromm, E. (1955) The sane society. New York: Henry Holt and Company, LLC. 
 
Fukukawa, K. (2003) A theoretical review of business and consumer ethics research: 
Normative and descriptive approaches. The Marketing Review, 3(2003), pp.381-401. 
 
Galloway, D. (1986) Necessity as a justification: A critique of Perka. Dalhousie Law 
Journal, 10(1986), pp.158-174. 
 
Galperin, B.L. Bennett, R.J. & Aquino, K. (2010) Status differentiation and the 
protean self: A social-cognitive model of unethical behavior in organizations. Journal 
of Business Ethics, 98(2011), p.407-424. 
 
  240 
Garrett, T.A. (2007) The rise in personal bankruptcies: The eighth federal reserve and 
beyond. Federal Reserve Bank of St-Louis Review, 89(1), pp.15-37. 
 
Gaski, J.F. (1999) Does marketing ethics really have anything to Say? A critical 
inventory of the literature, Journal of Business Ethics, 18(3), pp.315-335. 
 
Gattiker, U.E. & Kelley, H. (1999) Morality and computers: Attitudes and difference 
in moral judgments. Information Systems Research, 10(3), pp.233-255. 
 
Gefen, D. Rigdon, E.E. & Straub, D. (2011) An update and extension to SEM 
guidelines for administrative and social science research. MIS Quarterly, 35(2), pp.iii-
xiv. 
 
Gellerman, S.W. (1989) Managing ethics from the top down. Sloan Management 
Review, 30(2), pp.73-81. 
 
Geva, A. (2008) Three models of corporate social responsibility: Interrelationships 
between theory, research, and practice, Business and Society Review, 113(1), pp.1-41. 
 
Gilligan, C. (1982) New maps of development: New visions of maturity. American 
Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 52(2), pp.199-212. 
 
Gino, F. Ayal, S. & Ariely, D. (2009) Contagion and differentiation in unethical 
behavior the effect of one bad apple on the barrel. Psychological Science, 20(3), 
pp.393-400. 
 
Gioia, D.A. (1992) Pinto fires and personal ethics: A script analysis of missed 
opportunities. Journal of Business Ethics, 11(5/6), pp.379-390. 
 
Goldman, A.I. (1993) Ethics and cognitive science. Ethics, 103(1993), pp.337-262. 
 
Gray, G.C. (2006) The regulation of corporate violations: Punishment, compliance, 
and the blurring of responsibility. British Journal of Criminology, 46, pp.875-892. 
 
Grayson, K. (2006) Promoting responsibility and accountability: Human security and 
Canadian corporate conduct. International Journal, 61(2), pp.479-495. 
 
Greetham, B. (2006) Philosophy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Griggs, J.W. (2011) BP Gulf of Mexico oil spill. Energy Law Journal, 32, pp.57-79. 
 
Grover, S.L. & Hui, C. (1994) The Influence of Role Conflict and Self-interest on 
Lying in Organizations. Journal of Business Ethics, 13(1994), pp.295-303. 
 
Gunia, B.C. Wang, L. Huang, L. Wang, J. & Murnighan, K.J. (2012) Contemplation 
and conversation: Subtle influences on moral decision making. Academy of 
Management Journal. 55(1), pp.13-33. 
 
Gupta, O.K. Tandon, S. Debnath, S. & Rominger, A.S. (2007) Package downsizing: Is 
it ethical? AI & Society, 21, pp.239-250. 
  241 
Gurley, K. Wood, P. & Nijhawan, I. (2007) The effect of punishment on ethical 
behavior when personal gain is involved. Journal of Legal, Ethical and Regulatory 
Issues, 10(1), pp.91-105. 
 
Haidt, J. (2001) The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach 
to moral judgment. Psychological Review, 108, pp.814–834. 
 
Hair, J.F.Jr. Anderson, R.E. Tatham, R.L. & Black, W.C. (1998) Multivariate data 
analysis. 5th ed. Upper Saddle River: Prentice-Hall. 
 
Harrington, S.J. (1996) The effect of codes of ethics and personal denial of 
responsibility on computer abuse judgments and intentions. MIS Quarterly, 20(3), 
pp.257-278.  
 
Harrington, S. J. (1997) A test of a person-issue contingent model of ethical decision 
making in organizations, Journal of Business Ethics, 16(4), pp.363–375. 
 
Harris, L.C. & Dumas, A. (2009) Online consumer behavior: An application of 
neutralization theory. Marketing Theory, 9(4), pp.379-402. 
 
Heath, J. (2008) Business ethics and moral motivation: A criminological perspective. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 83(4), pp.595-614. 
 
Hegarty, W.H. & Sims, H.P.J. (1978) Some determinants of unethical decision 
behavior: An experiment. Journal of Applied Psychology, 63 (4), pp.451-457. 
 
Hegarty, W.H. & Sims, H.P.J. (1979) Organizational philosophy, policies, and 
objectives related to unethical decision behavior: A laboratory experiment. Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 64 (3), pp.331-338. 
 
Henseler, J. Ringle, C.M. & Sinkovics, R.R. (2009) The use of partial least squares 
path modeling in international marketing. Advances in International Marketing, 8(20), 
pp.277-319.  
 
Henthorne, T.L. Robin, D.P. & Reidenbach, R.E. (1992) Identifying the gaps in ethical 
perceptions between managers and salespersons: A multidimensional approach. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 11(11), pp.849-857. 
 
Hindelang, M.J. (1970) The commitment of delinquents to their misdeeds: Do 
delinquents drift? Social Problems, 17(1970), pp.502–509. 
 
Hoek, J. & Jones, S.C. (2011) Regulation, public health and social marketing: A 
behaviour change trinity. Journal of Social Marketing, 1(1), pp.32-44. 
 
Hofstede, G. (2007) Asian management in the 21st century. Asia Pacific Journal of 
Management, 24 (4), pp.411-420. 
 
Hofstede, G. & Bond, M.H. (1988) The Confucius connection: From cultural roots to 
economic growth. Organizational Dynamics, 16 (4), pp.5-23. 
 
  242 
Holton, E.F.III. & Naquin, S. (2005) A critical analysis of HRD evaluation models 
from a decision-making perspective. Human Resource Development Quarterly, 16(2), 
pp.257-282. 
 
Honeycutt, E.D.J. Glassman, M. Zugelder, M.T. & Karande, K. (2001) Determinants 
of ethical behavior: A study of autosalespeople. Journal of Business Ethics, 32 (1), 
pp.69-79. 
 
Hoshino-Brown, E. Zanna, A.S. Spencer, S.J. Zanna, M.P. Kitayama, S. & 
Lackenbauer, S. (2007) On the cultural guises of cognitive dissonance: The case of 
Easterners and Westerners. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89(3), 
pp.294-310. 
 
Howard, B.H. Shegog, R. Grussendorf, J. Benjamins, L.J. Stelzig, D. & McAlister, A. 
(2007) Development, implementation, and the evaluation of a web-based war-
prevention program in a time of war. Journal of Peace Research, 44(5), pp.559-571. 
 
Howe, V. Hoffman, K.D. & Hardigree, D.W. (1994) The relationship between ethical 
and customer-oriented service provider behaviours. Journal of Business Ethics, 
13(1994), pp.497-506. 
 
Hunt, S.D. & Chonko, L.B. (1984). Marketing and Machiavellianism. Journal of 
Marketing, 48(3), pp.30-43. 
 
Hunt, S.D. Chonko, L.B. & Wilcox, J.B. (1984) Ethical problems of marketing 
researchers. Journal of Marketing Research, 21(3), pp.309-325. 
 
Hunt, S.D. & Vasquez-Parraga, A.Z. (1993) Organizational consequences, marketing 
ethics, and salesforce supervision. Journal of Marketing Research, 30(1), pp.78-91. 
 
Hunt, S.D. & Vitell, S.J. (1986) A general theory of marketing ethics. Journal of 
Macromarketing, 6(1), pp.5-16. 
 
Hunter, J.E. Gerbing, D.W. & Boster, F.J. (1982) Machiavellian beliefs and 
personality: Construct invalidity of the Machiavellianism dimension. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 43(6), pp.1293-1305. 
 
Husted, B.W. (2005) Risk management, real options, and corporate social 
responsibility. Journal of Business Ethics, 60, pp.175-183. 
 
Israel, G. (1993) Taming the green marketing monster: National standards for 
environmental marketing claims. Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 
20(2), pp.303-335. 
 
Jamieson, S. (2004) Likert scales: How to (ab)use them, Medical 
Education, 38(12), pp.1,217-1,218. 
 
Jain, K. & Bearden, J.N. (2011) Machiavellianism and overconfidence. INSEAD. 
Faculty & Research Working Paper, pp.1-25. 
 
  243 
Jakobwitz, S. & Egan, V. (2006) The dark triad and normal personality traits. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 40(2), pp.331-339. 
 
James, H.S.Jr., & Rassekh, R. (2000) Smith, Friedman, and self-interest in ethical 
society, Business Ethics Quarterly, 10(3), pp.659-674. 
 
Jarvis, C.B. Mackenzie, S.B. Podsakoff, P.M. Mick, D.G. & Bearden, W.O. (2003) A 
critical review of construct indicators and measurement model misspecification in 
marketing and consumer research. Journal of Consumer Research, 30(2), pp.199-218. 
 
Jehn, K.A. & Scott, E.D. (2008) Perceptions of deception: Making sense of responses 
to employee deceit. Journal of Business Ethics, 2008(80), pp.327-347. 
 
Jekot, W. (2005) Over the limit: The case for increased regulation of credit cards for 
college students. Connecticut Public Interest Law Journal, 5(1), pp.109-131. 
 
Jennings, M.M. (2006) Business. Its legal, ethical, and global environment. 7th ed. 
Mason: Thomson. 
 
Johanson, G.A. & Brooks, G.P. (2010) Initial scale development: Sample size for pilot 
studies. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 70(3), pp.394-400. 
 
Jonason, P.K. & Webster, G.D. (2010) The dirty dozen: A concise measure of the dark 
triad. Psychological Assessment, 22(2), pp.420-432. 
 
Jones, G.E. & Kavanagh, M.J. (1996) An experimental examination of the effects of 
individual and situational factors on unethical behavioral intentions in the workplace. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 15(5), pp.511-524. 
 
Jones, T.M. (1991) Ethical decision making by individuals in organizations: An issue-
contingent model. Academy of Management Review, 16(2), pp.366-396. 
 
Jones, T. M. & Ryan, L.V. (1997) The Link between Ethical Judgment and Action in 
Organizations, Organization Science, 8(1997), pp.663–680. 
 
Kahneman, D. (2003) Maps of bounded rationality: Psychology for behavioural 
economics. The American Economic Review, 93(5), pp.1449-1475. 
 
Karpatkin, R.H. (1999) Toward a fair and just marketplace for all customers: The 
responsibilities of marketing professionals. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 
18(1), pp.118-123. 
 
Keil, R. (2010) Real estate, the city and place: The crisis unfolds. International Journal 
of Urban and Regional Research, 34(3), pp. 647-651.  
 
Keith, N.K. Pettijohn, C.E. & Burnett, M.S. (2008) Ethics in advertising: Differences 
in industry values and student perceptions. Academy of Marketing Studies Journal, 
12(2), pp.81-98. 
 
Kellaris, J.A. Dahlstrom, R.F. & Boyle, B.A. (1996) Contextual bias in ethical 
judgement of marketing practices. Psychology & Marketing, 13(7), pp.677-695. 
  244 
Kelley, S.W. Ferrell, O.C. & Skinner, S.J. (1990) Ethical behavior among marketing 
researchers: An assessment of selected demographic characteristics. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 9(1990), pp.681-688. 
 
Kennedy, E.J. & Lawton, L. (1998) Religiousness and business ethics. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 17(1998), pp.163-175. 
 
Kim, K.H. (2004) An attempt to elucidate notions of lifelong learning: Analects – 
based analysis of Confucius’ ideas about learning,” Asia Pacific Education Review 
5(2), pp.117-126.  
 
Kim, S.Y. & Chun, S.Y. (2003) A study of marketing ethics in Korea: What do 
Koreans care about? International Journal of Management, 20(3), pp.377-384. 
 
Kish-Gephart, J.J. Harrison, D.A. & Trevino, L.B. (2010) Bad apples, bad cases, and 
bad barrels: Meta-analytic evidence about sources of unethical decisions at work. 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 95 (1), pp.1-31. 
 
Keinan, G. (1987) Decision making under stress: Scanning of alternatives under 
controllable and uncontrollable threats. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
52(3), pp.639-644. 
 
Klein, N. (2000) No logo. New York: Picador.  
 
Klein, S. (2003) The natural roots of capitalism and its virtues and values. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 45 (4), pp.387-402. 
 
Kohlberg, L. (1976) Moral stages and moralization: The cognitive-developmental 
approach. In T. Lickona (Ed.), Moral development and behavior: Theory, research, 
and social issues, pp.31-53. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.  
 
Kotler, P. & Keller, K.L. (2007) Marketing management. 12th ed. New York: Prentice 
Hall. 
 
Krisher, T. (2010 Jul 22). GM buys AmeriCredit to expand subprime lending. The 
Associated Press. Retrieved August 16, 2010 from 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-investor/gm-buys-americredit-to-expand-
subpri.htm 
 
Krosnick, J.A. (1999) Survey research. Annual Review of Psychology, 50(1999), 
pp.537-567. 
 
Kurland, N.B. (1996) Sales agents and clients: Ethics, incentives, and a modified 
theory of planned behavior. Human Relations, 49(1), pp.51-75. 
 
Laczniak, G.R. & Inderrieden, E.J. (1987) The influence of stated organizational 
concern upon ethical decision making. Journal of Business Ethics, 6 (4), pp.297-308. 
 
Lam, K.C. & Shi, G. (2008) Factors affecting ethical attitudes in mainland China and 
Hong Kong. Journal of Business Ethics, 77(2008), pp.463-479. 
  245 
Lalwani, A.K. Shrum, L.J. & Chiu, C.Y. (2009) Motivated response styles: The role of 
cultural values, regulatory focus, and self-consciousness in socially desirable 
responding. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96(4), pp.870-882. 
 
Lauring, J. & Selmer, J. (2011) Multicultural organizations: Does a positive diversity 
climate promote performance? European Management Review, 8(2011), pp.81-93. 
 
Lee, D.J. & Sirgy, M.J. (1999) The effect of moral philosophy and ethnocentrism on 
quality-of-life orientation in international marketing: A cross-cultural comparison. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 18(1), pp.73-90. 
 
Lee, N. Beatson, A. Garrett, T.C. Lings, I. & Zhang, X. (2009) A study of the attitudes 
towards unethical selling amongst Chinese salespeople. Journal of Business Ethics, 
88(2009), pp.497-515. 
 
Leget, C. Borry, P. & De Vries, R. (2009) 'Nobody tosses a dwarf!' The relation 
between empirical and the normative reexamined. Bioetics, 23 (4), pp.226-235. 
 
Le Menstrel, M. (2002) Economic rationality and ethical behaviour: Ethical business 
between venality and sacrifice. Business Ethics: A European Review, 11 (2), pp.157-
167. 
 
Leung, A.S.M. Liu, X. & Liu, S. (2009) Moral Schemas and Business Practices: The 
Ethics of Guangzhou Migrant Marketers. Journal of Business Ethics, 88 (1), pp.11-23. 
 
Lewicki, R.J. & Robinson, R.J. (1998) Ethical and unethical bargaining tactics: An 
empirical study. Journal of Business Ethics, 17(6), pp.665-683. 
 
Lipman, B.L. (1995). Processing and bounded rationality: A survey. The Canadian 
Journal of Economics, 28(1), pp.42-67.  
 
Little, T.D. Cunningham, W.A. & Shahar, G. (2002) To parcel or not to parcel: 
Exploring the question, weighing the merits. Structural Equation Modeling, 9(2), 
pp.151-173. 
 
Locke, E.A. & Woiceshyn, J. (1995) Why businessmen should be honest: The 
argument from rational egoism, Journal of Organizational Behavior, 16(1995), pp.405-
414. 
 
Loe, T.W. Ferrell, L. & Mansfield, P. (2000) A review of empirical studies assessing 
ethical decision making in business. Journal of Business Ethics, 2000(25), pp.185-204. 
 
Lu, L.C. Rose, G.M. & Blodgett, J.G. (1999) The effects of cultural dimensions on 
ethical decision making in marketing: An exploratory study. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 18 (1), pp.91-106. 
 
Lund, D.B. (2000) An empirical examination of marketing professional's ethical 
behavior in differing situations. Journal of Business Ethics, 24(4), pp.331-343. 
 
  246 
Luo, S. (2011) Is yi more basic than ren in the teachings of Confucius?,” Journal of 
Chinese Philosophy, 38(3), pp.427-443. 
 
Lyons, A.C. Cude, B. Lawrence, F.C. & Gutter, M. (2009) Conducting research 
online: Challenges facing researchers in family and consumer science. Family and 
Consumer Sciences Research Journal, 33(4), pp.341-356. 
 
Maertz, C.P.J. Hassan, A. & Magnusson, P. (2009) When learning is not enough: A 
process model of expatriate adjustment as cultural cognitive dissonance reduction. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 108(2009), pp.66-78. 
 
Maignan, I. (2001) Consumers' perceptions of corporate social responsibilities: A 
crosscultural comparison. Journal of Business Ethics, 30 (1), pp.57-63. 
 
Maitland, I. (2002) The human face of self-interest. Journal of Business Ethics, 
38(1/2), pp.3-17. 
 
Malhotra, N.K. Kim, S.S. & Patil, A. (2006) Common method variance in IS research: 
A comparison of alternative approaches and a reanalysis of past research. Management 
Science, 52(12), pp.1865-1883. 
 
Malhotra, N.K. Patil, A. & Kim, S.S. (2007) Bias breakdown. Marketing Research. 
Spring(2007), pp. 24-31. 
 
Malinowski, C. & Berger, K.A. (2007) Differences in Marketing Ethics Attitudes 
between U.S. and Latin American Undergraduates. Competition Forum, 5(1), pp.118-
126. 
 
Mantel, S.P. (2005) Choice or perception: How affect influences ethical choices 
among salespeople. Journal of Personal Selling & Sales Management, 25(1), pp.43-55. 
 
Marshall, B. & Dewe, P. (1997) An investigation of the components of moral 
intensity. Journal of Business Ethics, 16(1997), pp.521-529. 
 
Marta, J. Heiss, C.M. & De Lurgio, S.A. (2008) An Exploratory Comparison of 
Ethical Perceptions of Mexican and U.S. Marketers. Journal of Business Ethics, 82 
(3), pp.539-555. 
 
Marta, J.K.M. & Singhapakdi, A. (2005) Comparing Thai and US businesspeople: 
Perceived intensity of unethical marketing practices, corporate ethical values, and 
perceived importance of ethics. International Marketing Review, 22(5), pp.562-578. 
 
Martinson, O.B. & Ziegenfuss, D.E. (2000) Looking at what influences ethical 
perceptions and judgment. Management Accounting Quarterly, Fall(2000), pp.41-49. 
 
Maruna, S. & Copes, H. (2004) What have we learned in five decades of neutralization 
research? Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, 32, pp.221-320 
 
Marquardt, N. (2010) Implicit mental processes in ethical management behaviour. 
Ethics & Behavior, 20(2), pp.128-148. 
  247 
Mascarenhas, O.A.J. (1995) Exonerating unethical marketing executive behaviors: A 
diagnostic framework. Journal of Marketing, 59(2), pp.43-58. 
 
May, D.R. & Pauli, K.P. (2002). The role of moral intensity in ethical decision 
making. Business and Society, 41(1), pp.84-118. 
 
Mazar, N. Amir, O. & Ariely, D. (2008) The dishonesty of honest people: A theory of 
self-concept maintenance. Journal of Marketing Research, 45 (6), pp.633-644. 
 
McBarnet, D. (2006) After Enron will ‘whiter than white collar crime’ still wash? The 
British Journal of Criminology, 46(6), pp.1091-1109. 
 
McCarty, R. (1988) Business, ethics and law. Journal of Business Ethics, 7 (11), 
pp.881-889. 
 
McConnell, C.R. & Brue, S.L. (2004) Economics: Principles, problems, and policies. 
New York: The McGraw-Hill Companies. 
 
McCoy, C. Evers, S. Dierkes, M. & Twining, F. (1995) Nestle and the controversy 
over the marketing of breast milk substitutes. Published by the Council for Ethics in 
Economics. Case 6, 1995. 
 
McDonald, G. & Pak, P.C. (1996) It’s all fair in love, war, and business: Cognitive 
philosophies in ethical decision making. Journal of Business Ethics, 15(9), pp.973-
997. 
 
McDonald, G.M. & Kan, P.C. (1997) Ethical perceptions of expatriate and local 
managers in Hong Kong. Journal of Business Ethics, 16(15), pp.1605-1624. 
 
McDonald, G.M. & Zepp, R.A. (1988) Ethical perceptions of Hong Kong Chinese 
business managers. Journal of Business Ethics, 7(1988), pp.835-845. 
 
McGregor, S.L.T. (2009) Conceptualizing immoral and unethical consumption using 
neutralization theory. Family and Consumer Research Journal, 36(3), pp.261-276. 
 
McMahon, J.M. & Harvey, R.J. (2006) An analysis of the factor structure of Jones’ 
moral intensity construct. Journal of Business Ethics, 64(4), pp.381-404. 
 
McMahon, J.M. & Harvey, R.J. (2007) The effect of moral intensity on ethical 
judgment. Journal of Business Ethics, 72(4), pp.335-357. 
 
Mick, D.G. (1996) Are studies of dark side variables confounded by socially desirable 
responding? The case of materialism. Journal of Consumer Research, 23(1996), 
pp.106-121. 
 
Midtun, A. Gautesen, K. & Gjolberg, M. (2006) The political economy of CSR in 
Western Europe. Corporate Governance, 6(4), pp.369-385. 
 
Milgram, S. (1964) Group pressure and action against a person. Journal of Abnormal 
and Social Psychology, 69(2), pp.137-174. 
  248 
Milgram, S. (1974) Obedience to authority: An experimental view. New York: Harper 
& Row. 
 
Mill, J.S. (1906) Utilitarianism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Miller, G. A. (1956) The magical number seven, plus or minus two: some limits on 
our capacity for processing information. Psychological Review, 63(1956), pp.81-97. 
 
Miller, H.M. Sexton, N.R. Koontz, L. Loomis, J. Koontz, S.R. & Hermans, C. (2011) 
The users, uses, and value of landsat and other moderate-resolution satellite imagery in 
the United States – Executive report. USGS Science for a Changing World, Open-file 
Report (2011-1031), pp.1-48. 
 
Millington, A. Eberhardt, M. & Wilkinson, B. (2005) Gift giving, guanxi and illicit 
payments in buyer-seller relations in China: Analysing the experience in UK 
companies. Journal of Business Ethics, 57(2005), pp.255-268. 
 
Minor, W.W. (1981) Techniques of neutralization: A reconceptualization and 
empirical examination. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 18, pp.295-
318. 
 
Minor, W.W. (1984) Neutralization as a hardening process: Considerations in the 
modeling of change. Social Forces, 62(4), pp.995-1019. 
 
Montgomerie, J. (2007) The logic of neo-liberalism and the political economy of 
consumer debt-led growth in Lee, S. & McBride, J. (eds) Neo-liberalism, state power 
and global governance, pp.157-172. New York: Springer. 
 
Moore, C. (2008) Moral disengagement in processes of organizational corruption. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 80 (1), pp.129-139. 
 
Morris, S.A. & McDonald, R.A. (1995) The role of moral intensity in moral 
judgments: An empirical investigation. Journal of Business Ethics, 14(1995), pp.715-
726. 
 
Murphy, P.R. (2008) The Attitude Toward and Rationalization of Fraudulent Financial 
Reporting. Queen's University School of Business. Research Paper No. 01-08. 
 
Murphy, P.R. & Dacin, M.T. (2011) Psychological pathways to fraud: Understanding 
and preventing fraud in organizations. Journal of Business Ethics, 101(4), pp.601-618. 
 
Nakano C. (2007) The significance and limitations of corporate governance from the 
perspective of business ethics: Towards the creation of an ethical organizational 
culture. Asian Business & Management, 6(2), pp.163–178. 
 
Nell, E.J. (2003) Nominal money, real money, and stabilization, pp. 111-137. In Bell, 
S.A. & Nell, E.J. The state, the market and the Euro. Chartalism versus metallism in 
the theory of money. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. 
 
  249 
Nill, A. & Schibrowsky, J.A. (2005) The impact of corporate culture, the reward 
system, and perceived moral intensity on marketing students' ethical decision making. 
Journal of Marketing Education, 27 (1), pp.68-81. 
 
Nonis, S. & Swift, C.O. (2001) Personal value profiles and ethical business decisions. 
Journal of Education for Business, May/June(2001), pp.251-257. 
 
Norman, G. (2010) Likert scales, levels of measurement and the ‘laws’ of statistics. 
Advances in Health Science Education, 15(2010), pp.625-632. 
 
Nulty, D. (2008) The adequacy of response rates to online and paper surveys: What 
can be done? Assessment & Evaluation in Higher Education, 33(3), pp.301-314. 
 
Nwachukwu, S.L.S. & Vitell, S.J.J. (1997) The influence of corporate culture on 
managerial ethical judgments. Journal of Business Ethics, 16(8), pp.757-777. 
 
Nyaw, M.K. & Ng, I. (1994) A comparative analysis of ethical beliefs: A four country 
study. Journal of Business Ethics, 13(7), pp.543-556. 
 
O’Fallon, M.J. & Butterfield, K.D. (2005) A review of the empirical ethical decision-
making literature: 1996-2003. Journal of Business Ethics, 59(4), pp.375-413. 
 
O’Hair, D. & Cody, M.J. (1987) Machiavellian beliefs and social influence. The 
Western Journal of Speech Communication, 51, pp.279-303. 
 
O’Higgins, E. & Kelleher, B. (2005) Comparative perspectives on the ethical 
orientations of human resources, marketing and finance functional managers. Journal 
of Business Ethics, 56(3), pp.275-288. 
 
Olivette, M.J. (1995) Beliefs and values as possible correlates of ethical awareness in 
business. Journal of Business and Psychology, 9(4), pp.427-436. 
 
Palazzo, G. Krings, F. & Hoffrage, V. (2012) Ethical blindness. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 109(2012), pp.323-338. 
 
Panitz, E. (1989) Psychometric investigation of the Mach IV scale measuring 
Machiavellianism. Psychological Reports, 64, pp.963-968. 
 
Paolillo, J.G.P. & Vitell, S.J. (2002) An empirical investigation of the influence of 
selected personal, organizational and moral intensity factors on ethical decision 
making. Journal of Business Ethics, 35(1), pp.65-75.  
 
Parvez, Z. (2007) Lack of business responsibility: An Islamic perspective. 
International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics, 3 (1), pp.42-55. 
 
Paternoster, R. & Simpson, S. (1996) Sanction threats and appeals to morality: Testing 
a rational choice model of corporate crime. Law & Society Review, 30(3), pp.549-
584. 
 
  250 
Paulus, D.L. & Williams, K.M. (2002) The dark triad of personality: Narcissism, 
Machiavellianism, and psychopathy. Journal of Research in Personality, 36(2002), 
pp.556-563. 
 
Perkins, J. (2004) Confessions of an economic hit man. New York: Penguin Group. 
Perkins, J. (2007) The secret history of the American empire. Economic hit men, 
jackals, and the truth about global corruption. New York: Penguin Group. 
 
Podsakoff, P.M. Mackenzie, S.B. Lee, J.Y. & Podsakoff, N.P. (2003) Common 
method bias in behavioral research: A critical review of the literature and 
recommended remedies. Journal of Applied Psychology, 88(5), pp.879-903. 
 
Pornari, C.D. & Wood, J. (2010) Peer and cyber aggression in secondary school 
students: The role of moral disengagement, hostile attribution bias, and outcome 
expectancies. Aggressive Behavior, 36 (2010), pp.81–94. 
 
Porter, M.E. & Kramer, M.R. (2002) The competitive advantage of corporate 
philanthropy, Harvard Business Review, R0212D(2002), pp.5-16. 
 
Powpaka, S. (2002) Factors affecting managers' decision to bribe: An empirical 
investigation. Journal of Business Ethics, 40(3), pp.227-247. 
 
Premeaux, S.R. & Mondy, R.W. (1993) Linking management behavior to ethical 
philosophy. Journal of Business Ethics, 12 (5), pp.349-357. 
 
Primeaux, P. & Stieber, J. (1994) Profit maximization: The ethical mandate of 
business. Journal of Business Ethics, 13(4), pp.287-294.  
 
Rand, A. (1961) For the new tntellectual. New York: Random House. 
 
Rand, A. (1964) The virtue of selfishness. London: Penguin Group. 
 
Randall, D.M. & Gibson, A.M. (1990) Methodology in business ethics research: A 
review and critical assessment. Journal of Business Ethics, 9(6), pp.457-472.  
 
Rao, C.P. & Singhapakdi, S. (1997) Marketing ethics: a comparison between services 
and other marketing professionals. The Journal of Services Marketing, 11(6), pp.409-
422. 
 
Rasmussen, J.L. (1989) Analysis of Likert-scale data: A reinterpretation of Gregoire 
and Drive. Psychological Bulletin, 105(1), pp.167-170. 
 
Rawwas, M.Y.A. Al-Khatib, J.A. & Vitell, J.A. (2004) Academic dishonesty: A cross-
cultural comparison of U.S. and Chinese marketing students. Journal of Marketing 
Education, 26(1), pp.89-101. 
 
Redfern, K. & Crawford, J. (2010) Regional differences in business ethics in the 
People’s Republic of China: A multi-dimensional approach to the effects of 
modernisation. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 27(2010), pp.215-235. 
 
  251 
Reidenbach, R. Robin, E. & Dawson, L. (1991) An application and extension of a 
multidimensional ethics scale to selected marketing practices and marketing groups. 
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 19(1991), pp.83-92. 
 
Rest, J.R. (1979) Development in judging moral issues. Minneapolis, MN. University 
of Minnesota Press. (Available from MMRP, University of Minnesota). 
 
Rest, J. R. (1986) Moral development: Advances in research and theory. New York: 
Praeger. 
 
Reynolds, S.J. (2006) A neurocognitive model of the ethical decision-making process: 
Implications for study and practice. Journal of Applied Psychology, 91(4), pp.737-
748. 
 
Reynolds, S. J. & Ceranic, T.L. (2007) The effects of moral judgment and moral 
identity on moral behavior: An empirical examination of the moral individual. Journal 
of Applied Psychology, 92(6), pp.1610-1624. 
 
Ribeaud, D. & Eisner, M. (2010) Risk factors for aggression in pre-adolescence: Risk 
domains, cumulative risk and gender differences — Results from a prospective 
longitudinal study in a multi-ethnic urban sample. European Journal of Criminology, 
7(6), pp.460-498. 
 
Rick, S. & Lowenstein, G. (2008) Commentaries and rejoinder to the ‘dishonesty of 
honest people,’ Journal of Marketing Research, XLV (Dec 2008), pp.645-653. 
 
Ringle, C. M. Wende, S. & Will, A. (2005) Smart PLS 2.0. Accessed September 1, 
2011 from http://www.smartpls.de 
 
Robertson, D.C. & Anderson, E. (1993) Control system and task environment effects 
on ethical judgment: An exploratory study of industrial salespeople. Organization 
Science, 4(4), pp.617-644. 
 
Robin, D.P. Gordon, G. Jordan, C. & Reidenbach, E. (1996) The empirical 
performance of cognitive moral development in predicting behavioural intent. 
Business Ethics Quarterly, 64(4), pp.493-517. 
 
Robin, D.P. & Reidenbach, R.E. (1990) Towards the development of a  
multidimensional scale for improving evaluations of business ethics, Journal of 
Business Ethics, 9(1990), pp.639-653. 
 
Robin, D.P. & Reidenbach, R.E. (1993) Searching for a place to stand: Toward a 
workable ethical philosophy for marketing. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 
12(1), pp.97-106. 
 
Robinson, J.P. & Shaver, P.R. (1969) Measures of social research. Ann Arbor: 
Institute of Social Research. 
 
Robson, C. (2002) Real world research. 2nd ed. Malden: Blackwell Publishing.  
 
  252 
Roman, M.D. Roman, M. & Talvan, M. (2012) A macroeconometrical model of 
sustainable fiscal policy. Study of Romania. International Journal of Trade, Economics 
and Finance, 3(1), pp.73-78. 
 
Roman, S. & Munuera, J.L. (2005) Determinants and consequences of ethical 
behaviour: An empirical study of salespeople. European Journal of Marketing, 
39(5/6), pp. 473-495. 
 
Ross, W.T. & Robertson, D.C. (2003) A typology of situational factors: Impact on 
salesperson decision-making about ethical issues. Journal of Business Ethics, 46(3), 
pp.213-235. 
 
Rubinstein, A. (1986) Finite automata play the repeated prisoner’s dilemma. Journal of 
Economic Theory, 39(1986), pp.83-96. 
 
Rungtusanatham, M. Wallin, C. & Eckerd, S. (2011) The vignette in a scenario-based 
role-playing experiment. Journal of Supply Chain Management, 47(3), pp.9-17. 
 
Russo, J.E. Carlson, K.A. & Meloy, M.G. (2006) Choosing an inferior alternative. 
Psychological Science, 17(10), pp.899-906. 
 
Sakalaki, M. Richardson, C. & Thépaut, Y. (2007) Machiavellianism and economic 
opportunism. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 27(6), pp.1181-1190. 
 
Sanyal, R. (2005) Determinants of bribery in international business: The cultural and 
economic factors. Journal of Business Ethics, 2005(59), pp.139-145. 
 
Saunders, M. Lewis, P. & Thornhill, A. (2007) Research methods for business 
students. 4th ed. London: Prentice Hall. 
 
Schepers, D.H. (2003) Machiavellianism, profit, and the dimensions of ethical 
judgment: A study of impact. Journal of Business Ethics, 42(4), pp.339-353. 
 
Schlegelmilch, B.B. & Robertson, D.C. (1995) The influence of country and industry 
on ethical perceptions of senior executives in the U.S. and Europe. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 26(4), pp.859-871. 
 
Scholtens, B. & Dam, L. (2007) Cultural values and international differences in 
business ethics. Journal of Business, 75(2007), pp.273-284. 
 
Schwartz, M.S. & Carroll, A.B. (2003) Corporate social responsibility: A three-
domain approach,” Business Ethics Quarterly, 13(4), pp.503-530.  
 
Schweitzer, M.E. Ordonez, L. & Douma, B. (2004). Goal setting as a motivator of 
unethical behavior. Academy of Management Journal,  47(3), pp.422-432. 
 
Schwepker, C.H.J. (1999a) Research note: The relationship between ethical conflict, 
organizational commitment and turnover intentions in the salesforce. The Journal of 
Personal Selling & Sales Management, 19(1), pp.43-50. 
 
  253 
Schwepker, C.H.J. (1999b) Understanding salespeople’s intention to behave 
unethically: The effects of perceived competitive intensity, cognitive moral 
development and moral judgement. Journal of Business Ethics, 21(4), pp.303-321. 
 
Schwepker, C.H.J. (2003) An exploratory investigation of the relationship between 
ethical conflict and salesperson performance. The Journal of Business & Industrial 
Marketing, 18(4/5), pp.435-447. 
 
Schwepker, C.H.J. Ferrell, O.C. & Ingram, T.N. (1997) The influence of ethical 
climate and ethical conflict on role stress in the sales force. Academy of Marketing 
Science, 25(2) 
 
Schwepker, C.H.J. & Good, D.J. (1999) The impact of sales quotas on moral judgment 
in the financial services industry. The Journal of Services Marketing, 13(1), pp.38-58. 
 
Schwepker, C.H.J. & Good, D.J. (2007) Exploring the relationships among sales 
manager goals, ethical behavior and professional commitment in the salesforce: 
Implications for forging customer relationships. Journal of Relationship Marketing, 
6(1), pp.3-21. 
 
Schwepker, C.H.J. & Good, D.J. (2011) Moral judgment and its impact on business-
to-business sales performance and customer relationships. Journal of Business Ethics, 
98(4), pp.609-625. 
 
Scott, R.J.Jr. (2002) Ethical decision-making: The link between ambiguity and 
accountability. Air & Space Power Journal. 
 
Seifert, B. Morris, S.A. & Bartkus, B.R. (2003) Comparing big givers and small 
givers: Financial correlates of corporate philanthropy. Journal of Business Ethics, 
45(2003), pp.195-211. 
 
Seleim, A. & Bontis, N. (2009) The relationship between culture and corruption: a 
cross-national study. Journal of Intellectual Capital, 10(1), pp.165-184. 
 
Seligman, A.B. (1991) Charisma and the transformation of grace in the early modern 
era. Social Research, 58(3), pp.591-620. 
 
Shapeero, M. Koh, H.C. & Killough, L.N. (2003) Underreporting and premature sign-
off in public accounting. Managerial Auditing Journal, 18(6/7), pp.478-490. 
 
Shleifer, A. (2004). Does competition destroy ethical behavior? The American 
Economic Review, 94(2), pp.414-420. 
 
Shulruf, B. Hattie, J. & Dixon, R. (2011) Intertwinement of individualist and 
collectivist attributes and response sets. Journal of Social, Evolutionary, and Cultural 
Psychology, 5(1), pp.51-65. 
 
Simes, R.J. (1996) An improved Bonferroni procedure for multiple tests of 
significance. Biometrika, 73(3), pp.751-754. 
 
  254 
Simon, H. (1976) Administrative behavior: A study of decision making in 
administrative organizations. New York: Free Press. 
 
Simon, H.A. (1955) A behavioural model for rational choice. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 69(1), pp.99-118. 
 
Simon, H.A. (1979) Rational decision making in business organizations. The 
American Economic Review, 69(4), pp.493-513. 
 
Simon, H.A. (1986) Rationality of psychology and economics. The Journal of 
Business, 59(4), pp.S209-S224. 
 
Sims, R.K. (1992). Linking groupthink to unethical behavior in organizations. Journal 
of Business Ethics, 11(9), pp.651-663.  
 
Sims, R.L. (2002) Ethical rule breaking by employees: A test of social bonding theory. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 40(2), pp.393-411. 
 
Singer, M. S. (1996) The role of moral intensity and fairness perception in judgments 
of ethicality: A comparison of managerial professionals and the general public, Journal 
of Business Ethics, 15(4), pp.469–474. 
 
Singer, M.S. & Singer, A.E. (1997) Observer judgments about moral agents’ ethical 
decisions: The role of justice and moral intensity. Journal of Business Ethics, 16(5), 
pp.473-485. 
 
Singhapakdi, A. (1993). Ethical perceptions of marketers: The interaction effects of 
Machiavellianism and organizational ethical culture. Journal of Business Ethics, 12(5), 
pp.407-419. 
 
Singhapakdi, A. Marta, J.K. Rallapalli, K.C. & Rao, C.P. (2000) Toward an 
understanding of religiousness and marketing ethics: An empirical study. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 27(4), pp.305-320. 
 
Singhapakdi, A. Marta, J.K.M. Rao, C.P. & Cicic, M. (2001) Is cross-cultural 
similarity an indicator of similar marketing ethics? Journal of Business Ethics, 32(1), 
pp.55-69. 
 
Singhapakdi, A. Rao, C.P. & Vitell, S. (1996) Ethical decision making: An 
investigation of services marketing professionals. Journal of Business Ethics, 15(6), 
pp.635-645. 
 
Singhapakdi, A. Salyachivin, S. Virakul, B. & Veerayangkur, V. (2000) Some 
important factors underlying ethical decision making of managers in Thailand. Journal 
of Business Ethics, 27(3), pp.271-285. 
 
Singhapakdi, A. & Vitell, S.J. (1991) Analyzing the ethical decision making of sales 
professionals. Journal of Personal Selling & Sales Management, 11 (4), pp.1-12. 
 
  255 
Singhapakdi, A. & Vitell, S.J. (1992) Marketing ethics: Sales professionals versus 
other marketing professionals. The Journal of Personal Selling & Sales Management, 
12(2), pp.27-39. 
 
Singhapakdi, A. & Vitell, S.J. (1993) Personal and professional values underlying the 
ethical judgments of marketers. Journal of Business Ethics, 12(7), pp.525-534. 
 
Singhapakdi, A. Vitell, S.J. & Franke, G.R. (1999). Antecedents, consequences, and 
mediating effects of perceived moral intensity and personal moral philosophies. 
Academy of Marketing Science, 27 (1), pp.19-36. 
 
Singhapakdi, A. Vitell, S.J. & Kraft, K.L. (1996) Moral intensity and ethical decision-
making of marketing professionals. Journal of Business Research, 36(3), pp.245-255. 
 
Singhapakdi, A. Vitell, S.J. Lee, D.J. Nisius, A.M. & Yu, G.B. (2012) The influence 
of love of money and religiosity on ethical decision-making in marketing. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 110(4), pp.1-9. 
 
Singhapakdi, A. Vitell, S.J. & Leelakulthanit, O. (1994) A cross-cultural study of 
moral philosophies, ethical perceptions and judgements. A comparison of American 
and Thai marketers. International Marketing Review, 11(6), pp.65-79. 
 
Siponen, M. & Vance, A. (2010) Neutralization: New insights into the problem of 
employee information systems security policy violations. MIS Quarterly, 34(3), 
pp.487-515. 
 
Siu, W.S. & Tam, K.C. (1995) Machiavellianism and Chinese banking executives in 
Hong Kong. The International Journal of Bank Marketing, 13(2), pp.15-22. 
 
Shapeero, M. Koh, H.C. & Killough, L.N. (2003) Underreporting and premature sign-
off in public accounting. Managerial Auditing Journal, 18(6/7), pp.478-490. 
 
Smith, A. (1759) The theory of moral sentiments. Indianapolis: Liberty Classics. 
 
Smith, A. (1776) An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations. 
Indianapolis: Liberty Classics. 
 
Smith, N.C. & Cooper-Martin, E. (1997) Ethics and target marketing: The role of 
product harm and consumer vulnerability. Journal of Marketing, 61(3), pp.1-21. 
 
Smith, N.C. Simpson, S.S. & Huang, C.Y. (2007) Why managers fail to do the right 
thing. Business Ethics Quarterly, 17(4), pp.633-667. 
 
Somer, S. (2011) The impact of credit card policies on small business. Communities & 
Banking, Summer(2011), pp.8-11. 
 
Sonenshein, S. (2007) The role of construction, intuition, and justification in 
responding to ethical issues at work: The sensemaking–intuition model. Academy of 
Management Review, 32(4), pp.1022–1040. 
 
  256 
Soper, D. (2011) A-priori sample size calculator for multiple regression. Data accessed 
November 14, 2011 from  http://www.danielsoper.com/statcalc3/calc.aspx?id=1 
 
Sorell, T. & Hendry, J. (1994) Business ethics. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann Ltd. 
 
Sparks, J.R. & Hunt, S.D. (1998) Marketing researcher ethical sensitivity: 
Conceptualization, measurement, and exploratory investigation. Journal of Marketing, 
62 (2), pp.92-110. 
 
Spector M. (2007) Taming the beast: Payday loans, regulatory efforts, and unintended 
consequences. DePaul Law Review, 57(961), pp.961-997. 
 
Spencer, H. (1851) Social statics. London: John Chapman. 
 
Spencer, H. (1872) Mr. Martineau on evolution, Reprinted Essays, II, pp.371-388. 
 
Squires, G. D. & Hyra, D. S. (2010) Foreclosures — yesterday, today, and tomorrow. 
City & Community, 9, pp.50–60. 
 
Statman, M. (2009) The cultures of insider trading. Journal of Business Ethics, 
89(2009), pp.51-58. 
 
Steidlmeier, P. (1999) Gift giving, bribery and corruption: Ethical management of 
business relationships in China. Journal of Business Ethics, 20(2), pp.121-133. 
 
Stein, E.W. & Ahmad, N. (2009) Using the analytical hierarchy process (AHP) to 
construct a measure of the magnitude of consequences component of moral intensity. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 89(3), pp.391-407. 
 
Stevens, G.W. Deuling, J.K. & Armenakis, A.A. (2012) Successful psychopaths: Are 
they unethical decision-makers and why? Journal of Business Ethics, 105(2012), 
pp.139-149. 
 
Street, S. & Street, V.L. (2006) The effects of escalating commitment on ethical 
decision-making. Journal of Business Ethics, 64(2006), pp.343-356. 
 
Su, Z. & Richelieu, A. (1999) Western managers working in Romania: Perception and 
attitude regarding business ethics. Journal of Business Ethics, 20(2), pp.133-147. 
 
Sullivan, R.J. & Allen, J.S. (1999) Social deficits associated with schizophrenia 
defined in terms of interpersonal Machiavellianism. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 
99(1999), pp.148-154. 
 
Svensson, G. & Wood, G. (2003) The dynamics of business ethics: A function of time 
and culture--cases and models. Management Decision, 41(4), pp.350-362. 
 
Sykes, G.M. & Matza, D. (1957) Techniques of neutralization: A theory of 
delinquency. American Sociological Review, 22(6), pp.664–670. 
 
  257 
Tadepalli, R. (1995) Measuring customer orientation of a salesperson: Modifications 
of the Soco scale. Psychology & Marketing, 12(3), pp.177-187. 
 
Takala, T. & Urpilainen, J. (1999) Managerial work and lying: A conceptual 
framework and an explorative case study. Journal of Business Ethics, 20(3), pp.181-
196. 
 
Tang, T.L.P. & Chen, Y.J. (2008) Intelligence vs. wisdom: The love of money, 
Machiavellianism, and unethical behavior across college major and gender. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 82 (1), pp.1-26. 
 
Tang, T.L.P. Chen, Y.J. & Sutarso, T. (2008) Bad apples in bad (business) barrels; 
The love of money, Machiavellianism, risk tolerance, and unethical behavior. 
Management Decision, 46 (2), pp.243-263. 
 
Tang, T.L.P. & Chiu, R.K. (2003) Income, money ethic, pay satisfaction, commitment, 
and unethical behavior: Is the love of money the root of evil for Hong Kong 
employees? Journal of Business Ethics, 46 (1), pp.13-30. 
 
Tashman, H.M. (2007) The subprime lending industry: An industry in crisis. Banking 
Law Journal, 124(5), pp.407-419. 
 
Tenbrunsel, A.E. (1998) Misrepresentation and expectations of misrepresentation in an 
ethical dilemma: The role of incentives and temptation. Academy of Management 
Journal, 41 (3), pp.330-340. 
 
Tepper, B.J. (2010) When managers pressure employees to behave badly: Toward a 
comprehensive response. Business Horizons, 53(2010), pp.591-598. 
 
The Economist. 2003. Business: Big oil’s dirty secrets; Corporate ethics. 367(8323), 
pp.62-63. 
 
Thomson, J.J. (1986) The trolley problem. Yale Law Journal, 94(1986), pp.1395-1415. 
 
Tiwana, A. & Keil, M. (2007) Does peripheral knowledge complement control? An 
empirical test in technology outsourcing alliances. Strategic Management Journal, 
28(2007), pp.623-634. 
 
Trevino, L.K. (1986) Ethical decision making in organizations: A person-situation 
interactionist model. Academy of Management Review, 11(3), pp.601-617. 
 
Trevino, L.K. Weaver, G.R. & Reynolds, S.J. (2006) Behavioural ethics in 
organizations: A review. Journal of Management, 32(2006), pp.951-992. 
 
Trevino, L.K. & Youngblood, S.A. (1990) Bad apples in bad barrels: A causal analysis 
of ethical decision-making behavior. Journal of Applied Psychology, 75(4), pp.378-
385. 
 
Tribue, E.V. (2009) Manage risk, issuers, don’t run from it. American Banker, 
174(117), pp.9-18. 
  258 
Trotter, R.C. Day, S.G. & Love, A.E. (1989) Bhopal, India and Union Carbide: The 
second tragedy. Journal of Business Ethics, 8(6), pp.439-455. 
 
Tsalikis, J. & Fritzsche, D.J. (1989) Business ethics: A literature review with a focus 
on market. Journal of Business Ethics, 8(9), pp.695-744. 
 
Tsang, J.A. (2002). Moral rationalization and the integration of situational factors and 
psychological processes in immoral behavior. Review of General Psychology, 6(1), 
pp.25-50. 
 
Tse, D.K. Lee, K.H. Vertinsky, I. & Wehrung, D.A. (1988) Does culture matter? A 
cross-cultural study of executives' choice, decisiveness, and risk adjustment in 
international marketing. Journal of Marketing, 52 (4), pp.81-96. 
 
Tsui, J. & Windsor, C. (2001). Some cross-cultural evidence on ethical reasoning. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 31(2), pp.143-151. 
 
Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1992) Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative 
representation of uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5(1992), pp.297-323. 
 
Tyson, T. (1990) Believing that everyone else is less ethical: Implications for work 
behavior and ethics instruction. Journal of Business Ethics, 9(1990), pp.715-721. 
 
Valentine, S. & Barnett, T. (2007). Perceived organizational ethics and the ethical 
decisions of sales and marketing personnel. Journal of Personal Selling & Sales 
Management, 27(4), pp.373-388. 
 
Valentine, S. & Bateman, C. (2011) The impact of ethical ideologies, moral intensity, 
and social context on sales-based ethical reasoning. Journal of Business Ethics, 102(1), 
pp.155-168. 
 
Valentine, S. & Hollingworth, D. (2012) Moral intensity, issue importance, and ethical 
reasoning in operations situations. Journal of Business Ethics, 108(2012), pp.509-523. 
 
van Griethuysen, P. (2010) Why are we growth-addicted? The hard way towards 
degrowth in the involutionary western development path. Journal of Cleaner 
Production, 18 (6), pp.590–595. 
 
van Zyl, E. & Lazenby, K. (2002) The Relation Between Ethical Behaviour and 
Workstress Amongst a Group of Managers Working in Affirmative Action Positions. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 40(2002), pp.111-119. 
 
Verbeke, W.J.M.I. Rietdijk, W.J.R. van den Berg, W.E. Dietvorst, R.C. Worm, L. & 
Bagozzi, R. (2011) The making of the Machiavellian brain: A structural MRI analysis. 
Journal of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics, 4(4), pp.205-216. 
 
Verhezen V. (2010) Giving voice in a culture of silence. From a culture of compliance 
to a culture of integrity. Journal of Business Ethics, 96(2), pp.187–206. 
 
  259 
Vitell, S.J. & Festervand, T.A. (1987) Business ethics: Conflicts, practices and beliefs 
of industrial executives. Journal of Business Ethics, 6(2), pp.111-123. 
 
Vitell, S.J. & Grove, S.J. (1987) Marketing ethics and the techniques of neutralization. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 6(6), pp.433-438. 
 
Vitell, S.J. & Ho, F.N. (1997) Ethical decision making in marketing: A synthesis and 
evaluation of scales measuring the various components of decision making in ethical 
situations. Journal of Business Ethics, 16 (7), pp.699-717. 
 
Wagner, S. C. & Sanders, G.L. (2001) Considerations in ethical decision-making and 
software piracy, Journal of Business Ethics, 29(1/2), pp.161–167. 
 
Wahn, J. (1993) Organizational dependence and the likelihood of complying with 
organizational pressures to behave unethically. Journal of Business Ethics, 12(1993), 
pp.245-261. 
 
Waldmann, E. (2000) Incorporating Freud’s theory on cognitive processes into 
business ethics education. Teaching Business Ethics, 4(3), pp.257-269. 
 
Wang, L. & Juslin, H. (2009) The Impact of Chinese culture on corporate social 
responsibility: The harmony approach. Journal of Business Ethics, 88(3), pp.433-453. 
 
Ward, D.A. & Beck, W.L. (1990) Gender & Dishonesty. The Journal of Social 
Psychology, 130(3), pp.333-339. 
 
Weber, J. (1992) Scenarios in business ethics research: Review, critical assessment, 
and recommendations. Business Ethics Quarterly, 21(2), pp.137-162. 
 
Weeks, W.A. Moore, C.W. McKinney, J.A. & Longenecker, J.G. (1999) The effects 
of gender and career stage on ethical judgment. Journal of Business Ethics, 20(1999), 
pp.301-313. 
 
Weijters, B. Cabooter, E. & Schillewaert, N. (2010) The effect of rating scale format 
on response styles: The number of response categories and response category labels. 
International Journal of Research in Marketing, 27(2010), pp.236-247. 
 
Wells, T. & Graafland, J. (2012) Adam Smith’s bourgeois virtues in competition, 
Business Ethics Quarterly, 22(2), pp.319-350. 
 
Werhane, P.H. (2000) Business ethics and the origins of contemporary capitalism: 
Economics and ethics in the work of Adam Smith and Herbert Spencer, Journal of 
Business Ethics, 24(3), pp. 185-199. 
 
Wertz, C. Linn, R. & Joreskog, K. (1974) Intraclass reliability estimates: Testing 
structural assumptions. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 34(1), 25–33. 
 
Whalen, J. Pitts, R.E. & Wong, J.K. (1991) Exploring the structure of ethical 
attributions as a component of the consumer decision model: The vicarious versus 
personal perspective. Journal of Business Ethics, 10(1991), pp.283-293. 
  260 
Whitcomb, L.L. Erdener, C.B. & Li, C. (1998) Business ethical values in China and 
the U.S. Journal of Business Ethics, 17(8), pp.839-852. 
 
White, M.J. (2007) Bankruptcy reform and credit cards. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 21(4), pp.175-199. 
 
Wright, B. (2005) Researching internet-based populations: Advantages and 
disadvantages of online survey research, online questionnaire authoring software 
packages, and web survey services. Journal of Computer-mediated Communication, 
10(3), pp.1-24. 
 
Wicks, A.C. Freeman, R.E. Werhane, P.H. & Martin, K.E. (2010) Business ethics. A 
managerial approach. Upper Saddle River: Pearson Education Inc. 
 
Wilson, B.A. (2008) Predicting intended unethical behavior of business students. 
Journal of Education for Business, March/April(2008), pp.187-197. 
 
Wilson, D.S. Near, D. & Miller, R.R. (1996) Machiavellianism: A synthesis of the 
evolutionary and psychological literatures. Psychological Bulletin, 119(2), pp.285-
299. 
 
Woiceshyn, J. (2011) A model for ethical decision making in business: Reasoning, 
intuition, and rational moral principles. Journal of Business Ethics, 104(3), pp.311-
323. 
 
Wood, J.A. Longenecker, J.G. McKinney, J.A. & Moore, C.W. (1988) Ethical 
attitudes of students and business professionals: A study of moral reasoning. Journal 
of Business Ethics, 7 (4), pp.249-257. 
 
Wotruba, T.R. (1990) A comprehensive framework for the analysis of ethical 
behavior, with a focus on sales organizations. The Journal of Personal Selling & Sales 
Management, 10(2), pp.29-43. 
 
Yang, C. (1996) Egoism: Adam Smith’s theory and Chinese traditional ideologies 
compared, International Journal of Social Economics, 23(4,5,6), pp.326-331. 
 
Zarkada-Fraser, A. & Fraser, C. (2001) Moral decision making in international sales 
negotiations. The Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing, 16(4), pp.274-292. 
 
Zey-Ferrell, M. Weaver, K.M. & Ferrell, O.C. (1979) Predicting unethical behavior 
among marketing practitioners. Human Relations, 32(7), pp.557-569. 
 
Zhu, W. & Yao, Y. (2008) On the value of traditional Confucian culture and the value 
of modern corporate social responsibility, International Journal of Business and 
Management, 3(2), pp.58-63. 
 
Zhuang, G. & Tsang, A.S.L. (2008) A study on ethically problematic selling methods 
in China with a broaden concept of gray-marketing. Journal of Business Ethics, 79(1-
2), pp.85-101.  
 
  261 
Zimbardo, P.G. (1973) On the ethics of intervention in human psychological research: 
With special reference to the Stanford prison experiment. Cognition, 2(2), pp.254-256. 
 
Zouboulakis, M.S. (2001) From Mill to Weber: The meaning of the concept of 
economic rationality. The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 8(1), 
pp.30–41. 
 
Zyglidopoulos, S. & Fleming, P. (2011) Corporate accountability and the politics of 
visibility in ‘late modernity’. Organization, 18(5), pp. 691-706. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  262 
Appendix A – Types of Ethically Questionable Behaviours in Business Ethics 
 
SOURCE TYPE OF BEHAVIOUR 
(Abdolmohammadi & Sultan, 2002) Insider trading 
(Abratt, Nel & Higgs, 1992) Gift-giving and insider trading 
(Ahmed, Chung & Eichenseher, 2003) Deception and consumer exploitation 
(Al-Khatib, Vollmers & Liu, 2007) Deceptive negotiating 
(Ang & Leong, 2000) Gift-giving   
(Armstong, 1996) Gift-giving and bribery 
(Armstrong & Sweeney, 1994) Gift-giving, bribery, and inappropriate products 
(Au & Tse, 2001) Harmful products, deception, and bribery 
(Badenhorst, 1994) Bribery 
(Barnett, Bass, Brown & Hebert, 1998) Industrial espionage and bribery 
(Bass, Barnett & Brown, 1999) Gift-giving, industrial espionage, and preferential treatment 
(Batory, Neese & Batory, 2005)  Pollution 
(Baughn, Bodie, Buchanan & Bixby, 2010) Bribery 
(Beams, Brown & Killough, 2003) Insider trading 
(Belk, Devinney & Eckhardt, 2005) Poor labour conditions 
(Bellizzi & Hite, 1989) Deception 
(Bellizzi, 1995) Territory raiding 
(Bersoff, 1999) Corruption 
(Burnaz, Atakan, Topcu & Singhapakdi, 
2009) Deception 
(Butterfield, Trevino & Weaver, 1996) Industrial espionage   
(Cadogan, Lee, Tarkiainen & Sundqvist, 
2009) Deception and gift-giving 
(Carson, Wokutch & Cox, 1985) Deception   
(Carson, 1998) Deception 
(Chan & Armstrong, 1999) Gift-giving and bribery 
(Cherry, Lee & Chien, 2003) Bribery 
(Cherry, 2006) Bribery 
(Chung, Eichenseher & Taniguchi, 2008) Deception 
          Continued… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  263 
SOURCE TYPE OF BEHAVIOUR 
(Cleek & Leonard, 1998) Pollution 
(Coyne & Traflet, 2008) Deception 
(Cragg, 1998) Bribery 
(DeConinck, 2003) Deception 
(Donoho, Polonsky, Roberts & Cohen, 2001) Deception and whistle-blowing 
(Dubinsky, Jolson & Kotabe, 1991) Back-door selling, gift-giving, and industrial espionage 
(Dubinsky, Nataraajan & Huang, 2004) Deception 
(Dunfee, Smith & William, 1999) Bribery 
(Dunkelberg & Jessup, 2001) Fraud and insider trading 
(Ferrell & Weaver, 1978) Improper use of company assets and gift-giving  
(Folkes & Kamins, 1999) Poor labour practices 
(Fraedrich, Ferrell & Pride, 1989) Manipulation and exploitation 
(Fraedrich, 1993) Industrial espionage and bribery 
(Free & Radcliffe, 2009) Bribery 
(Gino, Ayal & Ariely, 2009) Dishonesty and cheating for financial gain 
(Grayson, 2006) Pollution and poor labour practices 
(Grover & Hui, 1994) Deception 
(Gurley, Wood & Nijhawan, 2007) Deception, fraud, and insider trading 
(Hegarty & Sims, 1978) Bribery 
(Hegarty & Sims, 1979) Bribery 
(Henthorne, Robin & Reidenbach, 1992) Deception and consumer exploitation 
(Ho, 2010) Gift-giving, low quality products, and pollution  
(Honeycutt, Glassman, Zugelder & Karande, 
2001) Deception 
(Howe, Hoffman & Hardigree, 1994) Deception and disparaging a competitor 
(Hunt, Chonko & Wilcox, 1984) Gift-giving and bribery 
(Hunt & Vasquez-Parraga, 1993) Deception 
(Jehn & Scott, 2008) Deception 
(Jones & Kavanagh, 1996) Deception 
(Karpatkin, 1999) Predatory lending, advertising to children, and poor labour practices 
(Keith, Pettijohn, & Burnett, 2008) Deception and bribery 
(Kellaris, Dahlstrom & Boyle, 1996)  Disparaging a competitor and bribery 
(Kelley, Ferrell & Skinner, 1990) Deception 
(Kennedy & Lawton, 1998) Bribery, pollution, conflict of interest 
(Kim & Chun, 2003) Bribery, price gouging, deception, harmful products, industrial espionage 
(Kurland, 1996) Deception 
(Laczniak & Inderrieden, 1987) Low quality products, bribery, and intelligence gathering 
(Lam & Shi, 2008) Pollution, bribery, piracy, and low quality products 
(Lee, Beatson, Garrett, Lings & Zhang, 2009) Deception 
(Leung, Liu & Liu, 2009) Deception 
(Lewicki & Robinson, 1998) Deceptive negotiating 
          Continued… 
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SOURCE TYPE OF BEHAVIOUR 
(Lund, 2000) False advertising, bribery, conflict of interest, and harmful product 
(Malinowski & Berger, 2007) 
Pollution, bribery, abusive testing conditions, and exploitive target 
marketing 
(Mantel, 2005) Back-door selling 
(Marta & Singhapakdi, 2005) Deception 
(Marta, Singhapakdi & Kraft, 2008) Deception 
(Marta, Heiss & De Lurgio, 2008) Deception 
(Martinson & Ziegenfuss, 2000) Pollution and falsifying financial statements 
(Mascarenhas, 1995) Consumer exploitation and harmful products 
(May & Pauli, 2002) Pollution and harmful products 
(Mazar, Amir & Ariely, 2008) Deception for financial gain 
(McDonald & Kan, 1997) 
Industrial espionage, deception, exploitation, insider trading, and 
bribery 
(McDonald & Zepp, 1988) Bribery, industrial espionage, and deception  
(Millington, Eberhardt & Wilkinson, 2005) Bribery 
(Nill & Schibrowsky, 2005) Underreporting and manipulating sales figures 
(Nonis & Swift, 2001) Deception and consumer exploitation 
(Nwachukwu & Vitell, 1997) Advertising harmful products and consumer exploitation 
(Nyaw & Ng, 1994) Deception, poor labour practices, industrial espionage, and pollution  
(O'Higgins & Kelleher, 2005) Unfair pricing, pollution, bribery, and deception 
(Olivette, 1995) Deception and consumer exploitation 
(Paolillo & Vitell, 2002) Bribery and offensive advertising 
(Powpaka, 2002) Bribery 
(Premeaux & Mondy, 1993) Pollution, industrial espionage, harmful products, and bribery  
(Rao & Singhapakdi, 1997) Deception 
(Robertson & Anderson, 1993) Deception and gift-giving 
(Roman & Munuera, 2005) Deception 
(Sanyal, 2005) Bribery 
(Schlegelmilch & Robertson, 1995) Bribery, industrial espionage, and theft   
(Scholtens & Dam, 2007) Poor labour practices and bribery 
(Schweitzer, Ordonez & Douma, 2004) Deception 
(Schwepker & Good, 2007) Deception and exploitation 
(Schwepker & Good, 1999) Deception 
(Schwepker, 1999a) Deception and exploitation 
(Schwepker, 1999b) Deception and exploitation 
(Schwepker, 2003) Deception and exploitation 
(Schwepker, Ferrell & Ingram, 1997) Deception and low quality products 
(Seleim & Bontis, 2009) Bribery 
(Shapeero, Koh & Killough, 2003) Deception 
(Shleifer, 2004) Poor labour practices, bribery, and deception 
(Sims, 1992) Low quality products 
(Sims, 2002) Deception 
(Singhapakdi & Vitell, 1991) Bribery 
(Singhapakdi & Vitell, 1992) Bribery 
        Continued… 
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SOURCE TYPE OF BEHAVIOUR 
(Singhapakdi & Vitell, 1993) Deception and consumer exploitation 
(Singhapakdi, Vitell & Leelakulthanit, 1994) Deception and consumer exploitation 
(Singhapakdi, Rao & Vitell, 1996) Deception and consumer exploitation 
(Singhapakdi, Vitell & Franke, 1999)  Deception 
(Singhapakdi, Salyachivin, Virakul, & 
Veerayangkur, 2000) Deception 
(Singhapakdi, Marta, Rao & Cicic, 2001) Deception 
(Singhapakdi, 1993) Bribery 
(Singhapakdi, Marta, Rallapalli & Rao, 2000) Deception 
(Siu & Lam, 2009) Pollution, bribery, gift-giving, harmful products, and deception 
(Smith & Cooper-Martin, 1997) Target marketing (tobacco and financial products) 
(Sparks & Hunt, 1998) Deception 
(Statman, 2009) Insider trading 
(Street & Street, 2006) Insider trading 
(Steidlmeier, 1999) Bribery 
(Su & Richelieu, 1999) Bribery 
(Svensson & Wood, 2003) Harmful products 
(Takala & Urpilainen, 1999) Deception 
(Tang & Chen, 2008) Deception and bribery 
(Tang & Chiu, 2003) Gift-giving 
(Tang, Chen & Sutarso, 2008) Deception and bribery 
(Tenbrunsel, 1998) Deceptive negotiating 
(Trevino & Youngblood, 1990) Poor quality products and bribery   
(Tse, Lee, Vertinsky & Wehrung, 1988) Faulty products 
(Tyson, 1990) Bribery, deception, and harmful products  
(Valentine & Barnett, 2007) Deception 
(van Zyl  & Lazenby, 2002)  Insider trading, gift-giving, and deception 
(Vitell & Festervand, 1987) Bribery and industrial espionage 
(Whalen, Pitts & Wong, 1999)  Poor quality products and consumer exploitation 
(Whitcomb, Erdener & Li, 1998) Industrial espionage, pollution, harmful product, and bribery 
(Wilson, 2008) Inappropriate use of company resources and gift-giving 
(Wood, Longenecker, McKinney & Moore, 
1988) 
Pollution, bribery, industrial espionage, insider trading, and harmful 
product 
(Zarkada-Fraser & Fraser, 2001) Deceptive negotiating 
(Zey-Ferrell, Weaver & Ferrell, 1979)  Gift-giving and deception 
(Zhuang & Tsang, 2008) Gift-giving and bribery 
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Appendix B – Development of Questionnaire Items 
 
Variable Source Questionnaire Items (7 – point 
rating scale)  
Ethical judgment  The ethical judgment scale is based on Dabholkar and Kellaris’s 
(1992) six-item instrument. The question, which followed with 7-
point semantic differential anchors, stated “now, given the limited 
information available, how would you evaluate the salesman’s 
behaviour described above?” The anchors included: 
acceptable/unacceptable, ethical/unethical, correct/incorrect, 
moral/immoral, right/wrong, and good/bad. To reduce the items 
to four, which was conducted by Cherry and Fraedrich (2000), the 
instrument for this study used acceptable/unacceptable, 
ethical/unethical, right/wrong, and good/bad anchors (composite 
reliability = 0.98). 
If (Q1) the cost-reductions were 
provided (Q2) the order was 
produced (Q3) the project was 
managed, how would you evaluate 
Jessie’s behaviour? Please respond 
using the following scales: a) ethical 
(1 on Likert-scale) –unethical (7 on 
Likert-scale), b) acceptable (1 on 
Likert-scale) – unacceptable (7 on 
Likert-scale), c) right (1 on Likert-
scale) –wrong (7 on Likert-scale), d) 
good (1 on Likert-scale)– bad (7 on 
Likert-scale). 
 
Unethical intentions: 
projective technique.  
The unethical Intentions projective technique item was modified 
from Robertson and Anderson’s (1993) work. Specifically, “in each 
scenario, the respondent indicated on a 7-point scale (definitely 
should – definitely should not) whether his/her colleague, John, 
should undertake an action suggested in the scenario.”  
In this situation, Jessie should (Q4) 
provide the cost-reductions (Q5) 
produce the order (Q6) manage the 
project. Definitely should (7 on 
Likert-scale) – definitely should not (1 
on Likert-scale). 
Unethical intention: 
direct items 
The unethical intentions direct items were modified from Cherry 
and Fraedrich’s (2000) work that was based on Fritzsche and 
Becker’s (1984) scale. Specifically, a four-item 7-point semantic 
differential scale with poles: definitely would/definitely would not, 
likely/unlikely, possible/impossible and probable/improbable, was 
used. The item stated “if you were responsible, what are the 
chances you would make the payment (composite reliability = 
0.99).” 
If you were responsible, what are the 
chances you would (Q7) provide the 
cost-reductions? (Q8) produce the 
order? (Q9) manage the project? 
Please respond using the following 
scales: a) definitely would (7 on 
Likert-scale) – definitely would not (1 
on Likert-scale), b) likely (7 on Likert-
scale) – unlikely (1 on Likert-scale), c) 
probable (7 on Likert-scale) – 
improbable (1 on Likert-scale), d) 
possible (7 on Likert-scale) – 
impossible (1 on Likert-scale). 
Social Consensus One social consensus item was based on Minor (1981) and 
Agnew’s (1994) work. Minor (1981) asked participants to respond 
to the following item using a 5-point Likert scale of 
agree/disagree. “It is all right for J. to do this, whatever the 
reason.” Somewhat divergently, Agnew (1994) used the question 
“how wrong is it for someone your age to hit or threaten to hit 
someone without any reason. The anchors were very wrong to not 
wrong at all.  
It is alright for marketers to (Q10) 
deceive customers (Q11) pollute the 
environment (Q12) exploit 
consumers without any reason. 
Strongly agree (1 on Likert-scale) – 
strongly disagree (7 on Likert-scale). 
 
Social Consensus The other social consensus item was modified from Singhapakdi et 
al.’s (1996) work using agree/disagree anchors. Specifically, 
Singhapakdi et al. (1996) used “most people would agree that the 
[marketer’s] action is wrong (composite reliability = 0.76).” 
If Jessie (Q13) provides the cost-
reductions, (Q14) produces the 
order, (Q15) manages the project, 
most people would agree the action 
is wrong. Strongly agree (7 on Likert-
scale) – strongly disagree (1 on 
Likert-scale). 
Magnitude of 
consequences 
(others) 
The magnitude of consequences (others) was adapted from 
McMahon and Harvey’s (2006) work. The researchers developed 
their perceived moral intensity questionnaire using the work of 
Singhapakdi et al. (1996) and Frey (2000). The questionnaire used 
a 7-point Likert-type scale with agree to disagree anchors. The 
items included: "the negative consequences (if any) of the 
decision will be very serious (reverse scored)” and “the overall 
harm (if any) as a result of the decision will be very small 
(composite reliability = 0.87).” 
(Q16) If Jessie provides the cost-
reductions, (Q17) If Jessie produces 
the order, (Q18) If Jessie manages 
the project, the negative 
consequences (if any) of the decision 
will be very serious. Strongly agree (7 
on Likert-scale) – strongly disagree (1 
on Likert-scale). 
(Q19) If Jessie provides the cost-
reductions, (Q20) If Jessie produces 
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the order, (Q21) If Jessie manages 
the project, the overall harm (if any) 
as a result of the decision will be very 
small. Strongly agree (1 on Likert-
scale) – strongly disagree (7 on 
Likert-scale). 
 
Magnitude of 
consequences (self) 
 
The magnitude of consequences (self) questionnaire items were 
adapted from McMahon and Harvey’s (2006) work. The 
researchers developed their perceived moral intensity 
questionnaire using the work of Singhapakdi et al. (1996) and Frey 
(2000). Their questionnaire used a 7-point Likert-type scale with 
agree to disagree anchors. The items included: "the negative 
consequences (if any) of the decision will be very serious (reverse 
scored)” and “the overall harm (if any) as a result of the decision 
will be very small (composite reliability = 0.85).” 
(Q22) If Jessie refuses the cost-
reductions, (Q23) If Jessie rejects the 
order, (Q24) If Jessie refuses to 
manage the project, the negative 
consequences (if any) of the decision 
will be very serious. Strongly agree (1 
on Likert-scale) – strongly disagree (7 
on Likert-scale). 
(Q25) If Jessie refuses the cost-
reductions, (Q26) If Jessie rejects the 
order, (Q27) If Jessie refuses to 
manage the project, the overall harm 
(if any) as a result of the decision will 
be very small. Strongly agree (7 on 
Likert-scale) – strongly disagree (1 on 
Likert-scale). 
Denial of 
responsibility 
Techniques of neutralization – denial of responsibility was adapted 
from the literature using Anand et al.’s (2005) contextualization. 
Specifically, the researchers argue that “actors construe that they 
have no choice due to circumstances beyond their control such as 
management orders, peer pressure, and dire financial straits, 
etc…” For the scale, Agnew’s (1994) five-point rating scale was 
used. The researcher asked participants to agree or disagree with 
four statements. As an example using the denial of victim, 
participants were asked “it is alright to beat up people if they 
started the fight.” Siponen and Vance’s (2010) work was also used. 
Within the defence of necessity context, the researchers asked 
participants to agree or disagree with “it is all right to violate the 
company information security policy when you are under a tight 
deadline”.  
It is alright to (Q28) implement a 
package downsizing strategy (Q29) 
temporarily increase emissions 
beyond a safe level (Q30) manage a 
subprime lending project if there is 
no other option. Strongly agree (7 on 
Likert-scale) – strongly disagree (1 on 
Likert-scale). 
 
Denial of injury Techniques of neutralization – denial of injury was modified from 
Agnew’s (1994) five-point rating scale. The researcher asked 
participants to agree or disagree with four statements. As an 
example within the context of the denial of victim, participants 
were asked “it is alright to beat up people if they started the 
fight.” Siponen and Vance (2010) was also used. The researchers 
asked participants to agree or disagree with “it is OK to violate the 
company information security policy if no harm is done.”  
It is alright to (Q31) implement a 
package downsizing strategy (Q32) 
temporarily increase emissions 
beyond a safe level (Q33) manage a 
subprime lending project if no harm 
is done. Strongly agree (7 on Likert-
scale) – strongly disagree (1 on 
Likert-scale). 
 
Legality Techniques of neutralization – legality was adapted from the 
literature using Ashforth and Anand’s (2003) contextualization. 
The researchers argued that “actors may excuse corrupt practices 
on the grounds that they are not actually illegal.” For the scale, 
Agnew’s (1994) five-point rating scale was used. The researcher 
asked participants to agree or disagree with four statements. As 
an example of the denial of victim, participants were asked “it is 
alright to beat up people if they started the fight.” Siponen and 
Vance’s (2010) work was also used. Within the defence of 
necessity context, the researchers asked participants to agree or 
disagree with “it is all right to violate the company information 
security policy when you are under a tight deadline.”  
It is alright to (Q34) implement a 
package downsizing strategy (Q35) 
temporarily increase emissions 
beyond a safe level (Q36) manage a 
subprime lending project if no law is 
broken. Strongly agree (7 on Likert-
scale) – strongly disagree (1 on 
Likert-scale). 
 
Denial of victim  Techniques of neutralization – denial of victim was adapted from 
the literature using Ashforth and Anand’s (2003) work. It was 
argued that “the ‘victim’ volunteered to participate in the act and 
so is not a victim at all.” In addition, Ashforth and Anand (2003) 
further argued a person or group could be denied victim status 
It is alright to (Q37) implement a 
package downsizing strategy (Q38) 
temporarily increase emissions 
beyond a safe level (Q39) manage a 
subprime lending project if (Q37) 
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“through depersonalization (the victim is an interchangeable 
member of a social category) or of the victim’s very humanity 
through dehumanization (the victim is an object or of a lesser 
species).” For the scale, Agnew’s (1994) five-point rating scale was 
used. The researcher asked participants to agree or disagree with 
four statements. As an example, “it is alright to beat up people if 
they started the fight.” Siponen and Vance’s (2010) work was also 
used. Within the defence of necessity context, the researchers 
asked participants to agree or disagree with “it is all right to 
violate the company information security policy when you are 
under a tight deadline.”  
consumers will continue purchasing 
the product (Q38) it only affects 
people living abroad (Q39) borrowers 
seek credit. Strongly agree (7 on 
Likert-scale) – strongly disagree (1 on 
Likert-scale). 
 
Appeal to higher 
loyalties: Employer 
Techniques of neutralization – appeal to higher loyalties was 
modified from the literature using Vitell and Grove’s (1987) work. 
It was argued that “in special circumstances [the individual] feels a 
greater loyalty to the norms and values of some subgroup.” “One 
must have loyalty to the corporation, once hired.” For the scale, 
Agnew’s (1994) five-point rating scale was used. The researcher 
asked participants to agree or disagree with four statements. As 
an example using the denial of victim, participants were asked “it 
is alright to beat up people if they started the fight.” Siponen and 
Vance’s (2010) work was also used. Within the defence of 
necessity context, the researchers asked participants to agree or 
disagree with “it is all right to violate the company information 
security policy when you are under a tight deadline.”  
It is alright to (Q40) implement a 
package downsizing strategy (Q41) 
temporarily increase emissions 
beyond a safe level (Q42) manage a 
subprime lending project if your 
employer benefits. Strongly agree (7 
on Likert-scale) – strongly disagree (1 
on Likert-scale). 
 
Appeal to higher 
loyalties: Family 
Techniques of neutralization – appeal to higher loyalties was 
modified from the literature using Perreti-Watel’s (2003) 
contextualization that stated “the delinquent justifies a temporary 
violation of the laws because he had to bow to a stronger 
commitment (family, friendship…)” Heath (2008) stated “I did it 
for my family, remains one of the most popular excuses for 
occupational crime…” For the scale, Agnew’s (1994) five-point 
rating scale was used. The researcher asked participants to agree 
or disagree with four statements. As an example using the denial 
of victim, “it is alright to beat up people if they started the fight.” 
Siponen and Vance’s (2010) work was also used. Within the 
defence of necessity, the researchers asked participants to agree 
or disagree with “it is all right to violate the company information 
security policy when you are under a tight deadline.”  
It is alright to (Q43) implement a 
package downsizing strategy (Q44) 
temporarily increase emissions 
beyond a safe level (Q45) manage a 
subprime lending project if your 
family benefits. Strongly agree (7 on 
Likert-scale) – strongly disagree (1 on 
Likert-scale). 
 
Defence of necessity Techniques of neutralization – defence of necessity was modified 
from the literature using Minor’s (1981) contextualization stating 
“if an act is perceived as necessary, then one need not feel guilty 
about its commission, even if it is considered morally wrong in the 
abstract (p.298).” In addition, Gray (2006) argued “the related 
technique of neutralization – defence of necessity – was also 
evident because the supervisor tried to encourage me to not feel 
guilty because running the line in an unsafe manner was 
absolutely necessary if we wished to avoid a future contract loss 
and, in turn, possible lay-offs for workers (p. 881).” For the scale, 
Siponen and Vance (2010) developed items using a Likert format 
of agree or disagree for three statements. As an example, “it is all 
right to violate the company information security policy when you 
are under a tight deadline (composite reliability = 0.96).” 
It is alright to (Q46) implement a 
package downsizing strategy (Q47) 
temporarily increase emissions 
beyond a safe level (Q48) manage a 
subprime lending project if you could 
be fired if you didn’t. Strongly agree 
(7 on Likert-scale) – strongly disagree 
(1 on Likert-scale). 
Social Weighting Techniques of neutralization – social weighting was adapted from 
the literature using Anand et al.’s (2005) contextualization that 
stated “individuals may characterize the law as vague, complex, 
inconsistent, rarely enforced, punitive, or politically motivated 
such that enforcement is capricious or malicious.” Vitell and Grove 
(1987) argued that participants attempt to deflect guilt by 
complaining “I was only doing what others do all the time (p. 
434).” For the scale, Agnew’s (1994) five-point rating scale was 
used. The researcher asked participants to agree or disagree with 
four statements. As an example using the denial of victim, 
participants were asked “it is alright to beat up people if they 
It is alright to (Q49) implement a 
package downsizing strategy (Q50) 
temporarily increase emissions 
beyond a safe level (Q51) manage a 
subprime lending project if everyone 
else is doing it. Strongly agree (7 on 
Likert-scale) – strongly disagree (1 on 
Likert-scale). 
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started the fight.” Siponen and Vance’s (2010) work was also used. 
Within the defence of necessity context, the researchers asked 
participants to agree or disagree with “it is all right to violate the 
company information security policy when you are under a tight 
deadline.”  
Machiavellianism Christie and Geis’s (1970) Mach IV test (Q52) Never tell anyone the real 
reason you did something unless it is 
useful to do so. Strongly agree (7 on 
Likert-scale) – strongly disagree (1 on 
Likert-scale). (Q53)The best way to 
handle people is to tell them what 
they want to hear. Strongly agree (7 
on Likert-scale) – strongly disagree (1 
on Likert-scale). (Q54) One should 
take action only when sure it is 
morally right. Strongly agree (1 on 
Likert-scale) – strongly disagree (7 on 
Likert-scale). (Q55) Most people are 
basically good and kind. Strongly 
agree (1 on Likert-scale) – strongly 
disagree (7 on Likert-scale). (Q56) It is 
safest to assume that all people have 
a vicious streak and it will come out 
when they are given a chance. 
Strongly agree (7 on Likert-scale) – 
strongly disagree (1 on Likert-scale). 
(Q57) Honesty is the best policy in all 
cases. Strongly agree (1 on Likert-
scale) – strongly disagree (7 on 
Likert-scale). (Q58) There is no 
excuse for lying to someone else. 
Strongly agree (1 on Likert-scale) – 
strongly disagree (7 on Likert-scale). 
(Q59) Generally speaking, people 
won't work hard unless they're 
forced to do so. Strongly agree (7 on 
Likert-scale) – strongly disagree (1 on 
Likert-scale). (Q60) All in all, it is 
better to be humble and honest than 
to be important and dishonest. 
Strongly agree (1 on Likert-scale) – 
strongly disagree (7 on Likert-scale). 
(Q61) When you ask someone to do 
something for you, it is best to give 
the real reasons for wanting it rather 
than giving reasons which carry more 
weight. Strongly agree (1 on Likert-
scale) – strongly disagree (7 on 
Likert-scale). (Q62) Most people who 
get ahead in the world lead clean, 
moral lives. Strongly agree (1 on 
Likert-scale) – strongly disagree (7 on 
Likert-scale). (Q63) Anyone who 
completely trusts anyone else is 
asking for trouble. Strongly agree (7 
on Likert-scale) – strongly disagree (1 
on Likert-scale). (Q64) The biggest 
difference between most criminals 
and other people is that the criminals 
are stupid enough to get caught. 
Strongly agree (7 on Likert-scale) – 
strongly disagree (1 on Likert-scale). 
(Q65) Most people are brave. 
  270 
          
  
 
 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strongly agree (1 on Likert-scale) – 
strongly disagree (7 on Likert-scale). 
(Q66) It is wise to flatter important 
people. Strongly agree (7 on Likert-
scale) – strongly disagree (1 on 
Likert-scale). (Q67) It is possible to be 
good in all respects. Strongly agree (1 
on Likert-scale) – strongly disagree (7 
on Likert-scale). (Q68) P.T. Barnum 
was wrong when he said that there's 
a sucker born every minute. Strongly 
agree (7 on Likert-scale) – strongly 
disagree (1 on Likert-scale). (Q69) It is 
hard to get ahead without cutting 
corners here and there. Strongly 
agree (7 on Likert-scale) – strongly 
disagree (1 on Likert-scale). (Q70) 
People suffering from incurable 
diseases should have the choice of 
being put painlessly to death. 
Strongly agree (7 on Likert-scale) – 
strongly disagree (1 on Likert-scale). 
(Q71) Most people forget more easily 
the death of their parents than the 
loss of their property. Strongly agree 
(7 on Likert-scale) – strongly disagree 
(1 on Likert-scale). 
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Appendix C – Survey of Marketing Practices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Greetings, 
 
Thank you for accessing the survey portal. I am a research student at the University of 
Bradford, School of Management under the supervision of Professor Jon Reast and Dr. 
James Wallace. I am conducting a survey to assist me with completing my PhD thesis. 
The purpose of my survey is to (1) examine various marketing practices and (2) 
understand how marketers make decisions.  
 
 
I would be grateful if you would spend approximately 15 minutes to complete the 
survey. The survey theme is an interesting topic and you might find participation 
engaging.  
 
 
Please note this survey has received full ethics approval from the University of Bradford 
and confidentiality is offered for participation. If you wish to participate, please follow 
the instructions provided on the next page. If you choose to participate, the results will 
greatly improve if all questions are answered.  
 
 
Thank you, 
Jeffrey Overall 
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Instructions 
In the following pages, please read each scenario involving a marketing practice. Each 
scenario contains a marketing behaviour and it is important to note the behaviour is 
legal within the jurisdiction of the scenario. After reading the scenario, you will find 
a list of different factors that might explain these behaviours. For each type of 
behaviour, please indicate to what extent the factors explain that behaviour. Please note 
there are no right or wrong answers. 
 
In this survey, the questions make use of a seven-point rating scale. You are asked to 
select the option that best describes your opinion about the situation. For example:  
 
If you think the weather today is slightly good, then you would select the option as 
follows:  
 
    The weather today is: 
 
 
If you think the weather today is slightly bad, then you would select the option as 
follows:  
The weather today is: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Good                                                             bad 
 7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
 
7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
 
Good                                                           bad 
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Please read the following scenario carefully and note the behaviour is legal within the 
jurisdiction of the scenario. 
 
Jessie works as an account manager at Lennon Inc., a supplier in the grocery retail 
industry. Recently, Jessie’s largest account requested cost-reductions on Lennon Inc.’s 
consumer products. To provide the cost-reductions while maintaining Lennon Inc.’s 
existing profits, Jessie would have to implement a package downsizing strategy. 
Package downsizing involves reducing the product quantity without changing the 
package or the price of the product. The only change to the package would be the fine 
print stating the updated product quantity, which will likely go unnoticed by consumers. 
By implementing this strategy, the distribution price to the grocery retailer would be 
reduced. However, the end grocery consumer would be paying the same price, but 
receiving less value. If Jessie refuses the cost-reductions, the retailer will likely 
purchase all future products from Lennon Inc.’s competitor and Jessie could be fired for 
losing the account. 
 
Please select the option that best describes your opinion about this situation. 
 
(Q1) If the cost-reductions were provided, how would you evaluate Jessie’s behaviour? 
Please respond using the following scales: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Q10) It is alright for marketers to deceive customers without any reason.  
 
 
 (Q4) In this situation, Jessie should provide the cost-reductions.  
 
 
 
 
Unethical                                                                     ethical 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7               
 Unacceptable                                                                     acceptable 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7               
 Wrong                                                                     right 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7               
 Bad                                                                              good 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7               
 
Strongly agree                                                  neutral                            strongly disagree 
 7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
 
Definitely should                                                                   definitely should not 
 7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
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(Q7) If you were responsible, what are the chances you would provide the cost-reductions?  
Please respond using the following scales: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(Q16) If Jessie provides the cost-reductions, the negative consequences (if any) of the 
decision will be very serious 
  
 
 
(Q19) If Jessie provides the cost-reductions, the overall harm (if any) as a result of the 
decision will be very small. 
  
 
 
(Q22) If Jessie refuses the cost-reductions, the negative consequences (if any) of the 
decision will be very serious. 
  
 
 
(Q25) If Jessie refuses the cost-reductions, the overall harm (if any) as a result of the 
decision will be very small. 
  
 
 
(Q13) If Jessie provides the cost-reductions, most people would agree the action is wrong  
 
 
 
Definitely would not                                                                      definitely would 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7               
 Unlikely                                                                    likely 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7               
 Improbable                                                                    probable 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7               
 Impossible                                                         possible 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7               
 
1      2      3      4      5      6      7               
 
7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
 
7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
 
1      2      3      4      5      6      7               
 
1      2      3      4      5      6      7               
 
Strongly agree                                                  neutral                            strongly disagree 
 
Strongly agree                                                neutral                            strongly disagree 
 
Strongly agree                                                  neutral                            strongly disagree 
 
Strongly agree                                                neutral                            strongly disagree 
 
Strongly agree                                                neutral                            strongly disagree 
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(Q28) It is alright to implement a package downsizing strategy if there is no other option  
 
 
(Q31) It is alright to implement a package downsizing strategy if no harm is done 
 
 
(Q34) It is alright to implement a package downsizing strategy if no law is broken  
 
 
(Q49) It is alright to implement a package downsizing strategy if everyone else is doing it 
 
 
(Q37) It is alright to implement a package downsizing strategy if consumers will continue 
purchasing the product 
  
 
 
(Q40) It is alright to implement a package downsizing strategy if your employer benefits 
 
 
(Q43) It is alright to implement a package downsizing strategy if your family benefits  
 
 
(Q46) It is alright to implement a package downsizing strategy if you could be fired if you 
didn’t  
 
 
 
 
 
7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
 
7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
 
7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
 
7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
 
7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
 
7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
 
7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
 
7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
 
Strongly agree                                                neutral                            strongly disagree 
 
Strongly agree                                                neutral                            strongly disagree 
 
Strongly agree                                                neutral                            strongly disagree 
 
Strongly agree                                                neutral                            strongly disagree 
 
Strongly agree                                                neutral                            strongly disagree 
 
Strongly agree                                                neutral                            strongly disagree 
 
Strongly agree                                                neutral                            strongly disagree 
 
Strongly agree                                                neutral                            strongly disagree 
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Please read the following scenario carefully and note the behaviour is legal within the 
jurisdiction of the scenario. 
 
Jessie works as an account manager at Lennon Inc., a supplier in the retail industry. 
Unexpectedly, Jessie’s largest account placed a new order. Lennon Inc.’s factory, which 
is located abroad, has the capacity to produce the order, but the factory is operating at 
the maximum safety level for water emissions. By producing the order, Lennon Inc.’s 
factory would temporarily increase water emissions beyond a safe level in a small 
agricultural community, which would affect a portion of the local crops. If Jessie rejects 
the order, the retailer will likely purchase all future products from Lennon Inc.’s 
competitor and Jessie could be fired for losing the account. 
 
Please select the option that best describes your opinion about this situation. 
 
(Q2) If the order was produced, how would you evaluate Jessie’s behaviour? 
Please respond using the following scales: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Q11) It is alright for marketers to pollute the environment without any reason 
  
 
 
 (Q5) In this situation, Jessie should produce the order  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unethical                                                                              ethical 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7               
 Unacceptable                                                                    acceptable 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7               
 Wrong                                                                              right 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7               
 Bad                                                                              good 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7               
 
Strongly agree                                                 neutral                            strongly disagree 
 7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
 
Definitely should                                                                            definitely should not 
 7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
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(Q8) If you were responsible, what are the chances you would produce the order?  
Please respond using the following scales: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(Q17) If Jessie produces the order, the negative consequences (if any) of the decision will 
be very serious 
  
 
 
(Q20) If Jessie produces the order, the overall harm (if any) as a result of the decision will 
be very small. 
  
 
 
(Q23) If Jessie rejects the order, the negative consequences (if any) of the decision will be 
very serious. 
  
 
 
(Q26) If Jessie rejects the order, the overall harm (if any) as a result of the decision will be 
very small. 
  
 
 
(Q14) If Jessie produces the order, most people would agree the action is wrong  
 
 
 
Definitely would not                                                             definitely would 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7               
 Unlikely                                                                 likely 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7               
 Improbable                                                              probable 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7               
 Impossible                                                  possible 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7               
 
Strongly agree                                                 neutral                      strongly disagree 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7               
 
Strongly agree                                                 neutral                       strongly disagree 
 7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
 
Strongly agree                                                 neutral                   strongly disagree 
 7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
 
Strongly agree                                                 neutral                        strongly disagree 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7               
 
Strongly agree                                                 neutral                     strongly disagree 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7               
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(Q29) It is alright to temporarily increase emissions beyond a safe level if there is 
no other option  
 
 
(Q32) It is alright to temporarily increase emissions beyond a safe level if no harm 
is done 
 
 
 
(Q35) It is alright to temporarily increase emissions beyond a safe level if no law is 
broken  
 
 
(Q50) It is alright to temporarily increase emissions beyond a safe level if everyone 
else is doing it  
 
 
(Q38) It is alright to temporarily increase emissions beyond a safe level if it only 
affects people living abroad 
  
 
(Q41) It is alright to temporarily increase emissions beyond a safe level if your 
employer benefits 
 
 
(Q44) It is alright to temporarily increase emissions beyond a safe level if your 
family benefits  
 
 
 
(Q47) It is alright to temporarily increase emissions beyond a safe level if you 
could be fired if you didn’t  
 
 
 
 
 
Strongly agree                                                 neutral                  strongly disagree 
 7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
 
Strongly agree                                                 neutral                 strongly disagree 
 
7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
 
Strongly agree                                                 neutral                  strongly disagree 
 7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
 
Strongly agree                                                 neutral                 strongly disagree 
 
7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
 
Strongly agree                                                 neutral                   strongly disagree 
 7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
 
Strongly agree                                                 neutral                      strongly disagree 
 7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
 
Strongly agree                                                 neutral                strongly disagree 
 
7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
 
Strongly agree                                                 neutral                  strongly disagree 
 7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
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Please read the following scenario carefully and note the behaviour is legal within the 
jurisdiction of the scenario. 
 
Jessie works as an account manager at Lennon Inc., a financial service provider in the 
retail industry. Recently, Jessie’s largest account requested support in managing a new 
project. The project will permit retail consumers to purchase goods on credit at each 
retail outlet. The project will be targeted at subprime consumers - those with low-
incomes and low-credit ratings. The interest rates associated with the purchases on 
credit are 38% per year. Because of their low-incomes, these subprime consumers 
would require several months to repay the interest on their purchases. If Jessie refuses to 
manage the project, the retailer will likely seek support for all future projects from 
Lennon Inc.’s competitor and Jessie could be fired for losing the account. 
 
Please select the option that best describes your opinion about this situation. 
 
(Q3) If the project was managed, how would you evaluate Jessie’s behaviour? 
Please respond using the following scales: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Q12) It is alright for marketers to exploit consumers without any reason 
  
 
 
 (Q6) In this situation, Jessie should manage the project  
 
 
 
 
 
Unethical                                                                               ethical 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7               
 Unacceptable                                                                              acceptable 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7               
 Wrong                                                                              right 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7               
 Bad                                                                             good 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7               
 
Strongly agree                                                 neutral                     strongly disagree 
 7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
 
Definitely should                                                                 definitely should not 
 7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
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(Q9) If you were responsible, what are the chances you would manage the project?  
Please respond using the following scales: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(Q18) If Jessie manages the project, the negative consequences (if any) of the decision will 
be very serious 
  
 
 
(Q21) If Jessie manages the project, the overall harm (if any) as a result of the decision 
will be very small. 
  
 
 
(Q24) If Jessie refuses to manage the project, the negative consequences (if any) of the 
decision will be very serious. 
  
 
 
(Q27) If Jessie refuses to manage the project, the overall harm (if any) as a result of the 
decision will be very small. 
  
 
 
(Q15) If Jessie manages the project, most people would agree the action is wrong  
 
 
 
Definitely would not                                                                   definitely would 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7               
 Unlikely                                                        likely 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7               
 Improbable                                                                             probable 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7               
 Impossible                                                                      possible 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7               
 
Strongly agree                                                 neutral                       strongly disagree 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7               
 
Strongly agree                                                 neutral                strongly disagree 
 7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
 
Strongly agree                                                 neutral                     strongly disagree 
 7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
 
Strongly agree                                                 neutral                  strongly disagree 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7               
 
Strongly agree                                                 neutral                    strongly disagree 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7               
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(Q30) It is alright to manage a subprime lending project if there is no other option 
 
 
 
(Q33) It is alright to manage a subprime lending project if no harm is done 
 
 
(Q36) It is alright to manage a subprime lending project if no law is broken 
 
 
 
(Q51) It is alright to manage a subprime lending project if everyone else is doing it 
 
 
(Q39) It is alright to manage a subprime lending project if borrowers seek credit 
  
 
(Q42) It is alright to manage a subprime lending project if your employer benefits 
 
 
(Q45) It is alright to manage a subprime lending project if your family benefits 
 
 
(Q48) It is alright to manage a subprime lending project if you could be fired if you 
didn’t 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strongly agree                                                 neutral                     strongly disagree 
 7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
 
Strongly agree                                                 neutral                 strongly disagree 
 7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
 
Strongly agree                                                 neutral                  strongly disagree 
 7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
 
Strongly agree                                                 neutral                  strongly disagree 
 7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
 
Strongly agree                                                 neutral                 strongly disagree 
 7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
 
Strongly agree                                                 neutral                  strongly disagree 
 7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
 
Strongly agree                                                 neutral                  strongly disagree 
 7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
 
Strongly agree                                                 neutral                  strongly disagree 
 
7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
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Instructions 
 
The questions in the final part of this survey make use of a seven-point rating scale. 
Please read the following statements and indicate to what extent each statement 
accurately describes you. By choosing a number from the scale below, please indicate 
the degree to which you personally agree or disagree with each of the statements. For 
example:  
 
If you slightly agree with the statement ‘never tell anyone the real reason you did 
something unless it is useful to do so,’ then you would select the option as follows:  
 
Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless it is useful to do so. 
 
 
 
If you strongly disagree with the statement ‘never tell anyone the real reason you did 
something unless it is useful to do so,’ then you would select the option as follows:  
 
Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless it is useful to do so. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strongly agree                                                 no opinion                 strongly disagree 
 7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
 
Strongly agree                                                 no opinion                  strongly disagree 
 7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
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(Q52) Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless it is useful to do 
so. 
 
 
 
(Q53) The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear. 
 
 
 
 
(Q54) One should take action only when sure it is morally right. 
 
 
 
 
(Q55) Most people are basically good and kind. 
 
 
 
 
(Q56) It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak and it will come out when 
they are given a chance. 
 
 
 
 
(Q57) Honesty is the best policy in all cases. 
 
 
 
 
(Q58) There is no excuse for lying to someone else. 
 
 
 
 
(Q59) Generally speaking, people won't work hard unless they're forced to do so. 
 
 
Strongly agree                                                  no opinion                           strongly disagree 
 7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
 
Strongly agree                                                  no opinion                           strongly disagree 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7               
 
Strongly agree                                                  no opinion                           strongly disagree 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7               
 
Strongly agree                                                  no opinion                           strongly disagree 
 7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
 
Strongly agree                                                 no opinion                           strongly disagree 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7               
 
Strongly agree                                                 no opinion                           strongly disagree 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7               
 
Strongly agree                                                 no opinion                           strongly disagree 
 7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
 
Strongly agree                                                 no opinion                 strongly disagree 
 7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
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(Q60) All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than to be important and dishonest. 
 
 
 
(Q61) When you ask someone to do something for you, it is best to give the real reasons for 
wanting it rather than giving reasons which carry more weight. 
 
 
 
 
(Q62) Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean, moral lives. 
 
 
 
 
(Q63) Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for trouble. 
 
 
 
 
(Q64) The biggest difference between most criminals and other people is that the criminals 
are stupid enough to get caught. 
 
 
 
 
(Q65) Most people are brave. 
 
 
 
 
(Q66) It is wise to flatter important people. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strongly agree                                                 no opinion                           strongly disagree 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7               
 
Strongly agree                                                  no opinion                            strongly disagree 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7               
 
Strongly agree                                                  no opinion                           strongly disagree 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7               
 
Strongly agree                                                 no opinion                           strongly disagree 
 7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
 
Strongly agree                                                  no opinion                           strongly disagree 
 7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
 
Strongly agree                                                 no opinion                           strongly disagree 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7               
 
Strongly agree                                                 no opinion                           strongly disagree 
 7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
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(Q67) It is possible to be good in all respects. 
 
 
 
 
(Q68) P.T. Barnum was wrong when he said that there's a sucker born every minute. 
 
 
 
 
(Q69) It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and there. 
 
 
 
 
(Q70) People suffering from incurable diseases should have the choice of being put 
painlessly to death. 
 
 
 
 
(Q71) Most people forget more easily the death of their parents than the loss of their 
property. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strongly agree                                                 no opinion                           strongly disagree 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7               
 
Strongly agree                                                 no opinion                           strongly disagree 
 1      2      3      4      5      6      7               
 
Strongly agree                                                 no opinion                           strongly disagree 
 7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
 
Strongly agree                                                 no opinion                           strongly disagree 
 7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
 
Strongly agree                                                 no opinion                           strongly disagree 
 7      6      5      4      3      2      1               
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General Information 
 
Please answer all the following questions by selecting where appropriate. 
 
1. What is your gender? Male ( ) Female ( ) 
 
2. What is your age? _______ 
 
3. What is your nationality? ___________________ 
 
4. What is your country of birth?    ____________________ 
 
5. How many years have you been working in marketing? _____________ 
 
6. What is your highest educational qualification?  ____________________ 
 
7. What is your most recent employment title?  __________________ 
 
8. Have you participated in a study involving marketing behaviour within the past 
six months? 
Yes ( )  No ( ) 
 
 
